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Abstract 
The English School focuses on the issue of humanitarian intervention. because "it poses 
the conflict between order and justice in international relations in its starkest form. " This 
thesis posits that international investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes poses the 
conflict between order and justice in international relations in an equally stark form. 
Diplomatic attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement to an armed conflict (order) may 
be undermined by attempts to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes (justice), 
particularly where individuals deemed crucial to any settlement become the specific 
focus of investigations. Similarly, attempts to arrest individuals indicted for atrocity 
crimes (justice) in post-conflict environments, may in some instances lead to the nascent, 
fragile peace (order) breaking down where their supporters retain the capacity to act in a 
destabilising manner. 
The thesis explores these tensions between order and justice by focusing on the 
challenges faced by the Commission of Experts and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia during their attempts to investigate and prosecute atrocity 
cremes. 
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Introduction: The English School -A Framework for Analysis 
This thesis assesses the challenges faced by the Commission of Experts and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during their attempts 
to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes' committed during the armed conflicts which 
took place in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the early 1990s. The 
thesis posits that The English School theory of international relations represents a 
valuable conceptual lens from which to explore these issues for the following reasons. 
Firstly, international investigations and prosecutions relating to atrocity crimes are often 
concerned with acts which are in many cases inextricably linked to considerations as to 
whether Humanitarian Intervention, the English School's primary scholarly focus, should 
occur. Secondly, the international investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes may 
be viewed as an expression of solidarism, a key normative position within the English 
School. Thirdly, many scholars within the English School have focused on the issue of 
humanitarian intervention, because it poses the conflict between order and justice in 
international relations in its starkest form. "2 In a society of States guided by the cardinal 
principal of non-intervention in a State's internal affairs (order), military intervention 
(justice) which seeks to bring an end to widespread and systematic violations of human 
rights, may also undermine international order. However, this thesis will demonstrate 
that the establishment and operation of bodies mandated to investigate and prosecute 
atrocity crimes also poses the conflict between order and justice in an equally stark form. 
Diplomatic attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement to an armed conflict (order) may 
be undermined by attempts to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes (justice), 
particularly where individuals deemed crucial to any settlement become the specific 
focus of investigations. Similarly, attempts to arrest individuals indicted for atrocity 
crimes (justice) in post-conflict environments, may in some instances lead to the nascent, 
fragile peace breaking down (order). Before elaborating these points further however, it 
1 For the purpose of this thesis the term atrocity crimes refers to genocide, crimes against humanity. and 
violations of the laws and customs of war (often referred to as war crimes). 
2 See Nicholas J. Wheeler 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 21. No. 3.1992, p. 463. 
is necessary to provide a brief overview of the English School and its focus on 
humanitarian intervention. 
The English School has applied a tripartite distinction of international system. 
international society and world society, as a means of looking at international relations. 
For the international system approach "there is no universal agreement on ideas of justice 
and morality against which to judge moral behaviour in international politics. '"3 At the 
other end of the spectrum, the world society perspective "sees the grand narrative of 
international relations not in terms of a society of states, but that of a community of 
humankind `which exists potentially, even if it does not exist actually'. " 4 For Hedley 
Bull, the middle ground of international society represented the most appropriate prism in 
which to interpret international relations. As Wheeler highlights, Bull defined his idea of 
international society "in terms of what it was a rejection of. realism on the one hand, and 
global universalism on the other. "5 Such an international society existed "when a group 
of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in 
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with each other, and share in the workings of common institutions. "' 
Bull went on to postulate that two perspectives exist within the international society 
approach: pluralism and solidarism. For pluralists, "states are the principle bearers of 
rights and duties in international law, with individuals having rights insofar as the state 
provides them. "7 The cardinal principle of pluralist international society is the idea of 
territorial sovereignty which incorporates the norm of non-intervention in a state's 
internal affairs. Non-intervention is viewed as the key to maintaining the orderly 
coexistence of states, via its prevention of inter-state interference which could lead to 
3 See Nicholas J. Wheeler `Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3,1992, p. 464. 
4 Sec Nicholas J. Wheeler `Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal ofInter-national Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3,1992, p. 464. 
5 See Nicholas J. Wheeler `Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on 
Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal ofInter-national Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3,1992, p. 465. 
6 See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (Macmillan) 
1995, p. 26, [hereinafter BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY] 
7 Sec Nicholas J. Wheeler `Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium- Journal of International Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3,1992, p. 467. 
conflict. Conversely, the solidarist perspective accords moral priority to individual 
human persons and "assert there is a duty of collective humanitarian intervention [by 
external forces within a state's territory] in cases of extreme humanitarian suffering. "8 
In Bull's earlier work, it is evident that he endorsed a pluralist conception of international 
society and was skeptical as to the existence of consensus on a universal conception of 
justice which he viewed as necessary to advance solidarism, claiming the tentative steps 
that have been taken in our own times towards establishing the rights and duties of 
individuals in international law do not in fact reflect agreement as to what in fact these 
rights and duties are. "9 Furthermore, the pursuit of justice, in the form of humanitarian 
intervention, was, in light of the realities of the geo-political environment of the Cold 
War, viewed potentially too destabilizing to international order due to the threat of 
conflict ensuing from any such intervention. 
Nevertheless, it has been highlighted that even in this earlier work, there is evidence, 
albeit brief of solidarist inclinations. Bull stated "if any value attaches to order in world 
politics, it is order among all mankind which we must treat as being of primary value, not 
order within the society of states. " 10 He went on to posit "the moral value of international 
society has to be judged in terms of its contribution to individual well-being, making this 
the ultimate test of any ethical position. "" Bull seemed optimistic that a movement in 
this direction was indeed possible; suggesting that although in the twentieth century 
attempts to apply the solidarist formula had "proved premature, this does not mean that 
the conditions will never obtain in which it could be made to work. " 12 Perhaps the work 
which most illustrates Bull's approbation of solidarist precepts and the ability to see 
beyond the purely state-centric approach is the Hagey Lecture "The Concept of Justice in 
International Relations" where he acknowledged that "issues about justice in international 
8 See Nicholas J. Wheeler 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3,1992, p. 468. 
9 Sec HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (Macmillan) 
1995, p. 146, [hereinafter BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY] 
10 Sce BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY, p. 143. 
" Sec Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: A Review of the Ethical Claims of 
International Society', Political Studies, Vol. 44. No. 1,1996, p. 125. 
12 See BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY, p. 232. 
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relations.... [are] profound questions about the world community or society in which ww e 
live. " 13 Indeed Bull became increasingly critical of this pluralist normative foundation. 
which rests on the assumption that states operate in a way which is intrinsically beneficial 
for its citizens, asserting, the rights and benefits to which justice has to be done ... are 
not simply those of states and nations but those of individual persons throughout the 
world. "4 Such statements clearly illustrate a progression from a state-centric 
perspective. Similarly in the lecture, Bull enounced a more solidarist outlook, 
submitting that "Western states had both a long-term interest and a moral obligation in 
strengthening justice in world politics. "15 Furthermore, as Linklater and Suganami note 
Bull suggested that the modern society of states had moved into the direction of 
solidarism "by deciding that it is morally and legally entitled to take action to prevent 
human rights violations while stopping short of embracing neii' principles of 
humanitarian intervention. " 16 
Another advocate of the international society tradition, John Vincent, may be viewed as 
pursuing an intellectual path similar to Bull, by also initially expressing pluralist 
inclinations, but becoming increasingly solidarist in outlook. This development is 
explicit in his two main texts; Nonintervention and International Order 17, and Hilinanr 
Rights and International Relations' 8, where the former advocated the principle of the rule 
of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, whereas the latter qualified that view 
holding that intervention could be countenanced if a State violated basic rights. Vincent 
was more positive than Bull about the role of human rights and rather than viewing them 
as a dynamic which would undermine international society, deemed the doctrine of 
13 See Hedley Bull, The Concept of Justice in International Relations', The Hagey Lectures, University of 
Waterloo, (1983-84) p. 1. 
14 Sce Hedley Bull, The Concept of Justice in International Relations', The Hagey Lectures, University of 
Waterloo, (1983-84) p. 12. 
'' Sec Hedley Bull, `The Concept of Justice in International Relations'. The Hagey Lectures, University of 
Waterloo, (1983-84) p. 13. 
16 Sec ANDREW LINKLATER AND HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS. A CONTEMPORARY REASSESSMENT (Cambridge Uni. Press) 2006, p. 132. [hereinafter 
LINKLATER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL] 
17 Sec R. J. VINCENT, NON-INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Center of International Studies) 
(Princeton Uni. Press) 1974 
18 Sec' R. J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Cambridge Uni Press) 1987/ 
[hereinafter VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] 
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universal human rights as having had the potential to strengthen it. Although Vincent 
acknowledged the principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the L. N. 
Charter, he also emphasized that international law had developed principles which 
provided for the protection of human rights such as Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. 
Vincent set forth a general grounding of human rights, defining them as the rights that 
everyone has, and everyone equally, by virtue of their common humanity. " 19 He 
specifically focused on the concept of `basic rights' acknowledging that whilst different 
cultures may express different conceptions of human rights, a floor of fundamental 
human rights existed, emphasizing; "a core of basic rights that is common to all cultures 
despite their apparently divergent theories... 2" Following on from this, Vincent argued 
that "The failure of a government of a state to provide for its citizens' basic rights might 
now be taken as a reason for considering it illegitimate. " He then went on to posit that 
the question as to whether humanitarian intervention should occur should "correlate with 
a right on the part of individuals everywhere not to be treated outrageously. " 21 
In posthumously published work, Vincent expanded his solidarist outlook, challenging 
Bull's assertion that no international consensus existed as to what constituted justice, 
stressing, "we have to engage with an emerging notion of international legitimacy: 
`emerging since it can now be argued that the international law of human rights is 
recognized as part of ius gentium intro se.... This opens up the state to scrutiny from 
outsiders and propels us beyond non-intervention. "22 He also went on to question 
"whether states ought to satisfy certain basic requirements of decency before they qualify 
for the protection which the principle of non-intervention provides . -23 Ultimately, 
Vincent's exploration of individual human rights led him to recognize that if human 
19 Sec' VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, p. 13. 
20 Sc'e VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, p. 48. 
21 See VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, p. 125. 
22 Sec R. J. Vincent and Peter Wilson, `Beyond Non-Intervention' in IAN FORBES & MARK HOFFMMAN 
(EDS. ), POLITICAL THEORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION (Macmillan) 
1993, p. 128. 
23 Sec R. J. Vincent and Peter Wilson, `Beyond Non-Intervention' in IAN FORBES & MARK HOFFMAN 
(Ei)s. ), POLITICS\L THEORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ETHICS OF I\ I ERVEN ]'ION (Macmillan) 
1993, p. 125. 
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rights are "to mean anything at all" it is necessary to "reduce the domain defended by 
non-intervention' 24 
In the Post-Cold War environment, solidarist precepts began to be increasingly expressed 
beyond the academic realm. In a speech delivered in 1991, (then) United Nations 
Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, declared "every state has the duty to fulfill in good 
faith the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the United Nations Charter.... 
From this follows another essential proposition namely that each government is open to 
scrutiny by the United Nations and is internationally accountable for its efforts to live up 
to the precepts of the Charter. -25 De Cuellar went on to stress, "The sovereignty which 
resides in the people and is meant to be exercised for the benefit of the people can neither 
be used against the people, nor for the destruction of the patrimony of humanity.... The 
sovereignty that resides in the people and seeks to promote the welfare of the people 
cannot ignore the suffering of people, whether inside or outside its borders. Sovereignty 
and solidarity are thus parallel concepts. -26 He concluded, "It is now increasingly felt 
that the principle of non-interference with the essential jurisdiction of States cannot he 
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity.... [T]he case for not impinging on the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. 
But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that 
sovereignty... includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns 
of decimation or of forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil 
,, 27 or insurrection. 
Similarly, the statement adopted in 1991 by the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on 
the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) rejected the principle of absolute State sovereignty and non interference in states 
24 See LINKLATER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL, p. 139. 
25 See Perez de Cuellar Discusses Sovereignty and International Responsibility The Review'. International 
Commission Of Jurists, No. 47, December, 1991, p. 25. 
26 See Perez de Cuellar Discusses Sovereignty and International Responsibility The Review'. International 
Commission Of Jurists, No. 47, December, 1991, p. 26. 
27 See Perez de Cuellar Discusses Sovereignty and International Responsibility The Revic'it'. International 
Commission Of Jurists, No. 47, December, 1991, p. 27. (emphasis added). 
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internal affairs, and went on to draw a nexus between justice (in the form of the human 
rights protection) and order; "issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms. 
democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for thcsc rights and 
f -eedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order.... the 
commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of 
direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong to the internal 
affairs of the State concerned. "28 This trend continued in 1993 when the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action was adopted by consensus by the U. N. World 
Conference on Human Rights, which enounced that the protection and promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms was "the first responsibility of 
Governments... . [and] a 
legitimate concern of the international community. "29 
Nicholas Wheeler explores these contemporary developments in Saving Strangers which 
enounces a solidarist vision "that looks to strengthen the legitimacy of international 
society by deepening its commitment to justice. -30 Wheeler challenges the pluralist 
conception of international society, emphasizing the "glaring contradiction between the 
moral justification of pluralist rules and the actual human rights practices of states. "; ' 
Instead, like Vincent, he advocates "upholding minimum standards of common humanity, 
which means placing the victims of human rights abuse at the centre of its theoretical 
project, since it is committed to exploring how the society of states might become more 
hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics. -3' Following on from this 
foundational premise, Wheeler goes on to set out a framework to provide the grounds to 
justify legitimate humanitarian intervention. Although the tenets of State sovereignty and 
non-intervention are still viewed as "the constitutive rules of international society"33, 
Wheeler argues that humanitarian intervention can override these core tenets if four 
28 See Final Statement, Moscow Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
1991, cited in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT. LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS (Clarendon Press) 1996 p. 371. (emphasis added) 
29 Sec Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF. 157/23 12 July 1993. 
30 See NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY (Oxford Uni. Press) 2000, p. 11 [hereinafter WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS] 
31 See WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS. p. 27. 
12 Sec WHEELER, S: \\'ING STRANGERS, p. 38. 
33 See WHEELER, S; \\'ING STRANGERS, p. 28. 
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requirements are satisfied: there must be a supreme humanitarian emergency; the use of 
force must be a last resort; the intervention must meet the requirement of proportionality. 
and finally; there must be a high probability that the use of force will achieve a positive 
humanitarian outcome. 
Addressing the Gap 
Whilst the English School has clearly focused a great deal on humanitarian intervention, 
it has however, largely overlooked the issue of international criminal justice. This thesis 
submits that an exploration of this issue marks a natural progression for the following 
reasons. 
Firstly, the focus of humanitarian intervention is concerned with bringing a halt to the 
commission of widespread or systematic human rights violations of a state's civilian 
population. In cases where some level of humanitarian intervention occurred (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor) atrocity crimes were committed on a scale which also led to calls 
for investigations and prosecutions to be instituted with an international dimension. 
Secondly, attempts at achieving accountability via international criminal prosecutions, 
may be viewed as providing a form of 'justice' which Humanitarian Intervention often 
fails to provide. As Wheeler highlights, if we wait until the emergency is upon us, it 
will come too late to save those who have been killed or forcibly displaced... This brings 
us to an important point: in all cases covered in this volume, with the possible exception 
of the Kosovo one, military intervention came too late to protect civilians from the 
killers". 34 In other instances, military intervention did not come at all, as exemplified by 
the `International Community's' failure to intervene to attempt to stop the genocide 
which took place in Rwanda in 1994. Consequently, international criminal prosecutions 
may thus be viewed as a potential forum to achieve some measure of justice for the 
victims of atrocity crimes and their families. 
Thirdly, the international investigation and criminal prosecution of atrocity crimes may 
also be viewed as an expression of solidarism. As Linklater and Suganami highlight the 
34 Sec' WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS, p. 34. 
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creation of international tribunals for investigating war crimes in Rwanda and in the 
former Yugoslavia, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court, have 
greatly strengthened the solidarist vision of the universal culture of human riý-, hts. "" 
Furthermore, whilst Wheeler posits that the reason the English School focused "on the 
subject of humanitarian intervention is that it poses the conflict between order and justice 
in international relations in its starkest form" 36, this thesis will highlight that the issue of 
international criminal prosecutions reveals a conflict between order and justice in 
international relations in an equally stark form. Many of the normative tensions 
explored in the context of humanitarian intervention, also manifest themselves with 
regard to international criminal prosecutions. Thus, like humanitarian intervention, 
international criminal investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes may also 
represent a direct challenge to the pluralist conception of international society by their 
potential ability to penetrate State sovereignty and via their promotion of the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility, hold individuals up to the level of head of State, 
responsible for their involvement in the ordering or commission of atrocity crimes. 
Consequently, attempts to enforce atrocity law challenge conventional practice that 
prioritizes national sovereignty over individual rights. Additionally, these institutions of 
international criminal justice in some instances also challenge the principle of the 
primacy of non-interference in a State's internal affairs by virtue of their poýti er to order 
the disclosure of documents which have traditionally been withheld under the principle of 
national security. 
Critically, like humanitarian intervention, international investigations and prosecutions of 
atrocity crimes may also act as a potentially destabilising dynamic by undermining 
attempts to achieve order through internationally mediated efforts to terminate conflicts 
via a negotiated political settlement. There has been only a limited exploration from 
English School scholars of this potential tension between attempts to achieve order via a 
negotiated political settlement and justice via international criminal prosecutions. These 
35 See LINKLATER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL, pp. 140-14 1. 
36 See Nicholas J. Wheeler `Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium: Journal of International Studies. '-ol. 21, No. 3,1992. p. 463. 
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issues have however, received much more attention within the field of international law 
and international human rights discourse, where it has been framed as the -Peace versus 
Justice' debate. 37 
Peace Versus Justice 
The Peace versus Justice debate centres on the challenges associated with halting armed 
conflict and the associated atrocity crimes committed during its course, via a political 
negotiation process, whilst also attaining accountability via pursuing criminal 
prosecutions against those implicated in the commission or ordering of such atrocity 
crimes. As Scharf states In order to end an international conflict or internal conflict, 
negotiations often must be held with the very leaders who are responsible for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. "38 Consequently, "The former or current heads of states in 
which alleged crimes against humanity have occurred may prove to be essential to any 
formula for political stability [and] peace . ""39 This reality 
has often led to "the 
metamorphosis of yesterday's war monger into today's peace broker. -40 Within the 
discourse focusing on the Peace versus Justice debate, two particular perspectives may be 
discerned, which this thesis will categorize as `pro-negotiation' and `pro-prosecution'. 
These may be seen to loosely mirror the order/justice debate which lies at the heart of 
English School theory. 
37 See Anonymous, `Human Rights in Peace Negotiations', Human Rights Quarter/v. 18,2.1996; Felice D. 
Gaer, `UN-Anonymous: Reflections on Human Rights in Peace Negotiations', Human Rights Quarterh", 
19,1,1997; Richard J. Goldstone, 'Bringing War Criminals to Justice during an Ongoing War'. in 
JONATI IAN MOORE (ED) HARD CHOICES. MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Rowman 
& Littlefield) date; Michael P. Scharf `Justice versus Peace' in SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL KAYSEN (Ens) 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW. (Rowman & Littlefield); See Anthony D'Amato, `Peace vs. Accountabilit-\ in 
Bosnia', American Journal oflnternational Lair. Vol. 88, (1994); See Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 
`Trials and Errors. Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice'. International Security, 
Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003/04; See Anonymous, 'Human Rights in Peace Negotiations', Human Rights 
Quarterly, 18 2, (1996): Richard J. Goldstone, `Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions 
and International Criminal Tribunals', New York University Journal of International Lait and Politics. Vol 
28, No. 3 (1995-96) 
38 See Michael P. Scharf *Justice versus Peace' in SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL IL: AYSEN (EDS) THE [UNITED 
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL. LAW. 
Rowman & Littlefield) 2000, p. 179. 
9 See Mahmood Monshipouri & Claude E. Welch The Search for International Human Rights and Justice: 
Coming to Terms with the New Global Realities'. Human Rights Quarterly 23.2 (2001) 370 - 404. p. 392. 
40 Payarn Akhavan 'The Yugoslavia Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond. ' 
Human Rights Quarter/i 18 (1996): 259,271. 
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Pro-Negotiation 
The `pro-negotiation' perspective is primarily concerned with and supportive of 
diplomatic initiatives which strive to achieve a negotiated settlement during periods of 
international or internal armed conflict. As Hannum highlights, "Any negotiator's 
priority must be to end violence and in most cases, devise an acceptable means of power- 
sharing among former enemies . -41 In 
light of such objectives, demands for justice via the 
prosecution of individuals implicated in atrocity crimes at the time of political mediation, 
are often viewed by the `pro-negotiation' perspective as a potentially destabilising 
dynamic which may adversely affect and imperil the diplomatic initiative. The tension 
becomes particularly acute where those involved in the negotiations may be potential 
target of indictments. As D'Amato qustions "Is it realistic to expect them to agree to a 
peace settlement... [ifJ directly following the agreement, they may find themselves in the 
dock? If they, or their close associates and friends, face potential life imprisonment by 
simply signing a peace treaty, what incentive do they have to sign it? --42 
In light of such considerations, some `pro-negotiation' advocates argue that the demand 
for prosecutions whilst negotiations are ongoing "risks causing more atrocities than it 
would prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities. '43 D'Amato 
further elaborates this dilemma, highlighting "[h]owever desirable the idea of war crimes 
accountability might appear in the abstract, pursuing the goal of a war crimes tribunal 
may simply result in prolonging a war of civilian atrocities. This would surely be a 
paradoxical result, for the idea of war crimes accountability is to deter the commission of 
ý'4 
war crimes and not to serve as a barrier to discontinuing them. 
4 
41 See Hurst Hannum, `Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', Human Rights Quarterhi, 28, 
(2006)p. 22. 
42 See Anthony D'Amato, `Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia', American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 88, (1994) p. 500. 
43 See Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trials and Errors. Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003/04, p. 5. 
44 Sec Anthony D'Amato, `Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia'. . 
American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 88, (1994) p. 500. 
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The 'pro-negotiation' perspective demonstrates how amnesties45 have been employed in 
order to facilitate a cessation of hostilities or enable a transition from authoritarian 
military rule to nascent civilian-led democracy. This strategy was particularly prevalent 
within Latin America during the political transitions which took place in the late 1980s 
where the issue arose as to whether the successor regimes should institute trials against 
the leaders of the juntas. In many cases the price of relatively peaceful transition was the 
promulgation of laws which provided blanket protection for individuals connected with 
the previous dictatorial regimes. 46 As Huntington highlights. "virtually every 
authoritarian regime that initiated its transformation to democracy also decreed an 
amnesty as part of that process. "47 Similarly, in approving the 'Governors Island 
Agreement' the 1993 Haiti peace deal which included an amnesty clause, the U. N. 
Security Council stated the deal was "the only valid framework for resolving the crisis in 
Haiti. 48 
Such dynamics lead the `pro-negotiation' perspective to emphasize the acute difficulties 
diplomats involved in peacemaking negotiations face. In some respects, an analogy here 
can be drawn with the `terrible choices'49 Bull recognized foreign policy makers were 
confronted with over whether to rule out humanitarian intervention in deference to the 
sanctity of State sovereignty, abandoning the victims of human rights abuses to their fate, 
or to accept that a State forfeits its sovereignty when it commits serious violations of 
human rights, which could potentially open the floodgates to intervention justified on 
`human rights' grounds, but ultimately predicated on more Machiavellian grounds (e. g. 
territory/ resource acquisition). An `Anonymous' article published in a leading human 
rights journal, succinctly outlines the dilemma facing negotiators; "what should one do if 
the quest for justice and retribution hampers the search for peace, thereby prolonging the 
45 Black's Law Dictionary defines amnesty as the act of a sovereign power officially forgiving certain 
classes of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted'. See BLACK'S L; \\\, DICTIONARY, 
(West Group) 1999, p. 83. 
46 For more details see generally RUTI G. TEITEL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) 
47 See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWEN IIETH CENTURY 
Uni. Of Oklahoma Press) 1991, p. 215 
8 Sce Statement of the President of the Security Council of July 15.1993. 49 Scc Hedley Bull quote in LINKLATER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL. p. 140. 
12 
war and increasing the extent of suffering? The quest for retribution or for a perfect 
peace can result in a long war. Is this defensible? ''so 
Pro-Prosecution 
In contrast, the `pro-prosecution' perspective is primarily concerned with endinu the 
culture of impunity which has been a dominant feature of international affairs. Impunity 
has been defined as "the impossibility. dc jure or de facto, of bringing perpetrators of 
human rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to 
their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, convicted, and to reparations 
being made to their victims. "51 The `pro-prosecution' perspective emphasizes the 
existence of the positive duty in international law incumbent on States to either prosecute 
or extradite to an appropriate alternative legal forum individuals who stand accused of 
either committing or ordering the commission of atrocity crimes. Instead of viewing 
institutions of international criminal justice as an impediment to peacemaking initiatives, 
`pro-prosecution' advocates argue that these institutions can play a central role as a 
mechanism to address conflict, and can actively contribute to peace. Additionally, 'pro- 
prosecution' advocates submit that the pursuit of justice in the form of prosecutions, 
particularly when held at the international level, not only actively addresses the culture of 
impunity but also has additional benefits. Thus, it is argued that the prosecution of 
atrocity crimes deters future transgressions by demonstrating that perpetrators are not 
above the rule of law. As Argentina's President Raul Alfonsin's highlights, the decision 
to embark on a series of criminal prosecutions against members of the former Junta 
implicated in the country's `Dirty War' was predicated on the deterrence value; "Our 
intention was not so much to punish as to prevent; to insure that what had happened could 
not happen in the future. -52 
50 Sec Anonymous, 'Human Rights in Peace Negotiations', Human Rights Quarterh". 18.2, (1996) p. 249. 
51 Sec The administration of justice and the human rights of detainees: Questions of the Impunity of 
Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political)', Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet 
Pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2'1997r20, June 26.1997. Annex 
52, pp. 13-14. 
See Raul Alfonsin, `Never Again in Argentina'. Journal ofDemocracti". 4. No. 1, January 1993. p. 16. 
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Additionally, the 'pro-prosecution' perspective has sought to draw an explicit nexus 
between criminal prosecutions for atrocity crimes and reconciliation. Former President 
of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese argued that "Trials establish individual responsibility over 
collective assignation of guilt.... justice [also] dissipates the call for re\ enge .... 
hvý dint of 
dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled with their erstwhile 
tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes. "53 
Similarly, former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy posited that. "Without firm 
action on war crimes, reconciliation is doomed. "54 
Many `pro-prosecution' advocates also contend that the `pro-negotiation' contention that 
a choice must be made between peace or justice is both illusory and ultimately short 
sighted. Instead, the maxim that "there can be No Peace without Justice" is often 
invoked. This phrase became a strategic rallying call for many `pro-prosecution' 
advocates during the 1990s55 who argued that any peace secured without addressing the 
commission of atrocity crimes would be tenuous, dysfunctional and ultimately pyrrhic. 
As Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY suggested, "a negotiated 
peace without responding to demands of justice would hardly be worth the paper it is 
printed on. In many cases, one such superficial and fallacious peace returns in reality to 
prepare the sly return of war.... A peace concluded by war criminals returns finally to 
"'f' serve their own aims.... [and] will be known to be neither real nor durable. 
The `pro-prosecution' perspective has been widely critical of diplomatic initiatives which 
seek to negotiate with individuals implicated in war crimes, and which fail to accord 
explicit support to justice mechanisms. Consequently, the `pro-negotiation' endeavours 
are condemned as 'Realpolitik' which serves to reaffirm the culture of impunity, 
undermine the potential of justice and lead to a peace which it is argued rests on unstable 
53 See Antonio Cassese Statement reproduced in ERIC STOVER AND HARVEY M. WEINS FEIN (EDS. 
) MY 
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY. JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY (Cambridge 
Uni. Press) 2004, p. 3-4 [hereinafter STOVER & WEINSTEIN, MY NEIGHBOR, Ml' ENEMY] 
54 See Lloyd Axworthy quote in WILLIAMS AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? p. 
222. 
'S Including Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International. 
56 See Richard Goldstone quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 63. 
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foundations. 57 Negotiators are decried as "self-proclaimed realists «ho would put a 
political settlement before justice"58 and diplomacy castigated as the antithesis to 
justice, -59 Instead, elements within the 'pro-prosecution' perspective submit that "The 
search for justice cannot be tainted by diplomatic or political considerations. """ with 
some proposing "what we need now is the political will to pursue justice without 
, 61 compromise. 
Aims of Thesis 
1. - The thesis will explore the challenges faced by the Commission of Experts and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during their attempts 
to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes. These institutions were selected for the 
following reasons. Both bodies represented the first internationally mandated 
mechanisms established to investigate (which the Commission was mandated to do) and 
prosecute (which the ICTY was mandated to) violations of atrocity law, in this case 
relating to atrocity crimes occurring in Croatia and Bosnia. Secondly, both institutions 
would find themselves discharging their mandates whilst the conflicts in the Croatia and 
Bosnia were ongoing, a dynamic which served to heighten the potential tensions between 
peace and justice. 62 This wider environment which the Commission and ICTY found 
themselves operating contrasted starkly with both the institution which is in many 
respects viewed as the historical predecessor to the ICTY; the Nuremberg Trial for major 
57 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, `Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over 
Realpolitik', Case lf'estern Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2003. 
58 See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, `Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. 1, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University 
College of Law, 1996, p. 2. 
59 See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL Jl'STICE (Allen 
Lane, The Penguin Press) 1999, p. xvii [hereinafter ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY] 
60 See VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS. Vol. II 
(Transnational Publishers) 1995, p. 181. [hereinafter MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE 
ICTY Vol. II] 
61 See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, 'Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. 1, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University 
College of Law, 1996, p. 2. 
62 Although, the fighting in Croatia had largely subsided by the time the CoE and ICTY were set up, the 
situation on the ground was merely an uneasy ceasefire and no comprehensive settlement had been reached. 
Military engagements would again take place in 1994 and 1995, with the launching of the Croatian 
offensives 'Operation Flash' and 'Operation Storm'. with the aspects of the latter im estigated hý the 
Tribunal. 
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war criminals63; and the other ad hoc Tribunal established by the U. \. Security Council; 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
For Nuremberg, the preceding dynamics meant that the prosecution of senior Nazis 
would not adversely impact on the wider strategy to end the War. The Allies were 
actively engaged in fighting the Third Reich and its Axis supporters, and although the 
Yalta Declaration stipulated their commitment to "bring all war criminals to a just and 
swift punishment", it also highlighted the Allies agreement on "common policies and 
plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on 
Nazi Germany after German resistance has been finally crushed. "64 Consequently, with a 
strategy of unconditional surrender being pursued, there were no delicate political 
negotiations which could have been undermined by prosecutions. Furthermore, when the 
Nuremberg trials were established, they would focus on individuals from an utterly 
defeated State, whose power to adversely affect the outcome of the post-war environment 
was negligible, and who were already detained in Allied custody. 
Similarly, although the institutional architecture of the ICTY was largely replicated as an 
international legal response to the Rwandan genocide via the establishment of the ICTR, 
the Anrsha tribunal was established after the genocide had been committed and a Tutsi- 
led RPF rebel army had largely routed the Hutu genocidaires from Rwanda. 65 Thus, 
again, the dilemma over the threat of prosecutions undermining delicate peace 
negotiations was avoided. In contrast, both the Commission and the Tribunal would be 
established during the course of the conflicts they were mandated to focus on. 
Furthermore, unlike the Allies during World War Two, the `International Community'. 
was until the final stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, clearly reluctant to 
63 For further details on the Nuremberg Trial of Major German War Criminals see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (Alfred A. Knopf) 1992; WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANN' ON 
TRIAL. THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT 
NUREMBERG 1945-1946 (Southern Methodist Uni. Press) 1999. 
64 See The Yalta Declaration, 1945. 
65 The genocide took place from April to mid-July 1994. The establishment of the ICTR largely followed 
the same procedures as those used to establish the ICTY. The U. N. Secretary General appointed a fact 
finding, team in August 1994 which found evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law. 
Based on these finding the U. N. Security Council established the ICTR under Security Resolution 955. 
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engage in any military operations beyond peacekeeping. 66 Instead the primary focus was 
on an attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement. This strategy necessarily entailed 
dealing with the senior political and military leaders of the \ arious 'warring faction S, 67, 
who retained, by virtue of their involvement in the diplomatic process. varying degrees of 
international legitimacy. These dynamics produced a clear challenge for the Commission 
and the Tribunal, whose investigations would lead them to focus on some of the very 
individuals deemed to be essential to any negotiation process and subsequent settlement. 
The ICTY was also selected as the main case study for the thesis in order to assess 
whether useful indications of the challenges which may confront the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) may be discerned from its operation. With the ICC already 
established, it is inevitable that it will, like the ICTY, face the challenge of investigating 
and possibly issuing indictments where alleged atrocity crimes have been committed 
whilst conflicts arc ongoing. Thus, like the ICTY, tensions over pursuing justice in the 
form of criminal prosecutions whilst negotiations are taking place in an attempt to resolve 
the conflict, are likely to arise. 
2- The thesis seeks to critically assess a number of key premises made by `pro- 
prosecution' advocates. In does so in recognition that "Many assumptions about the 
effects that justice has on individuals and societies have gone unexamined and 
unchallenged for too long, , 68 noting Forsythe's premise that, "International criminal 
courts are assumed to reflect wise policy simply because it is morally unacceptable to 
66 Even when the use of force was finally applied by the `international community' during Operation 
Deliberate Force, where NATO air-strikes and the Multinational Brigade Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 
targeted Bosnian Serb positions, contrary to popular conception, it would be done in an extremely limited 
and measured way and was explicitly linked to the wider central strategy of achieving a negotiated 
settlement. 
67 The phrase `warring factions' has tended to be controversial within the discourse covering the wars in 
Croatia and Bosnia. Some commentators assert that such language was used by sections of the 
international community as a way of blurring the distinction between aggressor and defender. perpetrator 
and victim, in an attempt to infer moral equivalence between the parties and deflect calls for intervention to 
support the Bosnian Government or Bosnian Muslims, See generally SIMMS. UNFivt: s i Hot R. Whilst this 
contention may be in certain respects valid, the phrase is applied here in its neutral context. merely to refer 
to forces within Bosnia and those proxy forces from Serbia and Croatia. who engaged in military operations 
against each other. 
68 See STOVER & WEINSTEIN, Ml' NEIGHBOR, Ml' ENEMMY', p. 3. 
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consider the alternative"69 and that "social scientists who aspire to objectivity and critical 
appraisal are often regarded as [being] in the camp of the immoral and as unsympathetic 
to human rights. " 70 Consequently, the thesis aims to critically assess two contentions 
expressed by 'pro-prosecution' advocates: 
(i) Firstly, the contention that 'justice should be pursued without compromise. "7' The 
claim will be assessed via an assessment of the implications of attempting to incorporate 
explicit provisions relating to the prosecution of individuals implicated in atrocity crimes 
into peace deals, and by examining the viability of alternative `pro justice' options to 
negotiating with individuals implicated in atrocity crimes. 
(ii) Secondly, the contention that "there can be No Peace Without Justice. " The claim 
will be assessed by examining the impact and consequences of the 'International 
Community's' failure to actively pursue and arrest persons indicted for \var crimes 
(PIFWCs) in post-conflict Bosnia, particularly during the first eighteen months of the 
international force's deployment. 
3. The thesis also seeks to critically assess dimensions of the `pro-negotiation' 
perspective by examining the claims that States make to defend the sacrifice of 
international and cosmopolitan values, which Linklater and Suganami highlight is "a 
neglected area within the English School. "'' It aims to do this by exploring two specific 
areas: 
(i) The reasons behind the 'International Community's' failure to pursue justice in the 
form of prosecutions in a more robust manner during the various peace negotiation 
processes aimed at ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and 
69 See David P Forsythe, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View', Netherlands Quarter/} of 
Human Rights. Vol. 15,1, (1997) p. 7. 
70 See David P Forsythe, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View', Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, Vol. 15.1, (1997) p. 7. 71 See N1. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, 'Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia'. Occasional Paper No. 1. International Human Rights Law Institute. DePaul Lniversith 
College of Law, 1996, p. ?. 
72 See LINKL: 1TER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELA'I IONS. p. 241 
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(ii) The justifications advanced by NATO and the major troop contributing States for the 
failure to actively pursue and arrest PIFWCs, particularly within the initial stages of post- 
conflict peacebuilding in Bosnia. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter one focuses on the establishment of the Commission of Experts and the 
challenges the body faced in obtaining State cooperation. It also explores how the 
investigation into atrocity crimes was perceived by some sources as a potential 
impediment to obtaining a negotiated diplomatic settlement. 
Chapter two focuses on the establishment and initial operation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It includes a critical assessment of the 
claim that the Tribunal was established due to a recognition by States of the active 
contribution the body could make towards restoring peace to the region. It also explores 
the acute challenges the Tribunal faced in obtaining State cooperation, particularly with 
regard to the provision of intelligence material. 
Chapter three focuses on three specific areas. Firstly, it explores the debate within the 
U. S. administration during 1995, which effectively set the parameters of the mandate for 
the proposed international peacekeeping force to be deployed in Bosnia once the conflict 
had ended, and how this impacted upon the Tribunal. Secondly, it critically assesses the 
`pro-prosecution' contentions that Milosevic should have been indicted at Dayton and 
that further military operations should have been pursued instead of negotiation. Finally. 
it explores the Dayton Peace negotiations and the Tribunals endeavours to keep the issue 
of atrocity crimes on the agenda. 
Chapter four focuses on the immediate post-conflict environment in Bosnia, critically 
assessing the justifications advanced by NATO for its failure to actively pursue persons 
indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs). It also critically assesses the contention that domestic 
prosecutions for atrocity crimes were a viable option in the region and explores the 
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impact of failing to pursue a robust arrest strategy against PIFWCs during the initial two 
years post-Dayton. 
Chapter five examines the additional reasons behind NATO's un\t illingness to pursue 
PIFWCs, assessing how considerations of force protection and a reluctance to en`ga`ge in 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) were of significant influence. The chapter goes on 
to examine the Tribunal's continued struggle to obtain intelligence material from States, 
and explores how under a new Prosecutor, innovative strategies were developed in order 
to induce NATO's cooperation in arrest operations. 
The conclusion will review the main findings of the thesis, and seek to assess how these 
insights may inform the challenges which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is likely 
to confront. 
The main contributions of the thesis will be empirical. The author Evas granted access to 
the U. N. Commission of Experts archive by the former Chairman of the Commission 
Cherif Bassiouni, during a fellowship at the International Human Rights Law Institute, 
Depaul University College of Law and chapter one draws heavily on insights gathered 
from this material. The author also conducted a series of interviews with key individuals 
involved in various ways with the Commission and Tribunal. These include former 
senior officials within the U. S. State Department and Department of Defense, and 
Tribunal officials including former investigators, and members of the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP). 
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Chapter One: Uncharted Territories: The Commission of Experts and international 
efforts to investigate atrocity crimes. 
Chapter one focuses on the establishment of the Commission of Experts. ' the first 
international body to investigate atrocity crimes since Nuremberg. The Commission, 
established by the U. N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter, 
was mandated to investigate allegations of atrocity crimes committed in Croatia and 
Bosnia, gather relevant material, and submit a report to the United Nations Office of the 
Secretary General. It would act as a catalyst for the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and several of its investigations 
would form the foundational basis of the Tribunal's first indictments. However, the 
Commission would be confronted with a myriad of challenges; bureaucratic. financial 
and logistical, all of which would undermine its capacity to discharge its mandate 
effectively. 
The chapter will also demonstrate how the Commission faced protracted problems in 
obtaining State cooperation for a variety of reasons. The British Conservative 
Government viewed the establishment of the Commission as a potentially disruptive 
dynamic which could complicate and undermine diplomatic endeavours to obtain a 
cessation of the hostilities. This view would lead to both the pursuit of a policy aimed at 
restraining the investigative body's potential power, and active measures to prevent 
relevant material being obtained by the Commission. The chapter goes on to explore 
how the twin objectives of obtaining a negotiated diplomatic settlement and investigating 
atrocity crimes would inevitably end up clashing, with specific reference to The Vance 
Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). 
Although sections within the U. S. State Department would be more supportive of the 
Commission, their endeavours to increase support in the form of intelligence sharing 
would be constantly challenged and blocked by elements within the intelligence 
community and The Pentagon. A reluctance to disclose methods and sources, and the 
1lereinafter, the Commission. 
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existence of serious concerns that an acknowledgment of U. S. possession of information 
relating to atrocities would increase calls for it to become militarily involved. also 
impacted upon the Commission's requests for assistance. 
Finally, the Commission's investigations within the region \\-ill also be explored. 
illustrating the difficult relationships the body experienced with several of the 
international organizations operating on the ground, particularly the L. N. peacekeeping 
forces in the region. Whilst this may in part be explained by the fact that the force 
included contingents from States which perceived the Commission as a threat to the 
negotiation process, the chapter will also demonstrate that the deep institutional 
reluctance of peacekeeping forces to become embroiled in areas of human rights 
investigations, also played a significant part. 
International Responses to the Atrocities Committed in Croatia and Bosnia 
On July 13,1992 the U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 764, ' the first in a series 
of Resolutions which would prepare the legal ground for the creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It reaffirmed that all parties to the 
Yugoslav conflict should comply with their obligations under international humanitarian 
law, in particular the Geneva Conventions, stressing that those who committed or ordered 
violations of the Conventions would be deemed individually criminally responsible in 
respect of such breaches. 3 
The warning was reinforced one month later, with the adoption of Resolution 771 which 
demanded an immediate cessation of all violations of international humanitarian law. ' 
The Resolution also expressed the Security Council's intention to invoke its authority to 
take binding decisions under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter, and held that all those 
concerned in the former Yugoslavia and all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shall comply with the resolution" warning that "noncompliance would result in the 
2 See S. C. Res. 764. U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess.. 3093rd mtg. U. N. Doc. S RES 764 (199-1) 
` Sec S. C. Res. 764, U. N. SCOR 47th Sess.. 3093rd mtg. U. N. Doc. S RES 764 (1992) 
4 See S. C. Res. 771. U. N. SCOR. 47th Sess.. 3106th mtg. U. N. Doc. S RES 771 (1992) 
I') 
adoption of further measures by the Council. -5 It also called upon States and 
humanitarian organizations to submit "Substantiated information" regarding violations of 
international humanitarian law, to the Council. 
Despite the apparent toughening of attitudes within the Council towards the commission 
of atrocity crimes, the language of elements of the Resolution was nebulous. As one of 
the drafters noted, the failure to specifically define the term "substantiated information" 
led to material being submitted of vastly differing standards. A number of governments 
(e. g. Canada) only reported information which had been "corroborated by, other sources". 
whilst others (e. g. U. S. ) merely provided open source material including newspaper 
articles. 6 Other States avoided submitting any information on the grounds that it had not 
been "substantiated" through judicial means". 7 The general reluctance expressed by 
many States to disclose material relating to violations would be a recurring theme for 
both the Commission and the Tribunal. 
The Human Rights Commission and the CSCE 
By mid-August 1992, the U. N. Human Rights Commission appointed former Polish 
Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Special Rapporteur on the Former Yugoslavia. 
His September 3,1992 report emphasized. "The need to prosecute those responsible for 
mass and flagrant human rights violations and for breaches of international humanitarian 
law. " Mazowiecki went on to suggest that in order to deter future violations.... a 
systematic collection of documentation on such crimes and of personal data concerning 
those responsible [was necessary]. " He concluded, "A commission should be created to 
assess and further investigate specific cases in which prosecution may be warranted. '"" 
s St, (, S. C. Res. 771, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess.. 3106th mtg. U. N. Doc. S, RES 771 (1992) 6 See MICHAEL SCHARF B: \LKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES 
TRIAL SINCE NUREM4BI RG. (Carolina Academic Press) 1997, p. 39 [hereinafter SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE] 
7 See SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE p. 39. 
x Sec Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteur, U. N. Doc. A 47,418-S 24516, at 14-15. In his three year 
tenure, Mazowiecki would write eighteen reports, before resigning in protest at the international 
community's failure to protect the Srebrenica safe area. For more details see Konstant\ Gebert, In 
Investigating Human Rights Abuses. Reporting Is Not Enough'. Transitions, January 26,1996, pp. 40-44. 
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On September 28,1992, three Rapporteurs were appointed under the CSCE Moscow 
Human Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Ambassador Con-e!. 
Ms. Thune and Mr. Turk were mandated to "investigate reports of atrocities against 
unarmed civilians in Croatia and Bosnia, and to make recommendations as to the 
feasibility of attributing responsibility for such acts. ' The Rapporteurs recommended 
that a committee of experts immediately be convened to propose the necessary rules for 
the collection of information on suspected war crimes. 
A Commission of Experts 
Within two weeks, on October 6,1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 780.10 The Resolution requested the Secretary General establish as a matter 
of urgency, an impartial commission of experts to assess the information submitted 
pursuant to Resolution 771 (1992) and the present resolution, together with such further 
information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own 
investigations.... with a view to providing the Secretary General with its conclusions on 
the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other violations of 
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. "' Behind the unanimity of 
the vote however, clear divisions existed within the Council, and the negotiations 
surrounding the drafting of the Resolution involved acrimonious disagreements, 
particularly between its initial sponsor the U. S., and the U. K. '2 Former Bush 
administration State Department official, Michael Scharf recalled, "lt became very clear 
to me and my colleagues that what the British were doing from the very beginning was 
obstructionistic. , 13 
The `pro-prosecution' elements within the State Department lobbied for the Security 
Council Resolution to include three particular elements which they viewed as non- 
negotiable. These related to: the body's title, mandate, and mechanism to ensure State 
9 See MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II p. 213. 
10 See S. C. Res. 780, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. U. N. Doc S RES 780 (1992) 
11 See S. C. Res. 780, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. U. N. Doc S RES 780 (1992) 
12 Notably. although several States made supportive speeches during the ensuing debate within the Security 
Council after the Resolution was passed, the U. K. remained silent. 
I' Scc Michael Scharf comments in. 'Getting Away with Murder'. Panorama, BBC, December 13.1993. 
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cooperation. Firstly, it was proposed the new body be named the War Crimes 
Commission, thus invoking the historic precedent of the investigative bode which 
preceded Nuremberg, the United Nations War (UNWCC) Crimes Commission. 
Although this linkage conveniently overlooked the fact that the UNWCC was in many 
respects viewed as a failure, it was done to create the expectation that war crimes 
prosecutions would flow from investigations, as had been the case at Nuremberg. The 
U. K. opposed the suggested title, preferring the body be merely referred to as a 
committee of inquiry with no mention of war crimes. The rather insipid compromise title 
'impartial Commission of Experts' was finally agreed upon, in order to placate the U. K. 's 
objections. 
Secondly, it was proposed the Commission should have the authority to launch its own 
investigations. Again the U. K. was opposed to the suggestion. Williams and Scharf 
highlight that the U. K. "made no secret of its preference that the commission be limited 
to a passive group which would merely analyze and collate information that was passed 
to them. " 14 As one former State Department official remembered, they [the U. K. ] 
wanted one of those anonymous committees that produce endless reports which no one 
reads. " 15 The proposal was included in the Resolution after the British reluctantly 
backed-down due to high-level interventions by U. S. Government officials. 16 However, 
the U. K. managed to undermine this potential capability by blocking the inclusion of a 
specific budget for the Commission, which given its own dire record of late payment of 
U. N. dues, the U. S. found it hard to object to. Instead as the Secretary General stated in 
his October 14,1992 report on the establishment of the Commission, "The 
expenses.... will be met as far as possible from existing resources. " 17 However, "existing 
resources" were severely limited, meaning that the Commission would come into 
existence without any money for field investigations, and it would take over one year 
before alternative funding could be located. 
14 See WILLIANMS AND SCHARF, PENCE WITH JUSTICE?, p. 94. 
15 Comment of former State Department official, See lain Guest, On Trial - The United Nations. War 
Crimes and the Former Yugoslavia'. The Refugee Policy Group, September 1995, p. 55. [Hereinafter 
Guest, On Trial] 
16 Sec' MORRIS AND SCHARF. AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II, p. 26. 
" See UN Secretary General's report on the Establishment of the Commission of Experts. October 14. 
1992, S,, -14657. 
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The third element the `pro-prosecution' advocates proposed was the inclusion of 
terminology which would request States, relevant U. N. bodies and other relevant 
organizations to provide the Commission with substantiated information in their 
possession concerning violations of international humanitarian law. including gra\ e 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions being committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution and as appropriate 
thereafter. Supporters of an activist Commission envisaged that this `'request, " which 
was included in the final text of the Resolution, would enable the body to quickly gain 
access to valuable information. However, although a few States would provide the 
Commission with some material of interest, the "request" for information, like the one 
contained in Resolution 771, was almost exclusively ignored. 
The disagreements within the Security Council surrounding Resolution 78018 would set 
the tone for an ongoing debate between those who advocated a robust Commission and 
Tribunal and those who sought to limit their scope and minimize their impact. Although 
Scharf characterizes the U. K. as the main opponent to the Commission, the former State 
Department official fails to highlight that significant differences of opinion also existed 
within the U. S. administration regarding the desirability of pursuing war crimes 
investigations and prosecutions. Much of the literature focusing on the establishment of 
the Commission and the Tribunal has tended to portray the State Department as being 
'pro-prosecution. ' 19 Indeed, John Shattuck, (then) U. S. Under-Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor highlighted that several officials including himself, 
Jim O'Brian, Conrad Harper, James Matherson and David Scheffer, formalized 
themselves into a 'human rights coalition'20 and were vocal supporters of both bodies. 
However, these advocates were engaged in a constant battle with other elements of the 
Bush administration, including colleagues in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), 
18 Resolution 780 was followed by Resolution 787 in which the Security Council welcomed the 
establishment of the Commission and requested it to "pursue acti\ ely its investigations [of].... grax e 
breaches ... and other violations of 
international humanitarian law. " 
'Q Sec B: \ss. ST; \Y, THE HAND OF VENGE_ \NC'E . Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trading Order for Justice" Prosecuting 
\Var Criminals In The Aftermath of Conflict', (2001) PhD (Columbia University), p. 206. 
20 Sec JOHN SHATTUCK. FREEDOM ON FIRE. Am ERICA AND ITS RESPONSE To THE HUMAN RIGHTS W \R OF 
THE 1990s (Harvard Uni. Press) p. 12. [hereinafter SHATTUCK. FREEDOM ON FIRE] 
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who, like the British government, were also concerned that such justice initiatives could 
complicate the ongoing diplomatic negotiation process striving to achieve a peace 
settlement for the region. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) and National 
Security Council (NSC) accorded little priority to the pursuit of justice; with NSC staffer 
Richard Clark declaring that all policy relating to human rights issues would have to be 
"consensus driven 
.,, 
21 This allowed the NSC and the Pentagon to effectively block many 
moves by the `pro-prosecution' elements within the State Department to implement a 
more proactive approach. For example, David Scheffer's proposal that the administration 
publicly announce that it would "use all available means to continue gathering C% idence 
against war criminals" would be rebuffed22 and Shattuck's proposal to visit the region 
opposed. 
The Commission Gets to Work23 
On October 10,1992, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni received a telephone call from his 
friend Ambassador Nabil El-Arabi, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the U. N., 
informing him of the establishment of the Commission and revealing that the U. N. 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali intended to appoint Bassiouni to it. Bassiouni, 
an Egyptian born American citizen and Law Professor at the International Human Rights 
Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, had spent most of his 
professional life working on various international criminal law, human rights, and 
humanitarian law issues, and was a leading authority on the law relating to crimes against 
humanity. 24 On October 20 1992, Bassiouni was contacted by Carl Fleischauer, the 
Under Secretary General and Legal Counsel to the U. N., who confirmed his appointment 
to the Commission, and also inquired if he would serve as Chairman. Bassiouni was 
21 See SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE, p. 123. 
22 See David Scheffer, 'Three Memories from the Year of Origin, 1993' in The ICTY 10 Years On: The 
View from Inside, Join-nal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2. No. 2. June 2004, p. 356. 
'; The following section on the Commission of Experts draws heavily on material accessed whilst 
researching the Commission's archive, including; minutes of the meetings; internal memos; U. N. telefaxes: 
correspondence with U. N. member States. This material has been further supplemented with the personal 
notes and diary of Cherif Bassiouni. 
24 Bassiouni was instrumental in navigating the U. N. Torture Convention through the labyrinthine 
committee stages of the U. N.. after a number of States had acted to side-line the treaty, and had spent much 
of his professional career working on ways to advance the goal of establishing an International Criminal 
Court. 
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keen to take up the post and was surprised to learn that Frits Kalshoven had been 
appointed as Chairman. 25 He would subsequently discover that Ralph Zacklin. a senior 
staffer in the U. N. 's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) had convinced Boutros Ghali that 
Bassiouni should not assume the position, due to concerns that a Muslim Chair might 
send the wrong message to the Serbs regarding impartiality. 26 The incident would mark 
the commencement of a bitter struggle between the two men, with Bassiouni believing 
Zacklin to have an agenda that went far beyond simply not \\anting to send the wrong 
public relations message to the Serbs. -'27 
Eager to iron out a number of issues, Bassiouni sent an internal memo to the other 
Commissioners, which included a discussion paper for the first meeting and a proposed 
agenda. He suggested that the Commission should divide its tasks into a number of 
phases, with Phase One consisting of the gathering, correlation and analysis of available 
data" and Phase Two "devoted to the Commission's own investigation and fact 
finding. "28 The memo also contained a proposed agenda for the first meeting. However. 
during the meeting held on November 4,1992, disagreement emerged as to what 
direction the Commission should take. The nebulous wording of Resolution 780 and the 
absence of any explicit mention of a Tribunal led to debate over whether the body should 
prepare legal cases, or merely compile an archive. 29 Officials from the OLA argued that 
the evidence should be -demonstrative- rather than "evidentiary. "3ý' Some of the 
25 The five Commission members appointed were Professor Frits Kalshoven, Emeritus Professor of 
International Humanitarian Law at the University of Leiden (The Netherlands), (Chairman): M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law and President of DePaul University's 
International Human Rights Law Institute (Egypt); Commander William Fenrick, Director of Law for 
Operations and Training in the Department of Defense (Canada); Professor Torkel Opsahl, Professor of 
Human Rights Law at Oslo University, President of the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights and former 
member of the UN Committee on Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights 
(Norway); and the Hon. Keba M'Baye, former President of the Supreme Court of Senegal, former 
President of the Constitutional Council of Senegal, and Former President of the International Court of 
Justice (Senegal). Bassiouni would later characterise the overall composition of the commission as "a great 
group of people but for another purpose [the compilation of analytical reports] than the one we had to 
do.... none of them had faced difficult circumstances of having to investigate and obtain evidence in time of 
war. " Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
26 M. Cherif Bassiouni personal diary. 
27 Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
28 Internal Memorandum To the Commissioners from M. Cherif Bassiouni. October 30.1992 
29 See Guest, On Trial, p. 59. 
10 See Guest, On Trial, p. 60. 
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Commissioners disagreed with this, arguing that the compilation of criminal cases %v as 
paramount. Zacklin, who had been appointed the Commission's Legal Counsel. also 
gave a brief presentation. Zacklin foresaw that the need to gather detailed information 
--will no doubt, call for the development by you of innovative working methods and 
procedures. In this, you can count on the full support of the Secretar-iat. 31 Bassiouni's 
experience over the database, would in time, however, reveal such assurances to be 
hollow. 
Funding Problems 
The Commission was to be administered by the U. N. 's OLA. However, the OLA's 
primary function was to advise the Secretary-General on legal matters, not oversee 
investigatory bodies intending to launch field investigations, leading to suggestions that it 
was "singularly ill-equipped to administer the Commission. "32 Already suffering from 
an increased workload and a zero growth budget, the OLA could only access additional 
funding by gaining the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Question (ACABQ). This U. N. financial monitoring body, established to 
review spending proposals for the General Assembly, was driven by a zealous 
determination to curb U. N. spending. Thus, when the OLA submitted the Commission's 
initial budget, it was cut by a third in December 1992.33 Furthermore, the budget was 
only extended until the end of August 1993. 
Given the restrictions imposed by the ACABQ's cuts, it was essential to secure 
alternative sources of funding including a trust fund comprising voluntary contributions. 
Such trust funds are a common source of U. N. funding and several members of the 
Commission were now hopeful that the failure to provide specific U. N. funding could be 
overcome via this means. Kalshoven drafted a letter requesting funds directly from 
Member States. However, the move was opposed by the OLA, with Francis M. Ssekandi, 
the Deputy Director of the General Legal Division, OLA. informing Zacklin, we believe 
that the appeal for voluntary contributions should in any event be made by the Secretary 
31 Commission minutes. First Meeting. November 4.1992, emphasis added. 
32 See Guest, On Trial, p. 63. 
33 From $1,000,000 to $680.000 
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General and not the Chairman of the Commission. " The memo went on to posit that 
"authorization or approval by the General Assembly for soliciting voluntary contributions 
is necessary. "34 Attempts by the Commission to expeditiously resolve its financial 
problems were becoming embroiled in bureaucratic wrangling, and it was only after U. S. 
pressure that the General Assembly eventually approved a trust fund for the Commission 
in March 1993. However, the Commissioners were not informed of this development by 
the OLA until May, with funds being unavailable until July-August that year. Several 
35 months of potential investigation time had been wasted. 
The limited and delayed funding may be interpreted either as a symptom of bureaucratic 
inertia and poor management, endemic in many large institutions, or as a tactical 
maneuver to impede the Commissionis work. 36 Either way, Bassiouni is unequivocal, 
"[c]onsidering the Commission's mandate and the extent and range of the violations 
reported, it is incomprehensible that no resources were made available through the 
regular UN budget process for either the investigations or the operating expenses of the 
Commission. "37 He went on to dryly question, If the Iran-contra investigation in the 
United States cost over $40 million, how could a $1.3 million trust fund be sufficient in 
the context of such large-scale victimization as had occurred in the former 
Yugoslavia? "38 
34 UN Interoffice Memorandum, to Ralph Zacklin from Francis M Ssekandi, OLA, January 7,1993. 
35 The voluntary fund would be used to cover the Commissions operating costs and investigations after UN 
funding ended. The following countries contributed a total of $1,320,631: Austria, $20,000; Canada, 
$237,000; Czech Republic, $1,000; Denmark, $15,201; Germany, $16,000; Hungary, $3,000; Iceland, 
$500; Liechtenstein, $3,184; Micronesia, $300; Morocco, $5,000; the Netherlands, $260,000; New 
Zealand, $53,000; Norway, $49,978; Sweden, $94,955; Switzerland, $50,000; Turkey, $10,000; the United 
States $500,000. Three permanent members of the UN Security Council Britain, France and Russia made 
no contribution. 
36 As Guest observes "UN rules are no obstacle when the political will exists. (Thus, in 1992 the Human 
Rights Component of the UN transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) asked the Secretariat in New 
York to establish a human rights trust fund to take in pledges of support that it was receiving from 
governments. The fund was established, and the money was available, within a matter of weeks. )", see 
Guest, On Trial, p. 65. 
37 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia', in 
ROGER S. CLARK AND MADELINE SANN (EDS. ) THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
(Transaction Publishers) 1994, p. 70. [hereinafter CLARK AND SANN, THE PROSECUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES] 
38 Sec M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: In\ estigating Violations of International Humanitarian Laý\ in the Former Yugoslavia'. 
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Emerging Frustrations 
With little in the way of tangible progress, the Commission began to receive negative 
media coverage, with suggestions that the body had achieved little in the six months of its 
creation. 39 Tensions were also surfacing within the Commission, with some of the 
members expressing frustration that things were not progressing with the necessary 
urgency. A revelatory correspondence between the Chairman and one of the 
Commissioners who was advocating a more pro-active approach, provides a valuable 
insight into the pressures the Chairman evidently felt. Kalshoven confided "I can assure 
you that from the very first day, I have been hearing the reproach that we were doing - 
nothing - meaning that we were not doing what they wanted its to do. In this respect. I 
need hardly remind you that the very existence of the Commission finds its origin in 
disagreement among members of the Security Council about the course to steer with 
respect to the war criminality informer Yugoslavia..... I am well aware.... that public 
opinion is increasingly losing patience with the rather ineffective way the international 
community is handling the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and now in particular in 
Bosnia. "40 
The Commission's Database 
During its third meeting in mid-January 1993, consensus emerged over the need to gather 
the data so far received by the Commission in an organized and systematic manner. 
Consequently, Bassiouni was appointed "Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of 
the Facts. " However, the initiative was soon beset by problems, with funding objections 
again being raised. In response to the request for $10,000 to purchase computers, the 
U. S. member of the ACABQ reportedly recommended computers be transferred from the 
U. N. mission in Cambodia, an option which would have further delayed the 
commencement of work. Zacklin, suggested the Commission take a couple of old 
Occasional Paper No. 2. International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University, College of Law. 
1996, p. 67. 
39 See Roy Gutman. 'War Crime Unit Hasn't a Clue; UN setup seems designed to fail'.: "elrsday, March 4 
1993. 
40 Telefax from Fritz Kalshoven. Chairman of Commission of Experts. to Commission member (emphasis 
added) 
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systems from the OLA which were about to be discarded; hardly an adequate response 
given the size of the anticipated task. 
In light of the dire situation, Bassiouni proposed that the database be administered from 
DePaul University's International Human Rights La« Institute in Chicago. of which he 
was a Director. An inter-office memo reveals the OLA's strong opposition to conducting 
the work outside of U. N. premises; `we suggest that the United Nations should insist on 
performing the services in Geneva and under strict control and supervision of the 
commission. 41 Bassiouni contested this, noting "most Rapporteurs of UN bodies work 
elsewhere than at UN facilities. 42 Objections were also raised over confidentiality and 
security measures. These were addressed by a series of protective-measures which were 
instituted: the site would be protected by an electronic security system linked to the 
Chicago Police Department; documents would be stored in locked security cabinets with 
copies stored in a secure off-site facility; and all persons working at the project would 
sign and be bound by a confidentiality agreement. Given the lax security measures in 
place in the Commission's premises in Geneva (By late December 1993, the 
Commission's Geneva office still did not have a safe or shredder. 43) such concerns 
seemed somewhat misdirected. 
With no viable alternative, the OLA reluctantly agreed to the proposal. After securing 
$250,000 from the Soros Humanitarian Foundation44 Bassiouni and a team of attorneys 
and volunteer law students began work to compile the database from his University. The 
team would go on to compile and organize over 64,000 pages of documentation. 
However, the whole affair had further strained relations between Bassiouni, the OLA and 
also Kalshoven (it was not until several months into the compilation of the database that 
41 UN Interoffice Memorandum, to Ralph Zacklin from Francis M Ssekandi. OLA, January 7.1993. 
(emphasis added) 
42 Sec, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia'. in 
ROGER S. CLARK AND MADELINE SANN (EDS. ) THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
(Transaction Publishers) 1994, p. 75. 
41 Internal Minutes. Commission of Experts, Ninth Session, First Meeting. December 14.1993. 
4' Donations would also be received from the Open Society Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation 
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the Chairman even formally acknowledged its existence. ), although Bassiouni feels the 
work carried out by the DePaul Database team was ultimately vindicated by the 
subsequent commendation from the (then) U. N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali. 
Obstacles to Information Gathering 
It was anticipated that several key organizations working on the ground in Croatia and 
Bosnia would provide a vital source of information. However, specific requests for 
information were rebuffed by the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) both of whom claimed 
their mandate precluded such disclosure. 45 UNPROFOR was initially receptive to the 
Commission's requests for information, although an internal telefax reveals that the 
UNPROFOR liaison office in Geneva, which had at first permitted the Commission to 
see reports, was becoming increasingly reluctant to provide access due to "their 
confidential nature", leading to The Commission's secretary appealing directly' to the 
Deputy Head of UNPROFOR, Cedrick Thornbury, in an attempt to have the Geneva 
office revert to its initial policy. 46 In his report compiled after a Commission 
reconnaissance mission to Croatia, Bill Fenrick, the Rapporteur for on-site investigations, 
pointed out that UNPROFOR did not have a usable humanitarian law violation reporting 
procedure in place, nor a central office to gather violation reports. However, he informed 
the other Commissioners at least one contingent [of UNPROFOR] concerned about the 
possible long-term impact of turning a blind eye to humanitarian law violations, had 
established its own reporting procedure and a central point for the collection of reports. '47 
Fenrick also divulged that several U. N. Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers had gathered 
information concerning atrocities on their own initiative. 48 
45 The issue of disclosure would again be raised by the Tribunal, relating to ICRC personnel and the 
organizations policy of non-disclosure, see `Red Cross: `Absolute Right to Non-Disclosure', Tribunal 
Update, No. 146, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4-9,1999. 
46 Commission internal correspondence - UN telefax transmission, From: Jacqueline Dauchy, To: M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, March 9,1993. Similar problems of obtaining cooperation from UNPROFOR were 
experienced by Mazowiecki, See Konstanty Gebert, `In Investigating Human Rights Abuses. Reporting Is 
Not Enough', Transitions, January 26,1996, p. 42. 
4' Final Version of Mr. Fenrick's Report on the Reconnaissance Mission to the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, March 24.1993. 
48 Final Version of Mr. Fenrick's Report on the Reconnaissance ! Mission to the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. March 24,1993. 
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States' Non-Disclosure 
The Commission's work was seriously inhibited by the reluctance of most States to 
provide information. Kalshoven contacted all the U. N. Member States permanent 
missions in Geneva, with a request that they provide any material in their possession 
which may have been of use to the Commission. How wevver, the response was minimal. 
particularly with regard to intelligence material. Bassiouni would berate this abject non- 
disclosure, noting "Governments did not provide any intelligence information in their 
possession. "49 The inadequacy of most government submissions was all the more 
frustrating since it was anticipated that they would be "the Commission's primary source 
"so of information. 
In the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, Western intelligence services 
were initially relatively ill-prepared to gather information, and their human intelligence, 
[humint] was limited. As Wiebes notes, it would not be until 1993 that the U. S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense established the Defense Human Intelligence Service, which came to 
reside under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 51 Similarly, the U. S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) reportedly had a lack of translators and analysts trained in Serbo- 
Croat. 52 To a large extent these deficiencies related to the fact that most U. S. intelligence 
agencies were operating on a Cold War mindset, focusing on the enemy in the East. '3 
Indeed, similar problems existed within other Western intelligence agencies which had 
also paid scant attention to FRY. British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - also known as 
M16), reportedly had difficulties in these early stages together with British Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). A senior Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) 
49 See M. Cherif Bassiouni. `The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia', 
Occasional Paper No. 2, International Human Rights Law Institute. DePaul University, College of Law, 
1996, p. 22. 
so See M. Cherif Bassiouni. The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia', 
Occasional Paper No. 2. International Human Rights Law Institute. DePaul University, College of Law. 
1996, p. 25. 
51 See Cl: la WIERI S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 1992-1995 (Lit Verlag Munster) 2003. p. 52 
[hereinafter WIEUEFS. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA] The Service was not officially activated by 
the DIA until October 1995, and was only declared fully operational in September 1996. 
52 See WIEBI S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. J5. 
53 Sty(' WIEE3FS, INTELLIGENCE ANI) THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 54. 
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officer acknowledged that British intelligence agencies "had a bit of trouble getting, up to 
speed. It wasn't a priority they could quickly get good at. SIS and GCHQ needed to 
improve their expertise in the language. On the frequencies [to be intercepted]. GCHQ 
had to start almost from scratch. The quality at the beginning was a bit iffy, it was never 
exceptionally good. "54 
However, over time, these capabilities improved dramatically. Urban highlights that after 
the imposition of a no-fly zone, more sophisticated intelligence-gathering aircraft were 
deployed to the region enabling electronic intelligence to be gathered. 55 The U. S. 
intelligence community established a 'Balkans Task Force' (BTF) which included 
representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DIA. This was supplied 
with intelligence from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and NSA56, the latter 
of which capitalized on the Bosnian Serb military"s limited ability to encrypt their 
communications. As one U. S. military intelligence officer said "If it ain't scrambled, 
were listening to it. " 57 A separate Balkans Task Force was also established within the 
Intelligence and Research section of the State Department (INR) which received 
information from both U. S. intelligence agencies and the Private Military Company 
(PMC), Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). 58 Additionally, the NSA 
formed its own special Bosnia group in 1994.59 The U. S. embassies in Belgrade and 
Zagreb60 contained both CIA and NSA personnel who were monitoring communication 
traffic throughout the area, and the CIA and DIA were reportedly conducting clandestine 
operations in Serbia. 61 U. S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) had infiltrated various 
NGOs and humanitarian aid organizations within Bosnia, or were using them as cover, 
and were reportedly permitted to use United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
'4 See Captain Jonathan Cooke quote in MARK URBAN, UK EYES ALPHA. THE INSIDE STORYOF BRITISH 
INTELLIGENCE (Faber and Faber) 1997, pp. 215-216. [hereinafter URBAN, UK EYEs ALPHA] 
55 See URBAN, UK EYES ALPHA, p. 216. 
56 See WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 72. 
57 Sec' anonymous U. S. military intelligence officer quote in Charles Lane and Thom Shanker. 'Bosnia: 
\\'hat the CIA Didn't Tell Us'. Neu York Review of Books, May 9,1996. p. 11. 
58 See WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 66. 
59 Se'c' WIEBFS. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA. p. 72. 
60 In addition to focusing on Croatia, the CIA station \w ithin the US embassy in Zagreb was also responsible 
for Republika Srpska. 
61 Sec WI[IlI: S. INTFLI 101 N(1: AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 60. 
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(UNHCR) jeeps for their operations. 62 Furthermore, Miro Tudjman, son of the late 
president Franjo Tudjman and head of the Croatian Intelligence (POA) in the mid-1990s, 
revealed that the CIA also spent at least $10 million on equipment in Croatian listening 
posts intercepting telephone calls in Bosnia and Serbia; "All our [electronic] intelligence 
in Croatia went online in real time to the National Security Agency in Washington, " says 
Tudjman. "We had a de facto partnership. "63 The installation of CIA interception 
equipment in a secret base in Croatia close to Sveta Gera, meant that the majority of 
General Ratko Mladic's (Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army) conversations were 
64 recorded. 
Similarly, as the conflict progressed and its involvement became more pronounced, 
British efforts to gather information became more successful. Although the "UN itself 
did not empower its peacekeeping or humanitarian forces to compile intelligence-65, 
UNPROFOR provided ideal cover for British, French and Danish SOF national 
intelligence cells (NICs) to be inserted. Intelligence gathered by these NICs was 
transmitted directly to national capitals and was not disclosed within the formal U. N. 
system. Additionally, the British coordinating body for intelligence, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) established the Current Intelligence Group for the Balkans 
and a Bosnia cell was established in the U. K. Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). 66 Within 
eighteen months of the commencement of the conflicts, M16 had operatives on the 
ground and had recruited sources within all the warring factions including "excellent 
sources close to Mladic. "67 Furthermore, improved Signals Intelligence (Sigint) 
capabilities meant that conversations between Mladic and his subordinates were regularly 
intercepted. 68 
62 Sec US Special Operations Command, 10`}' Anniversary History, (MacDill, AFB). 1997, pp. 52-55. 
63 See 'What did the CIA know? '. Neu sx, eek, August 27,2001, p. 30. 
64 See Gordan Malic, 'Alleged CIA transcripts on Mladic published by the Zagreb Weekly. Globus, 
translated on Southeasteurope online, January 19,2006. 
65 See URBAN, UK E}'l: s ALP[ IA, p. 214. 
66 See WIEI3ES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA. pp. 72-73. 
67 Sec' WIEB[ S, INTELLIG[NC't AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 79. 
68 See URBAN, UK EY, i s ALPHA. p. 216. 
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Evidently, although a number of Western States initially had limited capabilities on the 
intelligence front, they quickly improved. Unsurprisingly, these capabilities and assets 
were primarily used for the purposes of gaining a clearer insight into political and 
military developments in the region, and by UNPROFOR troop-contributing states for the 
purposes of force protection. As Air Marshal John Walker, (then) director of British 
Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) emphasized, "[Y]ou need a military intelligence job to 
protect your troops. If you don't, you pay for it in body bags. "6" Nevertheless, a number 
of Western intelligence services were gathering material relating to atrocities. 
According to a State Department official, "by the third week of September [ 1992] we had 
a very large, comprehensive list of camps, with descriptions, places, information on 
inmates, conditions, maps. -70 U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command ran 
programmes in Germany and Italy to interview refugees and deserters from FRY, and in 
a rare instance of inter-agency cooperation CIA agents interviewed survivors of the 
detention camps and were accompanied by FBI sketch artists who attempted to 
reconstruct likenesses of alleged perpetrators. In Croatia, the CIA also established the 
Refugee Debriefing Center which recorded material from refugees coming from 
Bosnia. 7' Such refugee accounts contributed to an intensive study of ethnic cleansing 
conducted by the agency which also used open source material and aerial reconnaissance 
to document the destruction of over 3,500 villages, mass expulsions and murder of 
Muslims. 72 
Similarly, a member of Britain's DIS also revealed (in the context of a discussion relating 
to the somewhat thorny issue of the U. S. withholding intelligence material from the 
British due to their wide policy differences over Bosnia) that the U. S. possessed 
intelligence relating to Serbian war crimes, "They [the U. S. ] more or less admitted they 
were holding stuff back from us, not everything but really the bits relating to the most 
69 See URBAN, UK E)'E's ALPHA. p. 214. 
70 Sc'e anonymous State Department official quote in Charles Lane and Thom Shanker. 'Bosnia: What the 
CIA Didn't Tell Us', : VL'w York Review of Books, May 9,1996, p. 10. 71 Sc' cWIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA. p. 75. 
'' See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us', Nclr York Review of 
Books, May 9.1996, p. 12. 
37 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
pronounced political divide. They didn 't feel we took their information about Serb 
atrocities seriously enough. ''73 
Wiebes also highlights that declassified U. S. government documents reveal that in 1992 
and 1993, it had a good insight into atrocities committed in the various Bosnian Serb run 
camps in North Western Bosnia including Omarska. He goes on to note that "[a]ccording 
to a senior US intelligence official, US awareness on this issue ti, 'as broad and it-ell- 
defined. Nevertheless, the reporting priority given to atrocities was nil.... Reporting on 
atrocities was seen as being aimed at three to five years dotiwwii the road, , 
for some ill- 
defined effort to hold parties accountable. -74 This rationale appears somewhat spurious: 
rather than "reporting atrocities three to five years down the road" the Security Council 
had already specifically established a Commission to examine allegations of violations of 
international humanitarian law, and had explicitly asked States to provide information to 
the new body. 
Despite, the presence of strong supporters of the Commission within the U. S. State 
Department, liaison with the body was generally accorded limited priority, with the task 
assigned to an officer in the Human Right Bureau with little knowledge of Balkan affairs, 
and to a short-term intern recently out of college. 75 Although the State Department 
would pass on several reports on atrocities in the former Yugoslavia to the Commission, 76 
Bassiouni claimed "there was nothing in it that was particularly enlightening.... it was 
heavily edited. "77 In an attempt to increase the flow of information Bassiouni attended a 
meeting with State Department officials where he was informed that in order to receive 
intelligence material he would have to undergo security clearance. At a following 
meeting Bassiouni was informed that any material disclosed could only be used subject to 
approval by the State Department, a condition he was unwilling to be bound by. 78 
73 Sec URBAN, UK EYES ALPHA, p. 241. (emphasis added) 
74 See WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA. p. 75. (emphasis added) 
75 See S: \M APO PO\\'ER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL"'. AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (Basic 
Books) 2002. p. 292. [hereinafter POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL"] 
76 Sec' SII ATTUCK. FREEDONI ON FIRE, p. 131. 
77 Interview with M Cherif Bassiouni. 
78 Interview with M Cherif Bassiouni. 
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Clearly, large amounts of material which would have been very useful to the Commission 
had been collected by U. S. As Power contends "No other atrocit\ campaign in the 
twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the U. S. government. "79 
However, information was not being passed on. Whilst this was partially predicated on 
the contention expressed by the intelligence agencies that disclosure would reveal 
methods and sources8° deeper concerns were also being harboured by elements within the 
Bush administration, particularly the DoD. Calls from the `pro-prosecution' sections of 
the State Department to increase disclosure were met with by "A quiet mini-firestorm of 
negative reaction in the Pentagon among people who see it as an effort to bring 
Americans into the conflict. "81 Bush's foreign policy team applied criteria largely similar 
to that enounced by President Regan's Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, (known as 
the Weinberger Doctrine) to determine whether the U. S. should use military force. In 
1984, Weinberger proposals included the provisions that armed intervention (1) be used 
only to protect the vital interests of the U. S. or its allies; (2) be in pursuit of clearly 
defined political and military objectives; (3) be waged only as a last resort. To this, Colin 
Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added the requirement of 
"decisive force" and a clearly defined "exit strategy", and he was strongly opposed to 
U. S. military action in Bosnia. 82 As Samantha Powell notes, for the administration "The 
war [in the former Yugoslavia] was "tragic, " but the stakes seemed wholly humanitarian. 
It met few of the administration's criteria for intervention. -83 Thus, the views of 
Secretary of State, James Baker would prevail, who famously declared that the U. S. did 
not have a dog in this fight. " Consequently, the Bush administration assiduously 
resisted defining the `Serbian Project' as genocide throughout 1992 due to concerns that 
the genocide label would have demanded a U. S. response. 84 Furthermore, despite having 
intelligence from May 1992 of the existence of Bosnian Serb-run detention camps located 
79 See PO\\'ER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL" p. 264. 
80 For further details on this issue see chapters two and five. 
81 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us', 'cctiw York Review of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 12. 
82 See Michael Gordon, 'Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia', i cit, York 
Times, September 28,1992. 
8; Sec' PO\\ ER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL". p. 262. 
`' See POW[_R. "A PROBLEM FROM HE=LD. ". p. 288. Power goes on to highlight that The White House never 
issued a directive calling for research and analysis to determine whether a genocide case could be made 
against Milosevic or FRY see p. 290. 
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throughout North West Bosnia, administration officials never publicly condemned the 
camps or demanded their closure. 85 When Neii'sdav 's Roy Gutman broke the story in late 
July 1992 and continued to write a series of articles in August, 86 U. S. State Department 
spokesman Richard Boucher would confirm that the U. S. possessed evidence of the 
camps. However, the administration quickly backtracked, when other State Department 
officials testified on Capitol Hill that the U. S. had no substantiated information to verify 
the news accounts. 87 
Similarly, with the U. K. opposed to an activist Commission, due to concerns that it could 
upset the negotiation process, cooperation was at a bare minimum. This was particularly 
frustrating for the Commission given that British troops formed a significant part of 
UNPROFOR and could have potentially been a source of useful first-hand material. U. K. 
military debriefing teams based in Kent had also interviewed hundreds of refugees 
including former detainees from a number of Bosnian Serb run detention camps, 
collecting over five hundred testimonies. The Commission made a specific request to the 
U. K. to send it all information that was substantiated. However, Bassiouni recounted that 
the U. K. 's response merely amounted to a single affidavit consisting of a diary from a 
former detainee at one of the detention camps. A BBC Panorama investigation however, 
revealed an internal Foreign Office memo from March 1993, which acknowledged that 
the British had "a good untapped source of first hand substantiated information [relating 
to atrocities]"88 
The Commission anticipated that the European Community Monitoring Mission 
(ECMM) reports would also be a potentially a rich source of information, particularly 
regarding troop movements and command and control issues. However, The ECMM's 
response to requests for information would vary dramatically depending on which state 
had the rotating chair and could thus dictate disclosure procedure. Furthermore, although 
85 See POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL", p. 270. 
86 For further details of Gutman's accounts sec ROY GUTMAN, A WITNESS To GENOCIDE: FIRST INSIDE 
ACCOUNT OF THE HORRORS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN BOSNIA (Element Books Ltd) 1993. 
87 Scc Charles Lane and Thom Shanker. 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us', New Y01* Review of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 12. 
88 Set' 'Getting Away With Murder', Panorama. BBC, December 13.1993. 
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the Commission established positive relationships with a number of ECMM Observers on 
an individual basis, the ECMM's liaison office in Geneva \\ as umw illing to help. The 
majority of the Mission's documents were stored in Zagreb, and ý\ere difficult to access. 
although arrangements were eventually made for a member of the Commission's 
secretariat to visit Zagreb and consult the files. 89 However, as Bassiouni highlighted. "it 
appeared that some governments, including the United Kingdom, when chairing the 
ECMM, had removed some of the records, "90 later recalling that "some of the ý\ arehouse 
staff [in Zagreb] told us that U. K. military personnel had removed material. "9' 
Peace versus. Justice: The International Conference for the former Yugoslavia (ICFY) 
and the Commission of Experts 
Whilst the U. N. Security Council had adopted several Resolutions providing the 
framework for war crimes investigations and possible prosecutions, a major diplomatic 
initiative was also taking place in London in August 1992, aimed at finding a solution to 
the conflict. The London Conference led to the creation of the International Conference 
on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which set out and approved a dual track strategy in 
response to the crisis. 92 This comprised a U. N. mission to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the civilian population of Bosnia, and a European Community (E. C. ) led 
negotiation process designed to achieve a political settlement. By early 1993 that process 
led to the formulation and unveiling of the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), by the U. N. 
and E. C. Special Envoys Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State under President Carter, and 
David Owen, a former U. K. Foreign Secretary93 Despite the assertions that the 
89 Commission internal correspondence - UN telefax transmission, From: Jacqueline Dauchy, To: M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, Mr. Schiller, March 15,1993. 
90 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, `The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia' in 
CLARK AND SANN, THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, p. 81. 
91 Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
92 For more details on the London Conference and subsequent peace negotiations see generally GOw, 
TRIUMPH OF THE LACK OF WILL, pp. 224-232. 
9; VOPP proposed that Bosnia remain a republic but be divided into ten ethnically based, Croat. Muslim 
and Serb autonomous provinces, loosely bound under a central government with limited powers. The plan 
prohibited the provinces from entering into 'agreements with foreign states' in order to dem any Bosnian 
Serb and Bosnian Croat efforts to accede to Serbia and Croatia, and proposed progressively demilitarizing 
the republic under U. N. EC supervision. For further details sec Gow, TRIUMPH OF THE L aCK OF WILL, pp. 
232-248. Three other internationally sponsored peace plans were proposed after VOPP: The Owen 
41 
negotiation process and war crimes investigations w ere "two separate tracks', `'4, the two 
dynamics were soon to collide. The issue of war crimes had uncomfortably intruded into 
the political negotiations during one of the ICFY's December, 1992 meetings. In a rare 
departure from the usually sedate diplomatic protocol, Lawrence Eagleburger. the 
outgoing U. S. Secretary of State delivered a bombshell, with his so-called "naming 
names speech" informing the participants, "My government believes it is time for the 
international community to begin identifying individuals who have to answer for crimes 
against humanity.... We know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and «e kno\\ 
when and where they occurred..... We can also identify individuals who committed 
them .... We 
know, moreover, which forces committed these crimes, and under whose 
command they operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom 
the military commanders were - and still are - responsible. Eagleburger went on to 
identify ten individuals the U. S. had determined may be implicated in the commission or 
ordering of atrocity crimes, including Karadzic, Milosevic and Mladic, all of whom the 
international negotiators were in contact with in their efforts to achieve a negotiated 
settlement. Reaction in the room was reportedly "dead silence". 96 Eagleburger recalled, 
"I thought there was a certain degree of discomfort, wiggling in the chair and looking 
uncomfortable. "9' When asked specifically about the British response he replied, "1 think 
it would be fair to say they did not greet what I did with great enthusiasm. "98 Similarly, 
former State Department official, John Fox recounted, "the discussion that I recall in the 
U. S. government about the attitude of key allies towards prosecution of war crimes was 
that it could get in the way of the peace process, that the overriding objective was to keep 
the diplomatic game going at whatever cost, that prosecution of war crimes was too much 
Stoltenberg Plan, the EU Action Plan, and Contact Group Plan. All would fail to bring an end to the 
fighting. 
94 Sce Madeline Albright comments in `Getting Away with Murder', Panorama BBC, December 13,1993. 
95 See Lawrence Eagleburger, The need to respond to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia', December 16. 
1992. reproduced in The Path to the Hague', official publication of the ICTY. 
°G See Carla -finne Robbins, ' \\'orld Again Confronts Moral Issues Involved in War Crimes Trials'. Lall 
Street Journal, July 13,1993. 
97 Sec Lawrence Eagleburger comments in 'Getting Away with Murder', Panorama, BBC 1, December 13, 
1993. 
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of a cost to pay and could undercut the process by targeting individuals. "99 However, it 
was not only the British Government which was unhappy with the speech, with 
Eagleburger noting that David Owen "made it clear that he considered m" remarks 
"unhelpful". " 100 Ultimately. Eagleburger's speech would be no more than an act of 
political grandstanding of an outgoing Secretary of State. As Fox recalled, On his 
return, Eagleburger does not do what all secretaries of state usually do after publicly 
launching such an initiative, that is, create a working group to study how to enact such a 
proposition. " 101 
In addition to Owen's concern about the impact of highlighting war crimes during the 
diplomatic initiative, it appears that the E. C. negotiators were also uneasy about 
according those directly involved in investigating atrocity crimes and human rights 
lobbying a formal role in the process. U. N. Special Rapporteur on the Former 
Yugoslavia, Mazowiecki claimed he was effectively shut out from the negotiations due to 
the nature of his investigations. During meetings with Owen, Mazowiecki would be 
requested to be "less emotional" and in a later encounter with Vance's successor, 
Thorvald Stoltenberg' 02, the U. N. Rapporteur was lambasted; We do not need your 
moralizing. We know best how to protect human rights. "' 03 
Hannum succinctly highlights the tensions between those investigating human rights 
abuses and advocating prosecutions, and those involved in trying to achieve a negotiated 
settlement, contrasting their respective strategies. He stresses how human rights 
advocates are "confrontational and norm-based (if not moralistic) and they try to practice 
their craft through "naming and shaming" rather than through [the diplomatic approach 
ofJ persuasion or consensus building. " 104 To illustrate the vastly differing approaches, 
99 See John Fox comments `Getting Away with Murder', Panorama, BBC 1, December 13,1993. 
too Sec Eagleburger quote in SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, p. 44. 
101 See John Fox quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 33. 
102 Stoltenberg succeeded Vance in May 1993. 
103 Sec Konstanty Gebert. in Investigating Human Rights Abuses, Reporting Is Not Enough'. Transitions, 
January 26,1996, p. 41. 
104 104 Sec, Hurst Hannum, 'Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', Human Rights Quarterlti. 28, 
(2006) p. 16. 
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Hannum notes the view of a U. N. human rights official interviewed, who maintained that 
there must be "no compromise" in maintaining human rights principles"'05 Herein lies 
the acute dilemma for diplomatic negotiators who are often faced with the complex 
challenge of incorporating these principles, whilst also achieving the objective of 
obtaining a settlement and bringing an end to conflict. The prospect of successfully 
realizing both goals is all the more difficult where the negotiators have limited political 
support, and few `sticks or carrots' to induce cooperation from the warring factions'. 
Hannum goes on to neatly summarize this quandary. "It is almost a truism that 
negotiators need to deal with all parties to a conflict, including those guilty of committing 
or at least tolerating gross abuses of human rights that constitute war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. Human rights negotiators on the other hand, are in the business of 
demanding compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, 
rather than negotiating with the perpetrators. '"106 The VOPP negotiations are merely one 
illustration of this tension. More recently, during the early U. N. negotiations with 
Indonesia relating to East Timor in 1999, Jasmsheed Marker, the Personal Representative 
of the U. N. Secretary General, explained how he addressed the challenge, noting his 
"basic objectives were political and diplomatic. I judged, therefore, that it would be 
unproductive for my political negotiations if I were to imprudently concentrate efforts on 
investigations of human rights violations. " 107 Owen appears to have applied a similar 
strategy, with some claiming the E. C. negotiator had "basically been advocating 
immunity for Milosevic and Karadzic. -108 Owen has himself conceded, "I don't think 
there was any great enthusiasm for [the Tribunal] while there was a chance of an early 
settlement. " 109 Despite making supportive remarks regarding the Tribunal in public, 
Owen has since opined; If the VOPP had been accepted in February 1993,1 doubt a ýýar 
105 See anonymous U. N. human rights official quote in Hurst Hannum, `Human Rights in Conflict 
Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and 
Peacebuilding', Human Rights Quarterhi, 28, (2006) p. 17. 
106 See Hurst Hannum, `Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', Human Rights Quarterly, 28, 
(2006) p. 37. 
107 See Jasmsheed Marker quote in Hurst Hannum, 'Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', Human 
Rights Quartei-v, 28, (2006) p. 24. 
108 Sec Robert Fox quote in SIMMS, UNFINESI HOUR, p. 148 
109 Sec Lord David Owen quote, in Leslie \ injamuri. 'Trading Order for Justice? Prosecuting War 
Criminals In The Aftermath of Conflict', (2001) PhD (Columbia University) p. 206. footnote. 115. 
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crimes tribunal would have been established. "' 10 Evidently, it appears that Owen would 
have been willing to countenance impunity in order to secure a deal. In light of these 
factors, it would seem that Bertrand de Rossanet's assertion that the ICFY "Pioneered. 
and worked assiduously for, the establishment of an international penal tribunal, "' 11 is 
perhaps a somewhat inaccurate characterization. Indeed, it would not be long before a 
member of the Commission would experience first hand, attempts to muddy the waters 
over war crimes and accountability. 
Bassiouni recounted having lunch at the Palace of Nations in Geneva with New Zealand 
Diplomat, Kennedy Graham, who informed him that Owen was sitting at a table near 
them. Graham's brother was an MP, who knew Owen and it was suggested they should 
say hello. Bassiouni was reluctant and had purposely not wanted to meet ON% en. "they 
[Vance and Owen] were working the political field and I was working the investigations 
field, and I felt it's better our paths didn't cross. " 12 Owen rose to meet Graham and was 
introduced to Bassiouni. "He said to me 'I hear you are to investigate a mass grave at 
Ovcara', and I said 'Yes. ' He said 'How many bodies are there? ' I said I estimate about 
200. ' He said `Did you hear of Bratunac? ' And I said `Yes. ' He said I heard there are 
Serb bodies in a mass grave there, are you going to investigate? ' I said I hope so', and 
he said `How many do you think there are? ' And I said `39', and he said 'No, no. no, no 
there are 200', and I said 'No there's 39. ' He asked me `How could I be so sure? ' I said 
`I have a rule that if I have a report that has confirmation from another source, I take that 
report in, if it's not confirmed I put it as questionable, and I have seven reports about this 
mass grave, and all of them differ except as to one thing, all of them spoke of 35 
bodies'.... He looked at me and he said, `You really have to investigate three mass graves 
[of each ethnic group] of 200 each', and it suddenly hit me as a sort of naivety. I looked 
at him and said I can't do that. ' He stood up and looked at me with that sort of 
aristocratic imperious English look.... contemptuously said something to the effect that I 
110 See Lord David Owen quote, in Leslie \'injamuri, `Trading Order for Justice? Prosecuting War 
Criminals In The Aftermath of Conflict', (2001) PhD (Columbia University) p. 189. footnote 73. 
111 Sec' BERNARD DE ROSSANF I. AVAR AND PEACE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Kluwer Law 
International) 1997, p. 2. 
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don't know how you got this job' and walked away. "113 Clearly, those who were 
involved in investigating violations of international humanitarian law were Viewed as 
individuals who could, due to the nature of their mandate, complicate the work of the 
political negotiators. As Bassiouni recounts, "the last thing that those who w anted a 
political settlement to be reached was to have an activist Commission of Experts that 
could likely prove the accusations made by Secretary Eagleburger. The priority at that 
time was to achieve a political settlement - and justice was not viewed as an inducement 
to that end. "' 14 
VOPP was widely condemned in the media (particularly in the U. S. ) as tantamount to 
appeasement and rewarding Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing, and after a period of 
prevarication, the U. S. administration refused to support the initiative, claiming it 
rewarded ethnic cleansing. A number of critics even claimed that in establishing `ethnic 
cantons' which disproportionately favored the Bosnian Croats, VOPP may have 
unwittingly served to exacerbate forced displacement. As Lloyd darkly recounts, "even 
they [the Bosnian Croats] joked that HVO stood for `Hvala Vance Owen', thank you 
Vance Owen. " The journalist goes on to highlight that in the areas of the proposed 
Bosnian Croat sector of the plan, "tensions there rose even further, catalysed by the very 
diplomatic initiative that sought to end it all. "' is Nevertheless, before invoking the 
widespread criticism of Owen as nothing more than a cynical proponent of Realpolitik, 
the following factors should be considered. VOPP required the Bosnian Serbs to 
significantly roll back from the 70% of the territory they controlled, and critically, as 
Gow points out, unlike the final Peace Deal agreed at Dayton in late 1995, the Bosnian 
Serb territory would not have been contiguous, thus defeating one of the cardinal Serb 
war aims of attaining a `Greater Serbia'. 116 Vance and Owen were assigned the thankless 
task of trying to find a solution to the war in Bosnia whilst working under prevailing 
political conditions which meant they possessed little or nothing in the way of coercive 
113 Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
14 Ste M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780. Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia. ' 
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46 
power to back up their endeavors. As Owen later recalled in his memoir. The daunting 
challenge for the ICFY in November 1992 was whether, armed with only moral authority 
and weak economic sanctions, and with no credible threat of selective counter-force, we 
could roll back the Serb confrontation lines and create a new map. " 117 
However, a defence of Owens attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement should not be 
interpreted as a belief that the plan was viable or would have been successful (admittedly, 
this is no more than speculation). VOPP's proposed patchwork of cantons was probably 
practically unworkable. Furthermore, on the basis of Owen's own remarks outlined 
above, it appears likely that had VOPP been successful, impunity would have prevailed 
and calls to establish a Tribunal deflected. Ultimately, the VOPP failed due to a 
combination of factors: The U. S. was steadfastly opposed to the plan. Instead, it briefly 
advocated an alternative `lift and strike' strategy, which the UNPROFOR troop 
contributing States refused to accept due to legitimate concerns that their forces would be 
placed in an increasingly volatile environment. Without the associated U. S. troop 
deployment on the ground, the major European states were also unwilling to deploy the 
necessary troops to enforce VOPP. Emboldened by the clear division within the 
`International Community', the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale sealed the plan's fate by 
overwhelmingly rejecting it. 
The Interim Report 
In February 1993, the Commission published its interim report which defined the term 
`ethnic cleansing' as "rendering an area wholly homogeneous by using force or 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area""8 and stated that such 
ethnic cleansing had been carried out in the former Yugoslavia by means of murder, 
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, 
confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and 
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on 
117 See David Owen, BALKAN ODYsSFY, p. 67. 
118 See Letter from the secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Feb. 10.1993. U. N. Doc 
S%25274 (1993). transmitting Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to securitt 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), reproduced in N4ORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY 
Vol. II, p. 311. 
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civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. "' 19 The report went on 
to state that the practices of ethnic cleansing constituted crimes against humanity, and 
could also constitute the crime of genocide. It concluded that the establishment of an 
International Criminal Tribunal would be "consistent with the direction of its %\ ork. "'2° 
By late February, the Security Council had adopted Resolution 808, which decided that 
such a Tribunal would be established. In time, this development would play a part in the 
Commission's early termination. 
Field Missions 
During the first half of March 1993, Fenrick led an initial reconnaissance mission to 
Croatia and also Belgrade, but was informed by UNPROFOR that the deteriorating 
security situation precluded any visit to Sarajevo. The team consisted of Fenrick, two 
Canadian team members 12' and two representatives from Physicians for Human Rights 
(PHR). It soon became clear to the team that cooperation from UNPROFOR would be 
limited. Fears of a backlash by disgruntled local belligerents was clearly a factor, and the 
U. N. forces insisted on maintaining parity. When the team visited the Ovcara mass-grave 
site, UNPROFOR "indicated very strongly.... that balance was essential in Commission 
activities, and that if we were to excavate one mass grave site, we should excavate two 
sites at essentially the same time. " 122 Furthermore, the U. N. peacekeeping forces were 
reluctant to expend its limited resources on tasks beyond its main goals. 
However, beyond these practical and logistical considerations, the difficulties the 
Commission experienced during its dealings with UNPROFOR also reflected the 
119 See Letter from the secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. Feb. 10,1993, U. N. Doc 
S/25274 (1993), transmitting Interim Report of the Commission ofExperts Established pursuant to securitl 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), reproduced in MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY 
Vol. II, p. 311. 
120 Sec Letter from the secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. Feb. 10,1993, U. N. Doc 
S%25274 (1993), transmitting Interim Report of the Commission ofExperts Established pursuant to security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), reproduced in MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY 
Vol. 11, p. 311. 
121 In late 92, the Canadian Government wrote to Kalshoven offering the Commission the services of fix e 
of its nationals comprising lawyers, criminal investigators and support staff. Letter to Prof. Frits Kalshoven 
from Gerald E Shannon, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Canada 
to the United Nations. December 11,1992. 
122 Final Version of Mr. Fenrick's Report on the Reconnaissance Mission to the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, March 24.1993. 
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institutional and substantive tensions which exist between a military force which has 
historically been guided by a narrowly proscribed mandate, and the normative demands 
of a body established to investigate atrocity crimes and human rights violations. 
UNPROFOR's guarded attitude towards the Commission was informed by deep-rooted 
assumptions relating to the role of peacekeeping. As Bellamy and Williams highlight, 
traditional conceptions of peacekeeping are premised on the so-called 'holy trinity of 
consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. Their principal purpose is to assist 
in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long term conflict 
resolution. " 123 This "Westphalian" 124 conception of peacekeeping is thus premised on the 
belief that the achievement of peace can only be facilitated by an approach which 
respects the sanctity of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. Consequently, 
the prospect of interacting and cooperating with bodies focused on human rights 
investigations and "naming and shaming" was for many, a development they were 
unwilling to countenance. In addition to this institutional reluctance illustrated by 
UNPROFOR's stance, it is evident that expanding the parameters of the traditional 
peacekeeping doctrine is something which some forces struggle to comprehend. As 
O'Neill notes "Ask a peacekeeper.. . . what 
OXFAM, CARE or UNICEF did and you got a 
blank stare from most. Tell a soldier that he or she was needed to deliver food to a group 
of IDPs [internally displaced persons] and they would, respond: not in my job 
description and what is an IDP?...... None of this was in any peacekeeping manual or the 
ROEs [Rules of Engagement]. -125 Both factors would play a part in limiting the extent of 
cooperation the Commission would receive. 
After returning from the field mission, Fenrick informed the Commission of the team's 
plan to carry out a limited exhumation at Ovcara of around 20 -25 bodies with the 
intention of identifying a number of victims and returning them to next of kin, and most 
123 Scc Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams `Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations'. 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1. Spring 2004, p. 3. 
24 See, -\lex J. Bellamy and Paul \\'illiams 'Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace 
Operations', 
International Peacckcc pmg, Vol. 11, No. 1. Spring 2004, p. 3. 
"` Sec William G. O'Neill, 'A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced. ' Occasional 
Paper, The Brookings Institution - John Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, April 2004, p. 6. 
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importantly, establishing a link to the Vukovar hospital patients. '26 He proceeded to set 
out the requirements of the exhumation which would require a PHR team, a small 
investigative team, a combat engineering unit, and crucially, approval from the local 
`authorities. ' Tentative approaches were subsequently made with the local Croatian Serb 
representatives in Knin, and Fenrick received oral confirmation from Boro Martinovich, 
Advisor to the Serbian Krajina `government' that written permission to excavate Ovcara 
operation would be arranged. 127 Problems were however, encountered in finding any 
State willing to provide the necessary combat engineering troops. UNPROFOR refused 
to provide assistance and Kalshoven informed the other Commissioners that his requests 
to various member states, including Russia, France and China had been declined. The 
U. K. didn't even bother to respond. 128 The U. S. also failed to respond positively. 
Despite Clinton's initial rhetoric during the 1992 Presidential election campaign, that he 
would be prepared to use force to halt the ethnic cleansing, once in office, like Bush, he 
would also be reluctant to become militarily involved. As Power notes, whilst the 
Clinton administration were "far more attentive to the human suffering in Bosnia, they 
did not intervene to ameliorate it. "129 Consequently Kalshoven's request was met by 
strong opposition from the Pentagon, which felt that the deployment of U. S. troops, even 
for the relatively sedate task of guarding a mass grave and providing security in area 
where fighting had subsided, could lead to its forces being dragged into the conflict. 130 
Clinton's unwillingness to confront the U. S. military (the President had been derided as a 
"draft dodger" for his avoidance of the Vietnam War, and his policy to allow gay soldiers 
to serve in the military had done little to improve his relationship with its senior 
echelons 131) meant that the Pentagon's perspective would prevail. 
Faced with such lack of support, alternative options were discussed, and the 
Commission's internal minutes reveal a fascinating discussion over whether, in the event 
of no government providing the requisite forces, private sources should be approached to 
126 Internal Minutes of the Commission of Experts, Fifth Session, First Meeting, May 24.1993. 
127 William Fenrick letter to Frits Kalshoven, Department of National Defense, Office of the Judge 
Advocate General, Canada, June 4.1993. 
I2 Internal Minutes of the Commission of Experts, Fifth Session. First Meeting. May 24,1993. 
129 SecPOWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL' p. 294. 
130 Sec Guest, On Trial, p. 70. 
131 Sec POWER, ". A PROBLEM FROM HELL" p. 304. 
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carry out the work. Whilst Fenrick had no objections to using a private company to carry 
out the excavation or engage in mine clearance, he was much more reluctant to engage 
the services of private sources for secutrio, provision. The other Commissioners were 
equally reluctant to explore the avenue of obtaining private security to support the 
mission. 132 After receiving authorization from UNPROFOR, Fenrick and members of the 
Canadian team also conducted a mission in Sarajevo between late June and early July 
1993, conducting a `Draft Sarajevo Battle Study' focusing on Serb artillery attacks on the 
city. Despite the Commission's imprecise mandate, the focus of the team was to 
specifically conduct "insofar as it is possible, a proper in depth criminal investigation 
onto incidents in the area. " 133 
Kalshoven Steps Down 
On August 30 1993, Zacklin informed the other Commissioners that Kalshoven, who had 
taken leave during August, had requested sick leave for an indefinite period. In 
September, he offered his resignation, publicly berating the lack of support the 
Commission had received and reserving particularly scathing comments for the U. K. and 
France, "At a practical level we haven't received any help in particular from 
[them].... Britain hasn't done anything for us - nothing at all. I was very angry about 
these two because they are permanent members of the UN Security Council. If they 
didn't want us to participate actively. they shouldn't have voted for us. ''134 Fellow 
Commissioner Torkel Opsahl assumed the position of acting Chairman. With the 
Tribunal established (at least on paper) there were increasing calls for the Commission to 
wind down its work. In late August, the Secretary General met with the remaining 
Commissioners and requested they draft a "non-paper", outlining proposed options for 
the body. 135 The "non-paper"suggested two options: (i) The continuation of the 
Commission until July 31,1994, at which time it would submit its final report and 
supporting documents, (ii) to continue the work on an indefinite basis to support the work 
of the prosecutor as well as to fulfill its mandate in accordance with Security Council 
32 Internal Minutes of the Commission of Experts, Fifth Session, First Meeting, May 24.1993. 
1" Letter from William Fenrick to Frits Kalshoven and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Department of National 
Defence, Office of the Judge Advocate General. Canada June 10,1993. 
134 See Patrick Bishop. 'Britain `snubbed' war crimes team'. Daily Telegraph, December 4.1993. 
3' Personal Diary of M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
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Resolution 780.136 When Opsahl died suddenly of a heart attack in September requiring 
the Commission to be reconstituted, Bassiouni, initially denied, was finally appointed 
Chairman. Two new members were also appointed. 137 At this stage the Commission still 
envisaged it would be working until July 1994 and forged ahead with large-scale rape 
investigation138, the Ovcara exhumation and several specific studies including 
Dubrovnik, Medak, Prijedor, Sarajevo and Vukovar. 
However, by October 1993, Fenrick's proposed exhumation of the site at Ovcara were 
running into trouble. Although the Serb `authorities" in Knin issued three decrees 
granting the team the necessary authorization, and a Dutch military engineering unit had 
been provided, the mission was abruptly halted after two days as a result of a subsequent 
Serb decree ordering all work to stop until a final political outcome had been reached in 
Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK). 139 The team had no other option but to pack up and 
leave. Ultimately, both the exhumation at Ovcara and the rape inquiry would remain 
unfinished as a result of the decision to terminate the Commission's budget as of April 
30,1993, three months earlier that the date previously agreed upon. Bassiouni was 
highly critical of the decision, arguing it would endanger the completion of the mass rape 
inquiry and suggesting the Commission should continue working until the Tribunal's 
investigations gained momentum. However, the internal minutes of the Commission 
reveal that two other Commissioners were of the opinion that its work should be 
concluded and taken over by the Tribunal, with Greve informing Bassiouni that the 
Norwegian government was reluctant to continue supporting the Commission in light of 
the recent appointment of Ramon Escovar Salom as ICTY Prosecutor. 140 Bassiouni's 
concerns would be to some extent realized when Salom decided not to take up the post, 
136 Commission "non paper. " 
137 Christine Cleiren (The Netherlands) would conduct a specific study on the legal aspects of sexual assault 
as a war crime and Hanne Sophie Greve (Norway) who would be appointed Commissioner for the Prijedor 
Project. 
138 For more details see M. Cherif Bassiouni and Marcia McCormick, 'Sexual Violence. An Invisible 
Weapon of \\'ar in the Former Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. 1. International Human Rights Law 
Institute, DePaul University College of Law, 1996. 
19 Internal Minutes of the Commission of Experts, Eighth Session, First Meeting, October 27,1993. 
140 Internal Minutes of the Commission of Experts, Ninth Session, Third Meeting. 1993. 
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throwing the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) into confusion and undermining the 
commencement of investigations. '4' 
Conclusions 
Despite the numerous obstacles it faced, the Commission of Experts succeeded in 
compiling extensive documentation relating to violations of International Humanitarian 
Law which served to illustrate the systematic and organized nature of much of the 
atrocities occurring in Bosnia and Croatia. Its field missions to the Ovcara mass-grave 
site were also instrumental in persuading individuals within the U. S. administration to 
support the establishment of an international tribunal. The Commission's specific inquiry 
into rape in war was the largest ever undertaken, and although it would be terminated 
before completion, placed the issue of sexual violence firmly on the agenda and provided 
momentum for calls to prosecute such acts by the Tribunal. Furthermore, Fenrick would 
go on to work for the Tribunal providing the nascent court with some much needed 
continuity and expertise. 
Bassiouni concludes that the "cumulative effect of [the Commissions work, ] much of 
which was corroborative, was to help establish patterns of violations from which certain 
policies could be identified, particularly the policy underlying the consistent failure of 
military and political leaders to act to prevent grave human rights violations and to punish 
their perpetrators. " 142 Others have been less sanguine about the value of the 
Commission's material for the purposes of launching prosecutions. Chuter claims, 
"Whatever its other virtues [the Commission Report] was described.... by one 
investigator as "basically useless" for evidential purposes, since it simple rehashed 
secondary sources. " 143 However, this assessment appears overly critical. Indeed, 
Greve's Prijedor report was vital for the Tribunal and was relied on in the application by 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in order to persuade Germany to defer to the Tribunal 
141 For further details on the selection of the Tribunal's Prosecutor see chapter two. 
142 Sec N]. Cherif Bassiouni. The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia' in 
ROGER S. CL; \RK AND M: \DELINE SANN (EDS. ) THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
(Transnational Publishers) 1994, p. 83. 
143 Scc D \VID CHUTER, \VAR CRIMPS CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD (Lynne Rienner) 
2003, p. 151). [hereinafter CHUT[: R, WAR CRIMES] 
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in the prosecution of Dusko Tadic. Furthermore, as Fenrick highlights. the 'Draft 
Sarajevo Battle Study' investigation was one of "the first steps forming the intellectual 
under-pinning of the Galic case [one of the Tribunal's subsequent ke\ cases] .., 
144 
Additionally, physical evidence, evidence logs, photos and police notes secured and 
compiled by the Canadian team would also prove highly valuable to the Tribunal. 
Richard Goldstone, the Tribunal's first Prosecutor, provides perhaps the most balanced 
overall conclusion; "it was a huge help because it was a compass.... It pointed [the 
Tribunal's Deputy Prosecutor] Graham Blewitt in the direction of the massacre and the 
death camps in the Prijedor region. "" 145 
With the Commission terminated, the focus turned to the Tribunal. As the following 
chapter illustrates, the Court would also confront many of the challenges which the 
Commission had faced. However, with its objectives to indict, obtain custody and place 
on trial, the stakes for the Tribunal would be much higher. 
144 Stec' William Fenrick quote in JOHN HAGAN, JI' TIC'F IN THE BALKANS. PROSECUTING WAR CRVNIFs IN 
Tiff HAGt1l TRIBUNAL (University of Chicago Press) 2003. p. 44 [hereinafter H wv\`. Jus iici: IN THE 
BALKANS] 
145 See Richard Goldstone quote in H: AGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 69. 
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Chapter Two: A Solidarist Moment? The Establishment of The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the challenges confronting the Tribunal 
during its initial investigations. 
Chapter two will focus on the establishment of the ICTY and the challenges the Tribunal 
faced during its initial years. Like the Commission, the Tribunal was established under 
Chapter VII of the U. N. Security Council and a number of 'pro-prosecution" 
commentators have argued that the decision to use this route was predicated on the 
recognition within the Council of a nexus between justice and the restoration of peace. 
The author challenges this premise, suggesting that behind this purported apparently 
complementary nexus, lay deep contradictions. With the 'International Community' 
refusing to engage in more robust military action to bring an end to the fighting. 
negotiation with the senior political and military leaders of the `warring factions' 
remained a necessity. Thus, rather than representing a mechanism which would facilitate 
the restoration of peace, a Tribunal which could indict such leaders was viewed by some 
as a potentially disruptive dynamic. 
Consequently, the debate surrounding the creation of the Tribunal largely mirrored that of 
the negotiations relating to the establishment of the Commission. With the U. K. playing 
a lead role in the diplomatic negotiations, it pursued a policy which sought to seriously 
erode the Court's power, advocating a series of proposals including the suggestion that 
amnesties for heads of state should be retained as an option. Although, the ICTY's 
statute would expressly rule out the proposal, the threat of de facto amnesties being 
offered would constantly loom over the Tribunal. The chapter will go on to demonstrate 
how the appointment of a Prosecutor would descend into a protracted, politicized affair, 
with the U. K. blocking the candidacy of former Commission Chairman, Cherif 
Bassiouni, due to fears that an activist prosecutor would focus on senior leaders involved 
in the negotiations. 
The Tribunal's Statute will also be briefly assessed, illustrating how a number of key 
provisions granted the institution an unprecedented level of power to penetrate State 
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sovereignty. This development would be greeted with unease, not only by Serbia, the 
focus of a large part of the Tribunal's investigations, but also by other U. N. member- 
States concerned at the potential precedent the Tribunal may have established. The 
chapter will also discuss how the Tribunal was placed in a similar predicament to the 
Commission regarding State cooperation. The problem was perhaps even more acute for 
the ICTY in light of its goal of actually issuing indictments and obtaining the necessary 
evidence to ensure a conviction. With the conflicts ongoing, the scope for conducting 
investigations on the ground was extremely limited during this time. However, the 
Tribunal's endeavors to establish credible cases via the use of other material were also 
undermined by the unwillingness of many Western States to provide relevant intelligence 
material. Similar to the experiences of the Commission, this also appears to have been 
partially predicated on some States' concerns that such information could have facilitated 
indictments, which if directed at senior leaders, could complicate the ongoing negotiation 
process, and also a reluctance to disclose methods and sources. Additional factors 
however, will also be explored, demonstrating that both a culture of non-disclosure 
inherent within many intelligence services, and the perception that information sharing 
with the Tribunal resulted in no reciprocity, played a significant role in determining 
minimal cooperation. Finally, the chapter will conclude by briefly exploring the events 
which led to the end of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, paving the way for the Dayton 
diplomatic peace initiative. 
Establishing the Tribunal 
On February 22,1993, The Security Council had unanimously adopted Resolution 8081 
which decided, "an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. '"2 However, the Resolution failed to 
specify how the Tribunal would be created or on what legal basis, and instead requested 
that the Secretary General present, within 60 days, a report "including specific proposals 
and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation of the 
1 See S. C. Res. 808, U. N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. U. N. Doc. S/RESi808 (1993) 
2 Sec, S. C. Res. 808, U. N. SCOR. 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. U. N. Doc. S'RES/808 (1993) 
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decision [to establish an international tribunal].. .. taking into account suggestions put 
forward in this regard by Member States. "3 Proposals were received from thirty States 
and a number of NGOs, and three draft statutes were submitted. 4 The U. N. 's OLA. with 
whom the Commission had experienced a fractious relationship, was assigned the task of 
compiling the report. 
In many ways the suggestions advanced by Member States (both public and private) 
reflected their wider attitude towards the Tribunal. Given the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation in Bosnia in 1993, and the numerous media reports of widespread and 
systematic violations of international humanitarian law, most States were aware that 
`officially' opposing a Tribunal was not a viable policy. Thus, instead, a number 
embarked on what Forsythe characterizes as "double diplomatic game of public 
endorsement but private opposition. -5 Again, Britain has been singled out by a number 
of sources as pursuing a strategy designed to undermine the court, leading Simms to 
charge "At almost every stage of its gestation at the UN, British diplomats and lawyers 
strove to stifle the War Crimes Tribunal at birth. "' With British government policy 
primarily focused on achieving a diplomatic settlement to the conflict, an active Tribunal 
with the power to indict individuals deemed crucial to such a settlement, appears to have 
been perceived as contrary to achieving this aim. Thus, a confidential British non-paper 
submitted to the U. N. Secretariat, entitled `Former Yugoslavia: War crimes 
Implementation of Resolution 808. Comments and Observations of the United 
Kingdom'7 contained a number of premises, which, if implemented, would have 
frustrated The Tribunal's creation, or at a minimum, curtailed the court's scope to 
prosecute those most responsible. The non-paper argued, "The most appropriate basis for 
establishing an international criminal tribunal would be a treaty between the successor 
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
U. N. Doc S 25704,3 May 1993. 
' Draft Statutes were submitted by France, Italy, and Sweden on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
CSCE. 
` See David Forsyth, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View', Netherlands Quarterle of Human 
Rights, Vol. 151,1997, p. 8. 
6 See BRENDAN SIAMS, UNFINI ti 1 HOUR. BRITAIN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF BOSNIA. (Allen Lane, 
Penguin Press) 2001, p. 62. [hereinafter SiNIMS, UNFINEST HOUR] 
7 Set, Guest, On Trial, Annex 2. The British "Non-paper" on the Tribunal' pp. 181-184. 
57 
states of former Yugoslavia and other concerned states. Under it the successor states 
would cede jurisdiction to the tribunal. "8 
Whilst this approach may have been the most legally sound from a narrow positivist, 
sovereigntist perspective, it had serious practical limitations. As the subsequent report of 
the Secretary General noted, "the treaty approach incurs the disadvantage of requiring 
considerable time to establish an instrument and then to achieve the required number of 
ratifications for entry into force. Even then, there could be no guarantee that ratifications 
will be received from those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly 
effective. "`' As Madeline Albright, U. S. Ambassador to the U. N. pointed out, "The 
crimes being committed ... often are the systematic and orchestrated crimes of 
government officials, [and] military commanders. "10 Given the extensive nature of State 
involvement in the commission of many of the atrocities, particularly with regard to the 
execution of the `Serbian project', the British proposal to go down the Treaty route with 
the FRY successor states can be characterized as either naive or a mechanism designed to 
delay the court's creation. 
Perhaps the most revealing passage of the non-paper related to the issue of Competence 
Rationae Personae. ll It suggested "Consideration may, however, have to be given to the 
question whether some persons (e. g. Heads of State and Government) might be entitle[d] 
to immunity from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. " The paper then went on to 
acknowledge Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, explicit denial of sovereign immunity. 
but also posited, "It may in any case be undesirable politically to include any provision 
on the subject in the draft statutes (or even a reference to it in the report. ). ' 12 The 
position clearly contradicted the principles of international law enshrined in the 
8 See Guest, On Trial. Annex 2. The British "Non-Paper" on the Tribunal'. p. 181. 
9 Sec Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). 
U. N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) reproduced in n1ORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II, 
p. 7. (emphasis added. ) 
10 See Madeline Albright statement, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and 
Seventeenth Meeting. Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 May 1993, at 9 p. m.. reproduced in 
MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY. pp. 185-186. 
11 Personal Jurisdiction. 
12 Sec Guest. On Trial. Anne\ 2. The British "Non-Paper" on the Tribunal', p. 183. 
j8 
Nuremberg Charter and affirmed in the subsequent judgment U. N. Declaration on the 
Nuremberg Principles, which declared that sovereign immunity does not afford 
protection to individuals where crimes against humanity have been committed. It also 
contrasted with the other submitted opinions as the U. N. 's subsequent commentary on the 
Statute revealed, "virtually all of the written comments received by the U. N. ý\ ould argue 
that heads of state could be held criminally responsible. " 13 
Finally, the non-paper stated the tribunal should be modest in size [and] [t]he judges, 
including the President, should not be full-time.... [and] [a]cademic lawyers and 
specialists in human rights law would not be suitable. " 14 These suggestions, if acted upon 
would have prevented the appointment of some of the most knowledgeable and proactive 
candidates (such as the Tribunal's first President, the distinguished Italian international 
humanitarian law Professor, Antonio Cassese). Given that the Tribunal's judges would 
be responsible for drafting the Tribunals rules of procedure, the suggested prohibition of 
"specialists" in the fields of human rights law, could also be interpreted as either a crass 
oversight or another way of removing a potential strength of the court. 
In light of Britain's earlier attitude to the Commission and the possibility of prosecutions, 
the paper conveyed the impression that it "was merely the latest in a series of moves to 
undermine the U. N. 's pursuit of war criminals. First there had been the campaign to 
weaken the Commission of Experts and deny it funds; then the apparent reluctance to 
supply information to the Commission; then the campaign to weaken references to 
genocide; now opposition of a strong Tribunal. Taken singly, these concerns might have 
appeared justified and prudent. Taken together, however... they amounted to a singular 
vote of no confidence in the U. N. 's war crimes effort. " 5 
Russia proposed that the Tribunal be administered by a sub committee of the CSCE 
governments (which included the states of the former Yugoslavia. ) 16 In a similar vein, 
1' Sec Guest, On Trial, p. 120. 
14 Sec Guest, On Trial, Annex 2. The British "Non-Paper" on the Tribunal'. p. 184. 
15 Sec Guest. On Trial. pp. 122-123. 
16 Sec Steven Erlanger, 'Nlosco\\ Stepping in', New York Times, 20 May. 1993. 
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the U. S. suggested the court be supervised by an administrative council composed of the 
members of the Security Council. '7 Supporters of the Tribunal viewed the Russian 
suggestion as an attempt to restrict the institution by additional bureaucratic constraints, 
whereas the U. S. proposal was seen as a crude attempt to impose the Securit\ Council's 
influence and agenda directly on the Tribunal. Ultimately, both options were rejected. 
However, by controlling all the key nominations of the Court, the Security Council would 
retain significant influence. 
The U. S. also called for the Tribunal to be funded from the U. N. regular budget, leading 
some to accuse it of wanting the best of both worlds; the retention of substantial influence 
over the Tribunal via the Security Council nexus, without having to pay for it. The Dutch 
Government's submission was the most proactive. It proposed that investigations should 
commence "immediately" after the adoption of the charter and suggested that the 
prosecutor would need "at least several hundred investigators, including public 
prosecutors, policemen and medical specialists, all with considerable experience in the 
investigation of serious crimes. " 8 In its submission to the Security Council, France 
concluded that the establishment of an international criminal court to adjudicate atrocity 
crimes "while not impossible, would encounter numerous obstacles, and it seems 
unrealistic to believe that such a court could be established within the necessary time- 
frame. "19 Instead, it suggested, "[i]n line with the trend towards interpreting the Charter 
dynamically and teleologically, the Committee believes that the Security Council could, 
if necessary, establish such a Tribunal by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Chapter 
VII of the Charter. , 20 
17 See Federic Megret The politics of International Criminal Justice', European Journal of International 
Lau', Vol. 13., No. 5., (2002) p. 1275. 
18 See Guest, On Trial, p. 124. 
19 See Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the permanent representative of France to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General S25266,10 February 1993, reproduced in, MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN 
INSIDFR's GUIDE To Ttit ICTY Vol. II. p. 332. 
20 See Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the permanent representative of France to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General S 25266,10 February 1993, reproduced in, MORRIS AND SCHARF. AN 
INSIE)FR's GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II, p. 334. 
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The Security Council Route 
The OLA ultimately decided that the Tribunal should be established by the U. N. Security 
Council, acting under powers conferred upon it by Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter. The 
Security Council route was consistent with the process by which the Commission was 
created and it also removed the problem of obtaining States' ratification. The alternative 
approach contained considerable drawbacks. A treaty, by its very definition, only enters 
into force once its parties sign and ratify it. Given FRY's policy of the "Serbian Project" 
and its "strategy of War Crimes" it was inconceivable that it would agree to such a 
Treaty. However, a Chapter VII declaration by the Security Council would take affect 
immediately, and critically, create binding obligations on all States. 
A number of `pro-prosecution' commentators have emphasised the existence of a clear 
nexus between justice and peace, suggesting that the establishment of such a Tribunal 
under the Council's Chapter VII powers would actually contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of'peace. Hochkammer argued that the ICTY was "significant because its 
very existence will at the very least facilitate negotiations towards a peace settIcInClrt. "2' 
Similarly, Akhavan argued that "there was a political consensus on the complementary 
interrelationship between the establishment of the Tribunal and the restoration of peace 
and security in the former Yugoslavia"22, whilst David Scheffer claims that The Council 
recognized the enforcement of international law as an immediate priority, subordinate to 
neither political nor military imperatives. "23 Similarly, Arbour noted, "The link between 
criminal accountability and peace was essential to the juridical foundation of the 
intervention by the Security Council. In order to avail itself to chapter 7.... thereby 
overriding state sovereignty .... the Security Council was bound by law to 
find a threat to 
world peace and to enact a measure - in this case, for the first time ever, a measure of 
2L See K. A. Hochkammer, `The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics and 
International Laww ', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 28, pt. 1,1995, p. 124, (emphasis 
added) 
22 See Payam Akhavan quote in David P. Forsythe, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View', 
Netherlands Ouarterh" ol'Humnan Rights, 15.1, March 1997, p. 9. 
23 See David Scheffer quote in David P. Forsythe. 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View'. 
,V 'thcrlandc 
Ouarterhv of Hannan Rights, 15 . 
1. March 1997. p. 9. 
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personal criminal accountability - that would serve to r-e-establish the disturbed peace. "24 
The Tribunal's first annual report also optimistically suggested that rather than 
representing an obstacle to peace, the court would contribute to the peace process by 
"creating conditions rendering a return to normality less difficult. "-5 
Whilst Arbour's contention that the link between accountability and peace was csscntial 
to the juridical foundation of the intervention by the Security Council. is factually correct, 
the author contests the other remarks, positing that behind this suggested unequivocal 
link between justice and the restoration of peace, lay a profound tension. With the 
'International Community' unwilling to pursue robust military options to decisively end 
the conflict in Bosnia, and none of the `warring factions' able to achieve an outright 
military victory, the diplomatic negotiation process remained the most viable route to end 
the fighting. Thus, rather than the establishment of the Tribunal representing a dynamic 
which would contribute to the restoration of peace, the possibility that the court would 
indict senior leaders deemed essential to any negotiated settlement, represented a possible 
impediment to such a settlement. In light of this tension, the above 'pro-prosecution' 
assertions seem to be premised on a somewhat tenuous rationale, leading Forsythe to 
argue such narratives "seem to be trying to construct a certain interpretation for the 
benefit of posterity, rather than accurately report what actually transpired during 1992- 
1993. Nothing could be further from the truth than to say that there was a consensus on 
the compatibility between peace and legal justice, and that it was agreed that legal justice 
should be pursued without concern for political and military factors . Indeed, much of 
the empirical material presented in this thesis supports this view. Britain clearly saw both 
a robust Commission and Tribunal as having the potential to disrupt the diplomatic drive 
to achieve a negotiated settlement. Whilst it may have voted for the Tribunal, this 
decision was predicated largely on the strategic premise that to be seen to vote against 
Sec Madam Justice Louise Arbour, War Crimes and the Culture of Peace', The Senator Keith Dave\ 
Lecture, Delivered in the MacMillan Auditorium, University of Toronto, January 11,2001. (emphasis 
added) 
25 Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A49i342'S1994/1007,29 August 1994, para. 15. 
20 See David P. Forsythe, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View'. Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, 1 5.1, March 1997, p. 9. 
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such an institution would clearly be a serious public relations error. Even within States 
which some commentators have portrayed as largely championing the court i. e. the U. S.. 
deep tensions existed between the 'pro-prosecution' and 'pro-negotiation' camps over the 
extent to which the policy of prosecutions should be supported. Again, Forsythe's 
insights provide perhaps a more pragmatic and balanced assessment, when he posits 
"The Court did not reflect a sea change in international moral solidarity, but rather a 
confluence of varying political calculations. "27 
Piercing Sovereignty: The Tribunal's Statute and States Responses 
The Statute provided for jurisdiction over four different international crimes, Grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 194928, Violations of the laws or customs of 
war29, Genocide30, and Crimes against humanity. 31 It also stipulated that The Tribunal 
had primacy over national courts32 and granted the Prosecutor the power to conduct on- 
site investigations. 33 States would be under an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal 
and to assist at all stages of investigation. 34 Contrary to British suggestions regarding 
head of State immunity, the statute invoked the precedent of the Nuremberg judgment, 
with Article 7 (2) providing; "The official position of any accused person, whether head 
of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such 
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. , 35 It also went on to reaffirm 
the principle of command responsibility in Article 7(3) declaring; The fact that any of 
the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present statute was committed by a subordinate 
does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know 
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
27 See David P. Forsythe, 'International Criminal Courts: A Political View'. Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, 15,1, March 1997, p. 8. 
28 See Article 2, Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
29 See Article 3, Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
30 Sce Article 4. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
31 See Article 4. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
32 See Article 9(2), Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
33 See Article 18(2), Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
;a Sec Article 29. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
35 See Article 7(2). Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
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to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators 
thereof. -36 
The establishment of an international judicial organ, mandated to prosecute atrocity 
crimes under the principle of individual criminal responsibility. represented an 
unprecedented development by the Security Council. The Tribunal was keen to 
emphasize its unique character, stressing that unlike Nuremberg or Tokyo, it was not an 
organ of a group of States, but "an organ of the whole international community. "37 
However, for several States, both the establishment of an institution, which in principle, 
had the power to penetrate State sovereignty and exert primacy over a State's domestic 
jurisdiction, and the associated expansion of the Security Council's poww er. ww as greeted 
with unease. 
Given its extensive involvement in the commission of atrocity crimes, the move was 
predictably condemned by FRY. In a written response to the OLA's draft submission 
which was transmitted to the General Assembly and Security Council, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of FRY countered, "Yugoslavia has its doubts 
about the impartiality of the ad hoc tribunal, particularly because of the one-sided 
approach of the United Nations Security Council to the responsibility for armed conflicts 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. " They went on to argue "the Security Council 
has no mandate to establish an international tribunal, nor does Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter provide for the establishment of that tribunal... The proposed statute... is 
inconsistent and replete with legal lacunae to the extent that it makes it unacceptable to 
any State cherishing its sovereignty. "" Finally, the letter alluded to the level of 
cooperation the Tribunal could expect to receive from FRY, warning, "The establishment 
36 Sec Article 7(3), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
37 See Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 199 1, A, 49/342, 'S '1994%1007,29 August 1994, para. 10. 
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of an ad hoc tribunal is also contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of [FRY] which 
prohibits extradition of Yugoslav nationals. "38 
However, it was not only FRY which expressed concerns. As French Foreign Minister 
Roland Dumas noted, the U. N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali reportedly expressed 
some sympathy towards the FRY reaction. "He thought that such a tribunal constituted 
interference in the interior affairs of the state. Yugoslavia had been an important state for 
the U. N., one of the diplomatic standard-bearers for the Non-aligned movement. -39 
Similarly, although China voted for Resolution 827, its remarks to the Council during the 
ensuing debate illustrated its deep unease over the possibility that the ICTY represented a 
template which could be applied to other situations. China's representative claimed "to 
adopt by a Security Council resolution the Statute of the International Tribunal which 
gives the Tribunal both preferential and exclusive jurisdiction is not in compliant c with 
the principle of State judicial sover-eignt'... In short, the Chinese delegation emphasizes 
that the International Tribunal established in the current manner can onhv be an ad hoc 
arrangement suited only to the special circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and shall 
not constitute any precedent. , 40 Evidently harbouring similar concerns over the 
development of a potential precedent, elements within the Pentagon maintained strong 
reservations relating to Article 7 (3) and the principle of Command Responsibility. ` 1 
Several other States also expressed disquiet over the expansion of Security Council 
power, and the way in which the five permanent members had decided at informal 
meetings that there would be no amendments or wider discussions of the Statute. The 
process was viewed as particularly exclusive and exclusionary by the nonaligned States. 
"It was rammed down our throats, " claimed Diego Arria, Venezuela's (then) ambassador 
to the U. N., "They said to us: If you object you'll be responsible for damaging the war 
38 See Letter Dated 19 May 1993 from the Charge D'Affairs A. I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General A/48; 170, Sß'25801.21 
May 1993, reproduced in MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II. p. 480. 
'Q Ste Roland Dumas quote in Scc HAtAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 36. 
40 Sec, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting. Held 
at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday 25 May 1993, at 9 p. m. S , P\'. 3217,25 May 1993. reproduced in 
MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II, p. 199-200. 
41 Sec HA/AN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 36. 
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crimes Tribunal. -42 The affair caused deep resentment Mithin the General Assembly. 
intensifying the division between the two U. N. bodies. This would directly impact upon 
the Tribunal when, as a way of responding to the Security Council's high-handed 
approach, the General Assembly would regularly contest and limit the Court's budget, 
leaving it financially hamstrung in its early years. 
In contrast to the perspective which maintained the Tribunal was established due to a 
recognition of the role it could play in actively contributing to peace, a number of 
commentators argued that the `International Community's' decision to establish a 
Tribunal represented nothing more than a cynical exercise, designed to assuage guilt for 
its reluctance to militarily intervene and stop the `Serbian project. ' As Hazan su<ggests, 
"For Western governments.... to assert the need for an international tribunal... . 
is clearly 
an attempt to dispel suspicion of their own cowardice.... The "new Nurembet-g" is 
designed to soothe public opinion. -13 Similarly, Antonio Cassese a former President of 
the Tribunal would later highlight, "Some assert outright that the creation of the Tribunal 
reflects the incapacity of the international community to deal with the tragic conflict 
raging in the former Yugoslavia. [They believe] the judicial solution has been adopted 
for want of a better one, as an "ersatz" for the political solution; the establishment of the 
Tribunal is thus viewed as no more than a sign of weakness, if not hypocrisy on the part 
of the United Nations. -44 David Scheffer, the former U. S. Ambassador at large for war 
crimes issues, who was heavily involved in the process, provides a rare and refreshing 
insider response which challenges this oft-repeated charge. Scheffer argues The failure 
to act militarily resulted from decisions and circumstances that had nothing to do with the 
ICTY and should be critiqued on their own merits. Those decisions would have been the 
same with or without the existence of the ICTY in 1993 and for some time thereafter. " 
He goes on to point out "If the ICTY had been the excuse for governmental inaction that 
some presume, then the Tribunal would have been accorded far more deference in policy- 
making, as a panacea for such action. But, we had to struggle every step of the way to 
4' See Guest, On Trial, p. 129.. 
43 Scc HA/AN. JUS I ICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 40. 
44 See Antonio Cassese quote in WILLIAMS AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?, p. 96. 
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sustain the ICTY's relevance and importance in deliberations over US and UN policy in 
the Balkans. '4' 
Whatever the motivations behind the creation of the ICTY, at a very minimum, by paying 
lip service to the notion of international criminal prosecutions, the `International 
Community' created a serious benchmark, which over time would become increasingly 
difficult to completely control. Indeed, as Robertson notes, once such institutions are 
established they "have the tendency to develop a momentum of their own, independent of 
the concerns of those who create them. "46 As Louise Arbour, former Prosecutor of the 
tribunal remarked "as a lawyer I find it difficult to believe that those who voted for [the 
tribunal] didn't realize what they were launching. On its face, ýv ere launching a prett\ 
robust and well-equipped institution, and one that is difficult to recall. If it was a cynical 
act, my God, was it ever stupid .., 
47 Nevertheless, as will be illustrated, during the initial 
few years of its existence, the Tribunal would face a particularly difficult struggle to 
discharge its mandate. 
An Uncertain Start: Appointing the Bench 
Unlike the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which employed several 
hundred personnel and was well funded, the ICTY found itself under-staffed, under- 
funded, and after being informed by representatives of the International Court of Justice 
that it could not use its premises, having to set up in the offices of an insurance firm. 
Despite the lofty proclamations of support from the members of the Security Council, the 
Tribunal would face an uphill battle during its early years to gain the necessary staff and 
funding to enable it to discharge its mandate properly. As Akhavan dryly noted "There is 
a great distance between the establishment of an ad hoc judicial institution through a 
Security Council resolution and rendering it operational at the practical level. "` 8 
45 See David Scheffer. 'Three Memories for the Year of Origin, 1993, Symposium on `The ICTY 10 Years 
on: The View from Inside', Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2.. No. 2,2004, p. 354. 
46 Sec ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, p. 267. 
47 Sec Charles Trueheart, '. A New Kind of Justice'. Atlantic Monthh", April 2000. 
41, 'S(, (, Payam Akhavan The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment'. American Journal of International Law, 90, No. 3,1996. p. 508. 
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The U. N. Secretary General invited States to submit nominations for the judicial 
positions. However, still angry at their exclusion from the Statute negotiations, many 
States failed to nominate. 41 candidates from 38 countries were proposed and submitted 
to the General Assembly, only half the number expected by the U. N. In mid-September, 
after three days of voting the eleven judges were selected. 49 At their first meeting in The 
Hague on November 17,1993, the judges elected Italian jurist Antonio Cassese as the 
Tribunal's first President, and the enormity of the task ahead became clear. The Judges 
had to wear gowns donated by The Hague Bar Association at the swearing in ceremony, 
with Cassese recounting "Our borrowed robes symbolized the total lack of infrastructures 
or facilities at our disposal. We had no seat, no courtroom, no prison, no budget, no 
computers, no law clerks, no secretaries and no set of rules guiding criminal 
procedure. "50 The absence of a Prosecutor or a functioning prosecution team also meant 
that investigations could not commence and indictments could not be issued. With no 
permanent staff, and an uncertain financial future, Cassese would later suggest that the 
Security Council had "thought we'd never become operational., " 51 
A number of commentators have subsequently criticised the way in which the ICTY was 
established, with one of the Tribunal's Prosecutors, Louise Arbour, later arguing. -y, ou 
don't launch an investigative and judicial tribunal the way the ICTY was set up. You 
don't start with renting a building, hiring 11 judges, including a full complement of 
appeal court judges before you've even hired the first investigator, let alone the 
prosecutor. "52 Similarly, Chuter suggests that for many officials in The Hague, it was 
strange that most of the early attention was focused on the appointment of judges, -11, ho 
had nothing at all to do for several yeas-s, rather than on investigations staff, without 
whom the judges would continue to have nothing to do. "53 Indeed, a similar view 
49 The judges were; Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt): Antonio Cassese (Italy); Jules Deschenes (Canada); 
Germain le Foyer de Costil (France); Adolphus Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria); Li Haopei (China): Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald (United States); Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica); Rustam Sidhwa (Pakistan): Ninian Stephen 
(Australia); Lai Chand Vorah (Malaysia); 
50 Srr Antonio Cassese. The ICTI': A Lip ing and Vital Reality', in The ICTY 10 Years On: The Vie%\ 
from Inside, Journal of Inn'rnational 
C7 iminal Justice, Vol. 2. No. 2. June 2004. p. 585. 
51 Sec' KASS. STAY THE HAND OF VI NGFANCL:, p. 217. 
52 Sec, Louise Arbour quote in HAGAN. JUsTICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 97 
51 SccCHUTI R. WAR CRIME`,, p. 145. (emphasis added) 
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apparently existed amongst some of the judges, who, seemingly unsure as to what their 
role was at the initial stages of the Tribunal's existence, suggested packing up and going 
home until a budget had been approved. 54 
However, Chuter's characterization may be viewed as overly negative. Although it 
would be two years before any of the judges would see a defendant in court, they were in 
fact involved in crucially important work from the Tribunal's early stages. Under the 
guidance of Cassese, the judges spent three months drafting the Tribunal's Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE), a process that clearly benefited from their formidable 
legal skills. The RPE would prove vital in providing the necessary structure for all three 
organs of the Tribunal: the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and the 
Registry. As the Tribunal's first Annual Report highlights, without the RPE, the 
Prosecutor would not have been able to fully perform the task of investigation and 
prosecution. 55 Furthermore, the RPE provided important guidance to Member States 
which were required to enact or amend legislation in order to comply with their 
obligations vis-ä-vis the Tribunal. 56 With little in the way of precedent (the RPE for both 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were rudimentary and brief), the judges drafted a 
total of 125 rules. The process was a formidable exercise in judicial independence and 
innovation with Judge McDonald later acknowledging We basically created an 
international code of criminal procedure. "57 A number of the Rules served to reaffirm the 
provisions within the Statute with regard to the Tribunal's primacy over States. Rule 58 
represented a thorough rebuff to the suggestion (alluded to in FRY's written response to 
the establishment of the Tribunal) that elements of a State's domestic legislation could 
override the Tribunal, emphasizing "The obligations laid down in Article 29 
[Cooperation and judicial assistance] shall prevail over any legal impediment to the 
54 Sec HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 50. 
55 Set, Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991. A/49 342! S1994/1007,29 August 1994, para. 57. 
56 Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A 49 342 S'1994/1007,29 August 1994, para. 57. 
57 See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald quote in Barbra Crossette. 'World Criminal Court Ha\ ing Painful Birth'. 
, Veºr York Tinics. 
August 13,1997. 
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surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which may exist under 
national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned. "58 In his summary of the RPE. 
Cassese stressed "These obligations prevail over any internal national law impediment to 
the surrender or transfer of the accused. " He went onto to reassert the Tribunal's "po\\ er 
to report to the Security Council cases of State inaction or refusal to cooperate... If such a 
step proves necessary, we will look to the members of the Security Council for support 
on an international scale. "59 The Tribunal's President would constantly remind the 
`International Community' of the duty incumbent on States to comply with orders issued 
by the Tribunal and would be the first of a succession of the court's senior officials w\ ho 
would try in vain to persuade the Security Council to impose sanctions on FRY for non- 
compliance. 
A Rudderless Ship: The Struggle to Select a Prosecutor 
Despite the impressive work done by the judges in drafting the RPE, the absence of a 
prosecutor was undermining the ICTY. Given the ambivalent attitude towards the 
Tribunal from many within the `International Community', it was essential that a central 
figurehead should be quickly appointed, who could articulate the Tribunal's mission, 
seek to ensure it was not sidelined, and provide crucial guidance and direction to the 
OTP. However, the statute of the Tribunal stipulated that the appointment would be 
made by the Security Council, 60 providing the U. K. with an opportunity to block the 
candidacy of Bassiouni, whom they viewed as likely to upset the diplomatic negotiations 
through an activist OTP strategy aimed at indicting the 'Big Fish. ' Consequently. the 
selection process would descend into an embroiled "protracted, politicized fiasco"61 
leaving the Court without a Prosecutor for fourteen months. 
The candidacy of Kenya's Amos Wako was swiftly rejected. Although Wako had a 
background in human rights and prosecutions, the appointment of an individual who 
served as the chief law enforcement officer under dictatorial Kenyan President Daniel 
58 Sec Rules of Procedure, Rule 58. 
59 See Statement by the President made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions, IT 29. February 
11,1994. reproduced in MORRIS AND SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE ICTY Vol. II. p. 655. 
"0 Set, Article 10(4), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
61 See B; \SS S"I: \Y TºIU HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 217. 
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Arap Moi was viewed as less than ideal. Bassiouni was keen to take up the position, and 
received the support from the Islamic and nonaligned members of the Security Council. 
However, he came up against serious opposition from Britain, who after citing 
Bassiouni's lack of prosecutorial experience, proposed the alternative candidate John 
Duncan Lowe, the (then) Crown Agent for the Scottish legal system. In a letter to the 
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, William Powell MP (Corby Cons. ). a keen supporter of 
a robust tribunal, was incredulous, "The suggestion that Professor Bassiouni lacks 
prosecutorial experience is unworthy of Great Britain - particularly as the United 
Kingdom has suggested a candidate without any known international experience or 
knowledge and whose past experience is widely regarded as limited. " Powell continued, 
"My fear is that rather than seeking the person most qualified.... Great Britain has opted 
for something rather different, namely to establish somebody without any knowledge of 
the situation in order that a politically desirable result can be achieved.... 1 have been told 
from a variety of sources that our true motive is to discredit any idea of prosecutions in 
case they were to interfere with the work of Lord Owen. '62 Similarly, the Times reported 
"diplomatic sources said the real reason [behind opposition to Bassiouni's appointment] 
is that the European countries are afraid Dr. Bassiouni ut'ill move to quickh' to charge Serb 
and possibly Croat leaders with war crimes. "63 A British official acknowledged "[there 
was] a general feeling that at some stage we were going to have to talk to the Serbs. It 
wasn't going to help very much if all of them were going to be in fear of arrest at The 
Hague. "64 Such concerns may have not have been unwarranted, as Bassiouni himself 
stated, "From the beginning I said I was not interested in going after the little soldier who 
commits the individual crime. I was after building a case against the leaders who make 
the decisions. "65 In August 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally nominated Bassiouni. 
However, Albright telephoned the former Commission chairman, to inform him the 
soundings coming from New York were not positive and it did not look like he would 
achieve the requisite number of votes. As a compromise, Albright suggested Bassiouni 
take up the position of Deputy Prosecutor under Lowe, which he was unwilling to accept. 
62 Letter from William Powell MP (Corby) to Rt. Hon Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State, The Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, September 17,1993. 
63 See James Bone, 'U. K. Blocks Choice of War Crimes Prosecutor', Tinies, September 4.1993. 
64 Sec Tom Richardson, quote in S1NIMS, UNFINES r HouR, p. 63, footnote 75. 
65 Sec, M Cherif Bassiouni quote, in H: \c'.: AN, JtIS I ICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 5T'. 
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Consequently, Bassiouni was voted down in the Council, and Britain went on to propose 
that any subsequent nominee must be selected by consensus, bringing the spectre of the 
veto into the process and effectively ending any chance of a quick appointment. 
A series of alternative candidates were proposed, all of whom failed to receive the 
requisite support. The U. S. lobbied for Argentinean lawyer Luis Gabrielle Moreno 
Ocampo, who had had prosecuted a number of Argentine Generals implicated in the 
country's `dirty war. '66 However, Ocampo was a member of Argentina's political 
opposition, and the Menem government opposed his nomination. 67 The Secretary 
General nominated former Indian Attorney General, Soli Jehangir Sorabjee, only to be 
vetoed by Pakistan. The situation was rapidly descending into a political gridlock when 
Ramon Escovar Salom, a former Venezuelan Attorney General, was successfully 
nominated By Boutros-Ghali, and named Prosecutor on October 22,1993. The relief at 
finding a candidate would be short lived, when after four months, Escovar Salom 
informed the Secretary General that he no longer wanted the position and would be 
assuming the role as Venezuela's Interior Minister. However, before resigning, Salom 
did at least appoint a deputy. Graham Blewitt, an Australian who had headed the 
country's war crime unit would be tasked with running the OTP until a Prosecutor could 
be found. 
Russia, disgruntled over its failure to secure a judicial position at the ICTY, blocked the 
appointment of another U. S. nominee Charles Ruff, and also a Canadian candidate 
Christopher Amerashinge, on the grounds that no citizen from a NATO member-State 
would be acceptable. Frustration was giving way to desperation, and the situation was 
beginning to adversely affect the Tribunal. Blewitt expressed concern that he lacked the 
authority to issue indictments, and feared a potential legal challenge from the indictees 
defence counsel. President Cassese was even considering asking his fellow judges to 
66 For further details on Argentina's `dirty war' secs MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR. 
ARGENTIN: \ AND THE: LI G: ýCIEa OF TORTURE (Oxford Uni. Press) 1998 
67 Sec Da\ id Scheffer, 'Three Memories for the Year of Origin. 1993'. Symposium on 'The ICTY 10 Years 
on: The View from Inside'. Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2., No. 2,2004, p. 359. 
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resign en masse in protest in response to the situation. 68 However, on July 8,1994, the 
impasse was finally broken, when the Security Council unanimously approved the 
nomination of Richard Goldstone. A justice of the South African Supreme Court, 
Goldstone had made his name heading the South African Commission of Inquiry into 
Political Violence and Intimidation (CIPVI). Russia's initial skepticism was placated by 
U. S. assurances that Goldstone would be immune from direct influence by Contact Group 
countries. 69 The new Prosecutor would soon discover that like his previous work in 
South Africa, his role at the Tribunal would plunge him into a legal investigation 
influenced by a wider highly politicized environment. His initial visit to New York to 
meet the Secretary-General would be a sobering indication of the Tribunal's financial 
health: he had to pay for his own air fare. 70 
Funding Problems 
Indeed the Tribunal would be beset by funding problems during its first two years. As 
Guest notes, In a series of extraordinary moves they [Member States and the U. N. 
Secretariat] ensured that the Tribunal's resources were inadequate, inappropriate, and 
vulnerable to political pressure . -71 The main point of contention related to who would 
foot the bill, with The U. N. Security Council recommended it be financed from the U. N. 
regular budget. Whilst this route would have assured some continuity (as the U. N. 
budget runs on a two year cycle) the General Assembly, which has overall authority for 
budgetary issues, was not even consulted over this crucial proposal. "Not only was this 
[perceived to be] another example of the Security Council's arrogance, but [States of the 
General Assembly] would also be paying several times more towards the cost of the 
Tribunal than if it had been funded under U. N. peace-keeping. The five permanent 
members of the Security Council. in contrast, would be paying far less. "'' Even 
68 Sc'c B. \SS Si -i\1' THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 219. 
69 Sec' SH: \TTUCK. FREEDOM ON FIRE, p. 144. 
70 Ste RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY. REFLECTIONS OF A'WAR CRIMES INVE=STIGATOR, (Yale 
University Press) 2000. p. 77. [hereinafter GOLDSTONE. FOR HUMANI IY] 
71 See Guest, On Trial. p. 135. 
72 Sec Guest, On Trial, p. 135. 
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Bassiouni saw this as a politically tactless decision, describing it as a "knee jerk reaction 
- keep out the General Assembly. "73 
The dispute over funding would have serious ramifications for the Tribunal and the 
proposed budget of $31.2 million for the Court's first year of operation was subsequently 
thrown out by the ACABQ (which aligned itself with the General Assembly). When, on 
December 8 1993, the Secretariat submitted a revised budget of 533.2 million for two 
years it was under half the original proposal. However, still incensed at the Security 
Council's earlier snub, the Third World members of the ACABQ rejected the proposal, 
permitting a mere $5.6 million for the fist six months of 1994. The intransigence of the 
ACABQ continued into 1994 when an OLA budget request of nearly $33 million (to 
finance the Tribunal between 1994 & 1995) was again rejected. Instead 811 million was 
authorized for the rest of 1994. The temporary funding had a dramatic impact on the 
Tribunal's ability to carry out its work effectively. Employment contracts could only be 
offered on a six-month basis, deterring many potential staffers. 74 The recruitment drive 
was also initially frustrated by further bureaucratic barriers, w\ ith the U. N. 's Office of 
Human Resources issuing offers to applicants whom Blewitt viewed as totally 
unqualified. Consequently, the Tribunal began to appoint staff which had been seconded 
directly from governments. However, part of the seconded staff salaries had to be paid 
from the Tribunal's voluntary trust fund, money which was originally intended to be 
allocated to the important tasks of counseling rape victims and promotional activities. 75 
It also became clear that no specific consideration had been given to financing the 
investigation process. "Less than two percent of the total was budgeted for the critical 
work of tracking down witnesses, obtaining and translating their accounts, exhuming 
mass graves and conducting postmortems... no funds at all were budgeted for vv itness 
protection. "76 The extent of the dire situation was aptly illustrated by the fact that the 
7; Sec, Guest. On Trial, p. 119. 
74 See B: ASs STAI' THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 22 1. 
75 Set, GOLD'-, ONE, FOR HUMANITY. pp. 82-83. 
76 See NV, Il I 1: \I\1` AND SCHARF, PFACI WITH J1 »TICE? p. 110. 
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OTP only had one secure telephone line to make calls outside Holland. 77 Consequently. 
the Tribunal was forced to rely on a number of Charitable foundations to address specific 
needs, with The Heritage Foundation providing a substantial amount of money to the 
OTP, which was then able to equip its investigators with two-way radios. 78 The 
differences between the Tribunal and Nuremberg could not have been starker and did 
little to suggest that States were serious about supporting the first U. N. mandated tribunal 
to investigate war crimes. 
Inducements for Peace? 
Advocates of a robust Tribunal continued to face opposition from those who saw the 
Court, much like the Commission, as a possible impediment to political negotiations. 
Shattuck recalls when trying to gather more support for the court in the administration, 
The European Affairs Bureau (EUR) and its assistant secretary, Steve Oxman, at first 
tried to block my memo, saying I was wrong to focus on a tribunal at a time when efforts 
were being made to get the Balkan leaders to participate in peace negotiations .,, 
79 
Shattuck's attempts to visit the Balkans in 1994 to assess the situation and keep the 
pressure on the war crimes issue would also be blocked by EUR. Throughout this initial 
period of the Tribunal's establishment, the issue of amnesties still lingered. Madeline 
Albright's, the U. S. Ambassador to the U. N.. publicly declared "Let me... make it clear to 
the skeptics that the Clinton Administration will not recognize - and we do not believe 
the international community will recognize - any deal to grant immunity to those accused 
of war crimes. " 80 However, despite such public pronouncements, serious concerns 
existed that the Tribunal would be sidelined. Shattuck notes that in March 1994" "Heavy 
pressure to offer amnesty to the Balkan leaders to induce them to enter "serious" peace 
negotiations was coming from the Contract Group. 
81 
'' Sec Thomas S. Warrick, 'War Crimes: Don't Let Them Get Away With It'. it ashington Post, December 
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78 See Richard Goldstone, 'A View from the Prosecution' in The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from 
Inside, Journal of International Criminal Justice. Vol. 2. No. 2. June 2004. p. 382. 
79 Sec SºiATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE. p. 130. 
80 See Madeline Albright quote in Stanley Meisler. 'Jury Still Out on Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal Created 
by U. N. ', Los Angeles Times. December 25,1993. 
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Starting Investigations 
Understaffed and under-funded, the OTP found itself facing a daunting task. 
Commencing investigations in the middle of a war made access to material evidence and 
some witnesses extremely difficult. The magnitude of the alleged crimes and the 
perceived complexity of the origins of the conflict also had the potential to overwhelm 
the investigators. As John Ralston, former Chief of Investigations noted, "there was a 
perception that nobody outside the Yugoslavia would ever be able to understand it. The 
Prosecutor's office had to overcome this. -82 The OTP also faced the prospect of being 
overloaded by the sheer volume of open source material. Finally, the staff were acutely 
aware of the pressure they were under; there were high expectations and impatience for 
indictments, particularly from NGO's. victim groups and the judges. 
Blewitt's frustration at the U. N. "s laborious and time-consuming recruitment process led 
to him accepting an offer from the U. S. to second twenty two personnel to the Tribunal. 
However, the move received strident criticism from a number of other Western States, as 
recounted by Cassese "The French Italian and German governments questioned me. 
'Why are you accepting all these Americans? " .... I told them, `Do the same thing! ' They 
did nothing of the sort. "83 Similarly, (then) ICTY spokesman Christian Chartier pointed 
out that many of the European governments "had sent us no personnel when we cried 
famine and did nothing even when we asked for help. , 84 Although relieved that the OTP 
now had the requisite staff to get down to serious work, Cassese was under no illusions as 
to the apparent U. S. philanthropy, noting "I was not duped by the generosity of the 
Americans. They helped the tribunal, but they wanted a hold on it. "" 
82 Sec John Ralston `Investigating War Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"', 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal law, l5`t' International 
Conference, Politics. Crime and Criminal Justice, august 30,2001. 
83 Set, Antonio Cassese quote in H, Az: w, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 53. 
84 Sec Christian Chartier quote in H: \ZAN, Jus I ICE IN A TIME OF «'. AR. p. 53. 
s; Sec Antonio Cassese quote in H: ZAN. JUS I ºCI IN A TIME OF W 4R, p. 53. 
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The OTP was divided into four sections: the Administration and Records Section, the 
Special Advisory Section, the Prosecution Section, and the Investigations Section. 86 
Investigations at alleged crime scenes were largely impossible at this stage due to either 
security concerns linked to on-going fighting or the local 'authorities' refusal to 
cooperate. Goldstone held a series of meetings with Ministerial officials, in Zagreb, 
Belgrade and Sarajevo in October 1994. This led to the establishment of a three-person 
liaison office in Sarajevo and Zagreb87 to act as a point of contact between the OTP, local 
and national governments, the various local war crimes commissions, NGOs, and the 
different U. N. agencies on the ground. Despite this development, levels of cooperation 
varied dramatically. Whilst the Bosnian Government quickly entered into a 
memorandum of understanding with the Tribunal and offered material from its war 
crimes offices in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica, the BS (Bosnian Serb) `authorities' were 
utterly intransigent. In mid-November, Blewitt and two senior investigators visited Pale 
and Knin to discuss practical cooperation and attempt to obtain official documentation. 
The BS `authorities' refused access to both suspected crime scenes and official records of 
its administration and BS military forces. Similarly, the Croatian Serb `authorities' 
continued to block any exhumation of the Ovcara mass grave site. The consequences of 
prematurely closing down the Commission, which after protracted negotiations, had 
received authorization to exhume the site, were now painfully apparent. Relations with 
Serbia also continued to be strained. In a letter to Goldstone, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Federal Minister of Justice of FRY refused to allow any rigorous investigations to 
take place on its territory. Whilst the federal government was purportedly prepared to 
grant Tribunal representatives contacts with Government bodies and non-governmental 
organizations, they were prohibited from any investigations which required interviewing 
individuals. 
The Tribunal did, however, begin to develop a more productive relationship with 
UNPROFOR. Although the U. N. force had been generally reluctant to work closely with 
8b Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Laws Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A 49 342, S' 1994/ 1007.29 August 1994, paras. 151-154. 
"Although Belgrade would formally agree to allow a liaison office to be opened. it continually blocked the 
office from actually opening. 
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the Commission, or become involved in 'human rights issues'. there were elements 
within the force, which, over time, began to assume a more proactive approach. An 
internal UNPROFOR memo highlights that, whilst acknowledging atrocity crimes 
investigations were uncharted territory, some efforts were made by Military Police (MP) 
forces attached to UNPROFOR to conduct atrocity crimes investigations. The memo 
written by a senior U. N. officer in the field, and sent to the headquarters office in New 
York, acknowledged that In a theoretical point of view it appears that UNPROFOR has 
no mandate to conduct such investigations. - 88 Nevertheless, it highlighted that MPs had 
undertaken several investigations and that equipment necessary to conduct investigations 
had been requested. The officer requested guidance from the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) New York on the issue. and clear direction on; the 
assignment of appropriate support personnel to assist in such investigations [and] clear 
direction as to who is responsible for the receipt of the police report and associated 
evidence. " The memo went onto to suggest that '`Specific guidelines must be established 
on who will store, control.. .. and 
be responsible for the evidence collected by the platoon 
on completion of the investigation. "89 Eventually such guidelines were drafted which 
provided that UNPROFOR personnel would secure and preserve evidence of possible 
atrocity crimes. 
In light of the above obstacles, the OTP decided on a plan of establishing a tightly 
focused evidence collection plan. The early strategy was to focus on four areas: 
Vukovar, particularly the murder of the 200 men at the hospital and the Ovcara mass 
grave (which the Commission had focused on) where many were believed to have been 
buried; alleged murders by Bosnian Croat forces in Ahmici Vitez in Bosnia, alleged 
murders and mistreatment of prisoners by Bosnian government forces in Celebici prison 
camp; and allegations of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement of civilians 
and the practices in detention camps in various locations in Republika Srpska. 90 Like the 
Commission, the OTP would also make contact with the various refugee communities 
88 Confidential UNPROFOR Memo. February ??. 1994, Subject '\Var Crime Investigation. ' 
89 Confidential UNPROFOR Memo. February ??, 1994. Subject 'War Crime Investigation. ' 
90 See John Ralston 'ln\ estigatina War Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"'. 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal lax\. 15`h International 
Conference, Politics. Crime and Criminal Justice, august 30,2001. 
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spread throughout Western Europe in order to obtain witness testimony. In 1995 the 
OTP was re-organized and the Investigations Unit Strategy Team established. The 15 
member Team was divided into four sub-units; the Intelligence Analysis Unit: the 
Strategy Unit; the Investigation Development Unit, and, the Special Projects Unit. 91 
In late 1994 and early 1995, Goldstone issued the court's first indictments92 against 
Dragan Nikolic, 93 Bosnian Serb commander of Susica detention camp, and Dusko 
Tadic, 94 a Bosnian Serb civilian who, although not a guard, visited Omarska Detention 
camp and was alleged to have tortured several detainees, leading to a number of deaths. 
A further two indictments involving 21 persons, also relating to Omarska Detention 
Camp were issued. 95 Many commentators were critical that the Tribunal was focusing 
on what they perceived as so-called `small fish'. Goldstone despairingly justified the 
focus of the indictments, "It is highly unsatisfactory for someone at the level of Dusko 
Tadic should face trial and that those who incited and facilitated his conduct should 
escape justice and remain unaccountable. But it's really an academic question because 
we had no choice; Tadic was the only accused available to bring before the Tribunal at a 
time when the judges, the media and the international community were clamoring for us 
to begin prosecutions. '196 
The Tribunal's Registry initially requested UNPROFOR to transmit the arrest warrants to 
the Pale `authorities' but the peacekeeping force quickly rejected the proposal. The Pale 
`authorities' in Geneva also refused to accept the documents. Finally, one month after 
their issue, Pale representatives in Belgrade agreed to accept the warrants. However, no 
assurance was given to the Tribunal that they would be transmitted to the accused, and 
91 Sec' Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A/50/365/Sý 1995/728,23 August 1995, paras. 39-41. 
92 Dragan Nicolik, Bosnian Serb commander of the Suscia detention camp (November 94) and Dusko 
Tadic, Omarska camp 'freelance torturer' (February 95) 
`" IT - 94 -2- R61: (Suscia camp) November 4,1994. IN IT - 94 -1T: February 13.1994. °' IT - 95 -4-I: (Omarska camp) February 13,1995. 96 Set, Richard Goldstone quote in \VILI 1-\\, 1s AND SCH: \RF, PE. ACE \VI FH JUSTICE? p. 11 
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subsequent correspondence from the ICTY was not responded to. 97 The experience of 
transmitting the arrest warrants was merely the first instance of a prolonged battle 
between the Tribunal and Bosnian Serb officials. 
Empty Gestures: A Distinct Lack of International Cooperation 
The Bosnian Serbs, Croatian Serbs, and FRY authorities were not the only ones 
stonewalling the Tribunal. Like its predecessor, the Commission, despite declarations of 
support in the Security Council, the OTP faced serious difficulties obtaining information 
from a number of key Western States, particularly intelligence material. U. S. Intelligence 
services have historically adopted conflicting positions towards international legal 
institutions established to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes. For example, during 
the Nuremberg trials of major German War Criminals, The U. S. Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) played a key role, providing considerable logistical, strategic, evidentiary 
and diplomatic assistance to the prosecutors, with approximately one third of the senior 
staff of the U. S. prosecution team comprising OSS personnel. Nevertheless, Western 
intelligence agencies attitudes towards suspected Nazi war criminals would also be 
influenced by considerations as to whether such individuals could play a positive role in 
addressing the threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, U. S. intelligence agencies 
acted to exempt a number of suspected Nazi war criminals from prosecution at 
Nuremberg and subsequent prosecutions in exchange for their technical and espionage 
skills. 98 Thus, the U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Germany recruited 
Klaus Barbie (an SS officer who would later be convicted for his role in rounding up 
Jews in France and for suppressing the French resistance) as an agent and smuggled him 
out of Europe, thereby facilitating his evasion of justice for over 30 years. Similarly, the 
CIA's recruitment of General Reinhard Gehlen to establish West Germany's intelligence 
service enabled him to "promote and protect" [suspected] war criminals"99, and the 
97 See Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A 50 365 'S'1 995i728,23 August 1995, para. 92. 
98 See Bryan and Salter, -War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies', p. 101. 
99 See Professor Timothy Naftali. consulting historian to The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial 
Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) quote in RICHARD BREITMAN, NORNI: A\ GODA, 
TIMOTHI' Nr\I TAl 1. AND ROBERT WOLFF, U. S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAZIS. (National Archive Trust 
Fund Board) 2004, p. 406. 
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agency also failed to inform the Israeli authorities after learning the pseudonym and 
whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann, due to fears that Hans Globke, one of their top agents 
would be exposed. '00 
Such episodes indicate that for many State's intelligence services, supporting efforts to 
investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes may be contrary to other priorities or 
considerations, which are deemed to be of greater importance; something which would 
rapidly become apparent to the Tribunal. Thus, as highlighted by chapter one, although a 
number of Western States had deployed significant intelligence assets throughout the 
former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal's head of investigations stated that during its early days 
the OTP "had no access to Western intelligence sources. "101 Ralston went on to note that 
"Contemporaneous intelligence which had been gathered, allegedly no longer existed. If 
this contention was to be believed then most of the information which politicians, lobby 
groups etc used to base their calls for investigations on, was gone. "102 
Intelligence sharing is nearly always a delicate issue. Indeed, even tit'ithin States, various 
intelligence agencies are often embroiled in bitter turf-wars, jealously guarding their 
sources, and reluctant to share information. '03 The situation is often compounded in the 
case of intelligence cooperation between States. As Herman notes, intelligence liaison is 
100 See Scott Shane, 'C. I. A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding, Documents Show', ; Vc'i, w York Times, June 
7,2006. 
101 See John Ralston 'Investigating War Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"'. 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal law, 15th International 
Conference, Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice, august 30,2001. 
102 See John Ralston `Investigating War Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"', 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal law, 15`x' International 
Conference, Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice, august 30,2001. 
103 For example, during the British Government's campaign against the Irish Republican Army (IR. A) in 
Northern Ireland, British Army Intelligence was reluctant to share information with the province's police 
force the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Similarly, the relationship between the British Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) or M16, and the Security Service (M15) regarding their work in Northern Ireland 
was subject to intense rivalry and ill-feeling. For more details see MARK URBAN, BIG BOYS RULES. THE 
SECRET STRUGGLE AG. \INST THE IRA (Faber and Faber) 1992, particularly Ch. 2 The Security 
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often a "patch work of bilateral and multilateral arrangements of all kinds and all degrees 
of intimacy. "104 Intelligence liaison between States relating to the former Yugoslavia 
was considered a very sensitive issue. Within UNPROFOR's HQ in Sarajevo. a number 
of National Intelligence Cells (NICs) were established in separate shipping containers. 
These NICs were essentially involved in intelligence gathering for their own States rather 
than for the U. N. Cooperation between the NICs was limited. Although several Nordic 
States allowed their personnel to enter into each others premises, intelligence was only 
shared on a bilateral, not multilateral basis. Beyond the Nordic States, an attitude of 
mistrust prevailed between many other States. CIA officers deployed in the Balkans 
operated under a golden rule: no contacts with the French foreign and or military 
services; the CIA apparently did not trust the French services. "' 05 (This apparent 
concern over French operational security would later prove to be well founded, when a 
military mission to arrest Karadzic was reportedly compromised due to a tip-off received 
by his supporters from a French officer. 106) As Wiebes highlights, even liaison between 
friendly states cannot even be taken for granted. 107 
The prospect of the Tribunal receiving sensitive material from States was even more 
limited. For many intelligence agencies keen to retain control of their material, 
cooperating with an international institution staffed with individuals from a variety of 
different states, some of whom were seconded from government positions, was anathema. 
As Lane and Shanker highlight, "Handing classified information to a multinational 
agency went against every tradition of the spy business. -' 08 The U. S. was particularly 
reticent, and a senior White House advisor justified non-disclosure on the grounds that, 
"The US intelligence community will never release its intelligence because of methods 
104 Sec Michael Herman, 'Intelligence after the Cold War: contributions to international security? '. 
unpublished paper, quoted in WIEBES. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA. p. 57. 
105 Secs WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 79. 
106 See Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon. The Hunt for Karadzic'. Time, 11aga_inc. August 10.1998. 
For further details on the incident sc'e chapter five. 
107 SccWIEBI S. INTELLIGENCE AND THk_ WAR IN BOSNI \. p. 79. 
108 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker. 'Bosnia: What the C1. A Didn't TeII Us'.. Vetiti York Review Of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 12. 
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and sources. "' 09 However, Wiebes characterizes the justification as a "remarkable 
statement"' 10 noting "there is rarely a genuine need to release both methods and 
sources. " I11 Evidently, the purported concern over methods and sources was only part of 
the story. Most intelligence organizations are, by their very nature, imbued with a culture 
of non-disclosure. Gaining cooperation from bodies such as the U. S. National Security 
Agency (NSA), described by the director of the National Security Archive at George 
Washington University as the `"most close-mouthed of all U. S. government agencies. - 1 '- 
would be almost impossible. Although a number of legitimate objections were raised. 
including the lack of adequate storage facilities for classified material, the Tribunal was 
prepared to address these concerns, leading some commentators to conclude "the 
American intelligence agencies own penchant for secrecy was mainly responsible for the 
slow delivery of data to the Tribunal. "' 13 
Beyond this culture of non-disclosure, other considerations also played a role. As a 
Clinton administration official noted, "Sharing information ww ith international 
organizations is something which as far as I know is very ne\\ .... 
Friendly governments, 
yes. But that's where there were reciprocal arrangements. Here there 's nothing 
reciprocal. We're not getting anything back from this. " 114 Similarly, Wiebes notes, "if a 
service [or recipient] has nothing to exchange, then generally speaking it cannot be 
expected to be provided with much in return. 1 is This mindset meant that particularly 
during the early years, the Tribunal received minimal cooperation, and it would take 
several years before a number of intelligence agencies finally begin to adopt a more 
accommodating attitude towards cooperation with the Court. 
109 See CHARLES GRANT, INTIMATE RELATIONS: CAN BRITAIN PLAT' A LEADING ROLE IN EUROPEAN 
DEFENCE AND KEEP ITS SPECIAL LINKS To US INTELLIGENCE, 2001, p. 6, quoted in WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE 
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Consequently, during the Tribunal's initial investigations, its relationship with many 
intelligence services was often minimal and strained. In the U. S. however. it 'vwwas not 
only the intelligence services which advocated a policy of non-disclosure. On January 4. 
1995, the Republican controlled Congress introduced the National Security Revitalization 
Act. As Hendrickson highlights, the House of Representatives wanted to restrict the 
transfer of U. S. intelligence to the U. N. by requiring prior congressional approval hc'/ore 
any information could be shared with the U. N. ' 16 Although Goldstone formally 
requested that the U. S. administration provide assistance to the Tribunal through the 
provision of material from its intelligence agencies under the Rule 70 procedure, much of 
the information initially handed over turned out to be of limited value. The State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research had been designated the U. S. 
intermediary for U. S. dealings with the Tribunal. However, onhv one junnior official was 
assigned the task of going through material which may have included information on 
possible crimes, and the "torturous" declassification process led to large passages of text 
being blacked out or deleted, significantly reducing its probative value. 17 Similarly, 
when the CIA submitted over one thousand pages of refugee testimony they had recorded 
in Europe, it was so sanitized by the declassification process that it was rendered almost 
useless to the prosecution. ' 8A former senior State Department official involved in war 
crimes issues lamented "the CIA is not interested in law enforcement per se, unlike the 
FBI. There was a built-in tension between the organization [the CIA] and its mission to 
protect methods and not disclose sources, and the ICTYs mission to gather evidence. The 
bottom line is that the CIA is a terrible instrument of law enforcement. " 19 In other 
instances, basic recording errors rendered U. S. gathered material useless for the OTP. 
The DIA had reportedly recorded a great deal of material relating to evidence of 
atrocities, gleaned from debriefings with refugees, which was subsequently entered into 
the so-called Blackbird Database. 120 However, during the several hundred interviews 
116 Scc RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON WARS. THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE WAR 
PowlRS (Vanderbildt Uni. Press) 2002, p. 81 
117 Stv Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, `Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us',. Vetil, Fork Revieiv Of 
Books, May 9,1996 p. 12. 
118 Sec' Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, `Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell L's' The. \'etir York Review Of 
Books, May 9,1996 p. 12. 
119 Confidential interview with former senior State Department official working on U. S. Bosnia policy. 
120 See \VIEBFS. IN I ELLIGENCF AND THE W1 AR IN BOSNIA. p. 75. 
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which took place in Germany, DIA operatives reportedly failed to note in the debriefinu 
reports who said what. "Therefore these witnesses could not be used as ww itnesses by the 
Tribunal. "' 121 
Frustrated with the state of affairs, Goldstone sent a letter of complaint to the U. S. 
Embassy in The Hague, laying out a detailed chronology of the requests made by the 
OTP to the U. S. and the responses which were provided. He noted, "Regrettably, if I 
were to characterize those responses, I would have to say that the quality and the 
timeliness of the information has been disappointing. " The Chief Prosecutor \t ent onto 
emphasize "shorter response times will be necessary if the information is to be of any use 
to our investigations. -122 The letter was subsequently leaked to the press, which only 
served to further strain the already tense relationship. 
The German intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) were also reluctant 
to pass on material to the court. The BND's close relationship \v ith the Austrian Arms' 
Intelligence Service, the Heeresnachrichtendienst (described as a "BND subsidiary" 123 
gave it access to telecommunications installations in the Austrian Alps and signal 
intelligence. From there telecommunications throughout the former Yugoslavia were 
extensively monitored. '24 According to BND sources, a great deal of information of 
relevance to the Tribunal dating back to 1991 had been obtained. However, none of this 
had been passed on. '25 Similarly, France provided no intelligence material, although this 
121 See WIEBES. INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 75. 
122 See Letter from Richard Goldstone to Mr. Steve Mathias, Legal Advisor at the U. S. Embassy in the 
Hague, October 30,1995. 
123 Sec Andreas Zumach 'Intelligence Agencies Fail to Supply Information to War Crimes Tribunal'. 
British American Security Information Council, BASIC Reports, Newsletter on International Security 
Policy, No. 48, November 20,1995. 
124 The BND was also receiving an unprecedented amount of material from the U. S. under a bilateral 
information exchange. The U. S. entered into this relationship largely as a result of its decision to reduce 
intelligence cooperation with the U. K. and France due to breakdown in transatlantic relations over Bosnia 
policy. U. S. /British relations were characterized as being at the worst state since Suez. For more details 
sec generalhv. SIMMS, UNFINEST HOUR; ROSE, FIGHTING FOR PEACE. 
125 See Andreas Zumach 'Intelligence Agencies Fail to Supply Information to War Crimes Tribunal', 
British American Security Information Council, BASIC Reports, Newsletter on International Security 
Policy, No. 48, November 20,1995. 
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should perhaps not be so surprising; as Wiebes highlights, the man) French intelliuence 
services seldom keep each other informed of what they are doing. ' -126 
Bosnia: End Game Strategy 
By 1995, after the failure of a number of peace plans, a series of ceasefires were 
brokered. Despite this development, it became clear that all parties were merely using 
the break to prepare to mount operations in an attempt to settle the conflict militarily. 
The signing of the U. S. brokered Washington Accords in March 1994 ended the brutal 
and intense conflict between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats 121 leading to 
the formation of an (albeit fragile) alliance against the Bosnian Serbs. This allowed the 
Bosnian government to refocus their energy and resources and prepare to break the siege 
of Sarajevo. Meanwhile the Bosnian Serbs, with the assistance of Serbia, were finalizing 
plans to attack the remaining `safe areas' of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. In 
neighbouring Croatia, after receiving training, military equipment and strategic advice 
from the U. S. private military company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI), Tudjman's forces had retaken Western Slavonia during Operation Flash and 
were preparing to launch further military offensives to retake territory lost during 1991 
and coordinate with Bosnian Croat forces to support operations in Bosnia. The 
subsequent events on the ground would ultimately facilitate the prospects for establishing 
viable territorial boundaries for a political settlement and also provide the pretext, finally, 
for a robust international military response to Bosnian Serb actions. However, they 
would also lead to one of the darkest events of the conflict, which would shame the U. N. 
and become one of the key focuses for the Tribunal. 
By March 1995, the ceasefire was effectively over, and the Bosnian government launched 
a series of largely disastrous offensives against VRS positions around Sarajevo which 
were easily repelled with heavy losses. In May 1995 the VRS (with the support of the 
VJ) began its offensives against the three remaining enclaves in Eastern Bosnia and also 
126 Sec' WIEBES, INTEI. 1 IGENCF AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA, p. 61. 
127 For more details on the Bosnian Government"Bosnian Croat Civil War in Bosnia see CHARLES R. 
SIIRADER, THE MUSLIM-CROAT CIVIL \V: AR IN BOSNI, A: A MILITARI' HISTORY, 1992-1994 (Texas A& \1 
University Press) 2003. 
86 
intensified its shelling of Sarajevo. In response to the Bosnian Serb incursion into the 
weapons exclusion zone around the capital, the U. N. requested NATO air strikes against 
an ammunition dump in Pale. Mladic responded to the strikes by ordering that 400 U. I. 
peacekeepers be taken hostage. The episode clearly illustrated the contradiction in using 
airpower against the Bosnian Serb forces whilst UNPROFOR troops continued to be 
stationed in exposed positions. Subsequently, the U. N. was now unwilling to use aerial 
bombardment whilst its troops were still at risk. 
The purported deterrence effect of the Tribunal, and the credibility of the U. N. 'safe 
areas' were cruelly exposed as paper tigers by the fall of the Srebrenica enclave. The 
Dutch U. N. Battalion surrendered to the advancing Serb forces, women were separated 
from men and boys, the former were bussed to Tuzla in Bosnian Government territory 
and the latter who failed to escape and make it over to Bosnian government territory were 
systematically executed and buried in mass graves over the next several days in a well 
organized operation. 128 In the aftermath of the U. N. hostage crisis and the fall of 
Srebrenica, the U. K. hosted an international conference in London on July 21,1995. A 
consensus began to emerge amongst the British, French and Americans that a serious 
ultimatum should be issued to the Serbs. Consequently, it was agreed that an attack on 
Gorazde would be met with "a substantial and decisive response. "129 The U. N. authority 
(or `key' as it was referred to) to use airpower was wrested away from the organization's 
headquarters and its senior civilian mediator Jasushi Akashi, whom had been reluctant to 
authorize air-strikes, and given to General Bernard Janvier, the U. N. military commander 
on the ground in Bosnia. 
128 Several thousand men staged a break-out from the enclave, aiming to cross into Bosnian government 
territory. Many were hunted down and executed by Serb forces, in some cases using the Dutch U. N. 
contingents vehicles and equipment as a means to lure them out under the guise of a neutral force. For 
more details on Srebrenica see JAN WILLEMI HONIG AND NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA. RECORD OF A 
WAR CRIME (Penguin) 1996; DAVID RHODE, ENDGAME. THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA: 
EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (Farrar, Straus and Giroux) 1997; EMIR SULAGIC, 
POSTCARDS FROM THE GRAVE (Saqi Books) 2005. 
12Q On August 1,1995, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to extend the London Conference air 
strike ultimatum to the other 'safe areas'. For more details on the London Conference Sec The Road to 
Dayton. U. S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process. May - December 1995'. U. S. Department of State, 
available at littp: //\\'wN \\ . ý; \\, u. edui-nsarchi\'NSAEBB 
NSAEBB171 %index. htnl#studN [hereinafter 'The 
Road to Dayton. ' U. S. Department of State] 
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The London Conference statement represented a dramatic shift in policy by the 
-International Community'. Whilst the hostage crisis and the fall of Srebrenica 
undoubtedly strengthened international resolve to finally take decisive action against the 
Serbs, the emerging policy shift by the Clinton administration was also of critical 
importance. 130 Clinton's national security advisor. Anthony Lake. began to advocate a 
more active engagement in the region both politically and militarily, and in 1995 his 
policy review asserted that U. S. credibility was being seriously eroded by its failure to 
take a strong lead over Bosnia. He recommended that the administration lead a 
diplomatic effort to achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia, and that this strategy should be 
backed by credible force. This 'endgame strategy' envisaged Milosevic as a key 
facilitator to any agreement. In exchange for lifting the economic sanctions, Milosevic 
was expected to assume the role of main negotiator for the Serbs, thus excluding the 
intransigent BS leadership. 
Back in The Hague, after issuing another series of indictments against relatively low- 
level figures' 31 on July 25 1995, Goldstone's delivered a searing response to critics of 
the Tribunal's failure to focus on the `big fish. ' Karadzic and Mladic were indicted for 
genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the development caused considerable 
consternation for some, including the U. N. Secretary General, who reportedly felt that 
indicting senior figures could undermine the prospects of achieving a diplomatic 
settlement. Goldstone notes that Boutros-Ghali "made it clear to me that had I consulted 
him, he would have advised me not to indict Karadzic before peace had been brokered in 
Bosnia. "132 Similar concerns were being aired by other diplomats. Goldstone reportedly 
informed Shattuck that Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Norwegian U. N. representative 
involved in negotiations with Milosevic, "was saying that the tribunal investigations 
should be negotiable. Stoltenberg had apparently raised the tribunal issue with Milosevic 
suggesting that he could "expect understanding from the Tribunal" if he cooperated with 
130 For more details Seegeneral/j, Iv0 H. DAALDER, GETTING TO DAYTON. THE MAKING OF A\IERICA'S 
BOSNIA POLICY (The Brookings Institution) 2000, [hereinafter DAALDER. GETTING To DAYTON] 
131 IT- 95 -5- R61: July 25.1995 132 Richard Goldstone quote in. WILLIAM', AND SCHARF. PENCE WITH JPrICE? p. 103. 
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the peace negotiations. "' 33 Goldstone reacted with fury at the suggestion of amnesties. 
What politicians have the moral, legal or political right to forgive [individuals 
responsible for] the deaths of thousands of people - without consulting, the v ictims? "' '4 
International military forces in Bosnia were finally beginning to assume a robust posture. 
A 4,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) Anglo-Dutch-French Multi-National 
Brigade (MNB) had been deployed from Croatia, and took up positions on Mount Igman 
near Sarajevo. Although placed directly in the UNPROFOR chain of command, the RRF 
did not wear the Blue helmets of U. N. peacekeeping, but instead wore full combat 
camouflage and were equipped as a much more offensive force. On August 4.1995, 
Croatian forces launched Operation Storm (Oluja) to retake the Serb-held territory of the 
Krajina. Serbian forces withdrew rather than face the newly equipped Croatian anny and 
over 180,000 Serb civilians fled from the region fearing reprisals. Many of those who 
stayed were executed by advancing Croat forces. 
On August 25,1995, an artillery shell landed in the Sarajevo market place killing thirty 
eight and wounding eighty five. Once U. N. ballistics investigators determined the shell 
came from a Serb position, both U. N. 135 and NATO `keys' were turned which led to the 
commencement of `Operation Deliberate Force. ' Throughout the previous four weeks, 
U. N. forces had been discreetly withdrawing from Bosnian Serb territory and the 
remaining `safe areas', removing the threat of another hostage scenario. Just before 
`Operation Deliberate Force' got under way, Holbrooke's team arrived in Belgrade to 
meet Milosevic. The Serbian presented them with `The Patriarch Letter' witnessed by 
the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church which granted Milosevic the authority to be 
the main Serbian negotiator at any future talks. On August 30,1995, NATO aircraft and 
the MNB went into action striking numerous Bosnian Serb targets around Sarajevo. 
Capitalizing on NATO's and the MNB's operations, the Croats, Bosnian Croats and 
133S 
(, (, SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE, p. 150. 
134 See B: \ss STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 243. 
135 With Jam ier temporarily out of the country, the 'key' was passed to his Deputy Lieutenant General 
Rupert Smith, British commander of UN forces inside Bosnia. Smith was much more willing to authorize 
the use force against the Serbs, thus the problem prey iously experienced of UN reluctance to turn the 'key' 
was conveniently remo\ ed. 
89 
Bosnian Government launched Operation Mistral 2 on September 8,1995. a 'combined' 
offensive with the aim of `'inflicting a decisive defeat on the Serbs. "-136 The Bosnian 
Serbs finally began to feel the pressure and reluctantly agreed to cease offensive 
operations around Sarajevo and withdraw its heavy weapons. Successful combined 
Croat, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government offensives led to the situation on the 
ground starting to look something like the U. S. proposed territorial division, and on 
September 8, Holbrooke got the 'warring factions' to agree to a 51 %: 49% territorial split. 
After several more weeks of fighting, mainly in Western and North Western Bosnia, a 
ceasefire came into effect on October 15,1995.137 
Conclusions 
Despite facing resistance from opponents who viewed its establishment as either a 
potential impediment to a negotiated settlement or a dangerous erosion of the principle of 
State sovereignty, the Tribunal had managed to become operational. Furthermore, the 
Court managed to avoid the recommendations suggested by the British Government 
`non-paper', which if implemented, would have significantly undermined its powers and 
capacity to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate atrocity crimes. Instead, innovative 
Rules of Procedure were drafted, judges appointed and although delayed, a Prosecutor 
selected. However, progress in investigations clearly remained a challenge. Again, like 
the Commission, the reluctance of many States to disclose intelligence material, seriously 
inhibited the work of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the OTP still managed to issue a series 
of indictments. 
With a pause in the fighting coming into effect in mid October, 1995, the stage was now 
set for political negotiations to attempt to turn this tentative ceasefire into something 
more concrete, and on November 1,1995, the various parties convened at Wright 
Patterson Airbase, Dayton, Ohio in order to hammer out a settlement. However, as 
136 Sec TIM RIPLEY, OPERN I'ION DELIBERATE: FORCE. THE UN AND NATO CAMPAIGN IN BOSNIA 1995 
(CDISS) 1999, p. 276 [hereinafter RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE] 
137 President Clinton announced the ceasefire on live television on October 50'. However, it did not come 
into effect around Sarajevo until October 10`t', and five days later around Sanski Most. 
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chapter three demonstrates, many of the key decisions which would profoundly affect the 
Tribunal had already been determined. 
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Chapter Three: What Price Justice? An assessment of attempts to include robust 
provisions relating to the prosecution of atrocity crimes into peace agreements: The 
Dayton Accords. 
Chapter three commences by exploring the debate within the U. S. administration which 
effectively set the scope of the military mandate of the NATO-led force to be deployed to 
Bosnia. It illustrates how the administration was divided between two opposing groups: 
the `Minimalists' who advocated a narrow mandate for the force, focusing purer on 
conventional military tasks of monitoring the separation of the warring factions' armies; 
and the `Maximalists' who argued the force should actively engage in arresting persons 
indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs), providing area security and support refugee return. 
The chapter goes onto examine the Dayton Peace negotiations, and the Tribunal's 
endeavours to maintain the spotlight on the issue of atrocity crimes and accountability. A 
number of `pro-prosecution' commentators have been highly critical of Dayton due to the 
purported failure to adequately address the issue of justice, particularly the decision to 
grant Slobodan Milosevic, (widely seen as the principal architect of the wars in Croatia 
and Bosnia) a key role in the negotiations, rather than indict him for atrocity crimes. 
`Pro-prosecution' advocates are also critical of the substance of the Dayton Peace 
Accord, both for its failure to include robust provisions requiring the signatories to 
transfer PIFWCs (backed by specific sanctions in the event of non-compliance), and the 
omission of an explicit duty compelling NATO forces to actively seek out and arrest 
PIFWCs. Additionally, a number of `pro-prosecution' commentators have posited that 
alternative strategies should have been pursued to ensure a more just peace, including 
countenancing the rolling back of Bosnian Serb territorial gains through continued 
military offensives by the other 'warring factions', and the `International Community's' 
pursuit of unconditional surrender by Bosnian Serb military via continued NATO 
military offensive operations. 
The chapter critically contests these contentions. Firstly, it will posit that the Tribunal's 
failure to indict Milosevic at the time of the negotiations was predicated on an absence of 
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viable evidence to support such an indictment. Secondly, the chapter will also argue that 
even if evidence had, at the time of Dayton, been available to the Tribunal which could 
have supported an indictment against Milosevic, it would have been prudent to defer an 
indictment and to negotiate with the Serbian President in order to bring an end to the 
fighting. The chapter will examine the events in West Africa during summer 2003 (when 
the indictment of the Liberian dictator Charles Taylor for crimes against humanity 
contributed to the collapse of the peace negotiations, resulting in an upsurge in fighting in 
and around the capital, Monrovia) in order to demonstrate that attempts to pursue justice 
by issuing indictments at such critical junctures, may in certain circumstances, actually 
serve to prolong conflict and result in the further loss of lives. 
The chapter also posits that in light of the `Minimalist' position prevailing within the U. S. 
administration, which included the outright refusal to countenance any more than vague, 
nebulous provisions relating to the responsibilities of the NATO led peacekeeping force 
vis-ä-vis arresting PIFWCs, (a stance which had overriding influence within NATO, 
although most other member States agreed with it anyway), an explicit reference relating 
to the pursuit and arrest of PIFWCs uwas not achievable. Admittedly, such an approach is 
not without its problems. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, for nearly 
two critical years, NATO's `Minimalist' interpretation of the Accord's provision relating 
to PIFWCs provided the institution with a significant justification for its failure to 
apprehend PIFWCs. Nevertheless, despite recognizing such factors, the crucial issue, 
which advocates of the `pro-prosecution' perspective have consistently failed to 
adequately address, remains: how can a greater level of justice be achieved at the time of 
peace negotiations when the `International Community' is both unwilling to be bound by 
explicit obligations to actively seek out and detain PIFWCs, or pursue military 
enforcement measures to ensure compliance, and consequently individuals implicated in 
war crimes are deemed necessary to achieve a negotiated settlement' 
The 'pro-prosecution' alternative strategies to negotiating with Milosevic are also 
challenged, with the chapter demonstrating that continued military offensives by the other 
`warring factions', particularly those directed by Croatia, would most likely have 
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replaced one form of ethnic cleansing with another, rather than achieve a greater level of 
justice. Similarly, the suggestion that NATO could and should have continued its 
military offensives in order to obtain an unconditional surrender will be critically 
contested via an illustration of how the deep divisions within the Organization. meant that 
the option of expanding and intensify its military operations during Operation Deliberate 
Force was not a viable option. 
Setting the Scope of the International Military Mandate - The Debate within the U. S. 
Administration and Military 
Although a number of the critical issues, particularly the controversial subject of setting 
the territorial boundaries between the Federation and Republika Srpska, would not be 
resolved until the final hours of the Dayton conference, the scope of the international 
military mandate had been largely determined several weeks prior to the peace 
negotiations. As a recently declassified State Department document highlights, "since 
the beginning of the diplomatic initiative [to end the war], Pentagon officials "had no 
doubt" that the U. S. would assume the lead in drafting the military component of the 
peace agreement. "" During a series of meetings and deliberations, the U. S. administration 
decided the international military force, or IFOR, would not take on the role of actively 
hunting PIFWCs. With U. S. military personnel making up the majority of the NATO 
force to be deployed, this decision would hold sway within NATOs political body, the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, this essentially suited the majority of the other 
troop-contributing states, who were also keen to avoid adopting a more robust stance on 
the issue. 
1 See The Road to Dayton. ' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 7, p. 149. 
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Within the administration, the Deputies Committee2 would play a key role, meeting 
several times a week and passing on their recommendations to the principals for 
approval. Much of their time was taken up deliberating over the implications of 
successful peace negotiations and the nature and scope of any international military 
presence deployed to oversee the settlement. The meetings revealed intense 
disagreements between the various departments. Holbrooke characterized divisions 
between two camps: "minimalists" who wished to restrict the scope of the international 
forces' duties, and the "maximalists" who argued that it was necessary for the military to 
engage in a broader mission, including actively going after PIFWCs and protecting 
returning refugees and IDPs. 3 However, as Daalder highlights, acute differences of 
opinion existed within the "minimalists". Whilst the JCS advocated a large force to be 
deployed to ensure "robust enforcement capability", the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense reportedly wanted to "minimize both the size and nature of American military 
involvement. -4 
The Deputies soon reached consensus over the deployment of a NATO-led force which 
would operate under a unified command. The painful experience of the "dual key" 
debacle with the U. N. had convinced the U. S. that their military forces would never again 
be controlled by anyone other than themselves. The proposed force's primary objective 
would be to implement the military elements of the peace accord, such as ensuring the 
separation of the `warring faction's' military forces and monitoring their withdrawal to 
agreed boundaries. Equipped with robust rules of engagement, the force would react 
decisively against isolated security incidents or violations of the accord. However, if 
2 Chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, the Committee also included representatives 
from the State Department (Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Peter 
Tarnoff, and Policy Planning Chief James Steinberg), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy 
Secretary John White and Under-secretary for Policy, Walter Slocombe), the Joints Chiefs of Staff 
(Admiral William Owens), the CIA (Deputy Director George Tenet and Vice Admiral Dennis Blair) and 
also representatives from the Office of the Vice President, US Mission to the UN, and in certain meetings 
representatives from the Treasury Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
3 Sec' RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR (Random House) 1998, p. 216. [hereinafter HOLBROOKE, To 
END A W; \R] 
4 See DAALDER, GETTING To DAYTON, p. 141. The fact that the first version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) concept paper to circulate amongst the other agencies was the seventeenth revision illustrates that 
even within the Pentagon, large differences of opinion existed, See DAALDER. GETTING To DAYTON. p. 
141. 
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more serious violations occurred the deputies proposed the force would "respond 
asymmetrically depending on the cause of the breakdown. "5 Thus, if the Bosnian 
Muslims were at fault, NATO would withdraw its forces and terminate its military 
assistance in the form of train and equip. If the Bosnian Serbs were held responsible for a 
serious violation and a breakdown in the peace, NATO would use all the capabilities at 
its disposal, including air-power to re-enforce the peace. 6 With the basic parameters of 
the force determined by the Deputies, three senior U. S. officials? were dispatched to 
engage in high level consultations with NATO allies in Europe. 
The NAC convened on September 29,1995, and approved the fundamental components 
of an IFOR mission. 8 By early October a finalized concept of operations was submitted, 
and approved by NAC on October 11,1995. The plan was very similar to the Deputies 
proposals. 9 However, although NATO had approved the basic structure of the force, 
which would be referred to as the Implementation Force or IFOR, a number of crucial 
details still needed to be determined. The debate went back to the Deputies Committee. 
In the two remaining weeks before the commencement of Dayton, U. S. officials 
continued to be heavily focused on refining the U. S. role in IFOR. By late October, 
several issues had still to be resolved within the administration regarding the scope of 
IFOR's mission. At this stage there was no agreement on whether the force would even 
be deployed in Bosnian Serb territory. The Deputies reaffirmed IFOR's primary 
' Sec DAALDER, GETTING To DAYTON, p. 142. 
6 Interestingly, Daalder's analysis on the pre-Dayton political deliberations within the US administration, 
there is no mention of what response NATO would have taken if the Bosnian Croats were responsible for a 
breakdown in the peace. However, given that many commentators have highlighted that Croatia was 
perhaps the main beneficiary of the Dayton peace process, it was largely inconceivable at that stage that the 
Bosnian Croats, whom Croatia held enormous influence over would have been either able or willing to 
seriously undermine any Accord, see Misha Glenny, And the Winner Is ... Croatia'. New Iörk 
Times, 
September 26,1995. 
7 The team comprised Walter Slocombe, Wesley Clark and John Kornblum. 
8 See The Road to Dayton. ' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 7, p. 152. Strikingly - in the recently 
declassified State Department document on the Dayton negotiations, the chapter on setting the scope of 
IFOR completely fails to mention any of the policy disputes over the issue of IFOR and war crimes. 
9 As Daalder notes "The similarity should not be surprising. Given the dominance of U. S. military 
personnel at the top and within the NATO military structure, every detail of force planning is shared 
between \Vashington and Mons, Belgium (where Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe. or 
SHAPE, is located). Indeed JCS representatives would often refuse to clear cables containing instructions 
from NVashington to the U. S. mission at NATO until it had first been checked with the U. S. military 
representatives in Brussels". See DAALDER, GIST IING To DAYTON. p. 142. 
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objective would be the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement. It would 
have no responsibility for basic policing functions and would not hunt war criminals. but 
could apprehend PIFWCs "if the opportunity for doing so presented itself during the 
course of performing its mission. "lo 
The dispute between the "minimalists" and "maximalists" would come to a head during 
two Principles Committee meetings on October 25 and October 27,1995. Holbrooke, the 
chief 'maximal ist' forcefully argued it was crucial that IFOR assume an expansive 
mandate, beyond the narrow, circumscribed role proposed by the Deputies. This would 
include a robust attitude towards arresting PIFWCs. He regarded the military's 
objections, predicated on concerns over "mission creep". as spurious. in recent years, 
the military had adopted a politically potent term for assignments they felt were too 
broad: "mission creep. " This was a powerful pejorative, conjuring up images of 
quagmires. But it was never clearly defined, only invoked, and always in the negative 
sense, used only to kill someone else's proposal. '"" However, Holbrooke was reportedly 
cut off by General Shalikashvili, who was emphatic that there were certain things "that 
IFOR should not, would not, and could not do. " 12 As a compromise, General 
Shalikashvili suggested the military would be willing to accept the "authority" to do 
additional tasks, "but not the obligation. '"13 As Holbrooke notes "the meaning of this 
finely crafted compromise would not be determined until the commanders on the ground 
decided how to use their "authority"". 14 
Opposition to the military taking on a more expansive, proactive role, did not stem purely 
from a military motivated by considerations of minimising the numbers of U. S. troops to 
be deployed and a fear of mission creep. A number of White House officials had similar 
views, premised upon a strategic rationale which sought to place the onus of the 
responsibilit\' for peace on the domestic parties. Clinton's National Security Advisor. 
Anthony Lake, argued that a more proactive approach by the major international players 
10 See DAALDER, GETTING To DAYTON, p. 143. (emphasis added. ) 
11 See HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 216. 
'2 Sec, DA-\LDER, GETTING To D, \YTON, p. 147. 
13 Sec HoIBROOKE. To END A WAR, p. 222, (emphasis added. ) 
14 Si'c HOI. BROOKE, TO END A WAR, p. 222. 
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such as NATO and the OSCE, would lead to the domestic parties developing 
"unreasonable expectations that the hard work will be done for them not by them. " Lake 
believed they should "tackle their own problems. - 15 However. Lake's rationale pre- 
supposed a level of consensus existed between the `warring factions' as to what 
constituted the "problems. " As the following chapter will illustrate. many in both the 
Serb community within Bosnia and Serbia, and the Croat community within Bosnia and 
Croatia would openly revere individuals who had been, or would subsequently be, 
indicted by the Tribunal. Furthermore, the domestic political structures and associated 
legal, police, and security divisions continued to be controlled by individuals implicated 
in war time atrocities. Thus, the prospect of the issue of war crimes being tackled by the 
domestic parties was patently slim. 
Despite loosing the battle to the `minimalists', Holbrooke was determined to persevere 
with the issue of arrests. During the administration's final briefing before Dayton on 
October 31,1995, he gave a stark warning to the President and the other participants. 
Holbrooke recounts in his memoirs "I said there was one critical issue I had to raise, even 
though it was difficult. If we are going to create real peace rather than an uneasy cease- 
fire.... Karadzic and Mladic will have to be captured. This is not simply a question of 
justice, but also of peace. If they are not captured, no peace agreement we create in 
Dayton can ultimately succeed. " There was silence at the Cabinet table. "' 6 Interestingly, 
two weeks prior to this meeting, Clinton had made a similar, although more general 
statement in public, noting "Even if a peace is reached, and I hope that we can do that, no 
peace will endure for long without justice. " 17 Despite, this recognition however, the 
President would not seek to institute a policy to actively address the concern, with 
domestic political considerations restricting his scope for maneuver. Clinton had a 
strained relationship with the military, with some criticising his avoidance of active 
service in the Vietnam War. In addition, his policy towards gays in the military did little 
to endear him to the conservative institution. Ultimately, whilst the President may have 
1' See DAALDER, GETTING TO DAYTON. p. 
16 See HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 226. 
17 See President Clinton speech at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. October 15.1995 (emphasis 
added). 
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supported the substance of Holbrooke's appeal, he was not willing to take on a JCS and 
DoD, both of whom were firmly opposed to an expansive IFOR mandate. Perhaps most 
importantly, as Daalder highlights, the scope and extent of IFOR's mandate was driven 
to a considerable extent by political considerations of what the Congress and the public 
were likely to support a year before presidential elections. "'8 
Da on 
Before exploring the relationship between the ICTY and the Dayton negotiation process, 
the author will critically assess two assertions which have been made by a number of 
`pro-prosecution' commentators relating to the process. Firstly; the assertion that the 
Tribunal failed to indict Milosevic due to `Realpolitik" considerations, and that 
conversely, the "full application of the norm of justice would have dictated the indictment 
of Mr. Milosevic in 1995, if not earlier"19, and secondly; the assertion that rather than 
negotiating with the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic, securing a just peace" N%could have 
entailed either the "reverse of much of the gains of ethnic cleansing'"20, or achieving an 
"unconditional surrender. , 21 
The Failure to Indict Milosevic 
The Tribunal's first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone has on numerous occasions stated that 
indictments for leadership figures beyond Karadzic and Mladic were not issued by the 
Tribunal simply because the necessary information was not available to the court. The 
former Chief Prosecutor recounted in his memoirs the charge was made that I had been 
pressured by the major powers not to indict Milosevic. What the media did not appear to 
recognize was that making war is not a war crime. Waging an aggressive war is certainly 
recognized as a crime by international criminal law, but it is not a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That Milosevic may have approved of the criminal conduct 
of Karadzic and Mladic did not make him guilty of a war crime. Nor did the fact that he 
18 SecDA1\I I)ER, GETTING To DAYTON, p. 144. 
19 See \ViLI I: \M S AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH li'STICE? p. 117. 
20 Sc'c ý1'ILL1: \Ms AND SCHARF. PEACF WITH Jt'STICE'? p. 161. 
See HAZAN, ts rICIINA TIME OF \V'AR, p. 72. -ý 
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supplied weapons... . to the Bosnian Serb Arm Y. -22 He also pointed out "The only thing 
we had was the work of Bassiouni's Commission of Inquiry. which permitted us to 
construct the Tactic case. But there was nothing in the dossiers to indict Milosevic. '' 
Hazan however, is unconvinced, arguing "Goldstone's line of defense does not hold. The 
only explanation is politics, a terrain on which he excelled"24 
The charge that the Tribunal's Prosecutor held back from indicting Milose\' ic as a result 
of a political decision which determined that the move would have upset the peace 
process is a serious one. However, it may be contended that it is Hazan's rather strident 
claim that "the only explanation is politics"" which, to apply his own terminologv. "does 
not hold" with regards to Goldstone"s conduct. Numerous Tribunal officials have 
stressed that the court did not possess the relevant evidence necessary to bring a case 
against Milosevic during or before 1995. Paul Stuebner, Goldstone's principal counselor, 
emphatically stated, We have no, let me repeat no information... Neither the United 
States, nor France, nor Great Britain, nor any of the other countries aided us in building 
an indictment against Milosevic. -25 
Bill Fenrick (who went onto work for the Tribunal) highlighted whilst working for the 
Commission, it appears that there is a substantial degree of local autonomy for the large 
number of military and paramilitary formations deployed.. .. lt mai 
be that the appearance 
of anarchy and chaos is carefully simulated by a rigidly hierarchical military and political 
command and control structure. The existence and effectiveness of this structure misst be 
proven. It may not be presumed. "26 As ICTY investigator John Ralston stressed, proving 
this was a considerable challenge; "without access to documentation, command structures 
and de jure responsibility were difficult to determine. "27 Unlike the prosecution at 
22 See RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY. REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR. (Yale Uni. 
Press) 2000, p. 104 
2; Sc'c Goldstone quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 60 
24 Sec HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 60. (emphasis added. ) 
2 Sec HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 67. 
26 Final Version of Mr. Fenrick's Report on the Reconnaissance Mission to the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, March 24.1993, (emphasis added) 
27 Sec John Ralston 'Investigating \Var Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"', 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal la\\. 15th International 
Conference. Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice, August 30.2001. 
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Nuremberg, the OTP would not in these early stages be able to rely on official 
documentary evidence. Indeed, as Carter points out, "There was no indication that there 
existed a parallel 'Balkan penchant for meticulous record keeping., nor did it appear that 
a prosecution based on self-generated, irrefutable, incriminating documentation was 
like] Y. ", 28 
U. S. intelligence reportedly had no reliable evidence connecting Milosevic or his inner 
circle directly to war crimes. In a memorandum to State Department Chief of Staff Tom 
Donilon, Tobi Gati of the State Department's bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) 
reported that "the intelligence community for three years has looked for definitive 
evidence of President Milosevic's personal involvement in managing ethnic cleansing 
and other war crimes, and has come up empty handed. -2'' 
However, this is not to suggest that the U. S. administration's published conclusions or 
assertions should be unquestionably accepted. The administration was quite prepared to 
withhold information it possessed about the existence of Bosnian Serb-run detention 
camps in 1992 on the grounds that disclosure could have increased pressure on the U. S. 
to become further involved in the conflict. 30 Thus, it is conceivable that the U. S. may 
have withheld intelligence material which implicated Milosevic, based on the strategic 
rationale that the Serbian President was deemed a critical figure in any peace negotiation. 
Indeed, former State Department official John Fox claimed "There was very clear 
evidence coming in from Europe, for example, that the command and control, was clear, 
that it was from Belgrade. We knew for example that the shock troops of Arkan and the 
White Eagles were supported, armed and financed by Milosevic, by the security forces in 
Belgrade, so one has to close ones eyes very tightly to say there is not a link. -31 
2S See Kim Carter, 'Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?: Collecting Evidence for the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia. ' Annuaire canadien de Droit international, 1993, p. 239. 
29 Secs Memorandum to Tom Donilon from Tobi Gati, '\Var Crimes and MiloseN ic'. No\ ember ,. 1995, in 
'The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 8, p. 193. 
30 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us' The . \e1, - lOrk 
Review Of 
Books, May 9,1996, pp. 10-11. 
31 See John Fox comments in 'Getting A\\ay with Murder'. Panorama. BBC. December 1". 1993. 
(emphasis added. ) 
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If indictments have any hope of standing up in court however. they need to demonstrate a 
lot more than a mere "linkV' in order to gain a secure conviction. Whilst, by 1995 there 
was undoubtedly a mass of information, especially journalistic accounts, alluding to 
Milosevic's overall responsibility for war crimes in the region. such accounts, although 
useful in providing a contextual background, would not satisfy the high evidentiary 
threshold necessary to obtain a successful conviction. As Akhavan perceptively notes 
"individual criminal liability cannot be based on newspaper clippings. - 32 Furthermore, as 
Sell highlights, When Hague investigators approached.... Western journalists... . some 
were cooperative, but others proved unwilling to help or changed their stories when 
confronted with a request to testify on behalf of the tribunal. -33 
It is difficult to explain why, after the Kosovo conflict in 199934, when Milosevic lost the 
last remaining vestiges of diplomatic credibility, this allegedly available, 
comprehensively damning material, was not handed over to the Tribunal. Although a 
number of states did in fact provide more intelligence material to the court around this 
time, 35 the prosecution failed to produce a "smoking gun" or a decisively damning 
intercept during the Milosevic trial which would have made the case water-tight, 
particularly with regard to the indictment relating to Bosnia and Croatia. Instead, some 
of the prosecution's most compelling evidence at the Milosevic trial came from the 
testimony of key insider witnesses, who in 1995, were in no way inclined to turn on their 
then patron, and onhv since the fall of the Milosevic regime and the demise of their own 
respective power bases, became willing to testify. Thus, it appears unrealistic that 
cooperation could have been obtained from these sources prior to this time. 
32 Set, Payam Akhavan, 'Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future . 
Atrocities? ', 
American Journal of International Laxe, Vol. 95: 7,2001, p. 19. 
;; Sec Louis SELL, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA (Duke University 
Press 2002) p. 325. emphasis added [hereinafter SELL, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC] 
34 For further details on the Kosovo conflict see No H. D. -vALDER, WINNING UGLY: NATO'S WAR To SAVE 
Kosovo (Brookings Institution) 2000. 
35 See Ed \"ulliamy and Patrick \\ intour, 'Hawks smell a Tyrant's blood: N. ATO's Neww Confidence 
Suggests That the Neck of Slobodan Milosevic, the Butcher of Belgrade, May Itself Be on the Block', 
Obst'm r, May 30,1999. 
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Ultimately, if evidence was withheld from the Tribunal. Hazan's char`ie that the failure to 
indict Milosevic on the grounds of political expediency is misdirected. It would appear 
to be more appropriate to level such accusations against a number of States, rather than 
Goldstone and the Tribunal. Noting that the U. K. had agreed to handover "all- its 
evidence which might link Milosevic to war crimes in 1999, Goldstone mused One must 
question whether the information now being offered wasn't available tw\, o. three, or four 
years ago. "36 As Williams and Scharf highlight, it would not be surprising that the U. S. 
and U. K. withheld intelligence information regarding Milosevic's culpability (given the 
determination, which held the greatest sway within both governments, that he was a 
critical component of any peace negotiation process). 37 
Additionally, Williams and Scharf go on to argue that the OPT failed to adequately 
explore the possibility that, as the civilian commander of the Serb military and police 
forces, Milosevic could have been prosecuted at this time under the doctrine of command 
responsibility for failing to prevent his forces from committing atrocity crimes in 
Bosnia. 38 Indeed, some of the Tribunal's judges argued that the IMTFE Yamashita case 
of December 7,1945, could have been relied on to justify such an indictment. 39 
However, many within the OTP were reluctant to rely on the case's dubious legacy', as 
recounted by Steubner, "[General] MacArthur wanted the head of General Yamashita 
because the Japanese commander had won battles in the Pacific.... MacArthur succeeded 
and Yamashita was sentenced to death. Very frankly, the judgment was for me the 
quintessence of conqueror's justice. I did not want the Tribunal to take inspiration from 
this case. , 40 More recently, the concept of command responsibility has come under 
sustained criticism, with a number of legal commentators suggesting the charge has been 
used "as a last resort" by prosecutors who feel obliged to indict senior officials, even 
though there is little evidence against them. 41 During Milosevic's trial, the Former 
;G See Richard Goldstone quote in Raymond Bonner, 'Crimes Court Not Ready to Punish Kosovo 
Violence', Vc'w York Timc's, March 31,1999. 
37 Sc c\VILL I: \NIS AND SCHARF, PEACE WI I'H JUSTICE? p. 117. 
38 Sec \VILL1. AMS AND SCHARF. PEACE WITH JUSTICE? p. 117. 
39 Sc'c' HA/AN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 58. 
40 Sece Paul Steubner quote in HAIAN. JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 58. 
41 Sec, 'Command Responsibility Under Fire'. Tribunal Update. Institute for War. And Peace Reporting. No. 
445, March 24.2006. 
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Serbian President was relatively successful in obfuscating the role of Serbian military and 
police in Bosnia. The OTP's decision to submit additional video evidence well into the 
trial, showing a Serbian Special Forces unit present at Srebrenica, appears to confirm that 
prior to the introduction of the footage, the Prosecution had failed to comprehensively 
establish that Serbian forces directly under his control were present in Bosnia. 42 As 
Nancy Paterson, a former OTP lawyer who played a key part in drafting the Milosevic 
indictment indicated, the evidence relating to Milosevic's direct involvement in Bosnia 
was always more limited than Kosovo; "In Bosnia, there was no direct chain of 
command. Kosovo was a Milosevic project from the start. -43 
What Price Justice? 
Critically, whilst a number of `pro-prosecution' commentators have been quick to 
condemn the failure to indict Milosevic or arrest him at the Dayton Peace negotiations, 
they have largely failed to provide any serious analysis of the impact such a move would 
have had on the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement of the war in Bosnia. If 
Milosevic should have been arrested at Dayton for his involvement in the ordering of 
atrocity crimes, why not the Croatian President Tudjman? who, arguably, was also liable 
under the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes committed during Operation 
Storm. 44 And if Tudjman also, what about President Izetbegovic, under the same 
doctrine for the alleged crimes committed against Sarajevo's Serb residents during the 
city's siege. 45 An indictment against any of the three Presidents would have greatly 
increased the chances of the entire negotiation process collapsing, which may have 
increased the pressure on the `International Community' to impose a settlement 
militarily, something, which as will be discussed below, it was clearly unwilling to do. 
However, before exploring this issue, it is instructive to explore the events in West Africa 
42 More recently the Tribunal has amended the indictments issued against Franko Simatovic and Jovica 
Stanisic who were recently implicated in the Srebrenica massacre. The amended indictment now only ties 
them to the presence of the Serbian Special force unit shown in the video footage rather than to the wider 
operation. 
°; Sec Nancy Paterson quote in Ed Vulliamy. Rory Carroll and Peter Beaumont 'HoýN I Trapped the 
Butcher of the Balkans', Observer. July 1.2001. 
'a After Tudjman's death in December 1999. the Tribunal acknowledged that they were conducting 
investigations into his culpability for atrocity crimes. 
45 After Izetbegovic's death in October 2003 the Tribunal acknowledged that they were conducting 
investigations into his culpability for atrocity crimes. 
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during summer 2003 in order to illustrate the potential consequences of pursuing criminal 
indictments during the delicate period of peace negotiations. 
Liberia had been blighted by civil war and associated humanitarian catastrophe since 
1989 when Charles Taylor, a former exiled ally of Liberian Dictator Samuel Doe, re- 
entered the country from Cote d' Ivoire and incited rebellion. Although the Doe regime 
was defeated by late 1990, the rebels quickly split into rival factions, plunging the 
country in further civil war for seven years. In 1996 there was a break in the fighting, 
with Taylor winning a Presidential election the following year. However, a new conflict 
broke out after Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) a rebel 
group backed by neighboring Guinea emerged in the North of the Country. Taylor's 
powerbase was further eroded with the emergence of a second rebel group, the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), in the South of the country in 2003. 
A number of peace initiatives had been attempted over the years, with limited success, 
and by summer 2003, with fighting intensifying and the humanitarian situation 
deteriorating rapidly, there were serious concerns that the instability would again spill 
over into neighboring West African countries. In an attempt to resolve the crisis, a 
concerted diplomatic initiative was launched in an attempt to bring an end to the fighting. 
Under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a 
peace conference was convened in early June in Accra, Ghana. Nigeria, the dominant 
regional power, was instrumental in cajoling both LURD rebels and Taylor to agree to 
attend the talks. However, the negotiations were thrown onto crisis when, on the 
morning of June 4, whilst Taylor and his entourage arrived in Accra, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone unsealed its indictment against the Liberian President (originally 
approved on March 7,2003) for crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Sierra Leone conflict. 
A warrant for his arrest was served on the Ghanaian authorities and also transmitted to 
INTERPOL. Throughout the day senior Ghanaian officials insisted they had not received 
the documentation requesting Taylor's arrest. 
4(' The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
"' Sec Sierra Leone New Archives, June 4.2003, available at http: ', \v\v \\ . sierra-leone. org slne\\ s0603. html 
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(SCSL) quickly countered. A statement issued by the Court's Registrar Robin Vincent 
maintained "Copies of all relevant documents were served this morning personally on the 
Ghanaian High Commissioner in Freetown. " Vincent went on to point out "In addition. 
copies of those documents were electronically transmitted to the Ghanaian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and acknowledgement of receipt of those documents has been received 
by telephone from a senior official in that ministry . '"47 It was becoming clear that the 
Ghanaians were not about to arrest the Liberian President, and furthermore" were furious 
at the SCSL's indictment. Taylor left Accra and flew back to the Liberian capital. The 
peace negotiations had collapsed. 
The SCSL's unsealing of the indictment received praise from a number of `pro- 
prosecution' commentators. Human Rights Watch's Executive Director of the Africa 
Division described the indictment as "a tremendous step forward. -. 4s David Pratt, 
Canada's former Special Envoy to Sierra Leone argued "Under no circumstances should 
the Sierra Leone Special Court indictment against Liberian President Charles Taylor be 
lifted .... If we are ever going to end the culture of 
impunity, we must support this Special 
Court and others in the future whose objective is to bring to justice those charged with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, ""49 
However, the architects of the peace conference were dismayed at the development. 
Ghana's Foreign Minister Nana Akufo-Addo lamented "Obviously it's an embarrassing 
incident. 
-But as 
far as I'm concerned the focus should not be on our embarrassment... .1 
believe the action of the prosecutor in unsealing the indictment at this particular moment 
has not been helpful to the peace process . -50 Similarly, 
former Nigerian leader 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, the Chief Mediator at ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks in Accra 
claimed The announcement of this indictment came at a very, very wrong time, 
4' See Sierra Leone New Archives. June 4,2003, available at http: //www. sierra-leone. org/slnews06O3. html 
4S Seec, `West Africa: Taylor Indictment Advances Justice. Liberian President Must Be Arrested'. Human 
Rights Watch Press Release. June 4.2003. 
49 See Sierra Leone New Archives. June 13,2003, available at http: /iwwwv. sierra- 
leone. orýa'slne\wwsO603. html 
50 See Sierra Leone New Archives. June 4.2003, available at http: /, \\, \\, w. sien-a-leone. org/slnews06O3. htmi 
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throwing a spanner in the wheels and giving us a big problem . "51 The European Union's 
response was also rather circumspect. After calling for the warring parties to cease 
hostilities and to seek a negotiated solution to the Liberian crisis, a EU statement declared 
"The European Union holds the view that the indictment against Charles Taylor should 
not impede peace efforts underway in Ghana. ''52 
David Crane, the Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL was evidently conscious of the 
implications of unsealing the indictment. He acknowledged "I am aware that many 
members of the international community have invested a great deal of energy in the 
current peace talks. I want to make it clear that in reaching my decision to make the 
indictment public, I have not consulted with any state. I am acting as an independent 
prosecutor and this decision was based solely on the law. " 53 On June 5, the Court's 
Prosecutor attempted to further justify the move The disaster would have been if x\e 
would have allowed an indicted war criminal to sit through the (peace) process and to 
allow it to go forward, and then at the middle or the end let it be known that he was an 
indicted war criminal... . lt would 
have completely pulled the rug out from under the 
peace process. There was no disaster yesterday. The forces of good did in fact face down 
evil. "54 
However, for the people of Liberia, the breakdown in the peace negotiations represented 
a very real disaster. Representatives of the two main rebel groups LURD and MODEL 
put off signing a peace treaty, claiming Taylor's forces had renewed military offensives. 
By June 6, LURD rebels had overrun several refugee camps on the outskirts of Monrovia 
which had housed over 100,000 people including Sierra Leonean refugees and internally 
displaced people. World Food Programme Spokesman Ramin Rafirasme told journalists 
"People are fleeing in all directions.... tens of thousands.... the situation remains highly 
51 Sec Sierra Leone New Archives, June 13,2003, available at http: /%wawwkN'. sierra- 
leone. oru! slnews06O3. html 
'2 Set, Sierra Leone New Archives. June 13,2003, available at http: /xvwNA-. sierra- 
leone. org slnews0603. html 
53 Set, Sierra Leone New Archives. 2003, available at http: wk-ww\,. sierra-leone. org sinexN, sO6O3. html 
54 Sce Sierra Leone New Archives. June 5.2003, available at http: /? xN, w\wwww. sierra-leone. orýg'slnewsO603. htm 
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volatile. "55 Heavy fighting broke out between Taylor's soldiers and rebel forces in the 
capital's suburbs. Thousands of the Sierra Leoneans who had lived at one of the Refugee 
camps begun to arrive in Monrovia recounting stories of human rights abuse. UNHCR 
relayed "worrying reports of widespread incidents of violence, intimidation and extortion 
during and after the fighting. -56 
Amnesty International subsequently reported that the fighting which occurred after the 
collapse of the peace negotiations "exacted a heavy toll on civilians in Monrovia; the UN 
estimated that more than 1,000 people were killed and some 450,000 made homeless. 
Acute shortages of food, clean water, sanitation facilities and medical care resulted in an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis, and collapse of law and order left Monrovia's 
inhabitants, including Sierra Leonean refugees and hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced people, increasingly vulnerable to human rights abuses. "57 
With civilian casualties mounting, the U. N. Secretary- General, the U. N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and international humanitarian agencies called for urgent 
international military intervention, and in early August the U. N. Security Council 
authorized deployment of an ECOWAS force. On August 11, Taylor left Liberia and 
went into exile in Nigeria. The Nigerian government reportedly gave implicit guarantees 
that the former President would not be handed over to the SCSL nor prosecuted in his 
newfound country of residence. On August 18, a peace agreement was signed in Accra 
between the Liberian Government, LURD, MODEL, and political parties, and with the 
deployment of international forces, the situation was stabilized. 
Crane has reportedly admitted that the SCSL thought Taylor would not be arrested in 
Ghana, but that the unsealing of the indictment would be a catalyst for de-legitimizing the 
Liberian dictator, resulting in his removal from office. Crane also contended, in 
somewhat dramatic terms, that "the power of a pen, signing an indictment, humbled a 
Sec Sierra Leone New Archives, June 6,2003, available at http: //www. sierra-leone. org slnex s06O3. lItml 
56 Sec Sierra Leone New Archives, June 13,2003, available at http: /? xvxv\v. sierra- 
leone. orgLslnewsO603. html 
57 Sec Amnesty International Annual Report, 2004, Liberia Summary, available at 
http: /i ww eb. amnestv. org report-1004 lbr-summary-eng 
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dictator. "58 The SCSL Prosecutor's pronouncements regarding the impact of the 
indictment are spurious. Rather, it may be contended that the military realities on the 
ground (LURD and MODEL's rapid advance on the capital) ww as the ke\ dynamic which 
sealed Taylor's fate and political exile. With the government forces coming under 
increasing pressure and close to being routed from Monrovia, it appears that Taylor's 
demise was likely, regardless of the existence of any criminal indictment against him. 
Over the following two and a half years a steady stream of pressure was placed on the 
Nigerian government to hand over the former Liberian President. In April 2006, Nigeria 
declared it would have no objection to the Liberian authorities arresting Taylor and 
repatriating him to Liberia. However, it maintained its refusal to send him to the SCSL. 
In the ensuing confusion, Taylor left his palatial residence and attempted to flee the 
country, but was arrested at the Nigeria-Cameroon border and flown to Monrovia, where 
he was promptly arrested by U. N. authorities and transferred to the SCSL's detention 
facility in Freetown. 
Was the SCSL's decision to unseal the indictment at the time of the peace negotiations 
justifiable? Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor's observations 
regarding the tensions between peace and justice may be viewed as particularly 
perceptive, highlighting there is "always a balance between achieving justice.. . and 
sacrificing future lives on the altar of justice ... I think that to arrive at an absolutist 
answer on either side of that argument is wrong. "59 It is impossible to determine whether 
the fighting would not have broken out if the peace negotiations had continued. 
Nevertheless, Crane's claim that allowing Taylor to participate in the Peace Conference 
would have been a disaster and completely undermined the process is questionable. After 
the peace negotiations broke down, Liberia was again consumed in a humanitarian 
catastrophe, resulting in large-scale civilian deaths and massive population shifts. 
Ultimately, Taylor has ended up facing trial before the SCSL, illustrating that concerted 
58 See Comments made by David Crane during presentation at American Bar Association International Law 
Conference: Nuremberg and the Birth of International Law: A Day to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary 
of the Trials at Nuremberg. Georgetown University, Washington D. C. USA, November 11.2005. 
59 Sec Anthony Lake quote in B, \Ss. STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 232. 
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international pressure can be decisive in achieving justice after peace has been 
established. Thus, it may have been a more prudent option to have allowed the 
negotiations to continue, establish a ceasefire, deploy international troops to Liberia, 
countenance Taylor's exile to Nigeria, and only then unseal the indictment against him. 
`Pro-prosecution' Alternatives to Negotiating With Milosevic: Rolling Back Ethnic 
Cleansing or Unconditional Surrender 
A number of `pro-prosecution' commentators who are critical of the failure to indict 
Milosevic at Dayton have also suggested more robust actions should have been pursued. 
For example. Williams and Scharf assert to secure a just peace, it \\ ould have been 
necessary to reverse much of the gains of ethnic cleansing. "'0 Hazan argues "the onl\ 
remaining roads to justice [is] unconditional surrender" [of the Bosnian Serb Anny]61 
These contentions appear to be more informed by an admirable repugnance for the evils 
of ethnic cleansing, rather than any serious consideration of strategic, military, logistical 
or humanitarian realities. 
Williams and Scharf highlight "1t was believed if the [combined Croatian/Bosnian 
Croat/Bosnian Government] offensive continued .... [it] may well 
have been able to 
defeat the Serbian forces and thereby reiiift Bosnia. -62 This assertion is open to serious 
dispute. Whilst the combined offensives initially made significant territorial gains, when 
Mladic returned to Bosnia after a brief period in hospital in Serbia (ostensibly to treat a 
gallstone condition, but also interpreted as a means to enable him to meet with Milosevic 
to receive advice) the BSA began to stabilize their front lines (ironically, in part due to 
their redeployment of artillery withdrawn from Sarajevo in accordance with their 
unilateral agreement to the U. N. and NATO to remove heavy weapons around the capital, 
to Western Bosnia). Croatian units came up against sustained BSA resistance whilst 
trying to cross the Una River on the Croatian-Bosnian border, 
63 and Bosnian Government 
offensives were becoming bogged down. The fragile alliance between the 
60 Sec, WILI I: \NIS AND SCHARF, PEACI WITH JUSTICE'? p. 161. 
61 See HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 72. 
62 Seece \V, IL. I IANIS ANIS SCHARF. PEACE WITH JUSTICE? p. 156. (emphasis added) 
63 See RIPLEY. OPERATION DELIBERATI FORCE. p. 307 
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Croatian/Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Government forces was also becoming 
increasingly strained. Friction between ABiH 7th Corps and the HVO around Sanski 
Most led to the Bosnian Croat leadership threatening to break off cooperation. and 
fighting broke out between Croats and Bosnian government forces around Bosnaki 
Petrovac. 
Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether Croatian military aims were consistent 
with the premise of creating a "reunified Bosnia-, or whether instead, Tudjman envisaged 
that territory would be carved out in Bosnia which, in time would have been annexed into 
Croatia. 64 Chuter highlights that material which emerged during the Blaskic case at the 
Tribunal illustrates that as far back as late 1991, senior Bosnian Croat officials were 
zealously committed to the goal of a greater Croatia state comprising Croatia proper and 
parts of Herzegovina. At a meeting on December 12,1991 in Travnik, Mate Boban, 
(then) President of the regional crisis staff for Herzegovina, and Dario Kordic, then 
President of the HVO in Travnik, co-chaired a meeting which concluded the Croatian 
people of this region, and all of Bosnia still support the unanimously accepted orientation 
and conclusions adopted in agreements with President Franjo Tudjman on 13 and 20 June 
1991 in Zagreb 
. 
"165 These principles stipulated "the Croatian people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must finally embrace a determined and active policy til'hich vt'ill realise our 
"'66 eternal dream -a common Croatian state. 
Indeed, when Tudjman held a secret meeting with Milosevic in Karedjordjevo in 1991, 
the two leaders discussed the partition of Bosnia. 67 Whilst attending a World War Two 
"Victory in Europe" dinner in London on May 6,1995, Tudjman had confided to the 
(then) Liberal Democrat Party Leader Paddy Ashdown that he would like to divide 
Bosnia between the Croats and the Serbs, even drawing a cursory map outlining the 
division of Bosnia on a menu. 
68 As Ripley points out, many senior U. N. officers and 
64 Sec Roger Cohen, 'Croatia Expands Its Power In Bosnia'. \'w York Times, September 16,1995. 
bs Scc CHUTER, WAR CRIn1F s p. 229. 
66 Sec' CHUTER, WAR CRIMP, p. 229 (emphasis added). 
67 Ste L: \UR: \ SILBER AND ALAN LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (Penguin) 1996 p. 131-132. 
68 See Thomas Friedman 'Whose Balkan Menu'.. \clir York Times, September 27.1996. 
western diplomats viewed the Croatian offensive as a "land grab. --69 Even David 
Galbraith, U. S. ambassador to Croatia, who has been widely characterized as supportive 
of the Croatian offensives, predicted that had the advances continued, "Tudjman would 
never give up Banja Luka to the Serbs or the Federation . --70 The Croatian President's 
remarks during a meeting in Zagreb with Izetbegovic and Holbrooke on September 1995 
may be construed as giving credence to such concerns; "We have suffered the casualties, 
and we liberated eighty percent of this territory... Now you demand w\ e turn over to \ ou 
the towns that belong to Croatia... This is simply unacceptable. "71 Similarly, the 
Judgment in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez of February 26,200172 was 
unequivocal, noting "The Trial Chamber finds that President Tudjman harboured 
territorial ambitions in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that was part of his dream 
of a Greater Croatia, including Western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia. " 73 
Leaving Croatia's evident expansionist intentions aside, there were also real concerns that 
an attack on Banja Luka "would bring about a near-catastrophic defeat for the Bosnian 
Serbs, thus drawing Belgrade into the war.... the impression was that the Serbian military 
might feel compelled to intervene to stave off a complete BSA collapse . -74 Even if the 
continued offensives would not have sparked off a wider regional conflict, they would 
have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. Holbrooke predicted that capturing Banja 
Luka would generate over two hundred thousand additional refugees, 75 Galbraith, four 
hundred thousand. 76 The earlier Croatian 'Storm' offensive to retake the Krajina led to 
the displacement of approximately one hundred and eighty thousand Croatian Serbs and 
was characterized by massive human rights violations and widespread killing of those 
who remained. 77 As Sell notes "Few of the refugees had actually witnessed the arrival of 
Croatian troops in Krajina. Most had fled before the invaders showed up, well aware of 
69 Sec' RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, p. 276 
70 See RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, p. 302 
71 Sec Tudjman quotes in HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR p. 165. 
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75 See HoLBROOKI 
. 
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76 See RIPLI: I, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE. p. 302. 
77 For further details of Croatian atrocities see RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE p. 191 - 192 
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the fate that awaited them if they remained. None of these refugees mentioned it, but all 
of them understood that it was payback time, that the victorious Croats would extract 
revenge for what Serbs had done to the Croatian inhabitants of Krajina in 1991. "78 
More than 40,000 Serbs were displaced as a result of Operation Mistral 2. Given the 
atrocities committed against non-Serbs, particularly in Prijedor and Banja Luka, it is 
likely that had the Croatian/Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government offensive been 
allowed to continue, massive Bosnian Serb population displacement into FRY would 
have also occurred from the areas overrun. This may well have forced the FRY forces to 
become further dragged into the fighting in Bosnia leading to an escalation of the 
conflict. 79 Whilst Williams and Scharf s prescription of "rolling back ethnic cleansing" 
may have satisfied the desire for revenge of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
whose citizens had been so badly treated by BS forces, it is questionable whether it would 
have been consistent with the "full application of the norm of justice. " Instead, such an 
approach may be viewed more as an application of the principle of Iex talions, merely 
substituting one exercise of ethnic cleansing with another. The recent release of video 
footage of Croat paramilitary forces and Bosnian government soldiers harassing and 
attacking convoys of Serb refugees, which also includes a Bosnian government 
commander General Ante Dudakovic allegedly ordering his troops to burn a village, 
further serves to support this view. 80 
Hazan's consideration of the `International Community' pursuing a policy of 
"unconditional surrender" (presumably against the Serbs) is even more spurious, as aptly 
illustrated by one particular encounter between the Bosnian President and U. S. 
negotiators at the Dayton talks. Izetbegovic declared that he could not be a party to an 
agreement signed by the Bosnian Serbs, and instead, like the Nazis, the Bosnian Serbs 
should have the agreement imposed upon them. Defense Secretary Perry bluntly 
informed the Bosnian President, that unlike the Allies victory over the Axis forces during 
78 See SELL, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, p. 242. 
79 Some Serbian forces, including Arkan's Tigers and JSA Red Beret units were already operating around 
Sanski Most and in the Banja Luka region of Bosnia. 
80 Sec 'Serbs see new 'war crimes' tape', BBC Xcwws, August 9,2006, 'Bosnian President Defends a Muslim 
General', Associated Press, August 10,2006 
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the Second World War, the Bosnian government had failed to militarily defeat the BSA. 8I 
In light of this reality, the potential means to achieve an unconditional surrender could 
only have come from NATO military action. However. as the following section 
demonstrates, embarking on such a policy was never really possible, with the overriding 
consensus within NATO against the large-scale escalation which would have been 
necessary to achieve this strategy. 
A popular misconception appears to exist that Operation Deliberate Force resulted in 
NATO "massively bombing the Serb leadership. "82 In reality, targets which would have 
led to high human casualties were assiduously avoided. As the (then) Commander of 
AIRSOUTH U. S. Air Force, Lieutenant General Mike Ryan recounted, the planning for 
Operation Deliberate Force was "very systematic... and avoided barracks. "83 Similarly 
Lieutenant General Janvier, the French commander of UNPROFOR wanted the military 
action to "avoid gratuitously causing casualties so he did not want NATO to bomb 
military barracks or close to the Yugoslav border to prevent incidents. - 84 NATO's 
political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was even more circumspect. As Ripley 
notes, NAC was completely divided over the scope and duration of the organization's 
offensive operations. Four days into Operation Deliberate Force, major diplomatic 
disagreements emerged, with some NATO ambassadors worrying the "short sharp shock" 
they had sanctioned would develop into a slogging match. 85 When 13 Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missiles (TLAMs)86 were launched against Bosnian Serb targets on September 10, 
1995, NAC ambassadors again voiced their concerns, with France, Spain, Canada and 
Greece warning the U. S. against pursuing a strategy of creeping escalation. 87 Similarly, 
the UNPROFOR Commander was also clearly opposed to ratcheting up the fighting. 
Although Bosnian Serb lines of communication and bridges were targeted, some were 
81 Sec handwritten notes (no author) from Secretary Christopher's briefing at the Hope Hotel, November 
17,1995, EUR files, in The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 9. p. 234, fn. 16. 
X2 Sec, BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 234. 
8; See RIPELY. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, p. 236. 
S4 See RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, p. 238. 
85 Sc'c RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERAII FORCE, p. 263. 
86 The decision to use of TALMs was a US, not NATO decision. The Italians had initially refused to agree 
basing rights for US F-117 stealth fighters in response to them being refused a seat in the Contact Group. 
Rather than accede to the Italian's demands the decision was made to use cruise missiles. 
87 See The Road to Dayton' L. Q. S. Department of State. Ch. 5, p. 102. 
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left open for Bosnian Serb forces to withdraw along: "Janvier... did not \\ant a close- 
quarter battle with the BSA. " 88 
Furthermore, whilst aerial bombardment and cruise missile strikes of Serb 
communications systems had a dramatic impact on their ability to manage the battlefield, 
many strikes were merely targeting sites which had already been hit. When informal 
soundings were made about the option of extending air-strikes to Option 3 targets (large 
industrial targets, power stations, dams and other sites which would impact upon the 
Bosnian Serb civilian population), Field Marshal Sir Dick Vincent, (then) Chainnan of 
the NATO Military Committee considered it a "non-starter. "89 General George Joulwan, 
(then) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) recalled "NAC was "very 
nervous", with some ambassadors wanting to stop the bombing. "`"' The British 
government reportedly did not view the existing U. N. Security Council resolutions as 
providing the requisite legal backing for Option 3 targets, and it was feared that any new 
Resolution would be vetoed by the Russians. 91 More ominously, Russia viewed the air- 
strikes as supporting the Croat and Bosnian Government offensives, with the Russian 
Defense Minister warning U. S. Defense Secretary Perry "if the fighting continues.. . we 
will have to help the Serbs in a unilateral way. -92 In light of the protracted opposition 
within NAC and the U. N. to extending the bombing campaign, and Russia's warning 
against further escalation, it appears that pursuing a policy of unconditional surrender 
against the Bosnian Serbs was never a viable option. 
The Negotiations 
Although the scope and mandate of any possible international troop deployment had been 
largely pre-determined by the U. S. in the preceding two months before the 
commencement of the negotiations, with the U. S. negotiation team having drafted an 
initial Accord, most of the key issues were still to he formally agreed on h' the `warring 
parties'. Their delegations and the international mediators led by the U. S. would spend 
88 Sec RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE. p. 265. 
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three weeks arguing, blustering, prevaricating and eventually agreeing to a myriad of 
provisions which would be enshrined in the Dayton Accord. These included: Bosnia's 
constitutional framework; elections; the right of refugees to return home. and critically; 
determining the internal boundaries of the country. The Conference's opening e' ent 
included the first face-to-face meeting between Presidents' Izetbegovic, Milosev is and 
Tudjman in over two years. U. S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out four 
conditions for a settlement: Bosnia remaining a state with "a single international 
personality"; "the special history and significance" of Sarajevo had to be taken into 
account (Clinton had already informed Holbrooke that he did not want the city to be 
divided; only unified or internationalized); the resolution of eastern Slavonia; and finally 
that human rights must be respected and those responsible for atrocities be brought to 
account. 93 Despite the reservations expressed by many involved in the negotiation 
process that the issue of war crimes represented a potentially destabilizing dynamic, 
Christopher, at the very minimum, had publicly placed the issue on the agenda. 
Furthermore, in a speech delivered two weeks prior to the start of Dayton, Clinton 
recognized the need for balancing peace and justice, noting "We have an obligation to 
carry forward the lessons of Nuremberg. " He continued "there must be peace for justice 
to prevail, but there must be justice when peace prevails. "94 In the early stages of the 
talks U. S. policy towards the war crimes issue appeared confused and contradictory. 
Despite the administration's "Minimalist" policy towards PIFWCs being essentially 
settled at the Principal's Meetings, elements of the media reported a more robust 
approach may have been emerging after Christopher declared "We cannot really expect 
that the forces of NATO would be there at the same time those individuals [PIFWCs] 
were in a position of power. -95 However, the "Minimalist" line was quickly re-asserted 
by a senior U. S. official involved in Bosnia policy, who clarified that The charitable 
thing to say is that the secretary [of State] didn't quite get it right, "" 
93 See HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR, p. 237 
94 See President Clinton Speech delivered at University of Connecticut in Storrs, October 15,1995. 
95 See Erik Ipsen, `Optimism on Bosnia: U. S. Position is Faulted'. International Herald Tribune, 
November 6,1995. 
96 See l:: rik Ipsen, `Optimism on Bosnia: U. S. Position is Faulted', International Herald Tribune, 
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Representatives from the Tribunal failed to secure any formal role at Dayton and 
attempted to make up for their absence by keeping the issue of war crimes firmly within 
the media spotlight. Similar to Bassiouni's strategy whilst working in the Commission. 
the press was used as, if not "an equalizer", then a forum to maintain pressure. Goldstone 
wrote to Madeline Albright requesting that the US make the surrender of PIFWCs a 
condition for any peace deal. The request was subsequently leaked to the New York 
Times. 97 The OTP also issued a series of indictments throughout the negotiations. 
Investigations into the Ovcara massacre, which had been initially started by the 
Commission, would lead to the indictment on November 7,1995, of three senior JNA 
officers, Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin. 98 Three days later the 
Tribunal issued a series of indictments against six members of the Bosnian Croat military 
(HVO) for crimes against humanity and grave breaches and violations of the laws of war 
arising out of their command responsibility relating to crimes committed in Lasva valley 
and the massacre at Ahmici in Hercegovina. 99 Finally, on November 16,1995, new 
indictments were published against Karadzic and Mladic charging the two senior Bosnian 
Serbs with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes relating to the Srebrenica 
massacre. '°° Shattuck and Scheffer also invited Goldstone to Washington for a four day 
visit, in an attempt to build support for the Tribunal during the Dayton negotiations and 
try to overcome the difficulties the court was facing in obtaining intelligence information 
from the various U. S. agencies. After meetings with Warren Christopher, Tony Lake and 
CIA head John Deutch, the three U. S. officials agreed to have a secure phone installed in 
The Hague allowing Goldstone to contact them directly for information and evidence 
requests, in an attempt to circumvent the considerable bureaucratic process. The, `pro- 
prosecution' advocates within the U. S. administration also continued to lobby for the 
Tribunal. However, as Shattuck recounts, for many attending the negotiations, 
accountability for war crimes remained a taboo issue, As I went through the first round 
of Dayton meetings I felt like a skunk whose unpleasant message nearly everyone wanted 
to avoid .... the 
European leaders and some Americans were not pleased to find 
97 Sec Stephen Engelberg, 'Panel Seeks U. S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals', . 
\cm Fork Times, 
November 3,1995. 
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themselves discussing war crimes and missing persons on an American military base with 
an American human rights official. " 101 During an earlier meeting with Goldstone. the 
Chief Prosecutor informed Shattuck that "Thorvald Stoltenber`, of Norway [the U. N. 
representative in the ongoing negotiations with Milosevic] was saying that the tribunal's 
investigations should be negotiable. Stoltenberg had apparently raised the tribunal issue 
with Milosevic, suggesting that he could "expect understanding from the Tribunal" if he 
cooperated with the peace negotiations. "' 02 Similarly, Russia attempted to persuade the 
Tribunal to assume a more flexible approach, with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozvrev 
sounding out, via a Russian Ambassador, whether the arrest warrants issued against 
Karadzic and Mladic could technically be frozen. Both Cassese and Goldstone 
emphatically ruled out such a move. 103 
On November 7,1995, the Tribunal's President gave a speech to the U. N. General 
Assembly lamenting the lack of cooperation the Tribunal had so far received on the issue 
of arrests, and highlighting that forty one of the forty three current indictees were 
reportedly residing in Bosnian Serb territory or in FRY. Our tribunal is like a `giant 
without arms or legs... To walk and work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial limbs 
are the state authorities. " 104 Cassese also suggested to the U. S. that he would draft a 
number of clauses in the peace treaty referencing the role of the Tribunal and establishing 
a unit of NATO soldiers, to be placed under the direction of the Chief Prosecutor, with 
the power to arrest, seize documents and participate in investigations. " 105 The Americans 
were reportedly unimpressed, informing the judge the proposal was out of the question. 
Our military are military, not policemen at the service of an international prosecutor. "106 
It should be noted that the U. S. was not the only potential troop contributing delegation at 
Dayton opposed to IFOR actively pursuing PIFWCs. Russia was vigorously opposed and 
'0I Sec' SEI. ATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE, p. 201 
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105 Sec' HA/AN. JLlS I ICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 68. 
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a senior State Department official noted that Greece also issued strong objections during 
the negotiations. ' 07 
With NATO refusing to countenance any more than nebulous provisions vis-ä-vis their 
responsibilities to arrest PIFWCs, Holbrooke asserted that it was essential to have a 
strong international, armed, police force endowed with a robust mandate to carry out 
arrests. However, the proposal came up against intense opposition from both E. U. 
members and NATO. The British representative Pauline Neville-Jones reportedly argued 
the "legacy of Northern Ireland precluded her government from allowing police officers 
to make arrests on foreign soil. "108 As Holbrooke recounts "The connection between 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia was not clear to us. '"log Neville-Jones's analogy may be 
viewed as both misleading and inappropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, in 
Northern Ireland, a local Police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was 
operating on the ground and was quite able to carry out arrests, whereas in Bosnia, as will 
be further elaborated in the following chapter, local police officers were either unwilling 
or unable to arrests PIFWCs. Secondly, British military forces were also heavily 
involved in law and order issues in the province, which included occasional arrest 
operations. Finally, as for Neville-Jones's pronouncement that the British government 
was against carrying out arrest missions "on foreign soil", British special forces had been 
quite willing to carry out such missions within the Republic of Ireland. 1'0 NATO was 
also reportedly opposed to a robust international police force, based on the rationale "if 
they [the police] got into trouble the military would have to come to their aid. ", 
11 The 
minimalist position prevailed, and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) was merely 
assigned responsibility for an assistance program restricted to: (a) monitoring, observing, 
and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities; (b) advising law enforcement 
107 Interview with former senior State Department official. With its Orthodox connections, Greece had 
been a strong supporter of Serbia throughout the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Greek Cypriot banks held 
secret offshore accounts for the Milosevic regime, and Greek mercenaries were also reportedly present 
during the fall of Srebrenica, see generally, MICHALIS PAPAKONSTANTINOU UNHOLY ALLIANCE: GREECE 
AND SERBIA IN THE NINI I IFS (EASTERN EUROPEAN STUDIES) (Texas A&M Uni. Press) 2002. 
108 See HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 251. 
109 Sec HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 251. 
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personnel and forces; and (c) training law enforcement Personnel. 112 With NATO forces 
clearly reluctant to go after PIFWCs, and IPTF both unarmed and restricted by their 
mandate from doing so, General Clark prophetically observed "We are leaving? a huge 
gap in the Bosnia food chain. "113 
Shattuck returned to the Dayton negotiations intent on keeping up the pressure. 
However, his efforts to ensure more robust language relating to the scope of the 
international military force's duty's regarding PIFWCs would ultimately be unsuccessful. 
As a former senior State Department official recounted "The Pentagon had different 
priorities to Shattuck at Dayton. Their focus was on force protection, not to achieve war 
crimes accountability. " 114 Christopher invited Shattuck for a walk around the grounds of 
the air base, and whilst commending him for "spotlighting"" the human rights abuses 
which had been committed in the region, urged Shattuck "to be realistic.... and to 
understand the limits of what we could expect to accomplish at Dayton on the issue of 
war crimes. " 15 
The Bosnian government delegation proposed that the Accord include a number of 
specific provisions, including; an explicit obligation that each party "arrest, detain, and 
transfer to the custody of the [ICTY] any and all indicted war criminals who reside in or 
transit through or are otherwise present on their territory"; a clause providing that 
sanctions be applied to parties not complying with the obligation to cooperate with the 
Tribunal; the maintenance of sanctions on Serbia until it surrendered PIFWCs in its 
territory; the establishment of a vetting mechanism to remove "individuals reasonably 
suspected of responsibility for war crimes" from military and police structures, and; a 
general provision barring any individual suspected of committed war crimes from 
holding elected office or other public positions. ' 16 The Bosnian government delegation 
was also unhappy with the draft Annex on IFOR, viewing it as too weak on the issue of 
112 Sec Dayton Peace Agzreement, Annex 11. 
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war crimes. A U. S. negotiator noted the "storm clouds [begin to] thicken o% er IFOR. ** '" 
Richard Perle, acting as an advisor to the Bosnian government delegation, attempted to 
"raise IFOR's obligations.. .. [he was concerned that] in its current form, IFOR ý\ould be 
authorized to do almost anything, but obligated to do very little. ''' 8 Ni e% ertheless, despite 
Perle's endeavours, the IFOR Annex was not amended in any significant way. As to the 
other proposals, Holbrooke informed Sacirbey that most of them were -Impossible. "' 19 
Forcing the issue of war crimes was clearly viewed as a deal-breaker. The Bosnian 
delegation was reportedly placated by the suggestion that Goldstone had sent a letter 
agreeing that a general reference to an obligation to prosecute PIFWCs would be 
acceptable to the Tribunal. This subsequently turned out to be untrue, with Tribunal 
officials vigorously denying they had agreed to anything. 120 Ultimately, the only Bosnian 
government proposal which made it into the Accord related to barring PIFWCs from 
elected office. 
After two weeks of protracted, tense negotiations, Presidents Izetbegovic, Milosevic and 
Tudjman signed the Dayton Accord on November 21,1995.121 Ultimately, the issue of 
accountability for atrocity crimes within the Peace Accord would be only ascribed a 
minor role. As General Nash, Commander of 'Taskforce Eagle', the U. S. force to be 
deployed into Bosnia as part of IFOR remarked, provisions relating to war crimes were 
"glancing. " 122 The Accord merely required the parties to "co-operate" with the tribunal. 
Former Swedish Premier, Carl Bildt, who had played a supporting role in the negotiating 
process, and was subsequently appointed as Bosnia's first High Representative, recounted 
in his memoirs "The Serbs did not want any mention of The Hague Tribunal in the 
framework agreement -a battle which they eventually won in a direct session with 
Christopher. The Tribunal disappeared from the text, to be replaced by a general 
reference to international undertakings. '"'-3 
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Conclusions 
The Dayton negotiating process illustrates the acute difficulties in achieving explicit 
robust principles relating to accountability for war crimes, where the 'International 
Community' is unwilling to enforce compliance. Once the 'International Community' 
decided on a strategy of negotiation with all the 'warring factions'. Milosevic's 
participation was deemed crucial. Given that the U. S. and many other members of 
NATO were completely opposed to assuming a more pro-active role on PIFWC 
apprehensions, and the `International Community' was unwilling to enforce peace 
militarily, it is difficult to see how more robust provisions vis-ä-vis war crimes 
accountability could have been achieved. As Pauline Neville-Jones readily 
acknowledged "A negotiated peace was the essential objective.... The question of justice 
was absolutely not a priority. " 124 In light of the prevailing dynamics, it is inconceivable 
that either Milosevic or Tudjman would have agreed to more explicit conditions to hand 
over PIFWCs. Thus, vague provisions relating to war crimes may have been the best that 
could be achieved under the circumstances. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the deal related 
to the failure to incorporate a more explicit sanctions mechanism to be imposed for non- 
compliance. For a number of `pro-prosecution' commentators, Dayton was a missed 
opportunity, with Hazan characterizing the Accord as "A semblance of peace [which] 
wins out over justice. " 25 It is worth noting, that in some respects, the Tribunal's actions 
were not totally contrary to the overall diplomatic strategy. The indictment of Karadzic 
and Mladic provided a convenient pretext for their exclusion from Dayton, with 
Holbrooke rather flamboyantly informing Milosevic that PIFWCs would be viewed as 
persona non grata in the U. S., and that he would personally assist in arresting them, 
should they attempt to attend the negotiations. '26 However, had the U. S. administration 
not decided to pursue "the Milosevic strategy"127 it is conceivable that Karadzic may 
124 See HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 70. 
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have been accorded some role in the negotiations, albeit indirectly. As one senior U. S. 
official indicated, he had no problem" 128 with Holbrooke meeting Karadzic and Niladic. 
For all its flaws, the Dayton negotiation process and subsequent Peace Accord had 
managed to halt the war in Bosnia, which had claimed an estimated 250,000 lives 
between 1992-1995. Whilst justice may have been deferred at Dayton, the agreement did 
at least provide the scope for its realization post-settlement. However, the implications 
of the amorphous wording of the Accord's military Annex were becoming all too clear. 
As David Scheffer, former Ambassador at large for war crimes issues acknowledged, 
"There's some very subtle language in there if you want to interpret it aggressively. 
However, you can also interpret it very conservatively. -129 Ultimately. Perle"s 
observations concerning the IFOR Annex, would turn out to be keenly prescient, and 
confirmed by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff legal counsel who emphatically stated "«e 
[NATO] are not going in to perform law and order functions - we are not going to do 
this. "130 As chapter four demonstrates, whilst vague provisions relating to justice may be 
the only attainable option during delicate peace negotiations where the `International 
Community' is unwilling to force compliance, the enforcement of such provisions 
remains at the mercy of the signatories. Holbrooke's lament succinctly summarizes the 
dilemma; "Had I known how reluctant IFOR would be to use its '"authority, "' I would 
have fought harder for a stronger mission statement, although I would have probably 
lost. "" 13 
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Chapter Four: What Price Order? An assessment of NATO's justifications for failing to 
arrest persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCS) and the consequences of this policy. 
Chapter four focuses on the challenges the Tribunal faced in obtaining custody of 
Bosnian indictees in the initial period post-Dayton due to the unwillingness of both the 
domestic authorities' and NATO forces (Implementation Force or IFOR. and its 
successor, Stabilization Force or SFOR) to facilitate arrests. The chapter commences 
with an examination of the U. S. administration's approach towards the Bosnia mission 
and the impact of congressional and public opinion. The consequences of Dayton's 
nebulously worded military Annex, which failed to impose an explicit duty on IFOR to 
apprehend PIFWCs, and the associated NATO rules of engagement, became abundantly 
clear when despite the deployment of some 60,000 troops, IFOR adamantly refused to 
carry out arrests. In order to justify this position, a series of arguments were advanced, 
each of which will be assessed and their validity challenged and contested. 
The chapter discusses the scope of I/S/FOR's duty vis-ä-vis arresting war criminals, 
highlighting that NATO's initial attempts to justify a `minimalist approach' were 
effectively facilitated by the absence in the Dayton Accord of a clear duty to actively 
pursue PIFWCs. In response to calls for international forces to detain PIFWCs, IFOR's 
Commanding Officer initially denied that the force had the requisite authority to carry 
out such missions. This statement will be shown to be clearly false, and the scope of 
I/SFOR's authority to conduct arrests will be traced. Furthermore, the chapter also 
explores the debate surrounding whether, beyond a mere authority, I/SFOR was actually 
under a legal obligation to actively seek out and detain PIFWCs. 
With media and NGO criticism intensifying, US/FOR, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
and the various key NATO troop contributing States also attempted to deflect pressure to 
conduct arrest operations by arguing that the onus was on the domestic parties. Although 
technically correct, the chapter will demonstrate that domestic cooperation is often 
cooperative with the Tribunal, transferring indictees to Although the Sarajevo government was largely 
The Hague, it could do little about PIFWCs residing in Republika Srpska (RS) or in the area of Herceg- 
Bosna controlled by Bosnian-Croat authorities. 
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impossible where indictees and individuals implicated in atrocity crimes retain 
considerable influence. As Harmon and Gaynor adroitly point out, domestic officials 
may have "little incentive to assist investigators and to disclose documents or other 
evidence which might inculpate them personally. their subordinates or their superiors. "'` 
The chapter will also demonstrate that in such conditions, domestic authorities are also 
generally either unwilling or unable to institute domestic prosecutions, and the `pro- 
prosecution' argument that domestic prosecutions in Bosnia were viable and were 
undermined by The Rules of the Road Agreement3 will be critically contested. 
In an attempt to further circumscribe the scope of its duty vis-a-vis PIFWCs, the NAC 
issued a Directive which expressly defined IFOR's authority to arrest PIFWCs "only if 
they come into contact with such individuals in the execution of assigned tasks and the 
situation permits detention. " The chapter will highlight the farcical state of affairs 
whereby NATO forces either acted to avoid contact or failed to act when encountering 
PIFWCs. In light of these realities, another justification was advanced; namely that arrest 
operations by NATO forces would serve to undermine and threaten the nascent, fragile 
order established through the Dayton Accord. The chapter will highlight how, in certain 
cases, the premise that the arrest of PIFWCs may have a potentially destabilising impact, 
is legitimate, as will be demonstrated by reference to recent events in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Afghanistan. 4 However, in the case of Bosnia, the chapter will posit that, 
given the presence of a robustly mandated and equipped NATO force, and in light of 
evidence to suggest that arrests would not have resulted in a significantly adverse 
reaction from local security forces; such arguments were unwarranted, representing 
instead a cynical cover for NATO inaction. Finally, the chapter will conclude by 
demonstrating that the failure to apprehend PIFWCs actually served to undermine the 
quality of the order established by the Dayton Accords, due to the negative impact 
2 Sec Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, 'Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primiti\ e Tools: Three 
Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings'. Symposium. The ICTY 10 
Years On: The View from Inside'. Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2004, p. 
407 [hereinafter Harmon and Gaynor, 'Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools] 
The Rules of the Road Agreement made domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes subject to the 
Tribunal's prior approval. For further details see below. 
° The contention is similar to the premise outlined in chapter three that the indictment of individuals 
deemed crucial to peace talks may in certain cases, be destabilising. 
I -); 
PIFWCs exerted on peacebuilding initiatives, particularly with regards to minority 
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) return. 
Selling U. S. Troop Deployment to Bosnia to the U. S. Congress and Public 
Even prior to the Dayton negotiations, the White House had embarked on a concerted 
public relations exercise in an attempt to obtain the endorsement of a sceptical Congress 
and the support of a nervous public, many of whom knew little about Bosnia. 5 On 
October 26,1995, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich informed the President by letter, 
which was co-signed by the House Republican leadership, that it would be a ``rave 
mistake" to deploy U. S. troops to Bosnia without Congressional approval. 6 Although the 
Administration made the judgement that it did not need Congress's formal consent to 
authorize the deployment7, it was keen to obtain the bipartisan support which would have 
been derived from Congressional support. A concerted lobbying campaign directed at 
Capitol Hill was instigated. Senior officials from the Department of Defense, State 
Department, and National Security Council began to seek out supporters, and Secretary 
Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili (Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff) all appeared before congressional delegations. In addition a "buddy-system"" 
strategy was established whereby officials from the above agencies and the White House 
were assigned to maintain contact with each member of Congress. 8 The Administration 
also assisted in organizing a number of congressional delegations (CODELS) to visit the 
Balkans and meet with local leaders. Clinton also wrote to each Member of Congress, 
briefly outlining the Administration's rationale and requesting support. On November 
13,1995 Clinton sent a comprehensive nine page response, which had been fine tuned by 
the State Department's European Bureau and the NSC, to Gingrich's earlier letter. It 
contained the strongest and most detailed case'"' as to why the U. S. should be involved: 
5 As one State Department official acknowledged, it was essential for the Administration to clearly 
articulate in a comprehensive statement "why we're sending your kids and money to a stranLe place a long 
a\wway. " Sce comments made by John Price, State Department European Bureau, in The Road to 
Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 9. p. 222. 
6 Sec Letter to President Clinton from Newt Gingrich et al., October 26.1995, in 'The Road to Dayton' 
U. S. Department of State, Epilogue. p. 222. fn 34. 
7 Scc The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Epilogue, p. 254. 
Sec 'The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 9. p. 221. 
Sec Elaine Sciolino, 'Clinton Makes Case to Congress For Putting U. S. Troops in Bosnia'.. Vc w" York 
Timc. c, November 15.190 5. 
126 
arguing that peace in Bosnia was a clear U. S. interest, with the goal of an undivided. 
democratic Europe benefiting U. S. security and prosperity ." In a seeming 
acknowledgment that IFOR would come under pressure to address the issue of PIFW"Cs. 
the President emphatically stated that although "atrocities unknown in Europe since the 
Second World War have occurred [the President would] "not allow 'mission creep' that 
could involve IFOR in a nation-building role. "1° The letter also explicitly outlined the 
parameters of the mission, which included a 20,000 cap on U. S. forces, and critically, a 
12-month deployment time limit. 
Despite the extensive lobbying, Congress remained largely unconvinced. Gingrich and 
Senate Majority leader Robert Dole claimed legislative support for U. S. troop 
participation in IFOR was "virtually nil. "" Although Senator Dole eventually relented, 2 
a number of Republicans remained stridently opposed13, with the House of 
Representatives passing overwhelmingly a non-binding resolution stating that the U. S. 
should not send its troops without Congressional approval. 14 In the end, Congress voted 
to approve the mission, with the Senate voting 69 to 30 to support the troop deployment. 
However, the House response was much more confrontational, voting 287 to 141 to 
oppose the President's police' while supporting the actual deployment of the troops. 
However, both chambers rejected measures to cut off funds for the forthcoming mission. 
White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry was philosophical viewing Congress"s 
tepid response as "probably the strongest statement of support they could make. Having 
voted overwhelmingly not to shut off funding is, in a sense, supporting the President's 
judgment. " 15 
10 Sec, Letter from President Clinton to Newt Gingrich, November 13,1995, in See The Road to Dayton 
U. S. Department of State. Ch. 9, p. 222. 
See 'The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 9, p. ? 21. 
Sec Elaine Sciolino, 'Dole Backs Plan to Send U. S. Force on Bosnia Mission', Nc'tir York Times, 
December 1,1995. 
13 See Stephen Engelberg. 'Bosnia Highlights A Republican Split. ' . 
ý'ew+ York Times, December 10,1995. 
14 Sc' John Yang 'House Votes to Limit Role of U. S. Troops in Balkans', Washington Post. October 31. 
1995. 
15 See 'The Road to Dayton' L I. S. Department of State. Epilogue, p. 2'5ý. 
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In addition to its lobbying of Congress, the Administration conducted an intensive media 
campaign in an attempt to assuage public concerns over U. S. troop deployment. Senior 
members involved in the peace initiative penned newspaper op-ed articles16 and gave 
numerous television and radio interviews putting the White House message across. 17 
U. S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott emphasised the deployment's clearly 
proscribed scope, declaring "There will be no `mission creep' - from purely military 
tasks into `nation building"'. '8 The President also became heavily involved. In a speech 
at Freedom House, Clinton emphasised "as NATO's leader, the United States must do its 
part and send troops to join those of our allies under NATO command. "19 He went on to 
state that the force would have clear rules of engagement and that it would not be sent 
into combat in Bosnia. In a television address to the nation on the evening of November 
27,1995, Clinton assured the American people that the deployment «was a `'clear. limited 
and achievable" and publicly announced the mission "should and will take about one 
year. '2(' However, as the recently declassified State Department history of the Dayton 
Peace Process emphasised, despite the concerted media campaign by the Administration, 
it largely failed to allay public concerns about deploying U. S. troops to Bosnia, with 
"Public opinion polling show[ing] that the American people remained concerned that a 
Bosnia mission would turn into another Somalia, or worse, another Vietnam. "21 
The outcome of the debates within the U. S. would essentially set the tone for IFOR's 
deployment, particularly given that the U. S. was the dominant component of IFOR, 
contributing some 20,000 of the 60,000 force. This largely suited the majority of the 
other troop contributing states, who were also not very enthusiastic about taking on a 
more expansive mandate, especially with regard to arresting PIFWCs. Whilst delivering 
a speech to U. S. troops in Germany who were to be deployed into Bosnia as part of Task 
Force Eagle, Clinton again emphasised the limited time-scale and nature of the mission, 
16 For example sec Warren Christopher, No Troops, No Peace'. Nc t York Times, November 27,1995. 
17 Sec Elaine Sciolino, To Confront Call-In-Critics, U. S. Aides Take to the Airwaves'. New Yak Times, 
December 7,1995. 
'8 Scc Strobe Talbott, 'Job Can Be Done in Bosnia and Risks Can Be Managed'. Remarks delivered to the 
Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, December 14,1995. 
19 See President Clinton. Remarks at Freedom House Breakfast, October 6.1995. 
20 Sec President Clinton's Statement on Bosnian Peace-keeping Mission. November 27.1995. 
21 See The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State, Epilogue. p. 255. 
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--I pledged to the American people that I would not send you to Bosnia unless Iw as 
absolutely sure that the goals we set for you are clear, realistic, and achievable in about a 
year. ' 2 Clinton's insistence that the military mission would only be around one %ear. 
appeared to confirm the `International Community's' lacklustre commitment to peace- 
building in Bosnia, emboldening the array of `spoilers' to merely' bide their time and sit 
out the apparently fleeting international deployment. "3 
`Operation Joint Endeavour' Enter IFOR: "The Biggest, Toughest. and the Meanest Dog 
in Town"24' .? 
On December 16,1995, The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACUER), U. S. 
General George Joulwan, formally ordered NATO forces into Bosnia. 25 Several days 
prior to Joulwan's order Holbrooke and his core team reunited to conduct their final 
three-capital (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb) shuttle tour of the region. The shuttle aimed to 
ensure any outstanding issues were resolved prior to Izetbegovic, Milosevic and Tudjman 
meeting with the five Contract Group Presidents at the formal Accord signing ceremony 
in Paris. 26 Whilst noting that sufficient momentum existed in Sarajevo for 
implementation to begin successfully, Holbrooke warned "everything depends on 
vigorous implementation by IFOR from the first day. A slow start would be a mistake . 
"ý7 
With the deployment of some 60,000 troops, endowed with much more robust rules of 
engagement (ROE) than their UNPROFOR predecessors, a sense of anticipation existed 
amongst Tribunal officials that there would be some significant movement on the issue of 
arresting PJFWCs. However, despite Holbrooke's recommendations. it soon became 
22 See President Clinton, Speech to Troops in Baumholder, Germany, December 2.1995. (emphasis added. ) 
23 The Clinton administration would later recognize the imprudence of establishing arbitrary timescales, 
and in a Speech in January 1998, (then) Secretary of State Madeline Albright argued "The mission should 
determine the timetable, not the other way around. " See Madeline Albright Speech to the Center for 
National Policy, January 13,1998. 
24 SeC' William Perry, U. S. Secretary for Defense quote, in, BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE. p. 346. 
25 The deployment had been formally endorsed at the meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers in 
Brussels on December 5,1995. Whilst for some of the NATO forces (most notably the U. S. contingent) 
this would be their first time in the country, many of the forces already deployed in the country as part of 
UNPROFOR and the MNB RRF were merely transferred into IFOR's chain of command structure. This 
formal takeover from UNPROFOR to IFOR occurred on January 19,2006. 
26 See 'The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State. Epilogue. p. 257. 
27 See Nlessage to Christopher from Holbrooke. 'Official-Informal, ' Cable, Zagreb 8296. December 8. 
1995. in The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State. Epilogue. p. 258. (emphasis added. ) 
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apparent that IFOR would not be assuming a pro-active stance. As Shattuck recounts as 
I discovered myself when I went to make the first international investigation of the sites 
of the Srebrenica mass executions, the U. S. commanders of IFOR were going out of their 
way to keep their troops from coming into contact with war criminals. "28 Indeed, 
NATO's first major experience of dealing with the war crimes issue would do little to 
assuage concerns expressed by its commanders over becoming embroiled in what they 
perceived as a controversial area, beyond their mandate. 
Souring Relations - The Djukic Incident 
In early February 1996, BS army command informed international officials that three of 
their military personnel had been arrested and were being detained in Sarajevo's central 
prison. On January 30, two Bosnian Serb army officers, General Djordje Djukic and 
Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic and their driver took a wrong turn whilst driving a civilian 
car through the Sarajevo suburbs and crossed into Federation territory. They were 
quickly apprehended by Bosnian government forces and the Federation authorities 
initiated an investigation into charges of genocide and crimes against civilians pursuant to 
Bosnia's criminal code. In response, BS authorities broke off all formal contacts with 
both the Federation and IFOR. Bakir Alispahic, head of the Bosnian Federation security 
service (AID) maintained that under questioning, the two officers had confessed to 
committing war crimes. The international authorities expressed disquiet that the AID 
interrogation had continued for a week without any oversight or control. 29 They were 
also seriously concerned that an unregulated process of war crimes arrests and 
prosecutions by the domestic authorities would deteriorate into a politicized free for all. 
As Bildt noted "all parties to the conflict had long lists of persons they regarded as k\ar 
criminals. In fact, there were few leading persons in the country who did not in one way 
or another figure on one of these often politically motivated lists. If arrests and 
incarceration of individuals were threatened on the basis of these lists, all opportunities to 
build up confidence and allow people to feel secure when they crossed the wartime 
28 Se'c' SH: ATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE. p. 213. 
29 Sc'e BILDT, PF-ACT JOURNEY, pp. 188-189. 
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boundary lines would disappear very rapid] Y.,, 30 The Tribunal was contacted in an 
attempt to resolve the issue. 
Neither of the officers had been indicted by the ICTY and the Tribunal's Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence did not permit the transfer and detention of a suspect. The 
Prosecutor therefore filed an application before a judge of the Tribunal for their transfer 
and detention to The Hague, arguing they could provide evidence on the siege of 
Sarajevo, of which both Karadzic and Mladic had been indicted. Acting pursuant to Rule 
90 bis, which allows for the temporary transfer of individuals otherwise detained, whose 
appearance as a witness is required by the Tribunal, Judge Stephen ordered the men's 
transfer. Both were quickly moved from Sarajevo by French IFOR troops and 
transported to The Hague by U. S. helicopters. 31 Ultimately however, Krsmanovic was 
never indicted and was remanded to the custody of the Bosnian authorities in early April. 
Djukic was indicted and charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws 
and customs of war relating to shelling of Sarajevo, to which he pleaded not guilty. 
However, by April 1996, the OTP applied to have the indictment withdrawn in light of 
his deteriorating health. The Tribunal's Trial Chamber 1 denied the request, but did order 
his provisional release. Djukic died in the following month. 
The affair seemed to be badly managed by the OTP and the Prosecutor's move to have 
the men transferred to The Hague was criticised by both IFOR commanders and U. S. 
negotiator Holbrooke, who viewed the move as "disrupt[ing] the implementation process 
and setting a bad precedent for the future. " 32 IFOR commanders were also unhappy at 
the way the incident was handled, with General Nash, the Commander of Taskforce 
Eagle remarking "Judge Goldstone made a very serious mistake in having a nonindicted 
individual brought to The Hague. -33 Even elements within the Tribunal were frustrated 
at being forced to act on the issue, as one investigator irritably recalled, the Bosnians 
30 Sec BILDT, PEACE JOURNEY, p 189. 
31 See HOLBROOKE, To END A \\TAR, p. 332. - 333. 32 See HoLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 333. 
33 Sec BASS STrA1' TI I HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 250. 
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[i. e. the Sarajevo authorities] really pushed us into a corner on that one. " '4 The whole 
affair did little to enhance an already tense relationship between the court and IFOR. As 
a result of the Djukic affair, Holbrooke was sent back to Bosnia and during a series of 
meetings with Milosevic and Izetbegovic, managed to persuade them to accept principles 
drawn up by the High Representative stating individuals could not be arrested for war 
crimes unless approval was obtained from the Tribunal. 35 On February 18,1996, 
Presidents Izetbegovic, Milosevic and Tudjman formally signed an Agreement in Rome 
stipulating that "persons, other than those already indicted by the Tribunal, may be 
arrested and detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only 
pursuant to a previously issued order, warrant or indictment that has been reviewed and 
deemed consistent with international legal standards by the Tribunal. "Y' The agreement 
became known as the Rules of the Road Agreement. `Pro-prosecution' advocates 
Williams and Scharf, argue that the Agreement was designed by Ambassador Holbrooke 
and Mr. Milosevic to limit the role of justice by hampering domestic pro. ectrtion . 
"37 
They also contend "domestic war crimes prosecutions in Serbia. Bosnia and Croatia are 
crucial to achieving justice and peace in the former Yugoslavia.... the cl feet of the Rules 
of the Road Agreement was to entirely override the domestic legal structure in the area of 
war crimes. "38 However, as the section below will demonstrate, this perspective fails to 
recognize the significant barriers to pursuing viable domestic prosecutions. 
No Authority 
Holbrooke returned to Sarajevo on January 18,1996, for a series of meetings with 
international officials. His encounter with Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR's Commander. 
was a strained and sobering experience. Friction between the two men dated back to 
Operation Deliberate Force, when Smith was angered by what he perceived as 
Holbrooke's attempts to influence NATO's air campaign to support his negotiation 
strategy. Smith was adamant that as NATO commander, he did not work to any national 
`a Interview with former ICTY investigator. 
is See BILDT, PEACE JOURNEY, p. 190. 
36 See Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A'51; '292; S 1996'665.16 August 1996, para 80. 
37 Seer \Viº i º: wti AND SCHARF, PE AC F WITH JUSTICE? p. 118. (emphasis added. ) 
38 Set, Wiº. º_º: \Nis AND SCHARF, PF: \ct WITH JUSTICE? p. 119. (emphasis added. ) 
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agenda (even U. S. ) and instructed his subordinates not to talk with Holbrooke durinL, the 
operation. 39 Relations had failed to improve, with Holbrooke viewing the Admiral as the 
wrong man for his additional assignment as IFOR Commander. As Holbrooke recounts 
in his memoirs, the meeting would shatter his hope that IFOR commanders would adopt a 
proactive interpretation of the force's mandate. "Based on Shalikashv ili's statements at 
the White House meetings, Christopher and I had assumed that the IFOR commander 
would use his authority to do substantially more than he was obligated to do. The 
meeting with Smith shattered that hope 1,40 Instead Smith made clear that IFOR would be 
adopting a minimalist approach to all areas of implementation, apart from considerations 
of force protection. 
After encountering so many difficulties in obtaining access to crime scenes during the 
fighting, the OTP was keen to get to work on the ground and were hopeful of obtaining 
IFOR assistance. As Newton highlights "Military forces entering the area are uniquely 
situated to preserve evidence, begin forensics work at mass graves, and generate other 
highly probative evidence Shattuck had planned to visit Srebrenica and the 
surrounding area in order to maintain the pressure on the war crimes issue. He soon 
learned however, that Admiral Smith refused to provide an IFOR escort. Admiral 
Smith's ostensible justification was that IFOR had just arrived in Bosnia and was not yet 
familiar with the territory. Given that a large part of IFOR comprised elements of RRF 
and UNPROFOR who possessed extensive knowledge of the area, Smith's excuses were 
unconvincing. As Shattuck recounts, "I suspected that the real reason was the presence 
of the two tribunal investigators on my team and the possibility that we might encounter 
war criminals during our mission. -42 Instead Shattuck had to gain access via Belgrade, 
leading to the bizarre situation of the U. S. 's chief human rights advocate receiving 
support and protection from the very authorities implicated in the massacre he sought to 
investigate. On returning to Sarajevo, Shattuck met with Admiral Smith and other IFOR 
39 Sec RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, p. 295. 
40 Srce HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 328. For more details of the White House meeting see chapter 
three. 
41 Scc Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. 
Connecticut 
, Journal of 
International Law, Spring, 2004, p. 255. 
4' Sec SHATTUCK, FRl EDOM ON FIRE, p. 214. 
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commanders, all of whom refused to help when Shattuck raised the arrest issue, asserting 
that tracking down PIFWCs was not in their mandate. 43 
In response to the growing media criticism over IFOR's abject failure to take any 
proactive measures concerning law and order issues, Admiral Smith initially asserted that 
IFOR did not have the authority to conduct arrests. When the issue was raised at a press 
conference, he informed journalists, "One of the questions I was asked was. 'Admiral. is 
it true that IFOR is going to arrest Serbs in the Serb suburbs of Sarajevo? ' I said. 
'Absolutely not, I don't have the authority to arrest anybody. -44 He also remarked "It 
would help a lot of people's tasks if [indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic] were gone, but I'm not authorized to do that. Hold those 
who signed Dayton responsible and get off IFOR's back. 45 
NATO's responsibility vis-ä-vis PIFWCS: Authority or Obligation? 
Some commentators have interpreted specific elements of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 103146 as providing NATO the requisite 
authorization to arrest PIFWCs. Resolution 1031 "authorizes" IFOR -to take all 
necessary measures to effect the implementation of and ensure compliance with Annex 1- 
A of the Peace Agreement . 
-47 Article X of Annex 1-A of the Agreement stipulates that 
Parties "shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace 
settlement... including the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. "48 Jones 
argues that IFOR's arrest of PIFWCs would therefore represent action necessary to 
"ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement", particularly where the 
domestic parties have failed to carry out arrests. 49 Gaeta disagrees with Jones's 
4; See SI IATTLCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE, p. 215. 
44 Sec Admiral Leighton Smith quote in HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 328 (emphasis added). 
a` See Tracy Wilkinson, 'Serb Leaders Seen as Barriers to Peace', Los Angeles Times, April 29,1996 
(emphasis added). 
46 Set, S. C. Res. 1031, U. N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. U. N. Doc S/RES/1031 (1995) 
47 See S. C. Res. 1031, U. N. SCOR. 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. U. N. Doc S/RES 1031 (1995) 
49 Sec Art. X, Annex 1 A, Dayton Peace Accord. 
49 Ste John R. W. D. Jones, The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia'. European . Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2.1996. p. 
238. 
Similar arguments are made by Williams and Scharf, see \V'IILI: \MS AND SCHARF. PE: \CE WITH JUSTICE? p. 
212 
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suggestion, but does, however, posit there are more persuasive legal grounds within the 
Dayton Accord which confer an authority on IFOR troops to conduct arrests. '" Article 
VI, paragraph 4, of Annex 1-A provides that the Parties "understand and agree further 
directives from NAC [the North Atlantic Council] may establish additional duties and 
responsibilities for the IFOR in implementing this Annex. "51 Paragraph 5 of the same 
Article also provides that the Parties "understand and agree that the IFOR Commander 
shall have the authority. -to 
do all the Commander judges necessary and proper. 
including the use of military force.... to carry out the responsibilities listed ahovc in 
paragraphs 2,3 and 4. , 52 Furthermore, as outlined in the previous chapter, General 
Shalikashvili proposed that IFOR was willing to accept the "authority" to carry out 
additional tasks [including arresting PIFWCs] during the Principals Coininittee meeting 
in October 1995. The North Atlantic Council's (NAC) Directive of December 16,1995 
also explicitly granted IFOR a qualified authorLation to arrest PIFWCs. 53 In light of 
these factors, Admiral Smith's belligerent assertions were clearly erroneous: As Gaeta 
notes "The multinational force has undoirbtedlvv the authority' to arrest persons indicted by 
-54 the Tribunal. 
However, in addition to NATO being authorized to arrest PIFWCS, a number of legal 
scholars have argued that NATO forces were actually under an obligation to do so. 
Williams and Scharf highlight that in addition to representing an enforcement measure of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter, the Tribunal may also be 
considered a subsidiary organ of the Security Council with delegated enforcement powers 
within the terms of Article 29 of the U. N. Charter. 55 Consequently, Article 29 of the 
Tribunal's statute, «-hich requires states to co-operate with the International Tribunal and 
50 See Paola Gaeta, Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia? ', European Journal oflnternational Lam-. Vol. 9, No. 1. 
1998, pp. 177-178. A similar perspective is also aired by Susan Lamb, see Susan Lamb, The Powers of 
Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', in British Yearbook of 
International Law (1999) p. 190. 
51 See Art. VI., para. 4. Annex I A, Dayton Peace Accord. 
Sec Art. VI., para. 5, Annex IA, Dayton Peace Accord. 
53 For further details 
. sec 
below. 
'4 See Paola Gaeta, is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted bý the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia? '. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
1998, p. 180. 55 Sec \Vii Llý\ýtti AND SCHARF, PFACE WITH JUSTICE? p. 215. 
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to comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a 
Trial Chamber, including the arrest or detention of persons and the surrender or the 
transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal, is deemed to confer such an 
obligation on IFOR. 
Gaeta contests this, arguing "Neither treaty provisions nor Security Council resolutions 
impose upon IFOR/SFOR the obligation to execute warrants . 
-56 However. Williams and 
Scharf highlight that Article 48 (2) of the UN Charter requires member states to carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council (and its subsidiary bodies of which the ICTY could 
be considered) under Chapter VII of the Charter "directly or through their action in the 
appropriate international agencies of which they are members, " which would include 
NATO. 57 Furthermore, as Han-Ru Zhou highlights, in Simic, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
held that Article 29 of the Tribunal's statute also applied to international organizations; 
"the mere fact that Article 29 omits reference to collective enterprises of states such as 
NATO does not mean that such enterprises are exempted from complying with Article 
29. "5x Williams and Scharf also point out that, whilst considering the legal implications 
of an international arrest warrant, Colonel John Burton, the legal counsel for the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) remarked if the United States had such an 
order, that in Bosnia that the United States is charged to arrest and detain these people 
[PIFWCs] and turn them over, tilwould we be bound? As far as a state obligation goes, I 
think that the ansii'er is "I es. " We view these orders, and literally the Statute of the 
Tribunal itself, as well as the United Nations Resolution under Chapter VII that set it up 
as binding. -59 On July 11,1996, the Tribunal issued an Arrest Warrant and Order for 
Surrender in the cases of Karadzic and Mladic which met these two criteria. Following 
Burton's rationale, Williams and Scharf contend that the U. S. contingent of IFOR wwas 
consequently under an obligation to arrest the two senior Bosnian Serbs. 
56 See Paola Gaeta, is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia? '. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9. No. 1, 
1998, p. 180. 
57 Secs WILLI: \NIS AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? p. 215. 
58 Sec, Han-Ru Zhou The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants b\ International Forces'. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice. 4.2006, p. 207. 
59 See Colonel John Burton quote in WI[ l. IANis AND SCHARF, P1 ACE \Vi FH JUSTICE? p. 215. (emphasis 
added. ) 
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Beyond the discussion of whether I/S/FOR was under an obligation to arrest PIFWW'Cs 
arising from either Article 29 of the ICTY statute, or arisin`- from the Tribunal's orders. 
several legal commentators have also charged that I/S/ FOR was under a duty to arrest 
PIFWCS arising from obligations relating to Grave Breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, Protocol 1 and the Genocide Convention. With the Geneva Conventions 
widely recognised as holding the status of customary international law. it has 
consequently been argued that international forces would be under a duty to 'search' for 
PIFWCs regardless of whether their mandate or rules of engagement encompassed such 
operations. 60 The existence of such an obligation was vigorously contested by Max S. 
Johnson Jr, NATO's legal advisor, who posited that neither NATO nor SHAPE nor IFOR 
were parties to the Geneva Conventions or Protocols; only states could be parties. 61 In 
response, Orentlicher raises the compelling question as to whether parties to conventions 
may evade their commitments, merely by joining a multinational force, and also 
highlights that the ICRC has consistently taken the position that each state remains 
individually responsible for applying these treaties when it contributes contingents to 
multilateral peacekeeping forces. 62 
Under the Geneva Convention Each High Contracting Party shall be under the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed, such grave breaches. "63 Walter Gary Sharp Sr., former Deputy Legal 
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, posits that the text of the common 
article "does not impose anl° geogr-aphical, temporal, or other limitations on this 
60 See 'Bosnia-Herzegovina - The duty to search for war crimes suspects: An open letter from Amnesty 
International to IFOR commanders and contributing governments', Amnesty International, March 1.1996. 
61 Sec, response from Max S. Johnson Jr., Legal Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), to Amnesty International, March 12,1996, in 'Bosnia Herzegovina: Amnesty International 
renews calls for IFOR to comply with international law'. April 1,1996 
`'' See Diane F. Orentlicher. 'Responsibilities of States Participating in Multilateral Operations \\ ith Respect 
to Persons Indicted for War Crimes', in M-\KING JUSTICE \VORK. THE REPORT OF THE C[N IURY 
FOUNDATION. T\VENTIE FH CENTURY FUND T\SK FORCI ON APPREHENDING INDICTED WAR CRIMIIN aLS 
The Centur\ Foundation Press) 1998, p. 94. 
3 Sce Geneva Convention. 
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obligation. "64 In addition to stressing that no state made a reservation with regard to the 
textually unlimited obligation upon signing the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.65 
Sharp goes on to argue that Common Article I "strongly supports the interpretation that a 
state's obligation to search for and arrest persons suspected of grave breaches is universal 
and not limited to its own national territol°v. ""eh Common Article 1 provides that state 
parties "undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances. " The ancillary ICRC commentary to Common Article 1 emphasizes that 
state parties "should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian 
principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally. " Sharp therefore contends 
that "Accordingly, a duty under Common Article I "to ensure respect" for the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all circumstances and an absolute duty to prosecute grave 
breaches includes the obligation upon a state party to search for and arrest persons 
suspected of grave breaches. "b7 
Conversely, Newton argues that the legal obligation flowing from the Geneva 
Conventions is a limited obligation applicable on/v to states within their territoi-1' or in 
territory over which they exercise judicial control by virtue of the law of occupation. ""' 
Under article 29 of the Vienna Law of Treaties (1969), an obligation is binding upon a 
state within the state's own territory, or where the state exercises de facto exclusive 
jurisdiction over additional territory. 69 Given the existence of the Bosnian government, 
I/S/FOR did not exercise de facto exclusive jurisdiction over Bosnia. Accordingly, it has 
been posited that this factor militates against the obligation extending to international 
forces in Bosnia to arrest PIFWCs. 70 Nevertheless, others have suggested that the 
64 See W; \LTER GARY SHARP, JUS PACIARII. EMERGING LEGAL PARADIGMS FOR U. N. PEACE OPERATIONS 
IN THE 21 STCENTURY (Paciarii International) 2000, p. 215. [hereinafter SHARP, JUS PACIARII] emphasis 
added. 
65 See SHARP, JUS PACIARII, p. 217. 
66 See SHARP, JUS PACIARII, p. 217. 
67 See SH, wP, Jus PACIARII, p. 218. 
68 See Michael Newton, "'A View from the Trenches": The Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. Case 
Western Reserve Journal of Liternational Law, Spring 2003,35,2, p. 297. Similar views are expressed by 
Gaeta and Lamb. 
69 See Article 29, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331. UN Doc 
.A Conß9/27 25 ILM 562 
(1969) 
70 See Susan Lamb, The Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia'. in British Yearbook ofInternational Law (1999) pp. 193-104 
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territorial principle regarding treaty application is "a general, and not exclusk c rule. "'' 
Orentlicher goes onto argue "That the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are exceptions 
to the general rule is plain. These conventions, which establish rules principally 
governing the conduct of interstate armed conflict, vt'ould be meaningless if their 
provisions applied only within the territory of contracting parties. "7' Although Newton 
somewhat disparagingly suggests that some NGOs have attempted to stretch treaty-based 
obligations to pursue PIFWCs into "extraterritorial baggage that follows deployed 
military forces wherever they go and whatever the mission"73, it is critically important to 
highlight that elements of the NATO force also held similar views. The NORDPOL 
Brigade74 viewed hunting down war criminals as an obligation. "75 Although the report 
does not specify whether NORDPOL Brigade interpreted the obligation as arising from 
the Dayton Accord, Article 29 of the ICTY Statute, or due to customary international law 
status of the Geneva Conventions, it nevertheless indicates that some States are tiý illirig to 
accept such an obligation to arrest PIFWCs. 
Clearly, the vigorous debate regarding whether international forces are under an 
obligation to arrest PIFWCs has yet to be decisively resolved. Perhaps the most 
appropriate analysis which characterizes the current prevailing view is provided by 
Lamb, who postulates "The argument that multinational forces are bound to arrest 
Tribunal indictees appears.. . to 
be a normative one.... this has yet to crystallize into an 
explicit obligation to do so under customary international law. 76 In many respects the 
71 See Diane F. Orentlicher, `Responsibilities of States Participating in Multilateral Operations with Respect 
to Persons Indicted for War Crimes', in MAKING JUSTICE WORK. THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY 
FOUNDATION/TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON APPREHENDING INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS 
(The Century Foundation Press) 1998, p. 91. 
72 See Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Responsibilities of States Participating in Multilateral Operations with Respect 
to Persons Indicted for War Crimes', in MAKING JUSTICE WORK. THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY 
FOUNDATION/TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON APPREHENDING INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS 
(The Century Foundation Press) 1998, p. 91 (emphasis added) 
73 See klichael Newton, "'A View from the Trenches": The Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice', Case 
ll'estern Reserve Journal of International Law, Spring 2003,35,2, p. 297. 
74 The Nordic/Polish Battle Group, comprising Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish and Polish forces. 
75 Sce 'Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998. Lessons Learned For judge Ad%ocates', 
Center for La\\ and Military Operations (CLAMO), The Judge Advocate General's School, United States 
Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, November 13,1998, p. 125 [hereinafter Law and Military Operations in 
the Balkans 1995-1998] (emphasis added) 
76S( c Susan Lamb, The Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia', in British Yearbook of International Law (1999) p. 194. 
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debate may be viewed as somewhat esoteric, particularly given that it will remain likely 
that the decision as to whether or not international forces will act to apprehend PIF«'Cs 
will be determined by motivations which are largely political rather than legal. However, 
this issue is not solely a matter of policy, but also one of law. and following Wheeler's 
discussion of a 'normative cascade'77, normative arguments may be viewed as having the 
potential to become `crystallized' into law. Sharp refers to the contention that 
international forces are under a duty to seek out and detain PIFWCs. as an emergent legal 
paradigm for the 21"' Century. 78 It is likely that these issues will be revisited in relation 
to future international troop deployments to areas where PIFWCs may reside or pass 
79 through. 
To conclude the discussion, it is worth considering Newton's caveat that the net effect of 
imposing a legal obligation on international forces to actively seek out and detain 
PIFWCs could be to "undermine the pursuit of justice by creating a disincentive for the 
very forces capable of restoring respect for the law [to take part in the proposed 
mission]. "80 Unfortunately, as the chapter aptly demonstrates, the alternative approach, 
of merely setting a nebulous mandate and hoping for a robust response, may also allow 
international forces to effectively avoid going after PIFWCs. Neither option is 
particularly satisfying from the perspective of achieving arrests. 
It's Their Responsibility - The Fantasy of Expecting Domestic Cooperation 
In an attempt to deflect criticism over its failure to pursue PIFWCs, IFOR (and its 
successor SFOR) and its political master the NAC, would regularly emphasise that the 
primary responsibility for arrests resided with the domestic authorities in Bosnia. 8' As 
'n See WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS, p. 5. 
78 See generally SHARP, JUS PACIARII, 
79 For further details see Conclusion. 
80S(, 
(, Michael Newton, "'A View from the Trenches": The Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. Case 
il'estcrn Reserve Journal of International Law, Spring 2003,35,2, p. 298. 
81 For example, in July 1997, NAC declared "We call upon the leaders of the region to cooperate with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and fulfil their obligation to deliver those 
indicted for war crimes for trial at the International Tribunal in The Hague. " cited in See D: \VID S. JOST, 
N; \TO TR; \NSFORNIED: THE : \LLIAN('tý'S NEW ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (U. S. Institute of Peace 
Press) 1999 p. 221 [hereinafter JOST. N: \ TO TRANSFORMED] 
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the legal counsel to the U. S. JCS opined They are expected to police themsel%es. "S'2 
This approach mirrored Anthony Lake's assertion that the onus of implementing the 
Peace Treaty's key provisions should be on the domestic parties. Whilst such assertions 
were technically correct, they were in reality, wishful thinking. As Cousens and Carter 
note, "having been brought to the table by varying forms of coercion, the parties had little 
more than a tactical commitment to settle, making any resulting accord dependent on 
more than the will of the parties for its implementation . 
-13 Nowhere was this more 
apparent than the issue of cooperation with the Tribunal. As indicated in its 1995 Annual 
Report, the Tribunal stated it expected no cooperation from those authorities who may 
have been complicit in the commission of war crimes and did not anticipate that they 
would surrender any suspects to the Court. 84 
For similar reasons, the prospect of initiating domestic prosecutions which conformed to 
the principles of impartiality and due process, was not viable in Bosnia. Consequently, 
Williams and Scharf's critique of the Rules of the Road outlined above is largely flawed. 
Their assertion that the Rules of the Road had the effect of "hampering domestic 
prosecutions ", fundamentally underestimates the significant influence of individuals 
implicated in war crimes within the political, legal, and security structures, many of 
whom sought to frustrate cooperation with the ICTY and also either undermine or unduly 
influence domestic prosecutions. Whilst Williams and Scharf correctly highlighted that 
the Tribunal only allocated minor resources to the RoR issue, even where authorization 
was granted by the OTP, little progress was made by the domestic authorities. As Human 
Rights Watch noted, even where "hundreds" of cases were approved by the ICTY 
pursuant to the RoR procedure, the individuals outlined in the cases remained at liberty in 
the parts of Bosnia where the ethnic group to which they belonged remained the majority. 
82 Sec Colonel John T. Burton "'War Crimes. " Operations Other Than War: Military Doctrine and Lake 50 
Years After Nuremberg and Beyond', Militan" Law Revieir, Vol. 149, Summer 1995, p. 203. 
83 Sc'c ELIZABETH M. COUSENS & CHARLES K. CARTER, TOWARDS PEACE IN BOSNIA. IMPLEMENTING THE 
DAYTON ACCORDS (Lynne Rienner London) 2001, p. 27. [hereinafter COUSENS & CARTER, TOWARDS 
PI : \CI IN BOSNIA] 84 Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, N 50 365 S 1995'728.23 August 1995, para. 195. 
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due to either an absence of an indictment or the refusal of the police to carry out an 
arrest. 85 
The war shattered Bosnia's justice system and demolished much of the physical 
infrastructure. Many members of the country's legal profession fled abroad during the 
conflict. Furthermore, members of the Bosnian Muslim community were in many cases 
singled out and killed along with local government officials86 and other prominent 
figures, in a process referred to as "eliticide. '"17 Consequently, the majority of the 
personnel in the legal profession were political appointees. Nationalist leaders had a 
strategic interest in maintaining the conditions by which their power thrived, including 
the subversion of the rule of law. Control of the police and judiciary allowed them to 
effectively perpetuate their political and economic activities with impunity. 88 As the 
International Crisis Group emphasized, local courts were in no position to resist both the 
power and undue influence of the executive, or the temptations of national solidarity. 89 
Under such conditions, cooperation in the sphere of war crimes investigations would be 
highly problematic and legitimate domestic prosecutions an even less likely prospect. As 
one ICTY official remarked "I think that one should not underestimate the readiness of 
the parties to continue the war with different means, and war crimes trials were one of 
these means. "90 Subsequent trial monitoring within the region confirmed such fears, with 
prosecutions predominantly focusing on the other' ethnic groups. 
85 See Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, 
Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No. 7, October 2004, p. 13. [hereinafter Justice at Risk, Human Rights 
Watch] 
86 Interview with Muharem Murselovic former chairman of Prijedor's Municipal assembly and survivor of 
Omarska detention camp, Prijedor, 2003. 
87 See PETER MA, \ss, LOVE Ti n, NEIGHBOUR. A STORYOF WAR (Papermac) 1996. 
88 See `Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part One - Bosnian Power 
Structures', European StabilitN Initiative (ESI) October 14,1999 p. 5. 
89 Sec, 'Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia Herzego\ ina', International Crisis Group. Balkans 
Report No. 127, March 25,2002, p. 1. [Hereinafter Courting Disaster, ICG] 
"0 Interview with Refik Hodzik, (then) Outreach Programme Coordinator, ICTY. Similar views were also 
expressed by two prominent Bosnian figures working on war crimes issues. Interview with Srdjan 
Dizdarevic, Head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, 
Interview with Jacob Finci. Chair. National Coordinating Committee for the Establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
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In 1999, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) established 
Judicial System Assessment Programme (JSAP) documented `'a `grave lack of judicial 
independence, overt political interference and intimidation of judicial officials and 
substantial court inefficiencies"91 By 2002, serious concerns remained that the domestic 
parties were not doing enough to remove corrupt prosecutors and judges, leading to 
(then) High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch to re-direct the power to appoint and 
discipline legal officials to an International Judicial Commission (IJC). 92 Even seven 
years after the end of the war, the domestic parties (particularly RS and Bosnian Croat 
authorities) were clearly unwilling to allow the rule of law to take hold. Another report 
written for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 2002, which assessed the 
viability of domestic prosecutions was unequivocal that domestic prosecutions of atrocity 
crimes under the [then] legal system were impossible, concluding "there appears to be 
little confidence that such cases can be tried impartially, independently, and free of 
political, criminal or other influence or without bias. There is little faith that mono-ethnic 
courts could deliver judgements. "93 The International Crisis Group's conclusions were 
even more blunt; "The current practice of trying indicted ývar criminals in cantonal or 
entity courts has proved inadequate. Justice has neither been done nor beer .c 'eit to 
be 
94 done. 
Bosnia's police forces also suffered from corruption and were equally susceptible to 
ethnic bias. An OSCE Ombudsman report characterized the forces as the main violators 
of human rights throughout the country and noted their active involvement in criminal 
activities. 95 A clear lack of inter-entity or intra-entity cooperation also prevailed, further 
complicating the arrest of PIFWCs (a situation which continued up to 2002 and 
beyond). 96 As of 2004, concern remained that the police continued to be unwilling to 
')' See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, UN Doc. S/1999/1260,17 December 1999. para. 11. 
92 See Office of the High Representative, 'High Representative Issues Decisions Strengthening Judicial 
Reform Across BiH', Press Release, May 24.2002. 
9; Set, War Crimes Prosecutions in BiH, Consultants Report to the OHR- p. 1. 
94 Sccr Courting Disaster. ICG, p. 2. (emphasis added) 
°S Set, OSCE, Institution of the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Semi-annual 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights, Sarajevo, July 1996. 
°c' Sec Peter Bach, 1 jell Bjornberg, John Ralston and Almiro Ridrigues. The Future of Domestic War 
Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzego\ ina'. Consultants Report to the OHR. \lay 2002, p. -1. 
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investigate war crimes when those implicated were police officers or senior government 
figures. 97 The following sections illustrate the clear limitations in expecting domestic 
parties to actively cooperate in atrocity crimes investigations, or institute domestic 
prosecutions. 
Republika Srpska -A Conspiracy of Silence 
RS authorities were utterly intransigent regarding cooperation. As the Tribunal's 1996 
Annual Report outlined, they failed to execute any of the scores of arrest warrants which 
had been addressed to it, or to explain their inability or failure to do so, as required by the 
Tribunal's rules. 98 The authorities also expressly refused to hand over any requested 
documents to the Court. In an attempt to resolve RS non-compliance, the OTP invited 
Justice Ministry officials to attend a meeting in The Hague, where the delegation 
attempted to justify their failure to cooperate on the basis of a blatantly spurious 
interpretation of the Dayton Accord, which they argued, actually prevented them from 
arresting PIFWCs until after the elections in BiH scheduled for September 1996.99 The 
Accord contained no such provision, and the meeting only served to demonstrate the RS 
authority's delusions relating to their obligations to arrest PIFWCs. On January 2,1997, 
another flawed justification for non-compliance was advanced by RS authorities, namely 
the failure to hand over Karadzic or Mladic was predicated on the belief that "any such 
trial now falls outside the scope of the Tribunal's constitutional framework. -100 
NATO's insistence that domestic authorities lead the way in arrests was exposed as a 
sham by the reality that Karadzic received close protection (CP) details from Bosnian 
[hereinafter War Crimes Prosecutions in BiH, Consultants Report to the OHR] In mid-2003 RS police 
transferred a Bosnian-Serb indictee to Federation authorities, to be tried in Zenica. However, as Human 
Rights Watch noted, such practices were the exception rather than the norm; see Justice at Risk, Human 
Rights Watch, p. 16. 
97 See Justice at Risk, Human Rights Watch, p. 3. 
98 See Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A/51 %292 Si 1996/665,16 August 1996, para. 168. 
99 Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, A 51/29_' S'1996 665.16 August 1996, para. 173 
100 Quoted in Note of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, A, 51i2921S 1997'729. September 18,1997. para. 185. 
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Serb Police and Ministry of Interior Special Police (MUP), 10' both of whom during the 
war had acted as instruments of population control and engaged in numerous atrocity 
crimes. Furthermore, in the early stages of the DPA's implementation. the police forces 
often acted as a subterfuge for armed forces. particularly RS `Special Police', where 
instead of demobilization, forces were merely `transferred' into police units. 102 It was 
hardly likely that such forces, which had actively been involved in 'the Serbian Project', 
and remained deeply loyal to Karadzic, would carry out arrests. In a meeting with the 
IPTF Police Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, Dragan Kijac, the Minister of Interior of 
Republika Srpska, calmly informed Fitzgerald that he did not recognize the Tribunal 
warrants as evidence that people in his force were war criminals and refused to "arrest 
anybody or transfer anybody to The Hague. " 103 RS police authorities continued to 
obstruct the `International Community's' efforts to reform its ranks, and refused to 
submit to the IPTF restructuring formula until late 1997.1`14 In 1998, (then) ICTY 
Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, revealed that RS authorities were involved in "issuing false 
identification papers to those persons indicted by the Tribunal in an attempt to shield 
them. " 105 Like Karadzic, Mladic continued to receive protection from RS authorities, 
particularly the RS army (VRS), and contrary to the express terms of the DPA, retained 
his official position. Documents obtained by the Tribunal revealed that the Bosnian Serb 
General was only officially released from military service in February 2002, and 
continued to receive a pension. Mladic regularly stayed in MoD facilities well into 2004, 
including the underground military complex near the town of Hans Pijesak where his 
bodyguards were reportedly recruited from. 106 As (then) High Representative Paddy 
101 See Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Blair, `Bosnia and the International Police Task Force' in ROBERT 
B. OAKLEY, MICHAEL J. DZIEDZIC AND ELIOT M. GOLDBERG, POLICING THE NENA' WORLD DISORDER: 
PEACE OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC SECURITY (National Defense Uni. Press) 1998, p. 267. 
102 See 'Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998. Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates', 
Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) The Judge Advocates General's School. U. S. Army, 
Charlottesville, Virginia, p101. 
10; See IFOR Press Briefing Transcript, November 29,1996. 
104 See Jeremy King, A. Walter Dorn, Matthew Hodes, 'An Unprecedented Experiment: Security sector 
reform in Bosnia Herzegovina', Saferworld, September 2002, p. 18. 
105 See 'False Identifications', ICTY Press Release, CC/PIU/336-E, July 24,1998. 
106 Seere 'Reliable Information That Bosnian Serbs Shield War Crimes Suspects'.. -1FP, June 1,2001; Nick 
Hawton 'Bosnian Serb army 'helps \lladic', BBCAeus, December 12.2004. 'Ashdown Criticises Bosnian 
Serb Authorities Over Mladic'. South European Times, December 1,2004; Nick Hauton "Massacre 
general' kept from justice by old allies'. The Times, December 10,2004. 
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Ashdown remarked in 2004 "Rather than hunting down war criminals.... certain Bosnian 
Serb institutions, as recently as this summer, are actively protecting war criminals. 
A culture of denial pervaded throughout the entity. Anyone who openly raised the 
subject of atrocity crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs was taking a serious risk. Both 
international journalists researching the issue, and the local sources they used, ww ere 
threatened with death. 108 When the independent RS newspaper Necavisnc 1\'ovine 
published a detailed article outlining war crimes committed by Bosnian Serb forces at 
Koricani and Teslic, the newspaper's editor was seriously injured in a car bombing losing 
both legs. 109 Another prominent Serbian freelance journalist was forced into hiding after 
a series of death threats against her for a report about PIFWCs in Focal10 In fact, many 
sections of RS society openly revered those involved or implicated in war crimes. In 
Prijedor, scene of some of the worst ethnic cleansing and location of the notorious 
detention camps, the Bosnian Serb community has brought forward the date of the town's 
annual festival from May, the anniversary of the town's liberation at the end of the 
Second World War, to April 30, the date in 1992 when the Serb 'Crisis Staff seized the 
town. l l' Whilst memorials have been erected throughout the town to commemorate `all 
2 
war victims', the most prominent is an orthodox cross' 1 , whereas any reference to 
atrocities committed against the region's Muslim population, is conspicuous by its 
absence. As ICG noted, in all RS communities, indicted and suspected PIFWCs appear 
to enjoy respected status. ' 13 The extent of the RS authority's unwillingness to confront 
107 See Nick Hawton "Massacre general' kept from justice by old allies', Times, December 10,2004. 
108 See ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE KEY To MY NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE. SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND 
R\\'ANDA (Bloomsbury) 2002, p. 207. [hereinafter NEUFFER, THE KEY To MY NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE: ] 
109 Sc'ce An Editor Pays the Price in Republika Srpska', Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Balkan 
Crisis Report, No. 86, October 23,1999. 
"0 See Action Alert - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 'Serbian Journalist Threatened With Death', 
Committee to Protect Journalists, October 29,1997. 
111 Sc'c' ISABELLE WESSELINGH AND ARNAUD VAULERIN, RAw MEMORY. PRIJEDOR, LABORATORY OF 
EI HNIC CI FANSING (Saqi Books) 2005, p. 79. [hereinafter WESSELINGH AND VAULERIN. RA\\ MEMORY] 
See Interview with survivor of Omarska detention camp, June 2003, Prijedor. 
112 Similar tactics were used in Herceg-Bosna where after destroying the regions mosques, "stark concrete 
crosses dot the valleys .... 
intended to mark territory, and keep out Nluslims". see Nick Thorpe. 'Croat town 
now a criminal haven, SAS investigator asks why gangsters and ethnic warriors live freely in Stolac, 
Bosnia', Guardian, May 2,2001. 
113 See 'War Criminals in Bosnia's Republika Srpska. Who are the People in Your Neighbourhood? '. 
International Crisis Group. Balkan Report No. 103. No\ ember 2.2000. p. 2. [hereinafter 'War Criminals in 
Bosnia's Republika Srpska'. ICG] 
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its involvement in war crimes was most starkly demonstrated by the publication of the 
'Report about Case Srebrenica' published in September 2002 by the RS Government's 
office for relations with the ICTY. The Report "minimizes. coming very close to denial, 
the crimes committed against Bosniak men after the fall of Srebrenica. "i'4 With primary 
emphasis on the victimization of Srebrenica's Serbs, the Report states that the 
overwhelming majority of Bosnian Muslims killed died during fighting in the woods, 
suggesting the number of summary executions to be less than 100.115 The report also 
suggested that a number of Bosnian Muslim men died merely of "exhaustion. -"6 It is 
widely accepted that between seven and eight thousand Bosnian Muslim men and boys 
were systematically massacred after the fall of the enclave, many of them civilians, 117 and 
the report was roundly condemned. In 2003, the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber 
ordered RS authorities to conduct a full, meaningful and thorough investigation of events 
which took place around Srebrenica. The Commission's preliminar` report highlighted 
systematic obstruction by the RS military, police and intelligence agencies, leading to 
(then) High Representative Paddy Ashdown to dismiss all of the Bosnian Serb members 
of the Commission. This abject refusal to confront the entity"s recent past is perhaps not 
surprising. As Petrovic notes, it would be illusory to expect them to fulfil an obligation 
that runs contrary to their policies during the war. "8 As Gow demonstrates. RS's 
founding basis was, 'a strategy of war crimes. ' 119 To admit complicity in such activities 
would bring into stark relief the entire repugnant basis for its creation, which could serve 
to increase pressure to dissolve the entity in favour of a single Bosnian state. In light of 
114 Seec° Ulrich Garms and Katharina Peschke 'War Crimes Prosecution in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992-2002). 
An Analysis through the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Chamber'. Journal of International Criminal 
. Justice, 4,2006, p. 273. 115 Sce Ulrich Garms and Katharina Peschke 'War Crimes Prosecution in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992-2002). 
An Analysis through the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Chamber', Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 4.2006, p. 273. 
116 See Anes Alic and Dragan Stanimirovic, `Imaginary Massacres? ', Transitions. September 9,2002. 
117 For more details on Srebrenica see JAN WILLEN HONIG AND NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA. RECORD OF 
A WAR CRlnll (Penguin) 1996, DAVID RHODE, ENDGAME. THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENIC: \: 
EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (Farrar, Straus and Giroux) 1997; E\IIR SVLAGIC. 
POS I CARDS FROM THE GRAVE (Sagi Books) 2005. 
118 Sec, Drazen Petrovic 'The Post-Dayton Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, in M. O'FLAHER'l l'AND G. GIS\'OLD (EDS. ) POST-WAR PROTECTION OF Hum, RIGHTS IN 
I3oosNI v AND HERZEGOVINA (Kluwer Law International) 1998, p. 207. 
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these considerations it is unrealistic to expect domestic cooperation on war crimes issues. 
making it imperative that international forces play the key role in apprehensions. 
RS authorities have continued to frustrate the work of the Tribunal. In 2001. RS official 
documents were handed over to The Hague for the first time relating to Bosnian Serb war 
crimes suspects. However, even this exchange was carefully selective, comprising only 
cases where the RS authority argued there was "a reasonable doubt for the existence of 
war crimes committed by Serbs. " 120 In 2002, it emerged that BS military intelligence 
was conducting electronic surveillance against NATO forces, which may have enabled 
PIFWCs to evade SFOR raids. 121 Elements of Karadzic's protection net\\ ork have also 
reportedly monitored ICTY investigators who arrived at Sarajevo airport, placing them 
under surveillance. '22 Ten years after the end of the conflict RS authorities had failed to 
arrest a single PIFWC123, leading to the Tribunal's current Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to 
castigate the "fundamental systematic weakness built into the law enforcement and 
security structures [of]... the RS. -124 In June 2004, Ashdown removed 60 Bosnian Serb 
officials for their failure to apprehend Karadzic. Six months later several more police 
officers and officials were dismissed due to their failure to find indictee Gojko 
Jankovic. 125 Although a number of highly publicised raids have been carried out, they 
have largely been viewed as merely cosmetic by international officials, and a cynical 
attempt to placate demands for real action. In mid-April 2004, Bosnian Serb special 
120 Sec, `Bosnian Serbs to Hand Over Documents to Hague War Crimes Court', AFP, June 4,2001. 
121 See Senad Slatina, New Claims in NATO Surveillance Scandal: Bosnian Serb tapping of NATO 
communications could have helped alleged war criminals evade capture'. Balkan Crisis Report, Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, No. 344, June 20,2002. In his memoirs, General Wesley Clark highlights the 
effectiveness of the Serbian intelligence system with reference to an encounter with Milosevic in 
September 1997. The Serbian President voiced his displeasure of Clark's strategy of promoting a split 
between within the SDS and pushing for more PIFWC detentions and produced a copy of a personal and 
private memorandum the SACEUR had given to General Shinseki, U. S. Commander of SFOR, see 
GENERAL WP. SLFY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR. BOSNIA, Kosovo AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 
(PublicAffairs Ltd, Perseus) 2002, p. p. 93-94 [hereinafter CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR] 
1" See Antony Barnett, Most Wanted: Dr Death. The Hunt for Karadzic', Observer. June 26,2005. 
I2 For example see 'Arrest Warcrime Suspects, Envoy Tells Bosnia Serbs', Reuters April 18,2001; 
'Bosnian Serb Entity is Haven for War Crimes Suspects', AFP, May 24,2001: Robert McMahon 'Bosnia- 
Herzegovina: Ashdown Presses Bosnian Serbs On War Crimes Cooperation', Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty. November 12,2004. However, in early 2005, Bosnian Serb authorities did handover one suspect 
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police units conducted a raid on the house of PIFWC. Milan Lukic's parents. Lukic was 
not at the property, although his brother was fatally wounded after reportedly firing at the 
police. International authorities were initially supportive, viewing the raid as the first 
concrete signs of concerted efforts by RS authorities to carry out arrests. However, more 
sinister allegations soon began to surface, suggesting the raid was a shoot to kill 
operation aimed at silencing Lukic. Lukic, one of the Tribunal's most sought after 
indictees, had reportedly been meeting ICTY investigators and was passing on 
information relating to Karadzic's whereabouts. Relations between Lukic and Karadzic. 
who initially worked together running an extensive organized crime network in Eastern 
RS, were severed after Lukic was reportedly shot and wounded by Karadzic's 
bodyguards near the Montenegro border over a drug shipment dispute. Lukic reportedly 
subsequently made contact with undercover Hague operatives and was reportedly 
supplying information on Karadzic's whereabouts. RS intelligence, which regularly 
monitored the work of the Tribunal's investigators, reportedly intercepted a conversation 
outlining a proposed meeting with Lukic and subsequently engaged in a botched attempt 
to silence Karadzic's former ally. '26 Optimism that a new approach to cooperation by RS 
authorities was developing, appeared misplaced, and the cycle of non-compliance, 
international condemnation and associated sanctions continues. ' 27 It is worth noting that 
some commentators have suggested that placing the onus of responsibility on RS 
authorities to actively pursue and arrest senior PIFWCs is futile, as even if the requisite 
political will existed, the consequences for the authorities would be fatal. As (then) head 
of the ICG's Sarajevo office highlighted The SDS can't handover Karadzic to the 
Hague. This is one of the little illusions the international community likes to maintain by 
saying responsibility for the arrest of [PIFWCS] particularly Karadzic lies with the 
[Bosnian]Serb authorities... . they would commit political and real physical suicide 
if they 
themselves were to betray Karadzic and actively turn him in. 128 
'20 Sec Nerma Jelacic. Tanja Matic & Hugh Griffiths, 'Bosnia: Serb Police Target Karadzic Informer' 
Balkan Crisis Report, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 495, May 4.2004. 
127 See 'Bosnian Serb police chief resigns under pressure', Reuters, April 7,2006. 
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With individuals implicated in war crimes continuing to retain varying levels of influence 
throughout RS the prospect that legitimate domestic prosecutions could be initiated were 
equally unlikely. A 1997 UN Commission on Human Rights Report noted that all 
serving judges in RS were appointed for life by the RS Assembly, mainly in 1992. 
Consequently, many were merely lackeys of the SDS who could be assured to dispense 
politicized justice. The UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Bosnia referred to the 
verdict in the notorious "Zvornik ?" case, where seven Bosnian Muslim men from 
Srebrenica were charged with murder, as a 'judicial farce", with the case violating 
minimum international fair trial standards. 129 In 1999, Nezavvisne Novine published its 
investigation into war crimes allegedly committed by Bosnian Serb police in the Prijedor 
region. The newspaper discovered that when Banja Luka officials began investigating 
the alleged crimes, pressure emanated from the Centre for Public Security to frustrate 
progress. The (then) Bosnian Serb Public Prosecutor Vojislav Dimitrijevvic openly 
acknowledged the main reason for the lack of action in such [ww ar crimes] cases is the 
lack of political will. ', 130 Dimitrijevic went onto lament the failure to reform the judiciary 
promptly after the war, arguing such measures were imperative. 131 In the .1 latmIOOC 
case, one of the other few war crimes cases which actually reached trial stage in the RS, 
the District Court in Banja Luka acquitted all eleven defendants. 132 
The Federation 
The Sarajevo authorities were the most cooperative towards the ICTY, surrendering all 
Bosnian Muslim indictees to The Hague promptly. Nevertheless, when Tribunal 
investigators working on allegations of war crimes committed by Bosnian Muslim forces, 
conducted a "consensual search" of the Bosnian military archive, it soon became clear it 
I2) Scc 'Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia Report on the human rights 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, submitted by the Special Rapporteur Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, 
ursuant to Commission resolution 1997/57', E/CN. 4/1998/1 3 15 October 1997. para. 98. p30 
Comments made by then Bosnian Serb Public Prosecutor Vojislavv Dimitrijevic to,, c-avisnc . 'ovine. see 
'Tracking Down the Crimes at Koricani Near Knezevo in August 1992'. Zczavisne Novine. August 25. 
1999. 
131 Comments made by then Bosnian Serb Public Prosecutor Vojislav Dimitnjevic to. \'c_avisnc . 
'ovine, sec 
'Tracking Down the Crimes at Koricani Near Knezevo in August 1992'. Nc: avis, zc1\ovine, August 25. 
1999. 
132 Sec Olga Lola Ninkov ic, 'Bosnian Court Acquits 11 Serbs in war Crimes Case'. Washington Post. 
February 12,2005. 
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had been "weeded", suggesting incriminating evidence was removed. 133 Tribunal 
investigators were also reportedly monitored by Bosnian government intelligence 
services, which included the search of their temporary residences. ' WVith regard to 
domestic prosecutions in Federation territory, the scope has been limited due to the lack 
of inter-entity cooperation, with the majority of arrest requests issued to RS police not 
acted upon. Where prosecutions have taken place, although they have been less 
influenced by ethnic bias than in the RS, serious problems nevertheless remained, and 
even up until 2002, local courts in the Federations cantons remained "subject to 
substantial political interference. "135 Additionally, Bosnia's Human Rights Chamber 
jurisprudence illustrates that in some cases, Federation police tortured suspects detained 
on war crimes charges, in order to induce confessions. 136 
In the area of Herceg-Bosna, Bosnian-Croat authorities were either grudgingly 
cooperative with The Tribunal, or in some cases, actively worked to frustrate its 
investigations. Prior to President Tudjman's death in December 1999. the Croatian 
Government remained heavily involved in the area and was keen to minimize the scope 
of the Bosnian Croat authorities cooperation with the Tribunal due to concerns that its 
role in the Bosnian conflict would be further exposed, inculpating its officials in the 
crimes committed. 137 Incriminating archives of the Bosnian Croat military were spirited 
out of the country and passed onto the Croatian Ministry of Defence. 138 SFOR-led raids 
of four Bosnian Croat offices in Mostar revealed an extensive operation run by Bosnian 
Croat intelligence (SNA) and Croatian intelligence (HIS) to monitor ICTY activities. 
133 Interview with former Tribunal investigator. 
134 Interview with former Tribunal investigator. 
15 See Gerald P. O. Driscoll Jr. Kim R. Holmes, Mary Anastasia O'Grady. 2002 Index of Economic 
Freedom (The Heritage Foundation) 
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'Operation Puma' had targeted ICTY investigators carrying out inquiries into allc`Ted 
crimes in the Livno region of Bosnia. ' 39 
The situation in Stolac was perhaps one of the clearest illustrations that domestic 
prosecutions were not viable. During the war, the town was taken over and occupied by 
Bosnian Croat militia forces. Over 2000 Muslim homes were destroyed along with the 
three Mosques. Muslim civilians were murdered, placed in detention camps or forcibly 
displaced. Post-Dayton, the situation improved little for returnees, who were regularly 
intimidated and threatened. During 1998 and 1999 Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Gullan of 
the British Special Air Service (SAS) led an undercover operation in the Town. Gullan 
discovered that Renner, an organized crime network comprising figures responsible for 
the war-time occupation, continued to control Stolac, profiting from various criminal 
ventures. 140 In October 1998, RPGs were fired at a Bosnian Muslim returnee's house, the 
15th explosion in two months. Over 70 attacks against returnees were recorded 
throughout the year. 141 Gullan soon identified the key figures in Renner and submitted a 
report to the ICTY and SFOR calling for the indictment and arrest of 22 individuals. 
However, it was determined that the cases would have to be dealt with through the 
domestic authorities. Gullan was incredulous; "No Bosniak will testify in the local 
courts. , 142 The Sarajevo authorities decided to take the case away from the Mostar 
cantonal authorities and in 1999, under the direction of the Bosnian Federation Minister 
of Interior, Joso Leutar, issued eight arrest warrants. The men were reportedly tipped off 
by local police, allowing several to escape. Although the alleged leader Jozo Peric ý, N'as 
arrested, he was released after 60 days due to a "whitewash deal with the local police- 143 
and fled the country. Several months later Leutar was assassinated in a car bombing. 
which Gullan linked to the Stolac case. 144 
139 See 'Croatian Operation Puma'Targeted ICTY Investigators' In Bosnia', Tribunal Update, No. 156. 
December 13-18,1999. 
140 For more details of Jozo Peric, the alleged leader of Renner and his involvement in organized crime see 
'Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans', United States Institute for Peace. Special Report 97, 
December 2002, p. 7. 
141 Sec 'Explosions Rattle Three Towns in Bosnia', Acii- Im* Times, Jul' 30,1998. 
142 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Gullan, Sarajevo. 2003. 
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144 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Gullan. Sarajevo. 2003. Today in Bosnia, the prospects for 
holding viable domestic war crimes prosecutions has improved significantly due to the establishment of the 
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Only If We Come Across Them During The Course Of Our Other Duties 
In a move to circumscribe NATOs involvement in arresting PIFWCs, the NAC issued a 
policy which served to further narrow the scope of IFOR's authority set out in Da\-ton"s 
annexes. The December 16,1995 Directive promulgated that "IFOR should [only] detain 
any persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal who come into contact i ith 
IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks, in order to ensure the transfer of these persons to 
the International Criminal Tribunal. " 145 Bildt saw the policy as a means by which IFOR 
could avoid any sort of involvement in the effort to send PIFWCs to The Hague. '46 
General Joulwan, SACEUR was unequivocal; "... it is very clear what my instructions 
are. If we come into contact with them, we will detain them and turn them over to the 
proper authorities. "147 
It soon became clear however, that the policy was actually leading to IFOR troops going 
to ridiculous lengths to stay within the scope of the new RoE. As Shattuck highlights 
"the U. S. commanders of IFOR were going out of their way to keep their troops from 
coming onto contact with war criminals or appearing to assist the tribunal in its 
investigative work. " 148 Bildt was dismayed with the somewhat farcical state of affairs, 
dryly noting "While I tried to use IFOR to scare Karadzic away, it seemed as if the very 
risk of Karadzic turning up anywhere instead had the effect of scaring IFOR away .,, 
149 
An official U. S. Army report subsequently acknowledged that NATO "went out of our 
way to avoid them [PIFWCs]. " 150 The report goes onto highlight that on one occasion 
new War Crimes Chamber, which operates within the Criminal Division of the State Court of Bosnia, and 
is based in Sarajevo. The Chamber was established with direct assistance from the ICTY and the OHR and 
includes enhanced provisions for witness protection and judicial independence. 
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and Herzegovina, adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 16,1995. 
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where IFOR knew an indicted war criminal was in a building that they wt ere about to 
enter, they withdrew and waited until the PIFWC had departed. '5' 
Furthermore, in clear contradiction to Joulwan's statement, NATO forces also failed to 
detain PIFWCs with whom they came into contact. Whilst driving to Banja Luka from 
Pale, Karadzic's motorcade passed through four IFOR checkpoints, two of them manned 
by U. S. forces. 152 When confronted with the story by Holbrooke. Admiral Smith was 
scathing, remaining adamant that his forces would not arrest PIFWCs. '53 The ICTY's 
former liaison officer in Bosnia disparagingly recounted personally witnessing a group of 
Italian soldiers turn their backs on Karadzic's convoy so they would not "come into 
contact with him" under the terms of the NAC Directive. '54 Another indictee reportedly 
lived only one hundred metres away from a military post in the British Sector. '55 Other 
farcical encounters included NATO troops at checkpoints reportedly recognizing a 
PIFWC and ordering the individual to stand fast whilst headquarters was advised over a 
possible detention, providing the PIFWC the opportunity to leave the area. '56 Ultimately, 
as Cousens and Carter highlight, IFOR essentially abdicated its authorized responsibility 
to apprehend indictees with whom it was in effective contact. 157 
In response to increasing media criticism over their failure to carry out arrests, NATO 
also maintained it did not know the whereabouts of indictees. As Kerr suggests "A major 
obstacle to carrying out detention of accused for the military was logistical, not 
political.... even if the accused were sighted there the day before, and were officially 
151 See Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998, p. 125. Similarly, Amnesty International 
cited several reports of IFOR encountering PIFWCs and failing to arrest, see `Bosnia-Herzegovina - The 
duty to search for war crimes suspects: An open letter from Amnesty International to IFOR commanders 
and contributing governments', Amnesty International, March 1,1996. 
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residing there, it did not follow that they would be there the next da\. if at all. -'158 
However, given the extensive intelligence gathering capabilities NATO possessed, such 
claims may be viewed as ill-founded. As a collaborative report by the U. S. Department 
of Defense and National Defence University highlighted IFOR through its intelligence 
operation (supported by significant national contributions, especially from the United 
States), was able to make clear to the FWF [Former Warring Factions] that they could 
monitor them at any time of the day or night and under all weather conditions. "' 159 U. S. 
military intelligence officers also subsequently conceded that Mladic was easy to track, 
travelling with a radio in his vehicle, which was monitored. 160 Furthermore, the British 
and French contingents of IFOR had developed extensive HUMINT capabilities during 
their time serving with UNPROFOR, 161 and a large number of PIFWCs were highly 
visible, active players within their local communities, making no effort to conceal their 
whereabouts. 
Indeed, several journalists appeared to have little trouble finding them. 162 Some 
commentators have dismissed these encounters as no more than journalistic 
sensationalism 163 although the fact remains that with minimal effort, PIFWCs could be 
located, with many taking no steps to hide their presence. Furthermore, it was not only 
the media looking to generate stories who successfully located many of the indictees. In 
July 1997, Amnesty International, the Coalition for International Justice, Human Rights 
Watch and the International Helsinki Federation launched their Arrest Now! Campaign, 
which listed a variety of details relating to PIFWCs, including their locations in relation 
158 Scc RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. AN 
EXERCISE IN LA\\', POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY (Oxford Uni. Press) 2004, p. 157, [hereinafter KERR, THE 
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to NATO bases. U. S. and NATO officials were reportedly humiliated. 164 Similarly, 
ICTY officials managed to locate and identify eighty percent of the indictee list within 
the space of two weeks. 165 
Arrests Will Threaten a Fragile Order 
Consequently, NATO came under sustained media criticism for its failure to arrest 
PIFWCs, with many commentators increasingly questioning the credibility of the 
organization. Lack of information relating to PIFWCs whereabouts could hardly be 
maintained as an adequate justification in light of the Arrest Now! Campaign, and IFOR 
was clearly failing to arrest those indictees it did encounter. Thus, NATO attempted to 
justify their inaction by arguing arrests would threaten the fragile order achieved under 
Dayton. As Newton recounts, The North Atlantic Council (NAC).... determined that 
military apprehension of suspects indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would destabilize the region and undermine overall 
operational goals by enhancing the status of the radical nationalist parties. " 166 Similarly, 
a senior British Ministry of Defence official was reportedly "worried about the impact 
[arrests would have] on the broader peace process, the pi-ocess of reunification and nation 
building would be even more difficult. "' 67 Initial proposals to launch an arrest operation 
to lift Karadzic were reportedly denounced by the British Foreign Office, which refused 
to provide SAS personnel to support US snatch teams; "There will be casualties, the 
peace deal will be dead in the rater and our forces will be attacked in retaliation. "' 68 
Elements of the U. S. military made equally ominous predictions, "Precipitous military' 
action by SFOR could easily inflame the already deep ethnic hatred .... 
[ifj Karadzic and 
Mladic were [arrested].... The certain result in Serbska would be to further radicalize the 
population... .A 
likely result would be hostage-taking by the Serbs and increasing military 
164 See SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL. " AMERICA IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (Basic Books) 
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confrontation with SFOR troops. "169 Similarly. Kerr notes "there was a very real 
concern that carrying out arrests before the peace in Bosnia had achieved at least some 
measure of stability might provoke a recommencement of the \ýar. "* 170 
Were Such Concerns Warranted? 
Whilst the "concern" that arrests "might provoke a recommencement of the ývar" may 
have been "real", was it warranted? Like the associated premise outlined in chapter 
three, which posits that atrocity crimes indictments have the potential to undermine the 
attainment of a political settlement, the contention that arrests may imperil a fragile 
peace, is not without merit, and in certain instances, concerns that vigorously pursuing 
post-conflict justice could undermine fragile order, may be legitimate. Again it is 
instructive to examine recent developments in Liberia relating to placing former 
President Charles Taylor on trial. Taylor's arrest on the Nigeria/Cameroon border led to 
his rapid transfer to Sierra Leone's Special Court for War Crimes, where on April 3, 
2005, the former President pleaded not guilty to 11 counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. However, the relief that Taylor was prevented from slipping the net 
was tinged by serious concerns that holding the trial in Sierra Leone could have 
destabilizing consequences for the country and the wider region. On a visit to the U. K. 
Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, called for a trial outside Africa, noting "There 
are too many risks associated with an overbearing presence. "171 Consequently, it was 
proposed that Taylor's trial be moved to the premises of the ICC in the Netherlands. "' A 
number of Sierra Leonean and international NGO's passionately argued the trial should 
take place in Freetown, suggesting the move would distance the people of Sierra Leone 
from the process. 173 However, with several of Taylor's loyalists retaining office in 
169 See Colonel F. M. Lorenz, `War Criminals - Testing the Limits of Military Force', JFQ. Summer 1997, 
p. 63. 
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Liberia 174, reports of NPFL fighters slipping into Sierra Leone from Liberia'75, and a 
series of arrests linked to a plot to help Taylor escape' 76, the threat of instability was 
deemed too great to hold the trial locally, and the SCSL requested the case be moved to 
The Hague. The Court's Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Christopher Staker, revealed that 
many political leaders in the sub-region contacted the Court asking for Taylor to be 
transferred to the CC. 177 In light of the specific dynamics (Sierra Leone and Liberia's 
security forces are still in the early stages of restructuring and retraining and are both 
relatively weak, and international troop draw-downs are occurring in both countries) the 
transfer appears to be a prudent decision. As a British Diplomat in Freetown cautioned 
"It is clear to us that Charles Taylor still does command massive support in the sub- 
region. We need to build on the hard-won peace here rather than prepare its collapse. " 178 
Similar concerns have been aired relating to prosecuting atrocity crimes in Afghanistan, 
where the issue has remained controversial during the initial years of the nascent Afghan 
government after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International have regularly called for trials to commence against individuals implicated 
in atrocity crimes. ' 79 In September 2005, prior to the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial 
Council elections, Amnesty International criticized the prevailing climate of impunity 
and urged the judiciary to "bring to justice all those who have committed human rights 
abuses in Afghanistan. "' go However, given the small number of international troops in 
country (who were also either primarily focused on counter-insurgency operations, or 
engaged in very restrictive peacekeeping due to national caveat restrictions), the limited 
capacity for domestic security forces to maintain order, and more importantly, the ability 
174 See Adam Wolfe, The effects of the arrest of Liberia's Taylor' Power and Interest News Report, April 
21,2006. 
175 See Salifu Conteh, 'Liberia: Charles Taylor Should Be Watched', Standard Times (Freetown) posted on 
.- 
Ill. -afi"ica. com, May 12,2006. 
176 See 'Sierra Leone charges American in Taylor plot. Accused of helping ex-Liberian president attempt 
escape from court', Associated Press, May 19,2006. 
177 See Moses Kargba, 'Sub-Regional Leaders Call: Take Charles Ta} for Away'. Concord Times 
(Freetown) posted on All Africa. coin, May 19,2006. 
178 See Lansana Fofana, 'Mixed Feelings Over Charles Taylor's Transfer to the Hague'. Inter Press Service. 
posted on . 411.4 fi-ica. com, 
June 21,2006. 
179 Sec 'Blood-Stained Hands. Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity'. Human 
Rights Watch. 2005. 
180 See 'Afghanistan Human rights challenges facing Afghanistan's 'National and Provincial Assemblies - 
an open letter to candidates'. Amnesty International. September 15.2005. 
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of many of the senior powerful figures implicated to remobilize their militias, '8' arrests 
and prosecutions at that time had the very real potential to lead to serious disorder. 
Consequently, although the United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human 
rights in Afghanistan highlighted it was essential for the Afghan government to engage in 
an open process of facing past atrocities and seeking public accountability, he also 
recognized "the significance of current security concerns and continued political 
uncertainty. "182 In late January 2005, The Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) approached the issue in a similarly pragmatic manner. `A Call for 
Justice', the unprecedented domestically initiated national consultation process focusing 
on how to adequately respond to the issue of the commission of atrocity crimes, proposed 
a national strategy on transitional justice which acknowledged Afghanistan's "current 
socio-political realities, "183 and set out a sequenced strategy including criminal trials, but 
vt'ith no explicit timetables. The report was particularly cognizant of the challenges 
facing the country including the absence of security, the limited reach of the government 
and the problems associated with the judiciary. ' 84 
Both Liberia and Afghanistan illustrate that the specific dynamics and context within a 
country will necessarily dictate whether it is prudent to proceed with post-conflict justice 
initiatives. Where there is a genuine likelihood that arrests and prosecutions will lead to 
significant disorder, justice may well have to be deferred. However, in the case of 
'8' Although, the UN instituted a large-scale Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 
(DDR) leading to the demobilization of some 63,000 fighters, many senior commanders handed in old or 
obsolete weapons. Furthermore, the DDR Programme was less successful in breaking up the recruitment 
structure, and instances of rapid remobilization have occurred during periods of tension in Northern 
Afghanistan. Critically, DDR only focused on military forces with some formal association with the State, 
ignoring illegal armed groups. Although an associated Programme has been established (the Disarmament 
of Illegal Armed Groups - DIAG) progress has been slow. Consequently, the arrest and prosecution of. for 
example, Abdul Rashid Dostum, or Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, both of whom have been regularly 
accused by various human rights NGOs of being implicated in war crimes, and retain considerable levels of 
power and influence, would likely have resulted in serious disorder, which the Afghan government may not 
have been able to contain. 
182S ee Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif 
Bassiouni', E/CN. 4/2005/122 11 March 2005, at 41. The author worked for M. Cherif Bassiouni in 
Afghanistan and assisted in writing the U. N. Report. 
183 See A Call for Justice. Conclusions of AIHRC's National Consultation on Transitional Justice in 
Afghanistan', AIHRC Press Release. January 29,2005. 
Sce A Call for Justice. A National Consultation on Past Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan'. The 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, January, 2005. p. 42. 
1 S9 
Bosnia, the chapter demonstrates that, given the specific circumstances, the contention 
that the arrest of PIFWCs would have seriously threatened the incipient peace. was 
significantly overplayed by NATO. Although (as highlighted by Mark Wheeler) arrest 
missions launched earlier that July 1997 may have caused some disorder, the (then) head 
of the International Crisis Group's Sarajevo office, was keen to point out that "ýw ith the 
60,000 and 35,000 NATO troops [IFOR and SFOR levels] around, these would have 
been contuinable disorders. "' 85 Similarly, Holbrooke was unconvinced of the 'threat to 
order' argument and felt the military's predictions were based on "another misreading of 
the Bosnian Serbs .... the military viewed the 
Serbs as a potent military force that would 
threaten IFOR as it had the U. N. Our negotiating team, including two generals, Clark 
and Kerrick, believed these fears were greatly exaggerated.. .. 
We believed that if sent to 
Bosnia, the U. S. military and NATO would be able to control the situation on the ground 
with little difficulty or challenge from the Serbs. "86 Recently declassified U. S. 
government documents reveal that other senior officials within the Clinton administration 
were also confident that IFOR would not face a significant challenge. In a memo to 
William Perry and Walt Slocombe, James Pardew predicted "force will prevail quickly in 
Bosnia. We can expect localized resistance on a limited scale to test the IFOR but not 
major confrontation with the Serbs. " 187 Marcus Cox, (then) head of the European 
Stability Initiative (ESI) Sarajevo Office, was even more emphatic "IFOR had the 
security situation locked down in Bosnia and the argument that arrests would threaten the 
peace was tenuous" 88 
The attempt to invoke UNPROFOR's difficult experiences with the Bosnian Serb 
military, and the hostage taking incidents as a likely indicator of reaction to NATO arrest 
operations, may also be viewed as particularly misguided. Unlike their lightly armed, 
limited in number, and precariously deployed predecessors, I'SFOR were heavily armed 
and endowed with robust rules of engagement, empowering them to use massive 
firepower to deter any attacks. In the U. S. 1st Armoured Division area, the commanders 
18` Interview with Mark Wheeler, Sarajevo, (emphasis added. ) 
186 Sec HOLBROOKL, To END A WAR. p. 218. 
187S(, (, Pardee memorandum to Perry and Slocombe, 'Militar\ Roles in a Post-Settlement Bosnia. ' October 
199. in 'The Road to Dayton. ' U. S. Department of State, Ch. 7, p. 172. 
"8 Interview with Marcus Cox. European Stability Initiative (ESI) Sarajevo. 2003. 
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quickly established 22 live firing ranges. ' 89 Representatives from all the former ' N\ arring 
factions' were 'invited' to witness overwhelming firepower exercises which acted as a 
clear demonstration as to NATOs response to any challenge it received. The former 
`warring parties' generally left under no uncertain terms as to the consequences of them 
confronting the international forces. ' 90 A number of incidents showed that whilst still 
prepared to challenge international forces, BS forces would relent after their bluff had 
been called. In April a U. S. platoon commander was ordered to move his forces at a BS 
checkpoint. Instead, reinforcements were deployed. General Nash recalled "[\ ]e just 
said, 'You want to fight? Today's a good time. this is a good place. "'191 The BS forces 
soon backed down in the face of a determined and un-intimidated opponent. In another 
encounter a U. S. officer deployed within IFOR recalled "the [Bosnian] Serbs had their 
headquarters on the wrong side of the street. They had had twenty days to move it to the 
right side of the street, as stipulated by Dayton, and they hadn't. I told the [Bosnian] 
Serbs we would bomb their headquarters with an Apache if they didn't move it. I called 
in an Apache to do a flyover. " 192 The Bosnian Serb forces quickly complied with the 
order. Critically, General Zdravko Tolimir, deputy military commander of the Bosnian 
Serb army informed the NATO ground force commander that the arrest of Karadzic 
"tiawould not provoke a violent reaction among his people" 193 
In light of these considerations, the argument that I/S/FOR arrests would have seriously 
undermined the peace appears tenuous. More importantly, as the following section will 
clearly demonstrate, rather than arrest operations serving to "destabilize the region and 
undermine overall operational goals" of the internationally led peacebuilding forces, 
leading to the peace deal being the "dead in the vt'ater'. the failure to institute a more 
189 See A force for peace, p. 45. 
190 See Larry Wentz (contributing editor) Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, A DoD Command 
and Control Research Program (CCRP), NDU Collaboration, 1997. p. 57. 
191 Sec General William Nash quote, in, B: \ss, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 252. 
"2 Comments of Lieutenant Colonel Tom Wilhelm in ROBERT D. KAPLAN, IMPERIAL GRuN Is-. THE 
A\II Ric'AN MILITARY ON THE GROUND (Random House) 2005, p. 122 [hereinafter KAPLAN, IMPERIAL 
GRUNTS] 
193 Sec E\ c-: -inn Prentice. 'Serb Forces 'Would Not Resist Arrest of Karadzic', Times, July 22.1996, 
(emphasis added. ) 
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robust arrest policy earlier in the post-conflict environment actually undermined the 
quality of the order established in Bosnia. 
The Consequences of "Minimalism" - What Price Order? 
In the absence of any arrests by NATO forces during the first eighteen months of its 
deployment many PIFWCs exerted a pervasive negative influence on the peacebuilding 
process, particularly due to their actions related to frustrating minority return and their 
involvement in organized crime. As the Report Of The Century Foundation/Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force On Apprehending Indicted War Criminals highlighted, the 
continued presence of PIFWCs "helped consolidate Bosnia's ethnic partition, exacerbated 
the political and economic tensions in the country, poisoned its social and cultural 
institutions and entrenched its ultranationalist and ethnic-supremacist forces. "4 The 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) noted that a "considerable overlap" existed 
between the power brokers responsible for violence-prone networks in each ethnic 
community and perpetrators of war crimes. "' 95 Many PIFWCs also maintained and 
sought to extend their organized criminal networks, which flourished during the wars. 
Colonel Peter Lainbrechste of the EU police section working in Bosnia noted The old 
warlords have simply shifted their activities.... and in this postwar period. crime is 
flourishing. " 196 Similarly, the U. S. Special Representative to Bosnia stressed to the Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe that "Wartime 
underground networks have turned into political criminal networks involved in massive 
smuggling, tax evasion, and trafficking of women and stolen cars. '"197 Proceeds from 
these activities helped fund parallel institutions intent on undermining and subverting the 
DPA198, and were also used to fund the protection of senior PIFWCs. 1 
99 
194 See `Making Justice Work. The Report of The Century Foundation/ Twentieth Century Fund Task 
Force On Apprehending Indicted War Criminals', p. 4 
19i See 'Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Laww in the Balkans', United States Institute for Peace. Special Report 
97, December 2002, p. 3. 
196 See Colonel Peter Lambrechste quote in NEUFFER, THE KEY To Ml' NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE, p. 18-. 
197 See Harold J. Johnson, 'Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the 
Day ton Peace Agreement' Testimony before The Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives United States General Accounting Office, July 19,2000, p. 3. 
148 See Amra Festic and Adrian Rausche. 'War by Other Means: How Bosnia's Clandestine Political 
Economies Obstruct Peace and State Building', Problems of'Post-Communism. May-June, 2004. pp. 27-34. 
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Nowhere is the nexus between PIFWCs, organized crime and obstruction to post-conflict 
peacebuilding more apparent than with Radovan Karadzic and his protection entouraý(e. 
After lying low during the Dayton negotiations. Karadzic made a defiant re-entry onto 
Bosnia's political scene. staging a show of authority by touring Banja Luka in early 
February 1996. One of his first public announcements related to the introduction of a 
new law in RS which would allow Bosnian Serb refugees and IDPs to keep Bosnian 
Muslim and Bosnian Croat property they had occupied throughout the entity. 200 
Karadzic"s supporters also played a key role in orchestrating a Bosnian Serb exodus from 
the Grbavica suburbs of Sarajevo in early 1996, extinguishing any hopes of the city 
retaining its multi-ethnic character. 201 The Bosnian Serb neighbourhoods were due to 
revert to Governmental control, but many residents wished to remain. As Srdjan 
Dizdarevic, President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia 
Herzegovina recounted we know that in the period from January to April 96 that there 
was more than 60% of the Serbs that wanted to stay and we know the kind of pressures 
they had [faced] to leave. -202 Karadzic supporters threatened, intimidated and physically 
attacked any citizens who attempted to stay. Mark Wheeler, (then) Director of the 
International Crisis Group Sarajevo office, described the episode as "[Bosnian] Serb 
active self cleansing. " He continued "it was a calculated decision.... that no [Bosnian] 
Serbs should be allowed to remain in a [Bosnian] Muslim dominated entity.... [It] 
consolidated [Bosnian] Serb ethnic cleansing in the RS, making it plain that [Bosnian] 
Serb war-time propaganda that they and the [Bosnian] Muslims couldn't live together any 
more was true. -203 In addition to actively frustrating elements of the DPA, Karadzic 
controlled an extensive organized crime network, which continues to thrive today. Paddy 
199 See 'Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans'. United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 
97, December 2002, p. 7. 
200 See John Pomfret, 'Bosnian Serbs' Leader Stages Show of Defiance. Karadzic Tour end Months of 
Seclusions', ü ashington Post, February 10,1996. 
201 See Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Blair, 'Bosnia and the International Police Task Force' in ROBERT 
B. OAKLEY, MICHAI=L J. DZIEDZIC AND ELIOT M. GOLDBERG, POLICING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: 
PEACE: OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC SECURITY (National Defense Uni. Press) 1998, p. 300. 
202 Interview with Srdjan Dizdarevic. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Sarajevo. July 2003. 
203 Both Dizdarevic and Wheeler acknowledged that the Bosnian Muslim authorities could have done more 
to encourage the Bosnian Serb residents to stay. Furthermore. they noted that the International response 
\v as \voeful. with the IPTF being over wwhelmed and SFOR flatly refusing to intervene to stop the Bosnian 
Serb gangs. Nevertheless. they both agreed that the overwhelming responsibility lay ws ith forces under the 
control of Karadzic. 
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Ashdown. former High Representative, is quoted as describing him as ""the head of a 
vast criminal organisation" that thrives on corruption and extortion. Visits are paid to 
businessmen from dark forces who ask for contributions for the 'doctor in the forest'. 
These organised crime networks make vast sums from smuggling drugs, petrol and 
"'°4 tobacco as well as trafficking young girls for the sex trade. 
Although some U. S. military commentators acknowledged that certain senior PIFNVCs 
may pose a problem, they were dismissive over the impact lower level indictees. Colonel 
Lorenz agued "There is a major distinction between Karadzic and the lesser known 
indicted war criminals who wield little power and influence. [Although] -1 strong 
argument can be made that Karadzic is an obstacle to peace.... that argument it'eakens_for 
most of the others . 
-205 This perspective dramatically underestimates the considerable 
negative impact such "lesser known" PIFWCs exerted on peacebuilding efforts. Many 
acted to frustrate the civilian components of the Dayton agreement, particularly minority 
return. This obstruction was even more acute where they continued to occupy positions 
of authority, especially within the security sector. As Human Rights Watch noted with 
regard to Prijedor, "The police authorities and officers charged today with protecting the 
public good.... are in many cases the same individuals who have been accused by 
numerous witnesses of participation in war crimes. -N6 Mark Wheeler emphasised "Their 
continued presence as middle-level policemen or bureaucrats is a tremendous 
discincentive to refugee [and IDP] return. "207 Similarly, Wesselingh and Vaulerin noted 
that for refugees and IDPs "Fears of insecurity remain one of the principal obstacles to 
returning"208 Civilian and police authorities in many towns throughout RS organized or 
incited violence against minorities; houses were firebombed and property ownership 
records destroyed in a concerted attempt to create a climate of fear and hostility. 
204 Scc Antony Barnett, Most Wanted: Doctor Death. The Hunt for Karadzic'. Observer. June26,2005. 
205 Sec Colonel F. M. Lorenz, 'W'ar Criminals - Testing the Limits of Military Force', JFQ, Summer 1997. 
p. 04. (emphasis added. ) 
206 Sec Bosnia and Hercego% ina. The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of "Ethnic Cleansing". Human 
Rights Watch, Vol. 9. No. 1, January 1997, Summary. 
107 Interview with Mark Wheeler, International Crisis Group, Sarajevo, Juli', 2003. 
208 S 'e \V1 ssº: t. INGFi AND V'. vtILERIN, RAW M1: yIORY, p. 93. (emphasis added) 
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Simo Drljaca provides a classic example of a so-called `small fish' PIFW C in,, oIv ed in 
activities designed to frustrate the implementation of Dayton's civilian components. 
Drljaca was a key member of the "Krizni Stab" or Crisis Committee, which organized 
and implemented the take-over of Prijedor. As Chief of Police, he played a major role in 
the organization and management of the detention camps in the area, where many non- 
Serbs were tortured, sexually assaulted, raped and murdered. After the war he continued 
to exert significant influence. Although `removed' from his official position. Drijaca 
remained firmly in control, issuing orders directly to his supposed successor. 209 He 
controlled the local Property Commission and the Commission on Displaced Persons and 
Refugees, threatened Tribunal witnesses, and was implicated in the dynamiting of ninety 
Bosnian Muslim returnee homes. Local Bosnian Serbs who interacted with NATO 
soldiers were also threatened and intimidated. 210 Furthermore, as a logistics assistant to 
the RS's Interior Minister, Drljaca was in charge of providing false documents and safe 
houses to other Bosnian Serbs wanted on war crimes charges . 
21 1 Another indictee, Zeljko 
Mejakic, continued to serve as Deputy Station Commander of Omarska police station, 
exerting a repressive hold over the community, intimidating political opponents and 
destroying evidence. 212 In Eastern RS, Milan Lukic continued to control an extensive 
organized crime network with links to both Karadzic and Serbia's criminal elite and 
security services, and was involved in drug smuggling and extortion. In Foca, a 
particularly hard line town in the area, with little refugee or IDP return, indictee Janko 
Janjic issued death threats against OSCE election observers and attempted to extort 
money. 213 
Similarly in Herceg-Bosna, the criminal and paramilitary forces involved in atrocity 
crimes retained a tight grip on power. As an ESI report highlighted, "having used these 
illegal networks for military and economic ends during the war, the HDZ in some parts of 
the country is hostage to the criminal underworld, both because of threats of violence and 
209 See Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of "Ethnic Cleansing'. Human 
Rights Watch, Vol. 9. No. 1, January 1997, Summary. 
210 See NEUFFER, THE KEY To MY NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE, p. 188. 
211 See Richard H. Curtiss, As U. S. Shifts in Bosnia, NATO Gets Serious About War Criminals'. 
ü'ashington Report, October/November 1997. 
J2 See NEUFnER, THE KEA' To MY, NEIGHBOUR'S Housl_, p. 187. 
213 See Takis Michas, 'Appeasing Criminals in Bosnia'. il all Street Journal Europe, September 24.1997. 
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for fear that the war-time role played by key HDZ figures will become public. "214 Such 
figures played a part in violently obstructing minority returns to Bosnian Croat areas. 
Bosnian Croat veterans associations were particularly noted for their capacity to assemble 
violent "rent-a-mobs" at a moment's notice. and a number of PIFW Cs were directl\ 
involved in orchestrating these forces. In Jajce during mid-July 1997, a Bosnian Croat 
mob blocked Bosnian Muslims returning to their homes. The mob was personally 
directed by PIFWC, Dario Kordic. 215 Another paramilitary-type group involved in 
similar activities around Mostar was founded and controlled by Mladen Naletilic an 
indicted war criminal and notorious underworld figure. " 216 
The failure to pursue a robust policy towards PIFWCs in the early stages of 
peacebuilding in Bosnia only served to embolden many, allowed them to consolidate, 
strengthen and extend their organized crime networks and frustrate minority return. 
International peacebuilding initiatives have largely failed to recognize the links between 
PIFWCs and organized crime, with the latter particularly receiving scant attention. As 
USIP highlights; "Organized crime was regarded as having no relevance to military peace 
enforcement until relatively recently. '217 A recent RAND Corporation report focusing on 
restoring law and order after conflict highlights there is a "golden hour" time frame of 
several weeks to several months to establish the rule of law, noting that in this period 
potential spoilers may have insufficient time to organize. 218 However, International 
peacebuilding practitioners have only recently begun to belatedly acknowledge the grave 
consequences of failing to establish the rule of law at an earlier juncture. (Then) High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown conceded In hindsight, we should have put the 
214 See 'Reshaping international priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part One. Bosnian Power 
Structures', European Stability Initiative (ESI) October 14,1999, p. 10. 
21' See HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 351. 
216 See 'Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans', United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 
97, December 2002, p. 7. 
2l7 See 'Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans', United States Institute for Peace. Special Report 
97, December 2002. p. 3. The author acknowledges that organized crime in the Balkans extends beyond 
the control of PIFWCs. Nevertheless, a clear nexus exists between many PIFWCs and organized crime, 
and by acknowledging the links and acting to apprehend such PIFWCs, the International Community may 
have been able to break up some of the networks in the initial post-Dayton stage. Furthermore. the ICTY 
presented an ideal mechanism to remove PIF\\'Cs who ww ere involved in this activity. 
Sec, Seth G. Jones. Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell and K. Jack Riley. 'Establishing Law and 
Order after Conflict', RAND Corporation. 2005. pp. xi-xii. 
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establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it.... Failure to 
acknowledge the criminal threat earlier and develop the means to address it retarded 
Peacebuilding in Bosnia. "219 
Conclusions 
Chapter four demonstrates that the contention that domestic authorities can be the main 
forum to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes is seriously flawed. As the activities 
of the Republika Srpska and Bosnian-Croat authorities imply, where individuals 
implicated in the commission of atrocity crimes retain influence in government, there will 
be little in the way of support for investigations, transfer of indictees, or credible 
domestic prosecutions. 
The chapter also highlights how the prospects of international criminal tribunals 
obtaining the custody of PIFWCs will be particularly affected by whether the troop- 
contributing States to a peacekeeping/peace enforcement mission are willing to engagc in 
such arrest operations. Where the dominant troop-contributing State is opposed, it will 
often be very difficult to obtain the necessary cooperation. The chapter also shows how 
this inaction may be predicated on elaborate justifications advanced by States in order to 
respond to criticism of their failure to adequately respond to atrocity crimes by affecting 
arrests. In the case of Bosnia, the claim that NATO did not possess the requisite 
authority, or have the necessary intelligence to locate and detain PIFWCs, was clearly 
inaccurate. Similarly, whilst the contention that the arrest of individuals implicated in the 
commission of atrocity crimes may (as in the case of Liberia and Afghanistan) be a 
potentially destabilising dynamic, in the case of Bosnia, such fears were overplayed and 
largely unwarranted. Indeed, as the following chapter demonstrates, NATO's inaction 
was in reality predicated on considerations which went beyond a belief that arrests would 
threaten the nascent peace established in Bosnia. 
219 Sec Paddy Ashdown, `What I learned in Bosnia'. Netiiw York Times, October 28,2002. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by the former U. N. Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo. 
Michael Steiner, who emphasised "First and formost, it is essential to establish security and the rule of law 
- the very basis for all other progress" see Michael Steiner For Example Kosovo: Seven Principles 
for 
Building Peace. ' Speech delis ered at the London School of Economics, January 27,200-3- 
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Chapter Five: Between Order and Justice' An exploration of the reasons behind 
NATO's reluctance to arrest PIFWCs and an examination of strategies adopted by the 
Tribunal in order to induce cooperation. 
Chapter five commences with an examination of the reasons why NATO and many of its 
troop contributing states were so reluctant to arrest PIFWCs. I Within the literature 
relating to the ICTY, this unwillingness has been largely attributed to two factors. 
Firstly, the fear by several Western States that indictees had the potential to uncover 
damaging revelations relating to so-called `deals' made either during or after the war. and 
secondly; the overriding concern that arrest operations would have led to military 
casualties similar to those experienced by the U. S. during an operation to seize key 
members of Mohammed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance in Mogadishu, 
Somalia. 2 After critically assessing these two factors, the author will demonstrate that 
another dynamic, which has hitherto received minimal focus in the associated literature, 
was also critical in influencing NATO's unwillingness to apprehend PIFWCs: namely the 
wider reluctance (particularly within the U. S. military) to engage in Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW). 
The chapter also focuses on the progress of the OTP, highlighting the difficulties atrocity 
crimes investigators may face in relying on domestic intelligence services to facilitate 
their work. It also reveals the tensions within the Tribunal over the OTP's investigative 
strategy, relating to whether indictments should only focus on senior figures. The chapter 
goes on to explore whether the negative impact that lower-level indictees may play in 
frustrating peacebuilding initiatives has been adequately recognised by those advocating 
indicting only senior figures implicated in the planning and ordering of atrocity crimes. 
Building on the theme discussed in previous chapters, the Tribunal's continued struggle 
to obtain intelligence material (both from the States whose nationals were the subject of 
Chapter four highlighted how the NORDPOL Brigade of I'SFOR viewed arresting PIFWCS as an 
obligation. However, such views were clearly a minority within the wider force structure. 
Many commentaries on the Mogadishu operation suggest that the U. S. operation was aimed at arresting 
Aideed. However, accounts supported by inside sources indicate that there was no specific intelligence to 
suggest Aideed would be present at the meeting, although two 'Tier One Personalities* (senior Aideed 
aides) Omar Salad Elmi and Mohammed Hassan Awale were to be present, sec SMITH, KILLER ELITE pp. 
17S-204. 
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investigations, and Western States in possession of potentially valuable information) is 
further discussed. The competing demands of placating, States' appeals for 
confidentiality versus the interests of justice in obtaining vital information to ensure a fair 
trial are explored, and the Blaskic subpoena case is used to illustrate the potential 
consequences of a State's refusal to disclose information on the grounds of national 
security. 
With the support of key external actors and a new OTP strategy towards arrests, NATO 
forces gradually assumed a more active role in apprehending PIFWCs, and the chapter 
will demonstrate how these arrests were a crucial factor in facilitating refugee and IDP 
return, removing obstructionists and improving the security climate. However, as will be 
illustrated, the extent and nature of key Western States' cooperation remained uneven, 
with the OTP's senior legal advisor characterizing it as varying from, "operations carried 
out with great enthusiasm and skill, to downright resistance and obstruction. "3 The 
chapter will conclude by highlighting how the Tribunal's continued endeavours to obtain 
the custody of the remaining PIFWCs has been dramatically affected by the emergence of 
other global strategic priorities. 
Why were NATO forces and their Political Superiors so Reluctant to arrest PIFWCS? 
1. A Fear of Potentially Damaging Information Emerging The Trial 
Some commentators have suggested that the French refusal to arrest either Mladic or 
Karadzic was linked to a "concern for the damage they could inflict on Chirac's 
presidency, the French government, and the army during the Trial in The Hague .,, 
4 
Specific concern reportedly related to the potential exposure of the reasons behind 
General Janvier's (the French Commander of UNPROFOR) failure to call air-strikes in 
response to the VRS attack on the Srebrenica enclave, and the negotiations between 
Chirac, Janvier and Bosnian Serb officials (Janvier met with Mladic5) to secure the 
release of the two French mirage pilots who were shot down over Bosnian Serb 
`Sec Gavin F. Ruxton 'Present and future record of arresting war criminals; The vie\N of the Public 
Prosecutor of ICTY', ill VAN DIJK AND HoVENS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS, p. 20. 
4 Sec Chuck Sudetic. The Reluctant Gendarme. Why is France protecting indicted war criminals in the 
sector of Bosnia it controls? ' Atlantic . Vonthly, April 2000. 
See HOLBROOKE, To END AN VAR, p. 146. 
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controlled territory by the VRS. Sudetic highlights "despite French uoý ernment denials. 
ever since the pilots' release, on December 12 1995. there has been speculation in Paris 
and abroad that the French negotiators made promises not to arrest Serbs indicted for war 
'6 crimes. 
Similarly, allegations have been made that Richard Holbrooke made a deal during a 
meeting with Karadzic in July 19977 whereby if the Serb President stepped down from 
the RS Presidency and leadership of the SDS, he would not be arrested by NATO forces. 8 
Current Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte acknowledged she was aware of the allegations, 
stating the Tribunal even carried out an investigation to verify the claims, although the 
investigation did not arrive at any definitive conclusions9 and Holbrooke has strenuously 
denied any such deal was made. Former ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, 
Richard Pierre Prosper admitted `'there obviously was an understanding that he has to 
step down from power, but there never was a deal that would allow him to avoid the 
responsibility for his actions. "10 When pressed over the allegation, a former senior 
Pentagon official evasively stated "let's just say we may have misled him. "" Without 
access to French and U. S. government records, the allegations are difficult to verify,, but 
therefore cannot be discounted. Nevertheless, even if true, such somewhat sensationalist 
revelations seem only to apply to senior indictees (Karadzic and Mladic) and fail to 
account for NATO's wider reluctance to apprehend lower-level PIFWCs who, for the 
most part, were not in the position to reveal potentially embarrassing details. 12 
6 Sc'c Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme. Why is France protecting indicted war criminals in the 
sector of Bosnia it controls? ' Atlantic Monthly, April 2000. 
For more details of the strategy of removing Karadzic from office see below 
8 See Nedim Dervisbegovic, 'West Pushes Serbia on Mladic, But Where's Karadzic? '. Reuters, June 16, 
2006; Nick Hawton, 'Karadzic wife denies helping husband'. BBC News, March 16.2004. 
See Jennifer Glasse, 'Bosnia: The Men \Vho Got Away. Interview with Carla Del Ponte', PBS, March 28. 
2006. 
10 See Richard Pierre Prosper quote in 'The Hunt is Still On'. Ne: avisne Xovine. March 5.2004. translated 
and posted on TOL wire, March 10,2004. emphasis added. 
11 Intervieww with former Senior Pentagon official. Similarly. Mark Wheeler speculated that such a deal \\ as 
in fact made. Interview with Mark Wheeler. 
12 The Gagovic incident presents an exception to this principle, sec' below. 
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2. Fear of Casualties 
Considerations of Force Protection have also been highlighted by numerous 
commentators as another reason behind NATO's resistance to conduct arrest 
operations. 13 These considerations were heavily influenced by the U. S. experience in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, when on October 3,1993,18 servicemen were killed and 84 injured 
during an operation to arrest senior members of Aideed's Somali National Alliance which 
went disastrously wrong. 14 The spectre of Somalia is thus viewed as a significant factor 
as to why there was a distinct lack of political will from NATO and the major troop 
contributing States to go after PIFWCs. A former senior State Department official 
acknowledged that force protection was always a factor raised by opponents of a more 
"maximalist" approach by NATO forces in Bosnia. 15 
Learning the Wrong Lessons from Somalia 
Whilst the failed operation in Somalia may have been influential in determining NATO's 
attitude to arrests, the author posits that the disaster at Mogadishu represented an 
inappropriate template to base likely outcomes of the majority of PIFWC operations in 
Bosnia, for several important reasons. Firstly, the environments were completely 
different. Large parts of Somalia, including the capital, had descended into lawlessness 
making it an extremely high risk, hostile environment for operations. A former mid-level 
Pentagon official working on Somalia issues in 1993 noted "There is a popular 
conception that [up until the failed arrest operation] the mission went smoothly. In fact 
the warlords were constantly engaging us [militarily] and testing us to see how serious we 
were. " 16 Mogadishu was a sprawling, urban morass where forces could quickly be 
surrounded and cut off, as subsequently occurred. Furthermore, the international military 
presence comprising U. S. and U. N. forces was limited in size, operated under separate 
chains of command, and had a strained relationship. U. S. officials had charged that 
secret plans relating to operations aimed at Aideed's forces were deliberately leaked to 
1; Se'c' for example BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 240; H, \ZAN, JUSTICE IN A TI\IE OF WAR, p. 
68. 
14 For further details 
. sec general/'. 
MARK Bo\\, [)EN, BLACK HAWK DOWN. (Corp) 1999. 
Interview with former senior State Department official. 
ýý' Interview with former mid-level Pentagon official involved in DoD Somalia policy. 
Aideed by Italian troops in July 1993.17 That the targets of one U. S. snatch operation 
actually turned out to be members of the U. N. mission and their Somali assistants, did 
little to improve things. '8 Another target, Osman Ato, had also formed strong ties with 
UN officials and was one of their leading building contractors. 19 When things started to 
go badly wrong during the fateful snatch operation, U. S. requests for U. N. reinforcements 
were refused for several crucial hours. 20 Intelligence support for the Somalia operations 
was also limited and in some cases of dubious quality. Crucial human intelligence 
(Humint) was sparse, local agents were "deeply unreliable-21 and Aideed did not use 
radio, instead passing messages via courier in order to minimize detection. 2" Finally, the 
element of surprise had largely been squandered after the administration publicly 
announced it was sending Special Operations Forces to Somalia. 23 General Bill Garrison, 
commander of Task Force Ranger, the unit involved in the arrest operations, 
acknowledged "There is no question that we lost strategic surprise when we moved the 
force in the country. "24 Task Force Ranger had already conducted several snatch 
operations, all following the same template: Black Hawk helicopters would transport 
forces to the target location, remaining to provide fire support; a combined force of U. S. 
Army Rangers (to provide perimeter security) and Delta Force (to carry out the arrests) 
would descend via ropes; a helicopter would land to pick up the Delta Force team and the 
target(s). Consequently, the routine became easy to predict. As Colonel Ali Aden, one 
of Aideed's Soviet-trained commanders highlighted "If you use one tactic twice, you 
should not use it a third time .... and the 
Americans already had done basically the same 
2s thing six times. 
17 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, `Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Lis', Netir York Review of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 12. 
18 Se'c, SMITH, KILLER ELITE p. 185. 
19 See SMITH, KILLER ELITE p. 186. 
20 The fact that UN forces had suffered significant losses in Mogadishu throughout the mission, no doubt 
increased their reluctance to deploy in the capital. 
2! See SMITI1, KILLER ELITE p. 185. 
2' Sc'c' SMITH, KILLER ELITE p. 186. 
23 Interview with former Mid-level Pentagon official involved in DoD Somalia policy. 
24 See General Bill Garrison quote in SMITH, KILLER ELITE p. 188. 
25 Sec Colonel All Aden quote in SMITH, KILLER EI ITE p. 188. 
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In comparison, Bosnia represented a totally different operating environment. `Whilst 
significant numbers of belligerent military forces were still on the ground, the VRS had 
recently witnessed the devastating potential of NATO military capability during 
Operation Deliberate Force, and as chapter four illustrated, for the majority of operations 
(Mladic excluded) were unlikely to react adversely. Similarly, it was unlikely that the 
Bosnian Croat military (HVO) would have been prepared to act adversely and undermine 
their proportionately successful status achieved via the Dayton agreement by responding 
aggressively to the arrest of Bosnian Croat indictees. These contentions were 
subsequently confirmed when arrests of PIFWCs led to minimal reaction. With PIFWCs 
residing in several areas throughout Bosnia, including cities, towns and villages, NATO 
was presented with a less complicated theatre than the Somali capital and increased 
options. Furthermore, intelligence capabilities were incomparably better. As the 
`Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience' Report highlighted, NATO forces had the 
ability to monitor the former `warring parties' at all times. 26 Unlike Aideed, several 
PIFWCs were less vigilant regarding their communications, and were easily detected by 
NATO military intelligence and Western intelligence services. Huinint was also much 
more developed on the ground, particularly within the British and French forces, whose 
UNPROFOR contingents had established contacts during the war. 27 Critically, the unity 
of command of the NATO-led force meant that any violent response to an arrest 
operation would have been addressed with overwhelming and decisive force, without 
having to rely on the dubious support of other forces with separate agendas and priorities. 
Nevertheless, despite these factors, the fear of a repeat of Mogadishu continues to be 
influential vis-ä-vis perspectives on the achievability of active apprehensions. Chuter 
argues that due to the potential risk of casualties, such operations should largely be 
avoided, noting "It is simply not realistic - or acceptable in a democracy - to suppose 
that a nation that deployed an infantry battalion to a cease-fire monitoring mission will 
learn from the media one morning that two dozen of its troops have died in an ill- 
26 Sce Larry Wentz (contributing editor) Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, A DoD Command 
and Control Research Program (CCRP), NDU Collaboration, 1997, p. 57. 
27 Sec Larry Wentz (contributing editor) Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience. A DoD Command 
and Control Research Program (CCRP), NDU Collaboration, 1997, p. 60. 
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conceived plan to snatch an ICC indictee. "28 However. Chuter's contention is based on a 
totally pessimistic, worst case scenario. Rather than utterly discount the possibility of 
using the military to arrest PIFWCs, it may merely be necessary not to follow an ill- 
conceived plan. " Many of the indictees residing in Bosnia had little or no close 
protection. NATO military forces supported by Intelligence assets successfully 
apprehended a number of indictees in meticulously planned operations, with minimal 
casualties or loss of life. As Marks, Meer and Nilson highlight in their study 
`Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest' '9, intensive 
planning and surveillance allows weaknesses in suspects' protection regimes to be 
uncovered, dramatically reducing the risk associated with apprehension operations. For 
example, General Stanislav Galic, under sealed indictment for command responsibility 
for the shelling of Sarajevo, was covertly tracked for several days via a combination of 
electronic eavesdropping devices and cameras planted near his residence by Special 
Operations Forces. Spy satellites monitored his car journeys and covert human 
surveillance logged his routes and close protection routine. When Galic broke his routine 
and dismissed his bodyguards (reportedly to visit a lover) an SAS team boxed in his car 
using two other vehicles, smashed the driver window and dragged him out. 30 Such 
operations clearly demonstrate that arrests can be achieved without incurring the loss of 
two dozen" soldiers. 
It is important to highlight that there were elements within the NATO force, who were 
clearly frustrated with what they perceived as an undue deference to Force Protection. 
As one senior U. S. officer lamented "we should have posted a tank battalion in 
Pale/Banja Luka from day one-31 Lieutenant General William Carter succinctly 
28 See DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES. CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD (Lynne Rienner) 
2003, p. 197-8 
29 See Steven Marks, Thomas Meer and Matthew Nilson, `Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding 
Persons of National Interest', Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, Monterey, California, June 2005. 
`Ö Sec Philip Jacobson, 'War crimes court wants SAS to trap Karadzic', Daily Telegraph, March 12.2000. 
Similarly. Dragoljub Prcac's car was forced to a halt by three vehicles whilst driving through the British 
controlled sector, and soldiers smashed the windows, dragging him out of the car at gunpoint. Again, the 
operation was over within minutes without incurring any NATO casualties. 
i' Sec anonymous senior U. S. army officer quote in BAss, STAY' THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 252. 
Unfortunately, this robust proactive prospective did not receive enough support, and U. S. military was 
generally reluctant to provide area security. It was not until 2001, that the U. S. established a military base 
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highlights the frustration existing within elements of the military who feel, in some cases, 
an overemphasis on Force Protection inhibits their performance; 'Military leadership is 
about loyalty, commitment and sacrifice.... But it is also about fulfilling goals and 
attaining objectives. Every single military leader who commented on the political 
community's "aversion to casualties" contended that it was excessive and even counter 
productive to their mission and their effectiveness. "''' Carter goes on to argue "Congress 
has to get over it and say if we're going to send a force we're going to have to incur a 
casualty or two. 33 
3. The Wider Issue -A Reluctance to Engage in Operations Other Than War (OOT\\ ) 
Whilst the concern of incurring casualties was clearly influential, in light of the above 
factors, the author suggests it cannot adequately explain the failure to go after unn1' 
PIFWCs in the first two years post-Dayton. Consequently, the author submits that 
NATO's refusal to conduct arrests was also symptomatic of the wider reluctance 
prevalent within the military to engage in OOTW. Such reluctance is particularly 
apparent within the senior echelons of the U. S. DoD and military. With the U. S. exerting 
dominance in NATO generally and U. S. forces representing the centre of gravity of the 
specific mission (a U. S. General would control the overall force and its troops made up 
the bulk of IFOR personnel) this perspective was heavily influential within the context of 
the Bosnia mission. 34 
General Anthony Zinni, a U. S. Marine and former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and Commander in Chief of U. S. CENTCOM highlights that the U. S. was both 
unprepared and resistant to adopting to the changing dynamics of "the new world 
disorder" of the post-Cold War. "The military leadership did not expect or welcome a 
in Bratunac, a hardline area of Eastern Republica Srpska's which had seen little refugee return see U. S 
Builds New Base in Hardline Bosnian Serb Area' April 5,2001, Reuters. 
32 See Lieutenant General William Carter comments in `A Force For Peace. U. S. Commander's View of 
the Military's Role in Peace Operations', A Project of the Peace through Law Education Fund. 1999, P. 37. 
"Sec Lieutenant General William Carter comments in `A Force For Peace. U. S. Commander's Views of 
the Military's Role in Peace Operations'. A Project of the Peace through Law Education Fund, 1999. p. 37. 
14 For more details of the extensive U. S. influence over the NATO operation in Bosnia see Richard M. 
Swain, 'Neither War Nor Not War. Army Command in Europe During the Time of Peace Operations: 
Tasks Confronting USAREUR Commanders, 1994-2000', Strategic Studies Institute. U. S. Army War 
College, May. 2003. 
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sudden plunge into non-traditional missions. In taking on the new challenge, they 
decided to follow the path of least effort. The easiest solution was to play down these 
new missions"35 In his farewell remarks at the U. S. Naval Institute in March 2000, Zinni 
recounted We even had an earlier Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who said "real 
men don't do OOTW. " That just about says it all. Ans' Arm,, Commander worth his salt 
wanted to take his unit .... 
for live-fire maneuver and combined arms work, rather than 
stay at their bases and confront a bunch of troops in civilian clothes, throxving water 
balloons and playing the role of an angry overseas mobs . He later noted, "To the 
military, the business of war was about major conventional combat operations. and that 
was where it wanted to stay focused. They looked at these new missions as a temporary 
nuisance, not worthy of more than minor adjustment in doctrine, training, education, and 
organization. "37 
Similarly Brigadier Aylwin-Foster highlights that whilst the U. S. Army is "indisputably 
the master of conventional warfighting, it is notably less proficient in.... ww hat the U. S. 
defence community commonly calls Operations Other Than War (OOTW). '"38 Aylwin- 
Foster goes on to suggest the U. S. military's reluctance to engage in OOTW is 
"symptomatic of a trend rooted in U. S. army historical development: the Army has 
consistently seen itself more or less exclusively as a conventional warfighting 
organization, and prepared for operations accordingIY""39 - 
Part of the reluctance relates to the perception that that OOTW are inimical to U. S. 
interests, with noncombat operations threatening to diminish U. S. national security by 
keeping military personnel away from combat training for months and creating 
35 Sec ANTHONY ZINN!, THE BATTLE FOR PEACE: A FRONTLINE VISION OF AMERICA'S POWER AND 
PURPOSI: (Paigrav e Macmillan) 2006, p. 68 [hereinafter ZINNI, THE BATTLE FOR PEACE] 
36 Sec General Anthony C. Zinni, U. S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief U. S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) `Farewell Remarks at the U. S. Naval Institute, March 2000. 
}, Sec' ZINNI, THE BATTLE FOR PE:: AC E, p. 68. 
" Sec Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster. 'Changing the Arm) for Counterinsurgency Operations'. , 1lilitai i' 
Revieww", November-December 2005. pp. 1_-3. 
y 
39 See Brigadier Nigel Av lwin-Foster. 'Changing the . Arm) for Counterinsurgency 
Operations'. Afilitari- 
Revic'wr, November-December 2005, p. 7. 
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operations tempo that undercuts the U. S. military readiness. "4 Consequently. the views 
of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlop (USAF) are shared widely throughout the military; 
"armed forces [should] focus exclusively on indisputably military duties [and] not diffuse 
our energies away from our fundamental responsibilities for war-fighting. "4I In remarks 
made in the month before the U. S. deployment into Bosnia, General Powell alluded to his 
displeasure at U. S. armed forces becoming engaged in operations which detracted from 
what he perceived to be their most important function. Powell argued "wwe have a value 
system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this 
mission: to fight and win the nations wars. "42 
In addition to the dominant view expressed within the DoD and military that u . S. 
forces 
should primarily focus on `war fighting', reluctance to embrace OOTW also relates to the 
military's, and to a lesser extent the Pentagon's, "remarkable resistance to doctrinal 
change. 43 Nagal highlights a key difference between the U. S. and British military, 
suggesting the culture of the British army encourages a rapid response to a changing 
situation whereas "the culture of the American army does not, unless the changed 
situation falls within the parameters of the kind of war it has defined as its primary 
mission. "44 Furthermore, as Aylwin-Foster notes, the U. S. military tends to "discourage 
adaptation to roles deemed outside its primary mission. -45 A former senior Pentagon 
official acknowledged "the American military is very wary of going beyond what they 
regard as their core competence. They need to develop methods to do so, whether they 
will is another issue. ", 46 
40 Sec Gary Dempsey `Rethinking the Dayton Agreement. Bosnia Three Years Later', CATO Institute 
Policy Analysis, December 14,1998. p. 26. 
'' See Lieutenant Colonel Charles 1. Dunlop Jr, The Military Coup of 2012', Parameters, Winter, 1992/93, 
p. 287. 
42 See Colin Powell presentation 'The United Nations Financial Crunch: the US Role in Creating the 
Crisis', Washington D. C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Project on Peacekeeping and the 
United Nations, October 1995. 
4? See A. NAG. AL, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM: LEARNING To EAT SOUP 
\1'1 I'H A KNIFE (Praeger) 2002, p. 8. [hereinafter NAGAL, COUNTERINSURGENCY] 
44 See NAGAL, COUNTERINSURGENCY p. 218. 
45 See Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, 'Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations'. Militai- 
Review, Nov ember-December 2005, p. 10. 
46 Inter-vvieww \w ith former Senior Pentagon official 
177 
Particular resistance related to the potential use of military forces in rule of la-vv 
operations, including the arrest of PIFWCS. Clinton's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Henry Shelton was unequivocal, "I do drm\ a line between what I N\ ould 
call nation building and what I would call sustaining a safe and secure environment..... we 
don't do law enforcement. -47 Similarly Clinton's Secretary of Defense William J. Parrs 
was at pains to emphasize that at NATO a "clear distinction [was made] between the 
police functions, which are not a function of SFOR, and providing the secure 
environment, which is a function of SFOR. "4x Perry's successor Senator William Cohen 
was even more opposed to U. S. forces assuming a more expansive role in Bosnia, 
arguing "Peacekeeping is not [our] primary mission. Peacekeeping involves a different 
kind of training and capabilities. "49 Cohen also emphasised that arresting war criminals 
placed NATO forces "at great risk... They are not police officers, they are not people 
trained to arrest. Their function is quite different. -50 For many in the U. S. military, 
engaging in supportive work for the Tribunal was viewed as completely outside their 
competence. Richard Butler, a former U. S. army officer and intelligence specialist, who 
was seconded to the ICTY notes "To most of the US Army, the work of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has little bearing on their pursuits 
in the profession of arms. -51 Similarly, a senior pentagon official admitted "There were a 
lot of things we could have done [in Bosnia], but we elected not to do them because we 
were simply not interested injustice . '"52 
The reluctance to engage in rule of law operations was not only limited to the U. S. 
however. When pressed on their failure to arrest PIFWCs whom they encountered, a 
French SFOR soldier retorted we are not competent to make arrests ... w\e are an army. 
47 See Associated Press `Shelton: Peacekeeping Missions Unavoidable'. 11'ashington Post, November 17. 
2000 (emphasis added). 48 Sec' William J. Perry quote in VAN DIJK AND HOVENS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS. p. 63. 
aQ See William Cohen quote in Alice Hills, The Inherent Limits of Military in Policing Peace Operations'. 
International Peacekeeping. Vol. 8. No. 3. Autumn. 2001, p. 88. 
'Q See \1 illiam Cohen quote in BASS. STAN- THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 65. 
51 Sec Richard Butler. 'Modern War, Modern Laww. and Army Doctrine: Are We in Step for the 21st 
Centur\? ' Parameters, Spring. 2002, p. 45. 
52 Sec NFLUFFER, Ti IE K1 Y To Ml' NEIGHBOURS HOUSE. p. 177. 
178 
not the police. -53 Similar sentiments have also been expressed by elements within the 
British Ministry of Defence. For example. Chuter contends -Another basic problem is 
that arresting war criminals is not a military finiction, nor should it be. Few militarvv 
forces in the world possess such skills, even in their military police components, much 
less soldiers send on peacekeeping missions. "54 Chuter continues "There are onh' rnodest 
prizes for getting it right and potentially horrendous penalties for getting it wrong.... no 
individual's arrest, no matter how high profile, is worth hazarding the success of the 
mission as a whole and the political objectives of the international community. "'5 
Given the numerous successful arrest operations carried out by NATO forces (generally 
Special Operations Forces) in Bosnia, it is clear that the military can carry out such 
operations successfully. As Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Hardenbol of the Dutch Royal 
Marines (Special Forces) highlights, given the required manpower and equipment, the 
risk of escalation, and the complexity of such operations, military (preferably SOF) 
should take the lead role. 56 Arguably, some of the lower-level PIFWCs could even have 
been detained using infantry soldiers, or paramilitary-style Carabinien units, rather than 
always relying on SOF. Infantry troops have been used on occasion in Iraq to 
successfully detain suspected insurgents and criminal elements. In many respects such 
operations are little different than those aimed at detaining PIFWCs. Lieutenant Colonel 
Hector Gullan is unequivocal; "Arresting PIFWCs and those involved in Crimes against 
Humanity or War Crimes is very much the job of the military. No one should have any 
illusions about this. '57 
As for "only modest prizes for getting it right", Chuter either ignores or fails to recognize 
the pervasive negative influence PIFWCs often exert on post-conflict peacebuilding. As 
chapter four illustrated, obstructing minority return, supporting parallel institutions and 
involvement in organized crime, all significantly contribute to undermining stability, 
53 Sei' French SFOR soldier quote in Garodana Igric and John Swain `War-crimes suspects roam free in 
Bosnia', Times. 
'4 S(V CHUTER, WAR CRIMES. p. 196, (emphasis added. ) 
55 See CHUTER, WAR CRIMES, p. 196, (emphasis added. ) 
"' Sec 'Workshop 3: Requirements. Conditions, Supplies and Feasibility of an Operational International 
Arrest Team in VAN DIJk AND Hov1: NS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS, pp. 55-56. 
57 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Hector Gullan. 
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retarding international efforts to institute reform, and may also undermine and delay any 
viable exit strategy for international forces. The impact of the Prijedor operations 
(highlighted below) indicates that in many cases, the arrest of indictees may be critically 
important. 
British army officer Andrew G. Marriot emphasised that within the U. S. military, whilst 
the senior echelons may be primarily focused on a specific military task, an awareness 
and appreciation of issues beyond `war fighting' exists within the lower ranks. 8 (a trend 
which probably exists in many other States' militaries). Although Admiral Smith Nt as 
steadfastly opposed to conducting arrests, Reuters reported that subordinate officers were 
"champing at the bit for a chance to grab Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 59 Even 
some senior U. S. personnel have assumed a more 'maximalist' outlook. Lieutenant 
General William Carter argued "The Military should have gone after the war 
criminals.... I was an advocate of guarding the mass graves .,, 
60 Carter continued, "1 think 
had we gone in [to Bosnia] with that attitude, in the first 90 days we could have gone 
after the war criminals and taken them down .... They were scared to 
death of us at that 
time.... We could have taken Karadzic and Mladic and I think that would have gone a 
long way to solving the problem. We're paying the price daily for not having done 
that . "61 The 
legal counsel to the U. S. Joint Chief of Staff was even more forthright, 
suggesting "Although it is very difficult to do, it can be done. Everyone of these people 
[PIFWCs] could be delivered to The Hague within two weeks. -62 
58 See Andrew G. Marriot remarks in `Rule of Law. Conference Report', United States Army 
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army 
War College, July 6-9,2004, p. 47. 
54 See Reuters quote cited by Tom Warrick, Coalition for International Justice in The War Crimes Trials 
for the Former Yugoslavia: Prospects and Problems', Briefing of the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, U. S. Congress. May 28,1996. 
60 See comments made by Lieutenant General William Carter in 'A Force For Peace. L. S. Commander's 
Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations', A Project of the Peace through La\\ Education Fund. p. 
34. 
6' See comments made by Lieutenant General William Carter in 'A Force For Peace. t'. S. Commander's 
Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations'. A Project of the Peace through Law Education Fund. p. 
38. 
62 Str Colonel John T. Burton "'War Crimes. " Operations Other Than War: \lilitary Doctrine and Law 50 
Years After Nuremberg and Beyond'.. Vilitan" Law Revieii. Vol. 149. Summer 1995. p. 206. 
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Furthermore, as Marriot points out, divorcing combat operations from a more 
comprehensive approach (which would include utilizing military forces for rule of lagt 
operations) "suggests a willingness to accept the proposition that "someone else" Nt ill 
address the "other" task. However, often there will be no "someone else. "63 Bosnia 
clearly illustrated this challenging reality, where other international forces in theatre ýti c: re 
clearly unsuited to carry out the task in hand. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
established under the Dayton Accords was patently unable to do so. Major Hendrickx, 
Commander of the Dutch Special Security Missions Brigade noted, "IPTF could not 
force local enforcement personnel to pursue a particular policy or engage in certain 
actions... . 
In cases where the local police is not able or not willing to act. the IPTF lacked 
the mandate of enforcement .,, 
64 Indeed, the IPTF were not even mandated to carry 
weapons, and sending unarmed personnel to arrest PIFWCs would definitely represent an 
"ill conceived plan. "65 Consequently, NATO's attempts to pass off apprehension as a 
"police function" was to effectively decide that no arrests would be made. 66 As Leurdijk 
bluntly stated "There was only one organisation available who could perform the job, and 
that was [IFOR/]SFOR. ''67 
The Karadzic Strategy - Departure from Public Political Life Will Solve the Problem: A 
Flawed Approach 
In light of the sustained resistance to carry out arrest operations, the U. S. administration 
instead advocated and pursued an alternative policy of pressuring Karadzic to step down 
both as President of RS and head of the SDS. A former senior Pentagon official 
acknowledged "our focus was not on catching him. This was a tactical political 
63 Sec Andrew G. Man-iot remarks in 'Rule of Law. Conference Report', United States Army 
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army 
War College, July 6-9,2004, p. 47. 
64 See Major M. M. L. A. Hendrickx, 'An Operational Blueprint for Arresting War Criminals; a Low Risk 
and a High Risk Scenario', in W. A. M. VAN DIJK AND J. L. HoVENS (EDS. ) ARRESTING WAR CRIMIN gal S. 
(Special Publication by the Royal Dutch Constabulary) 2001, pp. 25-26. 
65 In contrast, the 1000 civilian police deployed to East Timor and the 5,000 deployed to Kosovo pos'essed 
arrest authority and were required to carry a sidearm, see James Dobbins The UN's Role in Nation- 
building: From the Belgium Congo to Iraq'. Survival. Vol. 46. No. 4 Winter. 2004. pp. 81-102. 
66 See Kenneth Roth, ' \\'li Justice Needs NATO', The Nation. September 22.1997. p. 22. 
67 Stv Dick A. Leurdijk 'Arresting War Criminals: The establishment of an international arresting: fiction. 
reality or both', in VAN DIJk AND HOVENS (EDS. ) ARRESTING WAR CRINIItiALS, p. 65. 
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decision ... 
[there was] more emphasis on isolating him at that stage. "hý Similarly, a 
former senior State Department official outlined "we looked at «aYs to marginalize him. 
essentially render him impotent in Bosnian politics.... There was a lot of tension v ithin 
the inter-agency discussions. We [the pro justice elements in the State Department] 
wanted to charge ahead with apprehension versus those who were concerned 
apprehensions would result in a backlash. "69 Holbrooke was again dispatched to Bosnia, 
holding a series of meetings, and on July 18,1996, an agreement was reached between 
Holbrooke, Milosevic, Aleska Buha and Krajisnik that Karadzic be removed 
"immediately and permanently [from] all public and private activities. " Karadzic as 
replaced as RS President by Bijana Plavsic and as head of the SDS by Buha. 
Goldstone was particularly scathing of the policy: it is really like say ing.... if murderers 
keep quiet and don't get in the way of the political process, well, we will get on with our 
work and leave them as free men. '"70 The Chief Prosecutor was essentially right: the 
policy had the direct effect of muting calls for Karadzic's arrest, as recounted by (then) 
NSC staffer, No Daalder, "once Karadzic was out of power, they [the Clinton 
Administration] didn't care [about his arrest] . 
"'71 A senior State Department official 
expressed frustration that "There was clearly a trade-off between apprehension and 
neutering Karadzic. -72 
Although sections of the media presented the move as "another success-73, in reality, the 
strategy \vas largely unsuccessful. Whilst Karadzic's public appearances were reduced. 
the impact of his removal from the official positions was extremely limited, and his 
pervasive influence over RS and the SDS remained undiminished. Given the specific 
dynamics of the region and his control of an extensive organized criminal network. it was 
perhaps unsurprising that the strategy failed to achieve the desired affects. As the U. S. 
Institute of Peace (USIP) Special Report stated, "[the] mere removal from formal 
68 Interview with former senior Pentagon official. 
69 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
70 See Richard Goldstone, "Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View'. Transnational Law and 
Contemporan' Problems, No. 7,1997, p. 8. 
71 Scc No Daalder quote in NEU FER, THE KEY TO Ml" NEIGHBOUR'S HovsE p. 179. 
7' Interview \w ith former senior State Department official. 
73 Holbrooke refers to the Financial Times, sec Hol-BROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 343. 
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positions had only cosmetic impact since their power [is] derived from informal networks 
involving family and interlocking business and foundation relationships: ''` Holbrooke 
lobbied the Principals Committee, arguing it was imperative to move immediately against 
Karadzic in the event of any violation of the July 18 agreement. However, it soon 
became apparent that no firm action would be taken, and "by the beginning of 1997. 
these admonitions and proposals would be forgotten or ignored, and Karadzic. sensing 
another opportunity, would emerge once more. "75 The former Head of Bosnia's Customs 
Intelligence Unit and former Deputy Head of the OHR's Anti-Fraud Department 
succinctly highlighted the strategies failure, noting "Karadzic's ability to raise funds and 
consequently engage in political activity never really declined. 76 Similarly, an ICG report 
indicated that even up to 2000, Karadzic continued to control the day to day operations of 
77 the SDS, creating party policy and selecting individuals to stand as candidates. 
Investigations on the ground and the Dispute over OTP Strategy 
The contrast with their predecessors at Nuremberg, where ninety percent of the evidence 
consisted of the Third Reich's governmental files, 78 could not be starker. Whilst Nazi 
archives had provided a documentary outline of the Reich's plans79, without such 
material to guide them, the Tribunal's investigations teams faced a much more 
challenging task. Furthermore, the Allied military occupation of Germany provided the 
Nuremberg prosecution team direct access to witnesses, whereas NATO forces were 
reluctant to support Tribunal investigators and in the early stages there «ere feww 'insider' 
witnesses willing to cooperate. 
74 Scc 'Lawlessness Rule Versus Rule of Law in the Balkans', United States Institute for Peace (USIP) 
Special Report 97, (2002), p. 8. 
75 See HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR, p. 344. 
76 See Amra Festic and Adrian Rausche, 'War by Other Means: How Bosnia's Clandestine Political 
Economies Obstruct Peace and State Building', Problems ofPost-Communism, May-June, 2004. p. 28. 
'' See ' War Criminals in Bosnia's Republika Srpska', ICG p. 78. Although Karadzic control over the SDS 
has lessened since 2000, the former High Representative, Paddy Ashdown's dismissal of 60 Bosnian Serb 
officials for allegedly protecting PIFWCs. including Karadzic, suggests the former Bosnian Serb leader 
retains a level of influence, see Dario Sito-Sucic. 'Bosnia Env ox sacks Bosnia Serb Officials over Hague'. 
ºº ashington Post, December 16,2004. 
78 Scc Jorg Friedrich, 'Nuremberg and the Germans' in BELINDA COOPER (ED), WEAR CRIMES. THE LFG: \C'Y 
OF NUREMBERG (TV Books) 1999, p. 91. 
79 Sc c Ruth \\'edgwood. The International Criminal Tribunal and Subpoenas for State Documents', in 
MICHAEL N. SCFINIITT R Li : st IE C. GREEN (EDS. ) THE L: \\\ OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT 
MILLENNIUM. INTERNATIONAL L: \\\`) I I1DIEti VOL. 71 (Naval War College. Newport Rhode Island) 1998. 
p. 4S3. 
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Although access to some witnesses had been secured outside the region from the various 
refugee communities spread all over the world, finding sources inside Bosnia remained a 
serious problem and placed investigators in an invidious position. As one former 
investigator noted "without local assistance you can't track down witnesses. ' Such 
"local assistance" would often turn out to be the local intelligence services. 8' In the 
initial post-Dayton years, Bosnia's various intelligence agencies remained outside any 
international reform and restructuring efforts, 82 and continued to largely comprise of 
figures appointed during the war, some of whom were implicated in crimes. 
Consequently, the Tribunal's investigators interaction with the Bosnian Muslim Agency 
for Investigation and Development (AID) and the Bosnian Croat National Security 
Service (SNS) was always a delicate affair. As one former investigator noted, although 
such local assistance may be crucial, it also "generally carries a health warning", and 
investigators had to be cautious of the domestic agendas. 83 As the prei- ious chapter 
demonstrated, both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat intelligence Services were involved 
in extensive surveillance operations against international authorities, including Tribunal 
investigators. In one such instance, part of an investigation team conducting interviews 
in the Prijedor region was monitored from the adjoining room by a Bosnian Serb unit. 84 
In an attempt to cope with the ever-increasing workload, the Sarajevo based section of 
the Tribunal was expanded from 3 to 12 persons and a Fugitive Intelligence Support 
Team was established in an attempt to coordinate fugitive tracking and intelligence 
gathering. 85 One Tribunal investigator referred to 1996 as "the year of finding crime 
80 Interview with former Tribunal Investigator. 
81 This was less common with Bosnian Serb intelligence, who even if contacted by Tribunal investigators to 
discuss alleged crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs, were reluctant to cooperate. As one former 
Tribunal investigator explained "everything is seen through the template of Karadzic and Mladic.... an} 
form of cooperation with the Tribunal was frowned upon. " - Interview with former Tribunal Investigator. 8. Sec Jerem\ King, A. Walter Dorn & Matthew Hodes, An Unprecedented experiment: Securit\ sector 
reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Saferworld (2002) 'Intelligence reform: Too tough to tackle? pp. 30- 
31. 
R; Interview with former Tribunal Investigator. 
Interview with former Tribunal Investigator. 85 Sec Report Of The International Tribunal For the Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious 
Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territor Of The Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991. A 51/292/S/1996/6( 5.16 August 1996, para 80. 
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scenes "x" which also including secondary graves, where Bosnian Serb authorities had 
attempted to conceal their crimes by digging up mass graves and reburying them in more 
remote areas. The process would make victim identification much more difficult. with 
many bodies breaking up in the process. Satellite imagery and aerial photographs were 
used in conjunction with witness statements, and in some cases massacre survivors were 
brought back to crimes scenes, 87 allowing investigators to gradually locate and pin point 
grave locations. Again, tensions existed between the investigators and IFOR during such 
work. One IFOR commander expressed frustration at what the military perceived as 
Hague operatives working on an "ad-hoc basis. ... 
They didn't know exactly \\ here they 
wanted to go, they wanted to kind of explore. They would hear a rumour and suddenly 
decide they wanted to go and check out an area. We'd explain to them.... w\e needed 24 
hours to brief our soldiers and make a reconnaissance, organize security, 
and.... coordinate with the local police authorities. "88 Such a perspective aptly illustrates 
the lack of understanding many in the military had of the dynamics of investigations. In 
the early days when intelligence material and leads were limited, exploration and 
responding to rumours could be critically important. Furthermore, given their 
involvement in war crimes, providing advance notification to local police authorities 
could actually undermine and further complicate investigations. On a more positive note, 
the Tribunal managed to negotiate a series of agreements with some States whereby 
investigators could operate within their territory to gather evidence (witness testimony 
etc) ii'ithout going through the national authorities. 89 A concerted effort was also made to 
establish a structured database in an attempt to cope with the "blizzard of information" 
that the Tribunal was now receiving. 90 
86 See HAGAN, JUS VICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 140. 
87 See H. \ i \N, JUSTICE IN THE BMRANS. P. 141. 
88 Sec quote by anonymous IFOR commander in B. -ass, STA\ ' THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, p. 
254. emphasis 
added. 
89 Off-record comment made by former judge of ICTY during presentation at Salzburg law school 
international criminal law summer course. The judge did not provide details of which states made such 
agreements, although it is reasonable to assume that it extended to certain Western European States which 
supported the Tribunal, rather than the states of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of the Federation 
authorities in Bosnian Muslim majority areas. 
90 Interview with former Tribunal Investigator. 
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Despite some progress on the ground for investigators, serious disputes had emerged 
within the OTP and the judiciary over the prosecution strategy. Some complained of a 
failure of strategic vision. 91 Dismay was expressed at Goldstone's decision to indict a 
number of middle ranking Bosnian Croats. As one investigator pointed out, "from an 
investigative point of view, you either start at the top, or at the bottom, [and] starting with 
middle ranking HVO seriously impeded the Tribunal's investigations and resources to go 
after senior HVO. "'92 Goldstone had undoubtedly played a fundamentally important role 
garnering financial and logistical support for the Tribunal in its early days and also 
conducted a tireless public relations campaign. However, he lacked a criminal law 
background, and some of judges began to express disquiet over the OTP's initial strategy. 
In a meeting between the Judges, the Prosecutor and the Chief of Investigations the latter 
revealed that a `pyramid strategy' would be pursued by the OTP. The strategy entailed 
focusing on lower-level figures and then moving up the pyramid or chain of command to 
the military commanders and political leaders. The Judges were vigorously opposed to 
this, arguing instead that the Tribunal should focus immediately on the senior figures. 93 
As one judge fumed "we are not here to judge the Tadics. ""94 Admittedly, Tadic, the 
`freelance thug' and the first indictee to be received by the Tribunal after his transfer 
from Germany, may not have been the ideal focus. However, as outlined in chapter two, 
with pressure mounting on the Tribunal to be seen to be doing something, and an absence 
of other indictees, Goldstone had little choice but to place Tadic on trial. 
Furthermore, the chapter posits that much of the criticism (which appears to emanate 
largely from international lawyers and judges) that the Tribunal wasted its time and 
resources on 'small fish', is to some extent misguided, reflecting an apparent failure to 
recognize that it is potentially critically important to focus on certain lower-level figures. 
As the International Crisis Group has consistently pointed out "small fish are the real 
91 Sec NEUFFER, TI IF KD' To MY NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE, p. 301. 
92 Interview with former Tribunal investigator. 
°; Seer Antonio Cassese, The ICTY:. A Li\ ina and Vital Reality', in The ICTY 10 Years On: The Vie\\ 
from Inside. Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2. No. 2. June 2004. p. 586. 
04 Scar HAZ: W, JU HCE INA TIME OF N VAR, p. 57 
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problem, -95 particularly where they continue to retain a pervasive influence within the 
security, political and judicial circles and act as barriers to post-conflict peacebuildin`` (as 
aptly illustrated by the activities of Simo Drljaca in chapter four. ) Additional evidence 
presented in chapter four also indicates that domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes in 
the early post-conflict stages are generally not viable. Thus, the chapter posits that the 
investigation, indictment, arrest and trial of certain 'small fish' (i. e. those actinu as 
`spoilers' undermining post-conflict peacebuilding) is as important as focusing on the so- 
called `big fish'. whom many commentators on the operation of the Tribunal appear to be 
overly fixated with. The author recognizes that the finite resources allocated to 
international criminal tribunals and courts affects indictment strategy and limits its focus. 
Nevertheless, it is critically important to consider the impact of `spoilers' on post-conflict 
peacebuilding, rather than completely focus on the accolade of trying 'those most 
responsible' i. e. senior military and political figures. 
Continued Western Reluctance 
Lack of cooperation from a number of key Western states remained a serious problem for 
the Tribunal. The organizers of a London Conference focusing on the post-Dayton 
Balkans scheduled for December 1996, failed to extend an invitation to representatives 
from The Hague. Under pressure from the German Government, the U. K. 's Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office begrudgingly relented. However, the Tribunal representative was 
merely accorded the status of "observer" and tellingly. any reference to the obligation of 
States to cooperate with the Court, was removed from the meeting's agenda. 96 Evidently, 
the Tribunal remained an awkward issue for the British. As one U. K. Foreign Office 
official who worked on Balkan issues readily acknowledged, the ICTY wasn't viewed 
as a credible institution in the early days"97, and the government reportedly rejected the 
OTP's requests for evidence gathered by its contingent of UNPROFOR. 98 Cassese met 
with several senior foreign government officials in an attempt to improve cooperation, 
95 See genera/li 'War Criminals in Bosnia's Republika Srpska: Who Are the People in Your 
Neighbourhood? ', International Crisis Group, Balkan Report No. 102, November 2.2000. 
96 Sc c H: \/AN, JVs IRA IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 93. 
97 Interview with U. K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office official. 98 See NI irko Klarin, The Tribunal's Four Battles'. Symposium. The ICTY 10 Years On: The V'ie%N from 
Inside'. Journal of Intc'rnational 
Cri minal Justice. Volume I. No. 2. June 2004. p. 549 
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but with little success. Italy, France and the L. K. were all dismissive. either making 
promises to send investigators who never arrived, or refusing to make an., commitments 
of wider support. Cassese's meetings in Russia ýý ere even worse. N\ ith the Prime 
Minister accusing the Court of being anti-Serb and a Western Tribunal. 99 
The Ongoing Struggle Over Access To Intelligence 
The Tribunal continued to be involved in a protracted battle to obtain intelligence 
material from a number of States. Some commentators have argued that the purported 
use of intelligence for war crimes prosecutions has been overplayed by journalism. 
popular fiction and Hollywood, suggesting that most intelligence reports are of little 
"probative value. 100 Whilst it may be true that intelligence may sometimes be 
inaccurately viewed as the 'magic bullet which can determine a case, its importance for 
the purposes of atrocity crimes prosecutions should not be so disparagingly dismissed. 
U. S. spy satellite imagery of the area around Srebrenica presented to the U. N. Security 
Council by Madeline Albright on August 10,1995, assisted tribunal investigators in 
locating some of the mass graves. Furthermore, the Signals intelligence (Sigint) evidence 
presented by the OTP during the Krstic case illustrates the potentially critically decisive 
impact such material may have. General Krstic was accused of genocide relating to his 
role as commander of the Bosnian Serb Drina Corps during 'Operation Krivija 95', the 
Srebrenica offensive, and was placed on trial in March 2000 An early intercept relayed 
an operator from Drina Corps saying "I can just put you through... to General Krstic. 
He's in charge of this attack. "" Although a former high-ranking U. S. intelligence official 
noted that generally, "Nobody sends detailed, lengthy orders to create massacres"'°' the 
Kr-stic case illustrates that even if crude codes are used in an attempt to mask intentions, 
intercepts of such conversations, when combined with other evidence, can provide 
valuable insights for the purposes of prosecution. In one recorded conversation, a 
subordinate officer discussed with Krstic an outstanding "3500 parcels that I ha\ e to 
distribute. " The OTP argued that "parcels" referred to Muslim men and "distribution" 
99 See HAZ: \N, 1 STICE IN A TIME OF NV AR, p. 97. 100 See CHUTER, WAR CRIMES. pp. 177-178. 
101 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the C1, ß Didn't Tell L's', Nc-iv York ReOetitw Of 
Book'. May 9.1996, p. 10. 
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referred to their impending execution. Furthermore, although individuals may usually 
refrain from discussing such issues over non-secure communications, or instead use 
codes, it is inevitable that, due to human fallibility, indiscretions will occur. 101 One 
intercept, allegedly of Krstic and a subordinate officer (Major Obrenovic) presented by 
the Prosecution late in the trial, was particularly damning: 
0: We've managed to catch a few more, either by gunpoint or in mines. 
K: Kill them all. God damm it. 
0: Everything, everything is going to plan. Yes. 
K: [not a] single one must be left alive. 
0: Everything is going to plan. Everything. 
K: Way to go Chief. The Turks [derisory reference to Bosnian Muslims] are probably 
listening to us. Let them listen. '03 
The OTP maintained at the trial that the conversation was intercepted at two Bosnian 
government listening sites, and submitted as evidence late in the trial (after Krstic's 
cross-examination) as it had only been located when the corresponding log book of the 
intercept had been happened upon in the Tribunal's archive, allowing the tapes to be 
subsequently found. 104 However, it has been recently suggested that the intercepts may 
have actually been recorded by a U. S. Sigint. unit, covertly operating on the ground 
during the war, and merely packaged as Bosnian government Armija material at U. S. 
insistence, in an attempt to cover their methods and sources. 105 Although this 
incriminating exchange was ultimately ruled inadmissible due to its late admission, the 
episode nevertheless illustrates that such intercepts may (where admissible) provide 
decisive evidence for atrocity crimes trials. Indeed, in finding the General guilty of 
102 A former intelligence officer and former Tribunal official recounted to the author a case during their 
time as an intelligence official, of a monitored telephone conversation where one of the participants used a 
crude code in reference to concealed explosives. The other participant was clearly confused by the code, 
and in exasperation the other participant openly discussed the explosives and their location. 
103 The above three Ki-stic trial intercepts are cited in See HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS. P. 164-169. 
1"Sce HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE B, \l. h; \NS. p. 171-172. 
105 See SMITH, K1LL1 R ELITE p. 204. 
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genocide and sentencing him to 46 years imprisonment, the Ki-stic judgment noted that 
evidence from intercepted communications played an important role in the verdict. lo6 
However, many of the key Western States, whose forces made up a large part of the 
NATO contingent in Bosnia, continued to refuse to hand over material. Despite 
receiving assurances, during his November 1995 meetings in Washington. that 
cooperation with the Tribunal would be enhanced, within two months Goldstone would 
again be exasperated by the delays in gaining access to classified information. ' 07 The 
U. S. remained concerned that the Tribunal lacked the proper facilities to store classified 
material, although the Tribunal actively responded by building secure premises to house 
confidential material. 108 Other specific barriers arose relating to evidence gathered by 
U. S. forces (either as part of the I/SFOR contingent, or from the small covert Special 
Operations Forces which were deployed during the war). Although U. S. military 
doctrine dictates that U. S. forces must collect evidence of suspected or known atrocity 
crimes, 109 there are invariably conflicting demands for the information, with priority 
generally being accorded to it being processed for military intelligence value. Once the 
information is processed into military channels it legally becomes the equivalent of 
intelligence and the property of the government which obtained it, 110 resulting in a 
myriad of classification procedures which made dissemination to external sources (such 
as the Tribunal) time consuming and problematic. Furthermore, U. S. domestic 
legislation further served to complicate the transfer of material. The National Security 
Revitalization Act 1995 stipulated that the transfer of U. S. intelligence to the U. N. 
required prior congressional approval. l ' Similarly, a basic provision of the National 
Security Act (2000) established that information cannot be released to any organization 
106 See HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 173. 
107 See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker. `Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us', New York Reviere of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 15. 
108 See Richard Goldstone, 'A View from the Prosecution' in The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from 
Inside, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2. No. 2. June 2004, p. 381. 
109 Sec, Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. 
Connecticut Journal of International Law. Spring, 2004, p. 255. 
110 See Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice', 
Connecticut Journal of Intonational Laii', Spring, 2004, p. 255. 
111 Sec RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON WV. ARS. THE CONS fI UTION, CONGRESS, AND THE WAR 
POWI RS (\'anderbildt Uni. Press) 2002, p. 81 
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affiliated with the United Nations" unless a presidential certification affirms procedures 
to protect U. S. sources and methods are in place. "' 12 
Beyond such logistical and legal constraints however, lay more ingrained institutional 
barriers. For many within the U. S. intelligence community (and other Western states) 
"sharing information with international human rights investigators x\ as viewed not as a 
morally urgent matter but as a potential threat to jealously guarded sources. ' 13 A former 
senior Pentagon official acknowledged that requests to disclose information were not 
generally viewed positively by many in the U. S. intelligence community noting: "If 
you're in the business of keeping secrets, your business is to keep them.... there's no 
question that the intelligence people keep too many secrets. " 114 As previously outlined in 
chapter one, a number of commentators working in Intelligence Studies have questioned 
whether disclosure would necessarily mean jeopardising either methods or sources. ' 1' 
Several former U. S. intelligence officials also confirmed that most of the visual 
information from Bosnia possessed by the DoD and CIA could have been made public 
[or at a very minimum passed onto the Tribunal] "without serious/v compromising the 
secret methods of intelligence-gathering. " 116 Even the White House spokesperson 
acknowledged that although theoretically some information could not be provided for 
national security reasons, there were "ways of repackaging the information" to avoid 
revealing sources and methods. " 117 Similarly, Wedgwood pointed out that in the U. S.. 
concerns over the handling of intelligence material during a domestic trial process were 
allayed by the Classified Information Procedures Act (1980) which introduced a series of 
safeguards relating to disclosure. Wedgwood went on to posit similar procedures could 
have been instituted at the international level. 
112 See Michael Newton, `Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice', 
Connecticut Journal of International Laxe, Spring. 2004, p. 256. 
113 Sec Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us' : Vctir York Revicli, Of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 10. 
114 Interview with former senior Pentagon official. 
1i` e. g. Cees Wiebes. 
116 Sec Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Lis', Xeit York Review Of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 15. (emphasis added) 
117 Sec SMITH, KILLER ELITE, p. 204. 
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A former senior State Department official stressed the need for perspective when 
assessing the intelligence community's reluctance to cooperate with the Tribunal: 
"Remember, our intelligence agencies were being asked to enýiaLe in a %erv 
unconventional practice.... Many line officers in the [intelligence] agencies were 
concerned about cooperating with a foreign body - which U. S. domestic laws forbid. '', 18 
However, Republican Senator Arlen Specter, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, was so concerned about the U. S. intelligence communities stonewalling of 
the Tribunal that he made a several trips to The Hague during 1996 and lobbied for 
assurances from the U. S. spy agencies to expedite the transfer of material. In a series of 
still-classified letters, to the CIA, Pentagon, and State Department, Specter called for 
enhanced U. S. cooperation with the Tribunal. ' 19 
As a former senior State Department official outlined, after painstaking negotiations 
between U. S. and Tribunal officials, "[W]e got over this problem - the psyche of non- 
cooperation, we jumped the hurdle by negotiating an agreement between the U. S. 
government and the ICTY which ironed out procedures for sharing intelligence 
information. " 20 The agreement included considerations such as whether the information 
disclosed by the U. S. was to be stored in Tribunal premises, or at another location (the 
U. S. Embassy) and who on the Tribunal staff had clearance for accessing the material 
(with the U. S. vetting the Tribunal personnel for clearance). Similar arrangements were 
made by the Tribunal with several other States and organisations, although generally, via 
less formal means than a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). '21 
In addition to the agreement between the U. S. and the Tribunal, a number of U. S. 
intelligence personnel were also seconded to The Hague in an attempt to allay DoD and 
intelligence community concerns. These officials knew how to structure requests for 
118 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
19 Sec Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, 'Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us' The V 'w I ork Review Of 
Books, May 9,1996, p. 15. 
120 Interview with former senior State Department Official involved in negotiating the agreement. 
121 Sec Nanc\ L. Paterson. 'Protecting National Security Information And Other Confidential Information'. 
in RODRIGO YEPEti-ENRIQUI Z AND Li TABASSI (EDS. ) TRE. -ATY' ENFORCEMENT AND IN I ERN \TIONAL 
COOPER: \l ION IN CRIMINAL MATTI=RS. \VI FH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CHE\IIC: AL \VEAPO\` 
CONVENTION (T. M. C. Asses Press) 2002, p 
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intelligence material from the U. S. and acted to resolve some of the problems associated 
with initial Tribunal requests. 122 A former U. S. intelligence officer and Tribunal 
investigator acknowledged that some Investigators and lawyers in the OTP `'don't know 
how to ask the right questions because they don't understand the intelligence 
community. " 123 Similarly, a former senior State Department official highlighted how, 
during the early stages of intelligence sharing, the U. S. would receive "very difficult 
requests, such as `could you please provide all intelligence on ethnic cleansing in 
Northern Bosnia between 1992 and 1994'. " Such nebulous "global requests" were 
considered a bureaucratic nightmare to respond to and practically unworkable as they 
would generally include certain material which the intelligence agencies were opposed to 
releasing. Consequently "there would always be a discussion of how to 'clean up the 
request bidding'. " However, the former official also conceded To be fair. it %%asn't that 
we were always doing a perfect job [in responding to the Tribunals requests for 
information]. Part of the challenge was getting the staff to go through the material, which 
was very labor intensive.... Delays were often based on `do \\ e divert personnel from 
other priorities? ' We only had a few Serbo-Croat speakers in the U. S. intelligence 
community, and their priority was to focus on issues concerning Force Protection... [even 
after Dayton] A great amount of intelligence resources focused on troop movements of 
Croatia and Serbia. "' 24 Competing priorities would be a constant thorn in the side of the 
Tribunal, as highlighted by Newton; `an infantry company that is guarding a mass grave 
is not patrolling and performing other duties. An unmanned Aerial Vehicle tasked to 
look for groups of civilian victims of the crimes against humanity is not seeking out 
enemy equipment or personnel. " 125 As a former senior State Department official and 
long-time supporter of the Tribunal acknowledged "I was constantly battling to divert 
these personnel to war crimes issues. "' 26 
122 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
123 See William Stuebner quote in Raymond Bonner. 'Crimes Court Not Ready to Punish Kosovo 
Violence'. New York Tieres, March 31,1999. 
'24 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
125 See Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. 
Connecticut Journal of International Law, Spring. 2004, p. 253. 
126 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
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In some instances, U. S. willingness to cooperate with the Tribunal was blocked by other 
States. In 1996 the U. S. NSA reportedly wanted to hand over to the Tribunal intercepts 
made by the U. K. s GCHQ which allegedly established a connection between Milosevic 
and Serb atrocities in Bosnia. The proposal was reportedly blocked by U. K. Foreign 
Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. '27 Whilst the secondment of U. S. intelligence personnel to 
the Tribunal may have acted to allay U. S. fears over disclosure, the prospect of foreign 
intelligence operatives working for the Court only heightened tensions of other States 
concerned over foreign `specialists' gaining access to their material. Herein lay one of 
the central dilemmas confronting the Tribunal: intelligence analysis requires specialist 
personnel to interpret it properly, the majority of whom have been trained within a 
particular State's intelligence service. Once deployed to the international court or 
tribunal, a residual concern will no doubt linger as to whether such personnel continue to 
`work' for their national intelligence service, passing on information disclosed by other 
States. 
In an attempt to assuage States concerns over such issues, the Tribunal amended its rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). Thus, a further sub-paragraph was added to Rule 66 
(`Disclosure by the Prosecutor') which stipulated: 
"Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of which may 
prejudice further on-going investigations.... or affect the security interest of any state. the 
Prosecution may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from the 
obligation to disclose. " 128 
Similarly, the following provision was added to Rule 70 (`Matters Not Subject to 
Disclosure'): 
"if the Prosecutor is in possession of information which has been provided to the 
Prosecutor on a confidential basis and which has been used solely for the purpose of 
1 27 See D. Leigh & J. Calvert, 'Rifkind put paid to war crimes inquiry', The Observer-, May 18.1997 
'2'Seee Rule 66, RPE, ICTY. 
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generating new evidence, that initial information and its origins shall not be disclosed by 
the Prosecutor without the consent of the person or entity providing the initial 
129 information. 
Rule 70 went some way to placating States' concerns over disclosure and "created a 
comfort zone that granted investigators access to materials so out of reach that their very 
existence might not otherwise have been acknowledged. " 130 However. the procedure also 
had significant drawbacks, and as Arbour notes, for some information providers Rule 70 
"became an addiction. Virtually nothing would be released except under its protection, 
with the result that the Prosecutor could never assess with any certainty the strength of 
the case for trial. Everything depended on what information would be released for trial 
purposes, if and when an arrest was effected. " 131 Consequently, Arbour became 
increasingly concerned that the systematic recourse to Rule 70 "was not in the interests of 
justice. " 132 In some instances OTP officials were at a loss as to why States had even 
bothered to use the Rule 70 provisions, given the quality and source of the information. 
One western State reportedly permitted the OTP to examine "highly classified military 
intelligence information" on the condition that no notes be taken, that no use be made of 
the documents before obtaining prior consent of the State, and that the cooperation 
extended be confidential and not subject to any public report. However examination of 
the material revealed that "the top secret dossiers were nothing but summaries of 
newspaper articles and radio broadcasts! '"' 33 
Rule 66 and Rule 70 also presented the OTP with the specific difficult dilemma of 
reconciling their substance with the conflicting requirement stipulated in Rule 68 
(Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence) to: 
129 See Rule 70, RPE, ICTY. 
130 See Louise Arbour The Crucial Years'. Symposium, The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from Inside'. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice. Volume 2, No. 2, June 2004, p. 399. 
13! See Louise Arbour `The Crucial Years', Symposium, The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from Inside', 
, lournal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 2. No. 2. June 2004, p. 399. 132 See Louise Arbour `The Crucial Years', Symposium. The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from Inside'. 
. Iournal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 2. No. 2, June 2004, p. 400. 133 Set Mohamed Othman. 'Briefing Note - ICC - OTP Questions, Expert consultation process on general 
issues relevant to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor. February 3,2003, p. 5. 
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"as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the existence of evidence known to the 
Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the 
accused or may Affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. "' 34 
In order for International Criminal Tribunals and Courts to retain credibility, the rights of 
the accused must be protected and given full meaning. Admittedly, the issue is 
particularly complicated. The insistence by certain States on using the Rule 70 disclosure 
procedure directly affected the release of certain exculpatory evidence to indictees 
defense counsel. However, given that many defendants in war crimes cases were agents 
of the state, it is virtually inconceivable that States would be willing to release sensitive 
information which could then be passed onto the defendant's State. 
Bad Neighbours: Croatian and Serbian Non-Compliance 
Unsurprisingly, Croatia and Serbia were resistant to the Tribunal's 'requests' for 
cooperation. Prior to the official signing ceremony of the Dayton Accords in Paris in mid 
December 1995, President Clinton had met with Izetbegovic. Milosevic and Tudjman at 
U. S. Ambassador Harriman's residence. Clinton urged the three Balkan Presidents to 
adhere to every aspect of Dayton and stressed the importance for the ww ork of the War 
Crimes Tribunal to go forth and be respected. " 135 Despite Clinton's message, it soon 
became clear that, like the authorities in Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna, Croatia 
and Serbia would continue their policy of obfuscation, opposition and tactical non- 
compliance. 
In Croatia, Tudjman's nationalist and authoritarian regime vigorously pursued "anti- 
ICTY policies" and designed a rhetorical strategy which sought to equate the Tribunal's 
indictments against Croatians as an attack on the dignity and legitimacy of its military 
134 Ste Rule 68, RPE, ICTY. 
135 Ste 'Memorandum of Conversation: Quadrilateral Meeting with Presidents Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. 
Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnian-Herzegovina, and Slobodan Milosei is of Serbia. December 14.1995, ' \SC 
in `The Road to Dayton' U. S. Department of State. Epilogue, p. 25S. 
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offensives in 1995, the so-called Homeland War (domovinski rat). 136 Additionally, the 
Tudjman regime sought to undermine the Tribunal's investigations into crimes 
committed by Bosnian Croats in Bosnia, due to concerns that its extensive involvement in 
Bosnia would emerge. 
Tudjman's response to the indictment of General Blaskic was indicative of the challenge 
the Tribunal would face in gaining cooperation. Rather than arresting the General, the 
Croatian President merely shuffled him from head of the Bosnian Croat army (HVO) to 
Inspector of the Army, which was subsequently reported as a promotion. '37 Others 
disagreed with this media characterization, with David Galbraith, (then) U. S. 
Ambassador to Croatia remarking "Since when is being the commander of your own 
army a less important job than inspector of the army? " 138 Regardless of whether the 
move constituted a promotion or demotion, the response clearly contravened the duty to 
cooperate as articulated in Article 29 of the Tribunal's statute. Attempts by 'pro- 
prosecution' elements within the U. S. administration to induce compliance were initially 
rebuffed by Tudjman's bluster that he couldn't promise to cooperate ww ith the Tribunal 
unless Serbia acted accordingly. 139 
In the face of increased U. S. pressure, The Croatian President changed tactics claiming he 
had no knowledge of the whereabouts of Kordic or any other of the indictees. After 
threats that the U. S. would veto a substantial IMF loan, Tudjinan backed down and ten 
Bosnian Croats were transferred to The Hague from Croatia. The transfers were referred 
to as 'Voluntary surrenders' meaning Croatia set no extradition precedent, which served 
to somewhat placate a public largely hostile towards the Tribunal. In giving a defiant 
press conference at Zagreb airport, Dario Kordic was assisted by Tudjman's personal 
interpreter, indicating the extent of their relationship. 140 
136 See Victor Peskin and Nlieczv slaw P. Boduszynski, 'Croatia's Moment of Truth: The Domestic Politics 
of State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'. Berkeley 
Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, January 2003, p. 3-4. 
1" Set, 'Justice Collides with Peace: Bosnia'. Economist. November 18,1995. 
118 Sec David Galbraith quote in B: ýss, STAY THE HAND OF VENGIF \NCE, p. 244 
139 Ste NIADELINE ALBRIGHT. N1: \DAM1 SECRETARY (Miramax) 2003, p. 267. 
140 Sec Hot. BRoOKF. o END A \V: vR. p. 351 
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In January 1997, with a team of Tribunal investigators working in-country, members of 
Croatian intelligence (then headed by Tudjman's son) reportedly exhumed a series of 
bodies (allegedly the victims of a massacre in 1991 committed by Croatian forces in the 
village of Paulin Dvor) in an attempt to evade detection. 14 1 Tudjman was particularly 
assiduous in his obstruction of investigators efforts to uncover evidence relating to 
Operations Flash and Storm, and persistently refused to recognize the Tribunal's right to 
investigate war crimes linked to the offensives. 142 Between 1997 and 2000, Croatian 
intelligence authorized two operations: Operation Hague and Operation Truth, designed 
to protect four members of the military police and intelligence services from investigation 
and their possible transfer to The Hague. 143 The details were revealed by Anto Nobilo, a 
Croatian defence lawyer who defended a number of indictees. Nobilo recounted, "The 
secret services gave them new names, houses, and cars, and new names for their family 
members"144 and went onto to suggest the motive for the operation was to cover up the 
extent of the Croatian state's involvement in war crimes in Bosnia. Similarly to the 
situation in Republika Srpska, addressing the issue of war crimes and actively 
cooperating with the Tribunal could prove fatal to Croatian citizens. In August 2000, 
Milan Levar who had been interviewed by investigators relating to the killing of forty 
Serb civilians by Croatian forces in the town of Gospic in 1991 was assassinated when a 
bomb exploded at his house. '45 The earlier publication of an account by a former 
Croatian Ministry of Interior soldier of his unit's involvement in the murder and rape of 
Serb civilians and the torture and execution of Serb prisoners, led to death threats being 
issued against the newspaper's editors. 146 
"' See Drago Hedl. 'Croatian Massacre Inquiry Fears', Tribunal Update, No. 283, Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, August 26-31,2002 
14. Scc Victor Peskin and Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, 'Croatia's Moment of Truth: The Domestic Politics 
of State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', Berkeley 
Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. January 2003. p. 16. 
143 The four men were Pasko Ljubicic, Vlado Cosic, Ante Sliskovic and Tomislav Vlajic 
'44 Sc. ' Anto Nobilo quote in Nicholas Wood. 'Croatian turnaround led to general's arrest'. International 
Herald Tribune, December 27,2005. 
145 See 'Potential Witness Dies in Croatia - Explosive device kills Milan Le\ ar outside his 
home'. Tribunal 
Update, No. 188, Institute for \V'ar and Peace Reporting, August 28-September 2,2000, 'Croatia Struggles 
to Protect \\Witnesses', Tribunal Update. No. 361. Institute for War . -bnd 
Peace Reporting. June 4.2004. 
146 Sec, 'Ho\\ \\ e Killed for Croatia'. Transitions, November 1997, p. 22. 
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Showdown Over Intelligence Material: The Blaskic Case 
Croatia's most dramatic confrontation with the Tribunal related to its refusal to hand o% er 
documents which the Prosecutor requested relating to crimes committed at Ahmici, 
Bosnia. The refusal was predicated on the grounds that the disclosure of the documents 
would be prejudicial to Croatia's national security. The Blaskic Subpoena case brought 
to the fore a key dilemma which lies at the heart of the workings of international criminal 
justice mechanisms. Arbour saw the issues surrounding the case as "critical.... to the very 
conception of our mandate and to our ability to discharge it in a fair and timely 
fashion. "147 
Blaskic had been charged with crimes against humanity and grave breaches and 
violations of the laws of war arising out of the principle of command responsibility. In 
order to prove grave breaches had been committed, the Prosecution had to establish that 
the crimes had been committed in the context of an international armed conflict, and thus 
needed to prove direct military involvement of Croatian forces alongside the HVO forces 
in Bosnia. During 1995 and 1996, the Prosecution made a series formal `requests for 
assistance', in an attempt to obtain relevant documents. Croatia largely failed to comply 
and consequently, on January 15,1997, at the request of the OTP, the lead Judge in the 
Blaskic case, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, issued a subpoena educes tecum to the Republic 
of Croatia, the Croatian Defence Minister Gujko Susak, the Federation of Bosnia 
Herzegovina and the defense authorities of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. 
The subpoena included requests for Blaskic's notes which had been transferred to the 
Croatian Ministry of Defence (Ministarstvo Obrane) and the defense authorities of 
Herceg-Bosna, communications between the Croatian MoD and other officials of 
Herceg-Bosna and records on Croatia's contribution of weapons, supplies and military 
units to the Bosnian conflict. 148 The acquisition of many of the subpoenaed records were 
147 Scc Louise Arbour The Crucial Years', Symposium, The ICTY 10 Years On: The Vieýý from Inside. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice. Volume 2, No. 2. June 2004, p. 400. 
148 See Ruth \\'edg, Nvood. The International Criminal Tribunal and Subpoenas for State Documents-, 
in 
MICII, \FL N. S('HI\1I I I, & LI s[ it C. GREEN (EDS. ) THE LA1\' OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO TI I- NEXT 
MILLENNIUM. IN1 [RNATION. -L L-\W STUDIES VOLUME 71 (Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island) 
1998, p. 485. 
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viewed by the OTP as central to its strategy of establishing proof of command 
responsibility in the case. 
In response to the Subpoena, the Bosnian Federation authorities in Sarajevo indicated 
their willingness to cooperate. However, in reality, this cooperation could only be limited 
given their restricted access to most of the material and their lack of control over the 
Herceg-Bosna authorities which had acted to spirit many documents out of the country 
into the custody of the Croatian MoD. Croatia immediately contested the subpoena, 
arguing it had no legal grounds as a form of communication between the Tribunal and 
sovereign States and their government officials. " 149 Furthermore, it argued that even if 
the Tribunal possessed such powers, a State still had the right to limit its compliance in 
order to protect its national security interests. 150 Croatia maintained that the Tribunal did 
not have the power to judge or determine its national security claims, and relying on the 
Corfu Channel case contended that "[t]he determination of the national security needs of 
each State is a fundamental attribute of its sovereignty. " 51 
In contrast, the OTP averred that the Croatian position would "prevent the Tribunal from 
fulfilling its Security Council mandate to effectively prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and thus, defeat its essential object 
and purpose. " Furthermore, it was not only the OTP which had an interest in obtaining 
the documents. As Blaskic's lawyer highlighted, "[I]f the court can't request records, 
then I can't defend my client. " 152 In an attempt to persuade the Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor highlighted that the notion of an international tribunal ordering a state to 
produce documentary evidence was not without precedent. In 1988 in the l'elasque: 
Rodriguez Case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of 
149 See Brief of the Republic of Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, T. Ch. II. Case 
No. IT-95-14-PT, (ICTY 1, April, 1997) 
150 See Brief of the Republic of Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, T. Ch. II. Case 
No. IT-95-14-PT, April 1,1997) 
M See Brief of the Republic of Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blaskic. T. Ch. II. Case 
No. IT-95-14-PT. April, 1 1997 (emphasis added. ) 
15 see Blaskic's defence la\v v er quote in Robert Niarquand. 'Bosnia Trial Shows Court's Rising Clout'. 
Christian Science Monitor, October 1,1997. 
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Honduras to produce documents relating to the organization and structure of the 
country's armed forces. 153 
The Trial Chamber ruled that the Tribunal did have the power to issue subpoenas against 
States and named government officials. It also recognised that many of the crimes the 
Tribunal was investigating involved military operations, holding that military records 
"may constitute vital evidence. " 154 Consequently, it was ruled that the Tribunal must 
have "the inherent power to compel the production of documents necessary for a proper 
execution of its judicial function. "'lss As Sluiter highlights, although customary 
international law largely protects the national security of States by preventing other States 
from intruding into the realm of domestic jurisdiction, Article 2 (7) of the U. N. Charter, 
"provides for a significant exception to the impenetrability of the realm of domestic 
jurisdiction in respect of Chapter VII enforcement measures. " 156 With the Tribunal being 
established under Chapter VII of the Charter, it thus possessed (in the legal sense at least) 
the power to penetrate that realm. The Trial chamber concluded that "[A] State invoking 
a claim of national security as a basis for non-production of evidence requested by the 
International Tribunal, may not be exonerated from its obligation by a blanket assertion 
that its security is at stake. Thus, the State has the onus to prove its objection. "157 
The Croatian govermnent appealed against the decision, which also attracted amicus 
curiae briefs from several governments, clearly indicating the international importance 
attached to the issue. On October 29,1997, the Appeal Chamber delivered its decision 
and retreated from the Trial Chamber's earlier decision, holding that the Tribunal could 
only issue binding orders or requests (as opposed to subpoenas which, if not acted upon, 
may be sanctioned as a contempt of court). It also held that such binding orders or 
'53 See Judgment 1'clasque: Rodriguez Case, July 29,1988, Inter-Am. Ct HR (Ser. Q. No. 4 (1989) 
1-54 See Decision on the Objections of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae Ducc's Tecum, 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Trial Chamber II, July 18,1997, para. 34. emphasis added 
[hereinafter Blaskic Subpoena Trial Chamber Decision] 
Sec Blaskic Subpoena Trial Chamber Decision 
156 Sec ANDRI KLIP AND GORAN SLUITER, ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: Ti ii- INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER Yi'GOSLAVIA: 
(Intersentia Publishers) 1999, p. 272. 
157 Sec, Blaskic Subpoena Trial Chamber Decision, para. 147. 
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requests could not be addressed to named government officials, but only to States. 
Critically, however, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the earlier Trial Chamber's 
decision, dismissing Croatia's contention that an absolute national security privile-ge 
should be recognised, holding that: to allow national security considerations to prevent 
the International Tribunal from obtaining documents that might prove of decisive 
importance to the conduct of trials would be tantamount to undermining the Tv/-V e sc'lrce 
of the International Tribunal 's function. " 158 However. the Appeals Chamber was not 
unmindful of legitimate State concerns relating to national security, suggesting that a 
single Judge presiding over in camera, exparte proceeding, could scrutinize the disputed 
documents to assess the claim as to whether their disclosure would be prejudicial to 
national security. If it was consequently determined to be prejudicial to national security. 
the redaction of parts of a document could also be permitted before their use at trial. 
A Pyrrhic Victory? 
Ultimately however, the rulings would largely be a pyrrhic victory for the OTP. Despite 
both the Trial and Appeals Chamber affirming the principle that a State should not be 
able to rely on the blanket exemption of documents on the grounds of national security. 
both rulings were emphatic in their judgment that the Tribunal did not have the power to 
enforce compliance. Instead, when a State failed to comply with its obligations under the 
Statute, the Prosecutor could merely inform the Tribunal's President that the State as in 
non-compliance. The President would then report the non-compliance to the Security 
Council. Harmon and Gaynor caustically highlight the limited effectiveness of the 
procedure, noting. The remedy of reporting state non-cooperation to the Security 
Council is hardly a remedy at all. -159 Indeed, as Tavernier points out, despite numerous 
reports of non compliance, the Security Council "has never gone further than a simple 
reminder to States of their obligations by means of new resolutions or declarations by the 
158 Sec Appeals Chamber Transcript in ANDRE KLIP AND GOR. AN SLUITER, ANNOTATED Ll: MANG CA' 1' 01 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL ti: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI\: 1L TRIBUNAL FORTHI FORMER 
YIJGOSL-1\'1,1: V. I (Intersentia Publishers) 1999, p. 151 (emphasis added). 
l'9Sce Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor. 'Prosecuting Massie Crimes \ýith Primitive Tools: Three 
Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings'. Journal 0/International 
Criminal Justicc. Vol. 2.. No. 2., June 2004, p. 420. 
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President. -' 60 Despite the Blaskic case subpoena rulings, Croatia continued to \vithhold 
disclosure of the requested documents. The Security Council's failure to act on the 
Tribunal's declarations of non-compliance (by e. g. imposing sanctions) merel\ 
emboldened both Croatia and Serbia to continue to flout their obligations. On %larch 3, 
2000, General Blaskic, was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to fort\ five years 
imprisonment, the stiffest sentence ever handed down by the Tribunal. 
However, the Trial and Appeals Chamber's observations relating to potential 
implications of a State's non-disclosure of documents on the grounds of national security 
would prove prophetic. Following Tudjman's death in 1999, the new reformist 
government ordered open the files of the Croatian intelligence agency in 2000, allowing 
access to both the Tribunal and Blaskic's defence team to important material, some of 
which provided the grounds for an appeal against the General's conviction. Critically, a 
number of the documents implicated other political leaders with direct links to the 
Tudjman regime who ran a parallel chain of command which used military police units to 
terrorize and kill civilians as part of their ethnic cleansing campaign. 16' In light of the 
new evidence, the Appeal Chamber rejected much of the lower court's conclusions, 
including the ruling that Blaskic was guilty of crimes against humanity under the 
principle of command responsibility relating to the atrocities committed at Ahmici. 
Blaskic's sentenced was slashed to nine years, and due to time already served, the former 
General was immediately released. The case provides a sobering example of the very 
real potential that States may attempt to mask or obfuscate their culpability in the 
commission of atrocity crimes by withholding crucial evidence on the grounds of national 
security. 
The Tribunal also had a difficult relationship with Serbia's ruling authorities. \vho ý\ere 
in many respects even less cooperative than Croatia, and refused to transfer any indictees 
to The Hague. Ratko Mladic and Veselin Sljivancanin turned up at Djukic's funeral in 
160 See Paul Tavernier, The Experiences of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda'. International Rei'h'e of the Red Cross, No. 321.1997. 
161 See \larlise Simons, 'Hague War Crimes Tribunal Frees a Corn icted General*. New York Times. Jul% 
30,2004 
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Belgrade in mid 1996, in full glare of the media, and a number of other indictees 
continued to remain in their official positions. The OTP faced protracted delays in the 
opening of a liaison office in Belgrade and the authorities even failed to take the most 
elementary step of implementing legislation enabling it to cooperate with the Tribunal, a 
clear signal of their intentions. When the U. S. pressed Milosevic to arrest and transfer 
three PIFWCs whom they believed were still serving in the Yugoslav army, the Serbian 
President deflected the request, suggesting instead that he would study the indictments 
and if the evidence was strong, prosecute them in the domestic courts. Milosevic was 
adamant that he would not authorize the men's extradition. 162 
A New Prosecutor: Enter Arbour 
In October 1996, Justice Goldstone departed the Tribunal and returned to South Africa to 
take up his position on the Supreme Court. He had played a critical role in the Tribunal's 
difficult early life, keeping the issue of war crimes on the agenda during the Dayton 
negotiations, tirelessly promoting the court's message and ensuring that crucial funding 
was obtained. However, the empty cells at the U. N. Detention Centre in Scheveningen 
could only be a source of deep frustration for the Tribunal's first Prosecutor. Out of the 
seventy four indictments issued, only seven were in Tribunal custody, none of whom had 
been arrested by international forces. Serbia and the authorities in Republika Srpska 
were effectively ignoring the Tribunal's indictments and the situation vas little better in 
Croatia or Herceg-Bosna. IFOR and their political masters continued to be resolutely 
opposed to carrying out arrests. Prospects remained bleak for the Tribunal. 
The appointment of Louise Arbour in place of Goldstone came at a time the Tribunal was 
at a critical juncture. Arbour, a Canadian jurist who had made a name for herself in the 
human rights community leading an inquiry into prison riots in Canada, arrived in The 
Hague to find morale amongst staff low, and discussions had started over whether to 
launch trials in absentia. The new Prosecutor was stridently against the proposal 
stressing "if that [decision had] passed, I would have left. I didn't go there for theater 
162 Sec, NI RDELINE ALBRIGHT, M: ADANI SECRETARY (Miramax) 2003 p. 268. 
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purposes. -163 Rather than dwell on its apparent impotence, she viewed the Court as a 
powerful legal entity. Endowed with Chapter VII authority. Arbour felt the Tribunal 
"should behave as such ... we 
had to assert ourselves as strong legal (hence moral) 
actors.. .1 
believe, we were strong. not weak. " 164 One of her first missions was a visit to 
the exhumation of the mass grave site at Ovcara which had been mapped out by the 
Commission and Physicians for Human Rights. During the day she met With Jaques 
Klein, the Head of the U. N. in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES ). 165 Klein was a strong 
supporter of the Tribunal, and in contrast to the experiences of the Commission faced 
from the U. N. personnel on the ground back in 1993, was keen to support and assist in 
the exhumation. Critically, Klein also informed the new Prosecutor that he was willing to 
arrest any PIFWCs found inside UNTAES administered territory. 166 
Sealed Indictments: Levelling the Playing field 
In contrast to her Predecessor's formidable public relations efforts, Arbour decided to 
cool the Tribunal's relationship with the media and the various NGOs. Her strate`g\ to 
break the deadlock over arrests required a level of secrecy and a more low -key approach. 
The previous policy of publicly issuing indictments had proved to be both impracticable 
and unworkable. Based on the (perhaps naive) assumption that the ICTY would be 
dealing with cooperating states, 167 in reality, this assumption had proved misguided. The 
domestic authorities were generally reluctant to act on them and indictees were merely 
given advance notice and a head start in avoiding arrest. 168 Consequently, Arbour 
decided to embark on a new strategy of issuing sealed indictments. The prospect of not 
disclosing the name of the accused caused consternation amongst certain members of the 
judiciary, who saw it as violating the rights of defendants. The OTP responded that it 
1 63 See Louise Arbour quote in HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, pp. 99-100. 
"" See Louise Arbour The Crucial Years', Symposium, The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from Inside'. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 2, No. 2, June 2004, p. 397. 
10 UNTAES was established on January 15,1996 by Security Council Resolution 1037 (1996). It acted as 
a transitional authority for Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium and was supported by some 
5,000 UN peacekeeping troops. Its mandate expired January 15,1998. 
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167 Sec 'Workshop 1: The need for an international arresting team, UN-or not UN led? ', in `': \ti DIJK & 
HoVENS. ARRES FING WAR CRIMM INALS, p. 39-40 
168 See Gavin F. Ruxton. 'Present and future record of arresting ww ar criminals, The v ie\\ of the Public 
Prosecutor of ICTY'. in \': \N DLIK & Ho\, E Ns, ARRESTING WAR CR1Mr \t-s. P. -0 
205 
was the only way to respond positively to the climate non-compliance. and after direct 
lobbying by Arbour, the judges warily agreed. 169 In addition to giving the OTP the 
element of surprise, sealed indictments were also viewed as a strategic device to break 
the dead-lock over international forces' refusal to make arrests. Arbour was scathin<, 
over the inaction, acerbically recounting, The politicians said that the military, did not 
want to proceed with arrests, because it was too dangerous... The military said that they 
were obeying orders and that the political leadership did not give instructions to do 
anything. When countries were criticized for their passivity, they hid 
behind.... SACEUR. Everyone was passing the buck. "170 When informed of the new 
strategy of sealed indictments, many of the NATO governments were opposed, "The\ did 
not want secret indictment, because they realized that this was pushing them to act. ", 71 
However, Arbour was unmoved, letting the politicians and military know that their 
refusal to cooperate would have consequences, "if something doesn't start to happen at 
some point we will unseal these indictments and reveal [that] you're not meeting the 
responsibility of arrests. " 172 
The first sealed indictment was issued against Slavko Dokmanovvic, the former Serb 
Mayor of Vukovar who was linked to alleged crimes committed at the Ovcara massacre 
site. Dokinanovic had allegedly beaten some of the Croatian POWs and was present 
during the executions. After the war he had moved across the border into Serbia to 
Sombor, and Tribunal investigators were tasked with the challenge of luring him back 
into UNTAES administrated territory in order to affect the arrest. Klein was keen to 
support and assisted in planning an operation with Polish Special Forces troops who were 
assigned a key role and began numerous rehearsals. ' 73 Investigators made contact with 
the former Mayor after he had approached the OTP to discuss crimes committed against 
Serbs by Croats in Vukovar. Although willing to talk, Dokmanovic was initially 
reluctant to enter into Croatia. After several months, a British Tribunal investigator re- 
169 Scc HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 95-96. 
170 Set, Louise Arbour quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 94 
171 Sec Louise Arbour quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF W. AR, p. 96. 
172 Sec Louise Arbour quote in HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS. p. 104. 
173 Sec, Jaques Klein interview 
, 
PBS, available at 
http: / www. pbs. or- wgbh'pages frontline! shows/karadzic/interviews klein. html 
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established contact and the former Mayor indicated his desire to meet Klein to discuss 
compensation for his property. The meeting provided the opportunity the investigation 
team had been waiting for. On June 27,1997, Dokmanovic was picked up on a bridge at 
the border by two Polish Special Forces soldiers in a vehicle, and ostensibly, driven to the 
Klein meeting. On arrival at the base he was quickly disarmed, handcuffed and hooded 
whilst Tribunal officials read him his rights. Klein had organized a Belgian Air Force 
plane under his authority to deliver the indictee to The Hague. 174 Contrary to the 
apocalyptic claims by NATO forces that arresting PIFWCs would shatter the fragile 
peace, there was no violent reaction from the local population. As one legal advisor to 
the OTP recalled, "We'd been fed all these arguments, if you do this. there N\111 be 
sniping, the war will break out, massive disruptions and problems. and it didn't 
happen. "175 Dokmanovic challenged the legality of his arrest arguing it violated the 
Sovereignty of the FRY. However, the Trial Chamber ruled the means to arrest 
Dokmanovic "neither violated principles of international law nor the sovereignty of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "176 
Albright, Cook and Clark: Critical Support 
After securing a second term of office in early November 1996, President Clinton 
unveiled a new foreign policy team, appointing Madeline Albright as the new Secretary 
of State. Albright had been a keen supporter of the Tribunal during her tenure as U. S. 
ambassador to the U. N., and sought to continue this stance in her powerful new position. 
In her first major foreign policy address at Harvard University, Albright emphasized the 
moral basis of American global leadership, devoting nearly half the speech to the 
importance of the ad hoc tribunals and called on PIFWCs to be arrested in Bosnia. She 
174 See HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 103. For more details of the arrest mission set, HAGAN. 
JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, pp 101-104. A more recent discussion of the role Polish Special Forces played 
in the operation alleges that several of Dokmanovic's bodyguards were killed see CHRISTIAN JENNINGS, 
MIDNIGHT IN SoNii BURNING TO\V'N. BRITISH SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS FROM BELGRADE TO 
BAGHDAD (Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 2004, p. 212. However, most other sources confirm the account in 
HAGAN. Although details of the operation were kept deliberately to a minimum (Hagan notes that 
personnel from the U. S. State Department and U. S. intelligence were also involved). However, it seems 
likely that more details would have emerged from Dokmano\ ic's associates if the alleged killings had 
occurred. 
1" See legal advisor OTP, anonymous quote in HAGAN, JUSTICE IN TILE BALKANS. P. 104. 176 Set, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanov ic, IT-95-13a. October 22. 
1997, at 88. 
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was also the driving force behind the establishment of the ne« ambassador-at-large for 
war crimes issues post in the State Department. David Scheffer, a tireless advocate of the 
Tribunal who worked for Albright at the U. N. took up the post and recalled it was 
Albright's lobbying which ensured the positions creation, it «ould not have happened 
had she not been Secretary of State. '"177 With Clinton's re-election, the "Maximalists"" 
within the State Department sought to steer the Administration towards endorsing a more 
expansive role in Bosnia. Although the requirements of the military Annexes of Dayton 
(separation of forces, cantonment of weapons etc) had been successfully met with fe« 
problems, implementation of the civilian side of the Agreement had lagged, running into 
sustained difficulties. Little had occurred in the way of refugee return and the 
nationalists had consolidated their powerbases in the September 1996 elections. The 
"Maximalists" argued that progress could only be achieved if NATO assumed a more 
robust and interventionist stance, including arresting PIFWCs. 
The White House however, initially failed to support the suggested policy change. As 
Holbrooke recounts, "by April [1997] there was a general impression that "Clinton 11" 
was downgrading Bosnia. " 178 Although the Administration had abandoned its initial one 
year deadline for the withdrawal of U. S. troops, in November 1996, it merely replaced it 
with another. The President pledged that IFOR's successor. SFOR, would complete its 
mission by June 1998. Similarly, Clinton's new Secretary of Defense, the Republican 
Senator, William Cohen stated in early January that the U. S. troop presence in Bosnia 
would be withdrawn by June 1998.179 With SFOR engaging in what Albright referred to 
as "reverse mission creep, taking no risks and doing little to help achieve civilian-related 
goals, "180 and Clinton and Cohen apparently committed to withdrawing U. S. forces by 
mid-98, the anti-Dayton forces were emboldened, viewing the growing unease in 
Washington as an indication that they could merely sit out the apparently fleeting 
international military presence. 
177 Interview with David Scheffer. 178 See HOL. BROOKE, To END A WEAR, p. 346. 
119 sec JOST, NATO TRANSFORMED, p. 218. 
180 Sec M1ADELINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY (Miramax) 2003 p. 265. 
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However, the ' Maximalists' and the Tribunal gained further important supporters with 
the election of a Labour Government in Britain in May 1997. Under Prime \linister 
Tony Blair, the new Government set out to be more internationalist than its Conservati', c 
predecessors. 
181 The New Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, was determined to transform 
the U. K. 's foreign policy into a more principled one which would "restore Britain's pride 
and influence as a leading force for good in the world .... not 
least by making the 
protection and promotion of human rights a central part "182 Cook focused on three 
specific areas regarding the U. K. 's Bosnia policy which he regarded the previous 
Conservative government as being weak on; a more principled approach to distribution of 
humanitarian aid; the engagement of moderate political forces in an attempt to weaken 
the nationalist elements, and; enhanced support and cooperation with the ICTY. 183 
Critically, and reversing the earlier U. K. policy, Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers wert 
made available for PIFWC apprehension missions. 184 With the U. K. now pushing for 
movement on arrests an agreement was made between France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the U. K. and the U. S. to provide their Special Operations Forces (SOF) to acti\ elv pursue 
and apprehend PIFWCs. 185 
In addition to Albright and Cook's activism, the appointment of Wesley Clark as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) provided the necessary senior military' 
support for a more robust approach. As Scheffer noted, "during the first term of 
Clinton's Presidency Wes was part of the Pentagon staff and on Pentagon message'. but 
once he got SACEUR he became a tremendous ally on war crimes issues. "186 (Then) 
Under-Secretary of Defence, Walter Slocombe. acknowledged "there's no question that 
Clark was much more sympathetic to a more aggressive stance for such operations. " 
Slocombe did however, emphasize that his predecessor Joulwan "had set the ground. He 
181 See DAVID COATES AND JOEL KRIEGER, BLAIR'S WAR (Polity Press) 2004, p. 11 
182 See Labour Party, General Election Manifesto, New Labour, Because Britain Deserves Better. 1997, 
pp. 37-39. The vision was endorsed in the July, 1998 Strategic Defence Review, which again called for 
Britain's military forces to be a `force for good' see Strategic Defence Review. Modern Forces for the 
\1odern \1 orld', JuR 1998. 
183 Scc Jane Sharp, `Prospects for Peace in Bosnia: The Role of Britain', Chaillot Paper 32, May 1998. 
'X4 See Sn1ITH, KILL FR ELITE, p. 197. 
185 See SMITH, KILLER ELITE, p. 197. 
196 Interview with David Scheffer. 
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[Clark] was operating in an environment allowing for this [position]. -'87 Clark 
recognized that unless PIFWCs were arrested, the successful implementation of the DPA 
could be imperilled or seriously dragged out, resulting in large numbers of NATO troops 
remaining bogged down in a costly mission. ' 88 In fact, with increasing support for the 
"Maximalist" position growing, a belated acknowledgment that PIFWCs ww ere an 
obstacle to real progress began to emerge. As David Scheffer's military, advisor 
conceded "After almost two years of criticism from human rights groups and the glare of 
the international media, NATO accepted that the low prioritization of military support to 
justice efforts hampered overall efforts to achieve the purposes prescribed in. 4nnc. v- JA 
[of the DPA]. "189 
The success of the Dokmanovic arrest operation in Western Slavonia in June increased 
the pressure on NATO to act. As one of the Tribunal staffers involved in the operation 
noted, the credibility of NATO's excuses could now be directly challenged, 'Look this 
can be done, they just did it in Vukovar and this wasn't a well armed UN force up there. 
You've got all the might of NATO behind you, certainly you can do the same in 
Bosnia. "190 The OTP issued its next sealed indictment against Simo Drljaca for 
`complicity in genocide' relating to crimes committed in Omarska detention camp. 
Aware that SFOR had been in contact with Prijedor's former police chief, Blewitt pushed 
for action; "[we] said, well, we know you were encountering this guy. and you can set up 
the encounter in a way that's not going to cause any loss of life. You're in the driving 
seat. The guy doesn't know he's indicted. "191 The request was initially resisted and there 
was pressure for the OTP to "back off. '"192 Undeterred, Arbour laid down the gauntlet, 
informing NATO authorities "when it becomes apparent to me that there is no real 
187 Interview with Walter Slocombe. 
188 Sec, Chuck Sudetic. Reluctant Gendarme. Why is France protecting indicted war criminals in the sector 
of Bosnia it controls? ' Atlantic Monthly, April 2000. 
189 See Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice. 
Connecticut Journal of International Law, Spring, 2004, p. 240, (emphasis added. ) 
90 See Tribunal staffer quote in HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKAN" p. 105. 
191 See Graham Blewitt quote in BASS. STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE. p. 266. 
192 See Graham Blewitt quote in BASS. STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE. P. 266. 
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intention to apprehend anybody and that your mandate is just a fraud, then I willex1io, 
lt. 
193 
Fortunately, Prijedor lay in the British sector of SFOR operations. Operation Tango 
aimed to arrest two indictees: Drijaca and Milan Kovacevic, the Director of Prijedor's 
hospital and former `Mayor' during the Bosnian Serb takeover of the town, who was also 
placed under sealed indictment for `complicity in genocide' in running Omarska. Cox en 
surveillance of the men was conducted by members of Britain's 14 Intelligence Corps (14 
Int. ) and members of America's `The Activity' 194 and intelligence revealed that Drljaca 
regularly went fishing with friends at a lake near Gradine. The active involvement of 
intelligence services in atrocity crimes investigations (CIA and NSA personnel also 
contributed to later operations) represented a significant shift in policy from their earlier 
reluctance to cooperate with the Tribunal. The mission was finally approved during a 
private meeting with Blair and Clinton during the NATO summit in Madrid and two SAS 
teams who had conducted training exercises in the U. K. were flown into Bosnia. On the 
morning of July 10,1997, after determining that the police escort which sometimes 
accompanied Drljaca was not present, a U. S. Black Hawk helicopter flew one of the SAS 
teams to the lake. Drljaca resisted arrest, shooting one of the soldiers in the leg and was 
subsequently fatally shot in the exchange. 195 In Prijedor the second SAS team entered the 
hospital by an elaborate ruse196 and retaining the element of surprise quickly arrested 
Kovacevic, moving him to the U. S. military base in Tuzla. There, U. S. Judge Advocate 
General's (JAG) supervised him being read his rights, took witness statements from the 
troops and turned him over to ICTY representatives who flew him to The Hague. 
197 
191 
See Louise Arbour quote in HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS p. 108. 
IQa Sc'c SMITH. KILLER ELITE, p. 200. For further details of the U. S. Intelligence Support Activity see 
general/' SMITH, KILLER ELITE. 
195 See '. A War Criminal is shot', A mv York Times, July 13,1997. 
196 Disapproval was expressed by some U. N. and ICRC officials working in Bosnia (over the SAS 
reportedly posing as ICRC officials) who argued the practice could undermine the neutrality and reputation 
of the Red Cross. 
197 See Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998, p. 126 
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The Impact of the Arrests 
The arrests led to a series of Bosnian Serb small arms and grenade attacks on se\ eral 
isolated SFOR outposts (mostly Civil Affairs and Intelligence detachments) 198 Civilian 
members of the various international organizations were threatened and an unoccupied 
U. N. car was burned. Milosevic also issued a series of ominous threats during a meeting 
with Clark suggesting future operations should not be countenanced. 199 Ho\v e\ er. ATO 
stood firm and Clinton was prepared to respond to any reprisals with a massive show- of 
force, (the option of launching retaliatory strikes, including the use of air power against 
Bosnian Serb targets was discussed. ) Ultimately, it was decided not to respond, "After 
all, the Serb response had carefully avoided serious harm to any members of the 
international community. "200 Like so much of the Bosnian's Serbs actions over the past 
five years, it was mostly bluster, which rapidly faded in the face of a determined 
opponent. As Wheeler had suggested, the reaction was merely a "containable disorder, "; 
one U. N. CIVPOL vehicle was damaged and several small improvised, explosive devices 
(IEDs) were detonated, in a response which Clark viewed as designed not to cause 
casualties. 
Furthermore, rather than the oft stated apocalyptic scenarios (hostage taking, anass 
reprisals, a break down of the nascent peace) occurring, the removal of PIFWCs had a 
dramatically positive impact in the area. Other indictees who had been living openly 
with little concern now went underground. As one OSCE official working in Prijedor 
recounted, the [ 19]97 arrests was a key moment .... [PIFWC 
Milomir] Stakic fled. The 
[subsequent] municipal elections allowed the vacuum to be filled with a strong 
component of Bosniaks.... Every two or three months there were arrests [hý the SAS] and 
no adverse public reaction. Once the top guys were removed, this allowed for returns. 
After the critical mass of returnees occurs, it has a significant effect . 
-2111 Similarly in 
January 1998, the ICG credited the SAS arrests operations with transforming the political 
198 Scc Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998. p. 126. 199 Ste CLARK, \\ AGING MODERN W'E'AR, p. 82. 
200 Sec CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR, p. 83. 
201 Interview with former OSCE fieldworker working on minority return issues. Stakic would later surface 
in Belgrade, and was arrested by Serbian authorities in March 2001 and transferred to The Hague. 
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atmosphere in western Republika Srpska, making it possible for the emergence of non- 
nationalists leaders. 202 
The tide was beginning to turn and SFOR continued to assume a more robust posture and 
pursue a more expansive interpretation of its mandate. 203 Patrols increased and Area 
Security was provided around the towns and villages of returning refugees and IDP's. 
British area security around Prijedor in conjunction with the arrest operations helped to 
bolster confidence. Although expressing dismay that more individuals living in Prijedor 
had not been indicted and arrested for their wartime actions, Muharem Murselovic, a 
former Omarska detainee acknowledged that the arrest operations had encouraged 
Bosnian Muslims to return. 204 Former UNPROFOR Dutch Battalion interpreter and 
Srebrenica survivor, Emir Sulagic, would later compare the stark differences in the 
atmosphere of Western and Eastern RS, "In Prijedor, people are coming back and picking 
up their lives because they feel safer knowing that their torturers are no longer physically 
present near their homes. The situation in Srebrenica is in flagrant contrast. The 
survivors are refusing to come back because up to now only two of the people 
responsible have been tried. A lot of people directly involved in the massacre are living 
there today without being disturbed. , 205 This pattern did not merely extend to Srebrenica 
but generally throughout Eastern RS. 206 
202 See generally `A Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation', International Crisis Group, 
November 1997. 
203 Furthermore, in an apparent admission of a flawed policy, Clinton announced in December 1997 that 
U. S. forces would remain in Bosnia after the June 1998 deadline, acknowledging that it had been an "error" 
to impose a specific deadline for the mission's duration, See JOST, NATO TRANSFORMED, p. 230. 
204 Interview with Muharem Murselovic former Omarska detention camp survivor, Prijedor. Mark 
Wheeler, former head of the ICG Sarajevo Office, also highlighted that many of the initial returnees to 
Prijedor had been refugees in various Scandinavian States and had secured nationality status. This was 
viewed as a form of "insurance policy" "I mean if you have a Norwegian or Swedish passport the police 
are not going to rub you out, you have some protection. " Furthermore, those returning from Scandinavian 
countries in many cases returned financially solvent and could start businesses, placing them in a stronger 
position. Interview with Mark Wheeler. os See WESSELINGH AND VAULERIN, RAW MEMORY, p. 94. 
206 Tim Judah highlights that in Eastern RS, where fewer people have been indicted or arrested, the rate of 
return is far lower, see Tim Judah, `Half-Empty or Half-Full Towns?, Transitions, February 5,2004. The 
author acknowledges that refugee and IDP return rates in Bosnia are affected by other issues as well as 
insecurity and the presence of PIFWCs. As an OSCE fieldworker working on minority return issues 
highlighted, certain areas of Eastern RS such as Foca and Visegrad were historically places of migration. 
(Interview with OSCE fieldworker). Furthermore, the decision to return also relates to considerations of 
access to employment, utilities, education and health. Nevertheless, the presence of PIFWCs remains a keß 
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More Arrests and Active Support for the Tribunal 
Under Clark's direction, NATO's initial policy of avoiding confrontation with the RS 
Special Police was also reversed. Now classified as a military force they were actively 
confronted, disarmed and disbanded by SFOR troops, which effectively resulted in the 
removal of one layer of Karadzic's protection force. After Bosnian Serb TV broadcast a 
doctored interview with a Tribunal Official designed to make it appear complimentary to 
Karadzic, SFOR seized control of four TV towers, blocking subsequent transmissions. '07 
On December 18,1997 Dutch army commandos from the 108th Special Operations 
Corps, supported by SAS troops, arrested two Bosnian Croats indicted for crimes against 
humanity committed in the village of Ahmici. Vlatko Kupreskic had initially been part 
of the group which were to `voluntarily surrender' in Zagreb, but had backed out of the 
deal, returning to live in Ahmici. After smashing down the door and firing tear gas into 
his apartment Dutch commandos stormed the building, shooting and wounding Kupreskic 
who resisted arrest. Anto Furundzija leader of the Bosnian Croat paramilitary, group The 
Jokers' was arrested without a struggle outside his home after returning home. °8 With 
Drljaca shot dead and Kupreskic wounded, NATO forces were sending a clear message 
of their willingness to use lethal force. (Then) NATO Secretary General. Javier Solana 
emphasized "This action stands as a warning to all those indicted for Nv ar crimes who are 
still at large that they, too, will be held accountable. They should take steps immediately 
to surrender themselves voluntarily to the ICTY. "209 In late 1997 and early 1998 several 
Bosnian Serb indictees residing in RS voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal. 210 The new 
strategy received strong criticism from the Russian government, which maintained that 
factor. As the President of the Helsinki Commission for Human Rights in Bosnia Herzegovina emphasized 
"Minority return groups and refugee families' representatives have specifically, said we will not go back 
when these people are the, -e. (Interview with Srdjan Dizdarevic). Similarly, Wesselingh and Vaulerin 
extensive research in Prijedor established that The imprisonment of leading faces from the ethnic 
cleansing campaign in Prijedor has made the refugees feel considerably safer" see \VESSELINGH AND 
V; IULERIN, R, %w MEMORY. p. 93. 
2°7 See CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR, pp. 101-102. 
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arrest operations were not within the remit of SFOR, 211 characterising the operations as 
"cowboy raids which may jeopardize the entire process of the Bosnian settlement. "212 
Such statements were not surprising given Russia's strong support for the Bosnian Serbs. 
but had little influence on the new policy. 
Despite British and Dutch willingness to pursue operations against PIFWCs, clear 
divisions still existed within the U. S. Administration over whether to move beyond its 
narrow military mission. General Clark's September 1997 presentation to the Secretary 
of Defense of his plans to continue the more robust approach. was met with barely veiled 
hostility from Cohen with Clark being informed the following day that Cohen was 
uncomfortable with the briefing. 213 Undeterred, Clark forged ahead with the more active 
policy in the continued belief that without the strategy U. S. forces could not be 
reduced. 214 As Scheffer recounted "Clark made it his mission in life to make the U. S. 
sector a PIFWC free zone . 
-215 Throughout 1997 `The Activity' had been conducting 
intelligence gathering and surveillance operations against PIFWCs, and reported directly 
to Clark, operating outside the normal NATO channels. 2 16 In early December, 65 
commandos from SEAL team 6 were secretly deployed to Tuzla military base in shipping 
containers in order to avoid detection by the Russian SFOR contingent due to concerns 
over potential leaks. Their mission was to arrest five PIFWCS and teams were then 
divided and deployed to CIA-run safe houses spread throughout Bosnia. 217 Howw ever, the 
operations came up against stiff resistance from U. S. General Eric Shinseki, commander 
of all NATO forces in Bosnia, who argued there was not enough "actionable" intelligence 
to guarantee success. Tensions were running high with some of the intelligence officials 
viewing Shinseki's requests for additional information as excessive. Ultimately. the 
211 See Speech of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Plenary Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on the Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Item 49 
on the Agenda) November 4,1997. 
212 See `SFOR Apprehends War Criminals', Balkan Watch, The Balkan Institute, Week in Review. 
December 16-23,1997. 
213 See CI 
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214 See CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR, p. 100. 
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mission was cancelled after Bosnian Serb authorities became aware of the planned raid. 
One month later a SEAL team arrested Bosnian Serb Goran Jelisic, indicted for crimes 
committed in the Luka detention camp in Brcko. Three more Bosnian Serbs indicted for 
crimes committed in Bosanski Samac (Simo Zaric. Milan Simic and Miroslav Tadic) 
were detained by U. S. forces over the following three weeks. 
One of the most controversial arrests was carried out in late September 1998, when 
Stevan Todorovic, indicted for the murder, torture and sexual assault of Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Croats in Bosanki Samac, was apprehended inside the territory of FRY, 
without the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Although some commentators have 
suggested the arrest was most likely carried out by bounty hunters, 218 more recent 
accounts allege the operation was conducted by an SAS snatch team. 219 Todorovic was 
reportedly located by The Activity, which tracked his mobile telephone calls to the 
remote Zlatibor region. Overpowered, blindfolded and gagged, he was brought back to 
the border, covertly transported over the River Drina and taken by helicopter to Tuzla. 
One British officer described it as `a classic mission'. adding that the authorities ere 
happy for the Serbs to know that the SAS had carried out the raid. "" However, the 
arrest led to an awkward confrontation between the Tribunal and NATO forces. Like 
Dok. manovic, Todorovic challenged the legality of his arrest and requested SFOR provide 
documents pertaining to the operation. A senior Pentagon official noted the incident 
nearly led to subsequent arrest operations being suspended, arguing -Hm he [Todorovic] 
got to The Hague was irrelevant to his innocent or guilt. We [the U. S. ] said [to the 
Tribunal] if you issue an order for us to disclose, \\e'll stop hunting PIFWCs. "22' 
Nonetheless, on October 18,2001, The Trial Chamber issued such a binding order to 
SFOR to release relevant material, including reports relating to the apprehension and 
copies of videos of the arrest. The governments of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the U. K. and the U. S. and NATO immediately appealed against the decision. 
Sec KERR, THE INTERNA1 ZONAL CRIMINAL TRIBI'NAL FOR THE FORCIER YUGOSLAVIA, p. 166. 
Str SM I nI. KILLER EI. ITE. p. 203. 
220S et, SMITH, KILLER Et ,iIE:, p. 
203. 
221 Intervie\\ with former senior Pentagon official. 
216 
Fortunately (from the perspective of the OTP) the potential crisis was averted after a plea 
agreement was made with Todorovic and the unlawful arrest motion dropped. '`" 
In addition to assuming a more proactive approach to arrests" NATO forces were also 
more supportive of the work of Tribunal investigators, being actively involved in a series 
of search and seizure operations carried out in RS and Bosnian Government facilities. 
The strategy involved either informing the authorities only half an hour before the 
operation began223, or sending Tribunal representatives to the site with the authorizing 
documents immediately before the search team entered. 224 NATO forces provided 
important area security and close protection escorts security during the operations 225 
as Hagan highlights, were crucially important in assisting offender identification, 
"[They were] the difference between knowing of the crimes and knowing who at higher 
levels planned, prepared and executed them. "''26 
"The Reluctant Gendarme" 27 
Whilst British, Dutch and U. S. forces had carried out several missions to arrest PIFWCs, 
French forces failed to act in their sector. This reluctance was merely one example of the 
French government's wider lack of cooperation with the Tribunal. Firstly, no intelligence 
material was provided to the Court 228 and a former senior official in the OTP castigated 
France's failure even to disclose intelligence under the Rule 70 procedure. 229 
Investigators were also frustrated by the convoluted, time-consuming process of 
obtaining information from French former peacekeepers. Questions had to be made in 
writing, which would then be checked by French legal officials before a response could 
222 See Mr. Drs. Elies van Sliedregt, `Arresting war criminals; Male catus bene detentus, human rights and 
the rule of law', in VAN DIJK & HOVENS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS, p. 79. 
. 23 See 'Workshop 1: The need for an international arresting team; UN- or not UN led? in \'AN DIJK & 
HOVENS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS, p. 42. 
224 See HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS p. 148. 
225 Again, like the PIFWC arrest operations, SOF were sometimes used, interview with Tribunal 
Investigator involved in search and seizure operation. 226 See H: wAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS p. 149. 
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be made. 230 The process could take weeks, and was hardly conducive to assisting` prompt 
investigations. That government and military personnel would potentially have to testify 
before the Tribunal was particularly sensitive. On December 7.1997. French Defence 
Minister Alain Richard rebuked the Tribunal for carrying out a "spectacle of justice" and 
declared he would "never go to the Hague. " Richard also flatly rejected that French 
military officers would testify. 231 
On the arrests front, Madeline Albright reveals in her autobiography that, in 1997. the 
U. S. working with 4 other nations, planned a major operation, a Bosnia-wide sweep 
designed to net Karadzic and 15 to 20 other PIFWCs in a single day. Albright recounts, 
"I was angered when, at the last minute, a key country - whose identity remains secret - 
opted out. "232 Media reports at the time alleged that France had been the State which 
pulled out of the mission considering it too risky. 233 The sector where French troops 
were deployed included Pale, where Karadzic was regularly seen, and Foca and \'isegrad, 
also areas where indicted PIFWCs were said to be openly residing. 
Concern also existed over elements in the French military compromising operations 
against PIFWCs. Liaison officer, Major Herve Gourmelon was known to have close 
links with Karadzic and when the Former Bosnian Serb President went underground days 
before a joint U. S., British and French operation to detain him was launched, U. S. 
sources suggested he had been tipped off by elements in the French military. 
234 U. S. 
intelligence were so concerned over links to Karadzic that a surveillance operation was 
mounted against a French army officer, bugging her car and monitoring her cell phone 
conversations. 235 As a former senior State Department official recounted, we \ý ent 
through a period of time where sharing intelligence with France became difficult. We 
230 See HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 100. 
231 Sec' HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 100. After protracted negotiations, the French gov ernment 
in 1998 allowed French officers to testify before the Tribunal. 
232 Sec' MADELINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY (Miramax) 2003 p. 270. 
''" See Steven Erlanger, 'France Said to Balk at 2nd Raid, Calling It Too Risky'.. 1'c'u York Times. July 16, 
1997. 
'`a See R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan. US Says French Jeopardized 
\iission'. Washington Post, April 2 13.1998; Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon. The Hunt for Karadzic', 
Time. August 10,1998. 
23' Seer David Scheffer quote in S. tIITH, KILLER ELITE, p. 194. 
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were concerned how intelligence was being used... there as a problem o\ er who was 
being party to it. If you have doubts about how partners are handling the information, 
you have problems. , 
236 
U. S. frustration led to Scheffer, the ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, to 
damningly refer to the French sector as a "sanctuary", and highlight that, "Karadzic is 
generally known to be in the French sector.... the means [to arrest him] exist. "-" Arbour 
assumed a similarly critical approach noting it is in the French sector that many ývar 
criminals are found, but they feel absolute security there.... There are considerable 
opportunities for action in the French sector, yet we confront complete inertia. Thus we 
conclude that this inertia constitutes a concerted policy. - 238 
In late 1998 the Tribunal placed Milan Lukic under sealed indictment. Lukic, a senior 
figure in the Serbian criminal underworld personally involved in the murder of dozens of 
Bosnian Muslim civilians was regularly seen driving around Visegrad, often without 
close protection, and frequently visited cafes in the town. However, French forces did 
not move to arrest him, informing the Tribunal they could not positively identify him.; " 
In response to increasing media criticism240 the French government attempted to justify 
its failure to capture indictees, emphasising the area's mountainous topography made 
operations difficult. 24' However, the justification was revealed to be somewhat 
disingenuous by French TV footage, which revealed French SFOR troops drinking with 
indictee Janko Janjic. 242 As the (then) executive director of the Coalition of International 
Justice remarked, "whilst U. S. troops in the past may have turned a blind eye to PIFWCs, 
236 Interview with former senior State Department official. 
237 See HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 103. 
238 Louise Arbour quote in Craig R. Whitney. 'Prosecutor Says French Balk at Seizing War Criminals in 
Bosnia', New York Times, December 16,1997. 
239 See Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme. Why is France protecting indicted war criminals in the 
sector of Bosnia it controls? ' Atlantic Monthly, April 2000. 240 For example sec Christopher Lockwood, 'French ignore indicted Serbs'. Daily Telegraph. August 2. 
1999. 
'" Sec Philip Shenon. 'Much of Bosnia still a haven for war criminals', Xcir Fork Times. December 12. 
1999. 
24' Sec OFF. TFiF: LION THE Fox AND THE EAGLE, p. 307. Janjic was later killed on October 13 after 
detonating a grenade whilst resisting arrest by German forces. 
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'you didn't see them fraternizing with them. Some commentators have made more 
serious allegations relating to French motivations for failing to arrest PIF\V'Cs. On 
January 9,1999, French soldiers established a checkpoint to detain Dragan Gagovvic. a 
Bosnian Serb under sealed indictment for crimes committed in Foca. Gagovic, who was 
returning from a karate tournament with five children in the car, reportedly failed to stop, 
accelerated at the soldiers, and was shot dead. NATO's (then) Secretary General, George 
Robertson, defended the troops, highlighting that under the rules of engagement SFOR 
was permitted to use lethal force where its soldiers were in a life-threatening situation. 
However, some sources began to question why Gagovic was not merely detained in Foca, 
where he was regularly seen walking alone. Western diplomatic sources pointed out that 
Gagovic was only weeks away from surrendering to the Tribunal and had discussed this 
openly on the telephone, which, given their close monitoring of phone communications in 
their sector, French forces would likely have been aware. 244 Sources close to the ICTY 
have reportedly alleged that the action was taken to prevent Gagovic, who was in contact 
with the Tribunal at the time of his death, from voluntarily surrendering. His wartime 
activities reportedly included business dealings with the French UNPROFOR contingent, 
and he reportedly received anonymous threats that surrendering to The Hague would cost 
him his life. 245 The French military's refusal to handover a video recording of the 
checkpoint shooting to NATO authorities only served to fuel speculation that a cover up 
had ensued. 246 Arbour has been to some extent, philosophical over France's 'minimalist' 
stance towards the Tribunal. Despite her searing critique over the lack of arrests, she has 
also acknowledged; "the French feared that the ICTY could turn on them and investigate 
decisions made by General Janvier or others, while Washington was unthreatened, having 
no troops in the war. I am convinced that the United States would have slammed on the 
243 See Nina Bang-Jensen quote in Philip Shenon, 'Much of Bosnia still a haven for war criminals'.. V'ew 
York Times, December 12,1999. 
''a See Philip Shenon, `Much of Bosnia still a haven for war criminals', New York Times, December 12, 
1999. 
245 See 'War Criminals in Bosnia's Republika Srpska: V1'ho Are The People in Your Neighbourhood? '. 
International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 103, November 2.2000, p. 72. 
246 See Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme. Why is France protecting indicted war criminals in the 
sector of Bosnia it controls? ' Atlantic Monthly, April 2000 
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brakes too, if the Americans had been implicated like the French and if their testimony 
"247 could embarrass their own authorities. 
With arrests being carried out by British, Dutch, German and U. S. forces. and sustained 
media and Tribunal criticism for their failure to act, the French were ultimatelv "shamed 
into active cooperation. "248 When Chirac visited the Tribunal in 2000 to discuss 
enhancing support, Arbour's successor, Carla Del Ponte handed him a sealed indictment 
issued against Momcilo Krajisnik. On April 3,2000, GCMC commandos ble«v the door 
off Krajisnik's house, dragging the former Bosnian Serb Prime Minister ignominiousl\ 
out in his pyjamas. 249 However, the arrest did little to allay suspicions that the French 
continued to retain inappropriate links to Karadzic. In late February 2002 a U. S. special 
forces arrest operation was reportedly foiled after a French officer tipped off the Bosnian 
Serb authorities who informed Karadzic's bodyguards, allowing the former Serb 
President to move across the border into Montenegro (the conversation was reportedly 
intercepted by British intelligence). 250 
The Situation Today 
NATO's change of policy towards PIFWCs was crucial in providing the Tribunal with 
many of its indictees. Without this active support, The Hague clearly would have 
struggled to obtain custody of such figures, particularly given Croatia, RS and Serbia's 
frequent non-compliance. Obtaining cooperation from the governing authorities in the 
region has remained a constant problem for the Tribunal. As Tribunal staffer Florence 
Hartmann noted, war crimes prosecutors in Serbia faced the problem of working with the 
24' Louise Arbour quote in HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR, p. 100. 24ý See HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS, p. 129. 
249 Sec' Andrew Purvis, `Under Arrest. NATO busts Bosnian Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik to shmý it is 
serious about nabbing suspected war criminal', Time Europe, April 17,2000, Vol. 155, No. 15. Although 
French authorities claimed to have "participated" in five arrests, Sudetic notes that the) initially refused to 
accept the surrender of Dragljub Kunarac until obtaining agreement from RS authorities. killed Gagovic in 
suspicious circumstances; were on the sidelines when German forces carried out an arrest, and, vv hilst 
actively arresting Mitar Vasiljevic, in whose apartment French forces were staying, actually acted counter- 
productively by effectively making public the sealed indictment of Milan Lukic during the operation, set 
Chuck Sudetic, 'Excuse me, may we arrest you? ', translated from Dani, April 2000. 
250 See Daniel McGrory, 'Phone trap for French 'traitor' who saved Karadzic'. Times, March 4.2002. 
Similar concerns were expressed over the leaking of intelligence material to Serbian sources by a 
French 
officer during NATO's Kosovo air campaign, see Stuart Jeffries, 'French major faces trial for leaking war 
plan to Serbs', Guardian, October 19,2001. 
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police and intelligence services that had not been significantly reformed since the fall of 
the Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, in October 2000.251 Moves by the reformist 
Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, to increase the tempo of cooperation effectively cost him 
his life, when on March 12,2003 he was assassinated outside the entrance to his office in 
central Belgrade. 
252 Since Djindjic's death Serbian cooperation with the Tribunal has 
remained mixed, 
253 and gaining access to documentary evidence has been a particular 
challenge. For example Minutes of the meetings held by the Supreme Defence Council. 
the body which oversaw Serbia's military actions in Kosovo, \\ere only disclosed to the 
prosecutor "after protracted negotiations and are subject to strict confidentiality 
clauses. "254 Furthermore, as chapter four illustrated, elements of Serbia's securit\ 
services have continued to protect Mladic. 
Following the death of Tudjman in 1999 and the ousting of the HDZ, a new centre-left 
government attempted to institute more progressive policies. The country's new 
President Stipe Mesic informed Bosnian Croats that they should look to Sarajevo for 
governance rather than Zagreb, and Prime Minister Ivica Racan advocated enhancing 
support and cooperation with The Hague. However, there was deep popular resistance to 
such moves with the HDZ retaining a considerable influence. In 2001, the Party's leader. 
No Sanader (who would become Croatia's Prime Minister in 2003) swore that he would 
not allow any Croatian war crimes suspects to be handed over to the Tribunal255, referring 
to retired general Mirko Norac, whom investigators wanted to question over alleged 
involvement in atrocity crimes, as "a hero. '256 Consequently, Croatia's attitude towards 
cooperation remained uneven, resisting the arrest and transfer of General Janko 
251 See Nicholas Wood, `Croatian turnaround led to general's arrest'. International Herald Tribune, 
December 27,2005. 
252 For further details see Ian Traynor. `Murder shows warlords still rule in Serbia', Guardian, March 13, 
2003; Ian Traynor & Dejan Anastasijevic, 'Death of a Balkan Hero', Observer, March 16.2003. 
2" With the E. U. making Serbia's entry conditional on cooperation with the ICTY the level of cooperation 
increased during 2005, with Serbian authorities offering generous financial incentives to indictees who 
'voluntarily surrender' to the Tribunal, see Rod Nordland, 'Pensions for War Criminals', Newsweek. Jul. 
25,2005. Nevertheless, the Tribunal's Prosecutor continues to castigate the failure to apprehend Ratko 
Mladic. 
254 See . Command Responsibility Under Fire', Tribunal Update. Institute for War And Peace Reporting. 
No. 445. March 24,2006. 
'" See Nicholas \\ ood, 'Croatian turnaround led to general's arrest'. International Herald Tribune, 
December 2.2005. 
256 See Ian Traynor. 'Croats turn on leaders for hunting 'ww ar criminals'. Guardian. February 12,2001 
ýýý 
Bobetko257, and only acting to facilitate the arrest General Gotovina in late 2005 `58 after 
several years of inaction or even opposition by elements of the security services to 
international attempts to locate him. 
In early 2003, British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or M16, launched Operation 
Cash. 259 Working from the British Embassy with support from ICTY investigators and 
elements of Croatia's intelligence service (POA), the operation aimed to locate and detain 
General Gotovina. Focusing on Zadar, the hard-line nationalist city where much of the 
network of organized crime and military figures which protected Gotovina resided, 
British intelligence shipped in three specialist surveillance vans from the U. K. to monitor 
telephone communications. The operation was dramatically compromised however, after 
the identities of the British, ICTY and Croatian police officers involved were leaked to 
the Croatian media, reportedly by Franjo Turek, the former head of the POA. 260 
Although the mission was ultimately unsuccessful the episode nevertheless illustrates 
how certain intelligence agencies, which initially had little regard for the Tribunal and its 
work, over time became actively involved in assisting the Tribunal. However, the fact 
that Gotovina's support network was suspected of being involved in shipping weapons to 
Irish Nationalist paramilitary groups, was reportedly an influential factor in the decision 
to launch the operation. 261 
Despite such instances of active support, the Tribunal's relationship with NATO and its 
key Member States262 has remained strained, particularly since mid 2000, with less and 
less credible arrest operations taking place. The Tribunal's current Prosecutor Carla Del 
257 See Chris Stephen, `Bobetko "Mastermind" of Medak Horrors. Ageing Croatian general at the centre of 
an extradition dispute is said to have played a vital role in the Medak atrocities', Tribunal Update, No. 286, 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21-26,2002. 
258 See Nicholas Wood, `Croatian turnaround led to general's arrest', International Herald Tribune, 
December 27,2005; Ian Traynor, `The Fugitive who stands in the way of Croatia's EU Entry', Guardian, 
March 18,2005. 
259 The Croatian word for cash is "gotovina", the surname of the target of the Operation. 
260 See Ian Traynor, `The fugitive who stands in the way of Croatia's EU entry. Brussels has shelved talks 
with Zagreb after renegade intelligence officials wrecked a UK-led effort to capture its chief war crimes 
suspect', Guardian, March 18,2005. 
261 See Ian Traynor, `The Fugitive who stands in the way of Croatia's EU entry' Guardian, March 18.2005 
22 In early December, 2004, EU forces took over from NATO forces, although a small NATO force 
remained to focus on PIFWC and counter-terrorism issues. The Tribunal has applied similar criticisms to 
EUROFOR's failure to apprehend remaining indictees in Bosnia. 
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Ponte has regularly lambasted NATO's failure to do more to arrest the remaining 
PIFWCs, going so far as warning that the Tribunal was considering raising the issue of 
SFOR's mandate at the U. N. Security Council if they are not arresting fu`, iti\ es.... in the 
next few month S. -, 263 Del Ponte went on to request that the Tribunal be allowed to 
establish a specialist tracking force to go after Karadzic and Mladic. although the 
proposal was met with resistance by NATO and ultimately came to nothing. 24 
Admittedly, obtaining the necessary intelligence (particularly human intelligence) 
remains a considerable challenge without the participation of reliable local 
collaborators 265, particularly when PIFWCs begin to take more protective measures. 
Recruiting such sources is a considerable challenge with many suspects living in insular 
communities almost impossible to penetrate. 266 As one former senior OHR official 
pointed out; "you can't pay men who make the same amount off their illegal activities 
and who feel they can't be protected by the international community. -. 267 The official 
also highlighted that Bosnian Serb counter intelligence was particularly good, 
acknowledging they know the country much better than we do . 
-26" Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal has developed a number of established contacts over the years in Bosnia, and 
officials have expressed frustration that SFOR has in some cases failed to respond to 
intelligence passed on relating to Karadzic's whereabouts, '" The six month rotation of 
SFOR intelligence personnel also did little to improve its capacity for building up a 
strong team to focus on PIFWC's. 270 The most serious problem the Tribunal faces 
however, relates to obtaining the necessary military and intelligence support to achieve 
arrests in the face of the emergence of what is largely perceived as more important 
263 See Carla Del Ponte quote in `Bosnian Serb Entity is Haven for War Crimes Suspects', Agence France 
Press, May 24,2001. 
264 See Tom Walker. `War crimes court seeks agents to track down Karadzic', Time Europe, Niaý 27.2001. 
ZGS See 'Workshop 3: Requirements, Conditions, Supplies and Feasibility of an Operational International 
: Arrest Team' in VAN DIJK & HOVENS. ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS, p. 58. 266 Ste Major M. M. L. A. Hendrickx. 'An Operational Blueprint for Arresting War Criminals; a Lock Risk 
and High Risk Scenario', in VAN DIJK R. HOVENS, ARRESTING WAR CRIMINALS. p. 31. 
267 Interview with former senior OHR official. 2O8 Interview with former senior OHR official. 269 Sec Nenna Jelacic and Hugh Griffiths, 'Karadzic Raid: Not Even Close'. Tribunal Update, No. 351. 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting. April 03,2004. 270 Sec Nerma Jelacic and Hugh Griffiths, 'Karadzic Raid: Not Even Close'. Tribunal Update. No. 
351. 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 03,2004. 
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strategic priorities since September 11,2001. A clear illustration of this reality was 
revealed in June 2002, when it was revealed that for more than six months live pictures 
from U. S. aerial spy missions were broadcast in real time, to commercial satellite viewers 
throughout Europe and the Balkans. The material recorded by manned aircraft and 
unmanned predator drones had previously been encrypted, but had subsequently been 
broadcast through a commercial satellite transmission allowing anyone in the region with 
normal satellite TV receiver to watch the surveillance operations. Former British Anny 
Intelligence officer Adrian Weale noted "I think I'd be extremely irritated to find that the 
planning and hard work that had gone into mounting an operation against, for instance a 
war crime suspect... . was 
being compromised by the release of this information. A 
U. S. intelligence source admitted "we seem to be transmitting this information straight to 
our enemies.... l would be worried that using this information, the people ý\ e are tracking 
will see what we are looking at and, much more worryingly, what we are not looking 
at. "272 The BBC's current affairs program Newsnight reported that the material had been 
transferred onto commercial satellite as a result of a competing demand which took 
precedence of classified satellites for U. S. led Coalition Force operations in Afghanistan 
following the invasion in late 2001.273 Similarly, although British troops were heavily 
involved in arrest operations in Bosnia, intelligence agents and Special Forces needed for 
such missions have been prioritized for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other 
associated missions relating to the Global War on Terror. ' British officials dismissed the 
high-profile NATO operations including the three day search of Pale in 2004 as a "public 
relations show" and have expressed growing concerns that unless a new and concerted 
"serious intelligence-led effort" is made, Karadzic may never be apprehended . 
274 Del 
Ponte's declaration to the U. N. Security Council in June 2006 that no one is actively 
searching for Karadzic, suggests that such concerns may well prove to be correct. 
275 
271 See Adrian Weale quote in Duncan Campbell, `Now showing on satellite TV: secret American spy 
photos', Guardian, June 13,2002. 
272 See anonymous U. S. intelligence source quote in Duncan Campbell, 'Now showing on satellite TV: 
secret American spy photos'. Guardian, June 13,2002. 
"'" See Newsnight, June 22.2002. 
274 See Richard Beeston. 'Karadzic could escape as NATO deadline looms', Times. January 20,2004. 275 See Paul Burkhardt. 'U. N. Official: No One Looking for Karadzic'. If ashington Post, June 7.2006. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusion aims to fulfil two specific aims. Firstly, it will provide a summary of the 
main findings of the thesis. Secondly it seeks to review these findings and explore their 
potential relevance to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the permanent judicial 
institution established to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes under the Rome Treaty 
in 1998, which became operational on July 1,2002. ' 
The thesis demonstrates that the issue of international investigations and criminal 
prosecutions of atrocity crimes represents a rich research agenda for the purposes of 
English School inquiry, particularly regarding the debate surrounding the tensions 
between the norms of order and justice. The introduction highlights how many English 
School scholars have tended to focus on the issue of humanitarian intervention because 
"it poses the conflict between order and justice in international relations in its starkest 
form. "2 The English School has focused less however, on the issue of instituting 
international criminal prosecutions against individuals alleged to have either committed 
or ordered the commission of atrocity crimes. The thesis demonstrates how international 
institutions mandated to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes also poses the conflict 
between order and justice in international relations in an equally stark form. 
Like humanitarian intervention, international justice mechanisms represent a challenge to 
the cardinal tenet of pluralism that a State should be protected from external inquiry and 
sanction by virtue of territorial integrity and the associated principle of non-intervention. 
Furthermore, international criminal prosecutions may represent a significant challenge to 
the pursuit and maintenance of order. The goal of achieving a negotiated diplomatic 
settlement to an armed conflict may be fatally undermined where individuals deemed 
1 For further details on the Rome Negotiation Process and the ICC see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Negotiating, 
the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court', Cornell International Law 
Joturnal, Vol. 32, No. 3,1999; Rol" LEE (ED. ), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE MAKING OF 
TFIE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS, (Kluwer Law International) 1999; LFIL: \ NADY, \ 
SADAT, TIºE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERN A\TION \1 LAW: 
JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Transnational Publishers) 2002 
2 Sec, Nicholas J. Wheeler 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Societ.: Bull and \'incent 
on Humanitarian Intervention' Millennium. Journal of Inter-national Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3.1992. p. 463. 
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critical to attaining such a settlement are under investigation for atrocity crimes and are 
indicted, leading to their withdrawal from negotiations. Similarly, the arrest of persons 
indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) in post-conflict environments may in certain cases 
undermine order where the PIFWCs supporters have the capacity to react in a manner 
which threatens the fragile, nascent peace. 
Order versus Justice: Ending Conflicts (What Price Justice? ) 
The thesis demonstrates that although the English School has largely overlooked how 
international investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes may result in tensions 
between order and justice, the issue has received significant focus within the international 
law and international human rights discourse, in the context of the Peace versus Justice 
debate. In this debate two perspectives may be discerned, which have been defined in 
this thesis as `pro-negotiation' and `pro-prosecution. ' The former, at its most extreme, 
supports the use of amnesties to facilitate negotiations3, whilst the latter, at its most 
extreme, advocates the "pursuit of justice without compromise"4 and the use of military 
force in order to remove the necessity of having to negotiate with potential indictees. 5 
It is highly questionable whether the potential `carrot' of an explicit de jure amnesty offer 
designed to induce a negotiated settlement would now be a viable option to international 
mediators. Contemporary practice appears to suggest that the offer of an amnesty 
relating to the commission of atrocity crimes is contrary to international law. As 
Campbell highlights, "the suggestion that blanket non-prosecution is a legitimate policy 
option .... runs counter to the 
direct imperative in the Geneva Conventions to repress 
grave breaches. 6 Furthermore, although the U. N. brokered Lome Peace Accord, 
concluded between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) on July 7,1999, included a blanket amnesty to all combatants, the U. N. 's Special 
3 See Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, `Trials and Errors. Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003/4. 
See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, `Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. 1, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul Uni\ ersitN 
College of Law, 1996, p. 2. 5 See, for example WILLIAMS AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? 
6 See Colm Campbell. 'Peace and the laws of war: the role of international humanitarian law in the post- 
conflict environment', International Review of the Red Cross, No. 839, September 30,2000. pp. 627-651. 
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Representative of the Secretary General for Sierra Leone inserted an appended disclaimer 
stating that the amnesty clause "shall not apply to the international crimes of genocide. 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. "7 Additionally, it is clear that the traditional 'pro-negotiation' strateg% 
of attaining "peace at any price"' has fundamental limitations. As Hannum notes, "Blind 
adherence to diplomatic traditions and the elite-based context of diplomatic negotiations 
may not be appropriate when the task is to end widespread violence and create the 
conditions under which sustainable and just peace can be achieved. "" 
Despite recognition of the potential limitations associated with the 'pro-negotiation' 
approach, the empirical material presented and discussed throughout the thesis indicates 
that the more extreme facets of the `pro-prosecution' approach, including the contention 
that justice should be pursued "without compromise", represent an equally problematic 
response. Furthermore, the potential 'stick' of military force. which many in the 'pro- 
prosecution' perspective argue should be relied on as an alternative to negotiation or 
accommodation, in order to achieve a more just peace, is often a much more complicated 
dynamic than many `pro-prosecution' advocates acknowledge. 
The thesis posits that the `pro-prosecution' suggestion that Milosevic should have been 
indicted at Dayton was both impractical or imprudent. Firstly, the Tribunal did not 
possess the requisite evidence to issue a credible indictment against the (then) FRY 
President, particularly given the non-disclosure of pertinent intelligence material from the 
key States of the `International Community' and the complete absence of' insider' 
witnesses. The thesis further proposes that even if such evidence was available at the 
tigre of the negotiations, considerations of prudence should have dictated that an 
indictment be deferred until the peace deal had been secured. Chapter three's discussion 
7 See 'Report of the secretary General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone'. 
4 October. 
2000, U. N. Doc. S/2000/915. 
8 See Hurst Hannum, 'Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding'. Human Rights Quarterly, 28. 
(2006) p. 
9 See Hurst Hannum, 'Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding'. Human Rights Quarterly. 28. 
(2006) p. 50. 
228 
of the timing of the Charles Taylor indictment for atrocity crimes in 2003 provides a 
compelling illustration of the dangers of zealously pursuing indictments at the time of 
delicate peace negotiations and the grave consequences civilians may face when a 
resurgence of fighting occurs if peace negotiations break down. 
Furthermore, the thesis illustrates that the purported `pro-prosecution' alternati\ es to 
negotiating with individuals implicated in atrocity crimes, are also fraught with their own 
limitations and potentially negative consequences. The use of force does not take place 
in a vacuum, and it will be highly likely that in an environment where atrocity crimes 
have been committed, if the military tide turns, a level of reciprocal atrocity crimes will 
occur. The atrocity crimes committed during the Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina 
region, and the recent video footage allegedly showing the Bosnian government 
commander Ante Dudakovic ordering entire villages to be burned10, provide a stark 
illustration of this. Even if the military forces are prepared to conduct a military 
campaign which conforms to principles of international humanitarian law, it is highly 
likely that where a civilian population who have been in many cases, sympathetic, tacitly 
supportive, or even complicit in the commission of atrocity crimes, it will not take the 
risk of waiting to see whether this will be borne out. Consequently, massive population 
displacement is likely, increasing the potential for widening the conflict. Finally, the 
pro-prosecution' perspective which advocates "rolling back ethnic cleansing" by 
military force, fails to sufficiently acknowledge the possibility that the pursuit of justice 
may be the last strategic objective of a potential military victor. As chapter three 
highlights, rather than serving to 'reunify Bosnia'. the Croatian military offensives 
merely served to replace one form of aggressive expansionism, one form of ethnic 
cleansing, with another. 
In light of such considerations the thesis posits that ultimately. the pursuit of international 
criminal prosecutions for atrocity crimes needs to take into account the particular 
dynamics of each situation: is it viable? will it lead to greater harm? Where the 
'International Comrnunit\" is unNN filling to enforce a peace. and continued military 
10 Sec 'Serbs see new 'war crimes' tape'. BBC : V'tirs, August 9, -1006. 
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offensives will lead to greater suffering for civilians and also the threat of more atrocity 
crimes, it may be necessary, however unpalatable, to negotiate with individuals 
implicated in the ordering of or commission of such crimes in order to secure a 
negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, the thesis does not advocate that justice be foregone 
and impunity be allowed to prevail, merely that in certain instances justice in the form of 
international prosecutions may have to be deferred. Again it is instructive to examine the 
Taylor case. Despite the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone issuing an 
indictment, Taylor was granted political exile in Nigeria. Nevertheless, over time, and 
after sustained international pressure, Taylor's position in Nigeria became untenable, and 
he now has the opportunity to respond to the indictment in an appropriate legal forum. 
Ultimately, the issue may be viewed as one of appropriate sequencing. As the Center for 
International Transitional Justice highlights "The debate now revolves around issues of 
timing, strategy and tactics, more than around stark either/or choices. "" 
No doubt advocates of the `pro-prosecution' perspective would deride such an approach 
as merely "a semblance of peace win[ning] out over justice"1', and posit that the longer- 
tenn goal of assuring accountability should be accorded a greater priority by the 
`International Community. ' However, such advocates have consistently failed to propose 
credible means of achieving this laudable goal, particularly in circumstances where the 
`International Community' is clearly unwilling to enforce a peace, or where alternative 
military options may merely lead to a prolonging or even exacerbation of the armed 
conflict and the possibility of more atrocity crimes being committed. 
Order versus Justice: The International Criminal Court 
During the 1998 Rome Conference convened to finalize the statute of the ICC, a vigorous 
debate took place in the negotiations relating to the extent of the scope of the U. N. 
Security Council's relationship with the Court. A number of State Parties and 'pro- 
prosecution' NGO's expressed concern over the potential 'politicization' of the Court if 
mechanisms were included in the Statute which allowed the Security Council to interpose 
It Set, Coalition: Centre for International Transitional Justice - Article on ICC and Peace 
Negotiations. 
12 See H: \Z-\N, JUSTICE INA TIME OF WAR, p. 69. 
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and block the Court's work. Conversely, other State Parties delegations argued that 
given the Security Council's eminent role as the ultimate arbitrator on issues of 
international peace and security, the body should be accorded some level of influence 
over the Court. The Security Council's relationship with the Court is shaped in two 
ways. Firstly, Article 13 of the Statute stipulates that the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, the crime of aggression13) where a `situation' 14 is referred to the Prosecutor by 
the Security Council acting Under Chapter VII. 15 (The Court can also exercise its 
jurisdiction where a `situation' is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Part\ . 
16 or where 
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime. 17). In addition to 
the Security Council's power to refer `situations' to the Court under Article 1 3(b). Article 
16 of the Statute enables the Council to defer investigations or prosecutions; No 
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for 
a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that 
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions. " 18 Thus, where the 
Security Council determines that an investigation or prosecution would interfere With 
efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security, it may require the Court to 
suspend action. In many respects, Article 16 may be viewed as a prudent mechanism to 
address `situations' where potential tensions between peace and justice arise, enabling the 
Security Council to retain an influence in addressing circumstances where international 
peace and security may be threatened. However, it also avoids the spectre of the 
13 States failed to agree on a workable definition of aggression at the Rome Conference and until this has 
been adopted, the Court will only focus on the other three categories). 
14 Rather than addressing `cases' the Court is mandated to address `situations. ' 
15 See Article 13(b) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Hereafter referred to as Rome 
Statute. 
16 Either the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred, or the State of which the 
person accused is a national, or a Non State Party which agrees to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court. sec 
generalhv Article 12 Rome Statute. State Parties whose nationals were the victims of the crimes outlined 
in 
Article 5 were not however, granted the power to refer a situation to the Prosecutor. 
17 See Article 13(c) Rome Statute. However, the Prosecutor requires the consent of a panel of pre-trial 
judges before she can proceed, see Article 15. Furthermore, the Court will determine that a case 
is 
inadmissible (e. g. if initiated by the Prosecutor) if it is being investigated or prosecuted 
by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuine/' to carm-t" out the investigation or 
n"osecution' see Article 17(a). 
8 See Article 16, Rome Statute. 
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permanent member veto serving to halt investigations or prosecutions, and thus seeks to 
minimise a single permanent member's attempts to unduly influence the pursuit of 
international justice for narrow self-interest reasons. Instead, a majority must be obtained 
within the Council in order to suspend the ICC's involvement in a particular situation for 
an additional 12 months. Furthermore, the suspension is not indefinite. but valid for a 
twelve month period, although it may be renewed if a majority in the Council agrees. 
Nevertheless, some commentators have raised legitimate concerns that. rather than 
Article 16 merely serving to defer justice, the provision could actually result in justice 
being foregone. A Belgian proposal, submitted during the Rome Conference, that a 
limited form of investigation be allowed to continue even in the event of an Article 16 
deferral, was not included in the final Treaty. As Bassiouni notes "the consequences of 
postponing an investigation may well be profound. Forensics will decay, mass graves 
may be tampered with, witnesses may be intimidated. "19 
Another element of the Rome Statute which may also be viewed as a potential 
mechanism the Court may rely on where potential tensions between peace and justice 
arise, is Article 53(2)(c), which provides that the Prosecutor may conclude that there is 
not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because a Prosecution "is not in the interests of 
justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the 
interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role 
in the alleged crime. -20 Where an indictment and prosecution of any individual(s) may 
seriously undermine diplomatic negotiations focusing on bringing an end to an internal or 
international armed conflict, or lead to a resurgence in fighting where a fragile peace has 
been established, it could be argued that such an indictment or prosecution is not in the 
interest of the victims if it will actually lead to further fighting and the possibility of more 
atrocity crimes being committed. Consequently, Article 53(2)(c) could provide the 
grounds for deferring a referral by a State Party, where the Security Council cannot 
muster the requisite consensus to institute a deferral on the basis of Article 16. A debate 
is currently taking place within the Court as to what actually constitutes "in the interests 
19 Interview \w ith Professor Bassiouni. 20 Sec Article 53(2)(c) Rome Statute. (emphasis added) 
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of justice". with a number of policy discussion documents revoly ing around this issue to 
be published. 21 It will be instructive to see how the Court seeks to approach this 
challenging and controversial subject. 
The issue of peace/order versus justice currently confronts the ICC regarding its 
indictments issued against six senior figures within the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a 
Ugandan rebel force led by Joseph Kony, alleged to have committed crimes against 
humanity within Uganda. There appears to be a recognition within the Court that the 
"pursuit of justice without compromise"" is neither prudent nor viable, particularly given 
the reality that the Court is even more reliant on active State cooperation to ensure 
progress in investigations and apprehensions than its ad hoc predecessors. Consequently, 
as stressed by an ICC OTP official, the LRA indictments were delayed in recognition of 
the ongoing peace process and released only after OTP officials concluded that the peace 
process between the Ugandan authorities and the LRA was "going nowhere. "" 
Nevertheless, key players in the peace negotiations including the highly respected chief 
peace negotiator Betty Bigombe and Catholic archbishop John Baptist Odama, have been 
critical of the timing of the indictments, arguing that they undermined efforts to induce 
the rebels to lay down their arms and enter into serious negotiations. Bigombe argued "In 
principle, the ICC is good but the time the ICC came here is wrong. They came during 
an ongoing war. " The chief peace negotiator went on to posit that it was unlikely that the 
issuing of ICC arrest warrants for the LRA rebel leaders would bring the war to an end. 
The question is: if you arrest Kony, will that end the war?.... We are talking about ending 
the war and you cannot end the war if the LRA leadership is not involved in the 
process. -24 Similarly, a number of humanitarian aid organizations operating on the 
ground including World Vision have suggested the primary focus should be to "push 
21 Interview with OTP official, ICC. 
22 Scc M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, 'Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. 1, International Human Rights Law Institute. DePaul University 
College of Law. 1996, p. 2. 
2' Interview with OTP official, ICC. 
24 Sec Betty Bigombe quote in . polo Kakaire. 'Ugandan Mediator Critical of ICC Indictments'. Africa 
Reports, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. No. 60, April 14.2006. 
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forward with the peace process and then call for international judicial action. -25 The 
situation has become further complicated by Yoweri Museveni. the Ugandan President's 
July 4,2006 offer of an amnesty to LRA leader Joseph Kony. Museveni stated the offer 
was made due to a frustration that he had "no partners" to arrest the LRA leader, who has 
reportedly been residing with his forces in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC); "The UN don't have the capacity to hunt for Kony. The\ don't allow us 
to hunt for him [in the DRC] . 
"26 It will be interesting to see how the issue is resolved. 
Amnesties for atrocities are now widely considered to be contrary to established 
principles of international law, and the ICC's Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has 
insisted that the ICC is under no obligation to respect an amnesty issued by the Ugandan 
Government. 27 However, if Kony returns to Uganda and Museveni refuses to initiate a 
prosecution, the ICC will remain reliant on the `International Community', particularl` 
the Security Council, to exert pressure on the regime to transfer him to The Hague. 
Alternatively, will the Security Council move via an Article 16 deferral to suspend the 
ICC's endeavours to have Kony arrested? An ICC OTP source suggested that given the 
gravity of the crimes Kony is accused of, and the message it would convey, it was highly 
unlikely that the members of the Security Council would attempt to invoke such a 
deferral. 28 Indeed it seems likely that in future cases where tensions between peace/order 
and justice arise, the Security Council will have more scope to act where the Court 
remains at the stage of considering issuing indictments or where indictments remained 
sealed from the public. In such situations international public opinion may be more 
accepting of the Council's efforts to protect the wider peace process from 'potential' 
indictments, than it would of the Council acting to seemingly insulate specific indictees 
who have already been publicly indicted of atrocity crimes. Whatever the outcome, these 
25 See Rory Anderson, Africa Policy Advisor, World Vision, comments made at ' Vv'ar Crimes in L'<ganda: 
Seeking Peace through Accountability', Citizens for Global Solutions Event. May 12.2004. (emphasis 
added) 
26 See President Museveni quote in Apolo Kakaire, 'Uganda: Amnesty Offer Blow for Rebel Chief Arrest 
Plans', Africa Report, No. 70, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 6,2006. 
27 See Amy Ross and Chandra Lekha Sriram, 'Catch 22 in Uganda: The LRA, the ICC, and the Peace 
Process', Jurist Legal News and Research, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. July 17,2006, 
aº'ailablc at http: I, jurist. la\r. pitt. edu/forumv'2006,07 catch-«-in-uganda-lra-icc-and-peace. php 28 Interview with OTP official, ICC. 
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highly controversial issues are likely to be a regular theme which the ICC will have to 
address. 
Order versus Justice: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (What Price Order? ) 
The thesis demonstrates that pursuing international criminal prosecutions in the post- 
conflict peacebuilding stage also poses the conflict between order and justice in a 
particularly stark form. Nowhere is this tension more acute than with regard to the issue 
of arresting persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs). Two perspectives are clearly 
discernable relating to the dilemma: 
Firstly; the arrest of PIFWCs, particularly those who retain significant levels of popular 
support and critically, the support of armed forces (including paramilitary, military, 
interior ministry, police and intelligence services), may result in the deterioration and 
possible breakdown of a fragile, nascent peace, if the indictee's supporters respond to the 
arrest with sustained violence. 
Secondly and conversely; failing to arrest PIFWCs serves to reinforce the culture of 
impunity, undermining the potential deterrent effect of international criminal 
prosecutions. Furthermore, the failure to apprehend PIFWCs may have a detrimental 
impact on the quality of the order attained in post-conflict environments. PIFWCs are in 
many instances involved in actively undermining international peacebuilding efforts, 
acting as spoilers, frustrating attempts at rebuilding communities, and opposing refugee 
and minority returns, the latter of which generally constitutes a key policy of international 
peacebuilding. An explicit nexus between atrocity crimes and organized crime often 
exists, with those implicated in the former often heavily engaged in the latter, providing 
additional grounds for their apprehension. 
The thesis demonstrates that elements of both of the above premises have validity. 
Consequently, the thesis posits that post-conflict justice strategies, particularly relating to 
the delicate issue of apprehensions, should be conditional upon the specific dynamics of 
each particular case. Chapter four highlighted the situation in Afghanistan as a means of 
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demonstrating this principle, where in light of the specific dynamics after the U. S. led 
invasion in late 2001, considerations of prudence dictated that justice in the form of 
criminal prosecutions against individuals implicated in atrocity crimes needed to be 
deferred. The `International Community's' peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan has 
been comparatively small, whereas the bulk of the Coalition Force has been 
overwhelmingly preoccupied with counter-insurgency operations. Furthermore, many of 
the individuals who have been identified by `pro-prosecution' sources29 as potential 
indictees for the active commission, ordering of, or liability under the principle of 
command responsibility for atrocity crimes, have retained significant power within 
Afghanistan. Would the arrest of, for instance Abdul Rashid Dostum (of whom 
considerable evidence exists to suggest his implication in the commission of atrocity 
crimes) who retains significant support throughout parts of Northern Afghanistan, and 
whose Junbish military forces retain the capacity to rapidly remobilize and significantly 
threaten an uneasy peace which prevails in the region, be a prudent strategy, particularly 
in light of the "war"30 currently taking place in several Southern and South Eastern 
Afghan provinces? In such circumstances the "pursuit of justice without compromise , 31 
could well prove devastating for Afghanistan's civilians, resulting in a return to fighting, 
widespread loss of lives and associated population displacement. 
Ultimately, such predictions and scenarios are no more than speculation. Indeed, perhaps 
'factional commanders' such as Dostum are in reality paper tigers, who could be 
confronted and prosecuted for their alleged culpability for atrocity crimes without 
necessarily resulting in the dire suggested consequences. Having to make a choice as to 
which strategy should be pursued represents a succinct example of the 'terrible choices'32 
29 See Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001. Documentation and 
analysis of major patterns of abuse in the war in Afghanistan, The Afghan Justice Project, July 2005; Blood 
Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity. Human Rights Watch, 
July 2005 
30 In a refreshing dose of candour, NATO's commanding officer Lt Gen David Richards acknowledged in 
2006 that the engagements between NATO forces and Taliban fighters constituted a "war", something the 
military organization's political masters have been much less willing to admit. 31 Sec M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia, `Sexual Violence. An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former 
Yugoslavia', Occasional Paper No. I. International Human Rights Law Institute. DePaul University 
College of Law, 1996, p. 2. 
32 Sec' Hedley Bull quote in LINKLATER AND SUGANAMI, THE ENGLISH SCHOOL. p. 140. 
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Bull acknowledged confronted foreign policy makers in determining policy. Whilst the 
groundbreaking Afghan domestic consultation process `A Call for Justice' indicated that 
many respondents wished to see prosecutions initiated against those implicated in atrocity 
crimes, it also acknowledged the country's -current socio-political realities. -33 
particularly with regard to absence of security and the limited reach of the government. 
Consequently, whilst the issue of criminal prosecutions have been firmly placed on the 
agenda as a potential response, no specific timetables have been set. 
Despite these observations, the thesis also illustrates that considerable negative 
consequences may ensue where the `International Community' fails to acts robustly in 
instituting the rule of law in post-conflict environments. Whilst Holbrooke's ominous 
prediction that the continued freedom of Karadzic would mean no peace agreement we 
create in Dayton can ultimately succeed'. 34 has thankfully, not been realised, the presence 
of PIFWCs in post-conflict environments can clearly have an adverse impact on the 
quality of the order which materializes. Many PIFWCs in Bosnia were actively involved 
in undermining post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, blocking minority and refugee 
return and frustrating international initiatives. Furthermore, Chapter four highlights that 
a nexus often exists between the commission of atrocity crimes and organized crime, with 
the latter tending to expand and flourish in post-conflict environments where there is an 
inadequate international response. 
In light of these considerations, although the prevailing dynamics in certain cases will 
militate against instituting a more robust attitude towards enforcing the rule of law, 
particularly the arrest of PIFWCs (e. g. Afghanistan), where the dynamics do allow. for a 
more robust response, it should be instituted in the initial peacebuilding stages, given the 
significant negative consequences associated with failing to do so. The thesis argues that 
post-conflict Bosnia represented a clear case where a more robust international response 
towards enforcing the rule of law, particularly the arrest of PIFWCs, was possible, and 
should have been instituted earlier and in a more systematic manner. Hence, the thesis 
"Sec, A Call for Justice. Conclusions of AIHRC's National Consultation on Transitional Justice in 
: Afghanistan', AIHRC Press Release, January 29,2005. 34 Sec HOLRROOKE, To END A \V': \R, p. 226. 
237 
posits that in the case of post-conflict Bosnia, the claims made by States (as outlined in 
chapter four: NATO not having the requisite authority to arrest PIFWCs: not having 
enough information to locate PIFWCs; and critically, the contention that the arrest of 
PIFWCs would have imperilled the fragile post-conflict order) to justify, their failure to 
actively pursue and apprehend PIFWCs, particularly during the initial eighteen months of 
NATO's deployment were not valid and were applied `instrumentally. ' 
The presence of the robust international military force in Bosnia would have enabled 
NATO to have adequately responded to, and contained, any adverse reaction to 
apprehensions. Furthermore, the specific operating environment in Bosnia meant a 
repeat of the disaster which occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia, during the compromised 
operation to apprehend key figures associated with General Aideed, was for the majority 
of potential apprehensions, highly unlikely. Additionally, the statements by the domestic 
parties (particularly the Bosnian Serbs) that there would have been no significant adverse 
reaction to arrests, even of Karadzic35, also demonstrates that NATO's su`g, estion that 
arresting PIFWCs would be too destabilizing was patently wrong. Instead, the thesis 
posits that the purported threat to order was applied instrumentally by NATO and its 
major troop contributing States, to mask ulterior motives for inaction, relating to 
considerations of force protection and the wider reluctance to engage in Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW). 
Domestic Prosecutions 
The thesis demonstrates that holding domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes in the 
State/entity whose citizens are implicated in the crimes, is in many cases not viable. 
Chapters four and five highlight that individuals implicated in atrocity crimes are often 
feted as heroes by their fellow citizens and that dramatically varying perceptions exist 
within such communities relating to the cause of the conflict(s). In such cases, the 
acknowledgment within a particular ethnic community that atrocity crimes ww ere 
committed, is often limited to the extent that the particular community was the v ictim of 
such crimes rather than an admission of their culpability in the commission of any such 
35 Sec Eve-Ann Prentice, 'Serb Forces 'Would Not Resist Arrest of Karadzic', Times. July 22.1996. 
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acts. As a result, domestic prosecutions are vulnerable to ethnic bias and a 
disproportionate focus on the other'. 
Chapters four and five also demonstrate that where individuals implicated in the 
commission of atrocity crimes retain a level of influence within the political, judicial or 
security spheres, domestic investigations and prosecutions relating to these crimes, which 
adhere to due process and international standards of fair trial, are highly unlikely. In such 
circumstances, credible witness protection schemes are also extremely difficult to 
institute, acting as a further barrier to trials. The experiences of the Bosnian Federation 
authorities in Sarajevo also suggests that even where States/entities are willing to conduct 
such prosecutions, their scope to do so is seriously inhibited where evidence and potential 
suspects reside within a State/entity which refuses to cooperate. Consequently. William's 
and Scharf's critique that the Rules of the Road Agreement (an agreement which made 
domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes conditional on authorization from the ICTY), 
frustrated domestic prosecutions, as outlined in chapter four, is largely flayed. Whilst 
the ICTY may not have allocated sufficient resources to the Rules of the Road 
programme, Republika Srpska's abject failure to investigate crimes committed by 
Bosnian Serbs suggests that even if more cases had been authorised by the Tribunal, 
prosecutions would not have been instituted. Such factors throw into doubt the 
contention that `, justice at the level of the state is more effective in rebuilding strong 
communities than justice implemented at cosmopolitan level"36 It has become 
increasingly common within the human rights community to emphasise how international 
criminal prosecution initiatives based outside the area where atrocity crimes were 
committed, are too removed from the victims. Instead it is argued that domestic 
prosecutions provide a greater level of `ownership' However, whilst this is a laudable 
aim in principle, the practices of the States/entities of the former Yugoslavia suggests that 
in practice, domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes, without a sufficient level of 
international involvement are an unrealistic proposition. Thus, where an international 
presence is deployed in a post-conflict environment, it may be necessary to address these 
36 See Jason Ralph. International society. the international Criminal Court and . -American 
foreign policy'. 
Review oflnternational Studies, 31,2005, p. 37. 
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concerns via the direct involvement of international rule of law specialists to ensure any 
domestic prosecutions adhere to internationally recognized fair trial standards. A process 
similar to the "Regulation 64" panels instituted in Kosovo. where cases relating to 
atrocity crimes were heard by a panel of three judges, two of whom were international 
personnel, may provide a potential template. 
Domestic Prosecutions: The International Criminal Court 
In contrast to the ICTY's principle of primacy, which empowered the Tribunal to 
exercise jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes regardless of whether a 
State of the former Yugoslavia wished to initiate domestic proceedings, the ICC's Treaty 
is firmly grounded on the premise that States should assume the primary responsibility 
for adjudicating such crimes. Both the Statute's preamble and Article 1 emphasize that 
the Court "shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. "137 Furthermore, 
Article 17 (1) of the Statute stipulates that the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. 
As the ICC is the product of an international Treaty rather than a U. N. Security Council 
Chapter VII Declaration, considerably more deference was accorded to States concerns 
and objections during the Treaty negotiation process. Consequently, the Court is 
endowed with considerably less power to exert its jurisdiction than the ad hoc tribunals, 
as a result of the cardinal principle of complementarity, and the Treaty's deferential 
language of "requests" rather than "orders" regarding State cooperation. Ultimately, 
it is 
unlikely that the Treaty would have been successfully negotiated without such deference 
being afforded to States. Nevertheless, the implications for the Court may be 
37 Sc'e Preamble & Art. 1, Rome Statute. 
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considerable. The thesis demonstrates how States entities are often unwilling to pursue 
credible domestic prosecutions, particularly relating to atrocity crimes in which the 
State/entity are implicated. However, a recalcitrant State, entity may seek to delay the 
ICC's involvement by embarking on a strategy of maintaining that it is instituting 
credible domestic prosecutions. Whilst the Court has, in principle. the potential po« er to 
intervene in cases where it determines a State is either unwilling or unable to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution, it remains unclear how the Court will make such a 
determination, and clear scope exists for the State to carry out lengthy stalling tactics. By 
keeping the ICC at bay in this way, the prospects for achieving a credible prosecution at a 
later date may well be imperilled, crimes scenes could be tampered with, witnesses 
intimidated or killed etc. Although a non State Party to the ICC Treaty, Sudan 
nevertheless appears to recognize the potential value of stressing that domestic 
prosecutions are being initiated as a mechanism to deflect calls for the ICC to obtain a 
greater level of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities. 
Intelligence Cooperation 
Whilst some characterisations of the value of intelligence material for the purposes of 
investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes are overstated, the thesis demonstrates that 
in many cases such material may often prove critically important. Satellite imagery of 
suspected mass grave sites, such as those presented by Madeline Albright to the Security 
Council in 1995 and subsequently passed on to the Tribunal, can be of significant 
assistance in locating crime scenes. Similarly, as chapter five illustrates, the signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) excerpts submitted by the Prosecution in the Krstic case highlights 
the potentially decisive impact such material may have in helping to prove individual 
criminal responsibility. Such intelligence becomes even more crucial where the 
State/entity in which the crimes have been committed refuses to cooperate. Nevertheless, 
despite the clear potential value of the material, the thesis also illustrates that the 
relationship between institutions of international criminal justice and intelligence 
agencies has been, and continues to remain, complex, delicate, challenging. and 
ultimately, conditional on considerations of wider geo-political imperatives. 
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Chapter two reveals how, historically, Western intelligence agencies have adopted 
conflicting attitudes towards the issue of atrocity crimes. Thus, the U. S. Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) would play a key role in the Nuremberg trial, providing 
considerable logistical, strategic, evidentiary and diplomatic assistance to the prosecutors. 
with approximately one third of the senior staff of the U. S. prosecution team comprising 
OSS personnel. However, Western intelligence agencies attitudes towards suspected 
Nazi war criminals would also be influenced by considerations as to whether such 
individuals could play a positive role in addressing the threat of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, U. S. intelligence agencies acted to exempt a number of suspected Nazi 
war criminals from prosecution at Nuremberg and subsequent prosecutions in exchange 
for their technical and espionage skills. 38 Thus, the U. S. Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps (CIC) in Germany recruited Klaus Barbie (an SS officer who would later be 
convicted for his role in rounding up Jews in France and for suppressing the French 
resistance) as an agent and smuggled him out of Europe, thereby facilitating his 
avoidance of justice for over 30 years. Similarly, the CIA's recruitment of General 
Reinhard Gehlen to establish West Germany's intelligence service enabled him to 
"promote and protect" [suspected] war criminals"39, and the agency also failed to inform 
the Israeli authorities after learning the pseudonym and whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann, 
40 due to fears that Hans Globke, one of their top agents would be exposed. 
The thesis also demonstrates the acute challenges institutions of international criminal 
justice face in persuading key States of the `International Community' (whose formidable 
intelligence gathering capabilities are often deployed to gather information where atrocity 
crimes are being committed), to disclose relevant material which could facilitate 
investigations, the drafting of indictments, and ultimately contribute to successful 
prosecutions. In some instances a State's refusal to supply intelligence may be predicated 
on the premise that such disclosure could undermine or disrupt diplomatic initiativ es the 
38 See Bryan and Salter, 'War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies', p. 101. 
39 See Professor Timothy Naftali, consulting historian to The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial 
Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) quote in RICHARD BREITNIAN. NORM, \` GOAD; \. 
Two I 'Hy N: \I 1 ; \LI, AND ROBERT WOLFE, U. S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE N, \zis. (National 
Archive Trust 
Fund Board) 2004, p. 406. 
40 See Scott Shane, `C. I. A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding. Documents Show'.. Vcº, ' York Times, June 
7,2006 
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State is involved in or supports, which is aimed at facilitating a negotiated settlement 
between `warring factions. '(as demonstrated by the refusal of the U. K. Conservative 
Government of John Major to disclose information to the Commission and Tribunal). 
Chapter one also highlights that intelligence material may also be withheld where a State 
determines that its publication could lead to increased pressure being placed on the 
disclosing State to respond to the atrocities more robustly (in this case the Bush Senior 
administration's knowledge of the existence of Bosnian-Serb run detention camps 
throughout 1992). 
Additionally, the thesis suggests that the Commission and the Tribunal's struggle to ý_ain 
access to intelligence material was affected by the deeply entrenched attitudes within 
many States intelligence agencies which informed their position of opposing such 
cooperation. This opposition was predicated on the belief that cooperation with 
international investigative and prosecutory bodies was often a one-way exchange, of 
limited benefit, and contrary to the principle of reciprocity which generally characterizes 
intelligence cooperation. Furthermore, the culture of non-disclosure imbued within most 
State intelligence services would serve to frustrate attempts by the Commission and 
Tribunal to obtain material. Nevertheless, when assessing this difficult relationship, it is 
important to appreciate that the intelligence agencies were confronted with an 
unprecedented situation in being requested to disclose information to an international 
judicial institution. Intelligence sharing within a State's own intelligence community is 
often a fractious and limited affair. The process generally becomes even more 
complicated when disclosure is between States. For interaction with an international 
institution, staffed with multi-national personnel, these tensions will almost inevitably be 
increased. 
Were States concerns legitimate? Sharing intelligence with multinational organizations 
may clearly increase the risk of leaks. The compromised arrest operations aimed at 
apprehending Radovan Karadzic outlined in chapter five, succinctly highlights the clear 
risks associated such intelligence sharing. In many respects, the ICTY's personnel 
structure could only enhance concerns of many intelligence services. A large number of 
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the Tribunal's intelligence analysts were seconded from State intelligence services. 
Whist this may allay the fears of those States with personnel working for the Tribunal. 
the prospect of specialists gaining access to material from States who do not have 
representatives working at the Court, may present a significant disincentive 
One of the main reasons advanced by key States of the 'International Community ' for the 
non-disclosure of intelligence material often related to a purported concern that their 
methods and sources would be compromised. However, the thesis demonstrates that in 
many cases, appropriate ways and means can be devised in order to address such 
concerns. Rule 70 of the Tribunal's RPE allows States to hand over certain material 
without disclosing either its source or the method used to obtain it, and also provided the 
additional safeguard that any use of the material be conditional on the disclosing State's 
consent. Further provisions, such as enabling a single judge sitting in camera to assess 
the material to determine whether a State's concerns that disclosure during trial N\ould be 
prejudicial to national security, also provide a means to facilitate cooperation in this 
sensitive area. 
The above procedural safeguards do not come without consequences. Whilst Rule 70 
may have acted to assuage State concerns relating to the disclosure of sensitive material, 
many States became almost totally reliant on the Rule as a means to provide information. 
Hence, serious questions have been raised as to whether the mechanism undermines 
wider `interests of justice' issues. Can a defendant receive a fair trial if potentially 
critical evidence is withheld from his defence counsel due to a State's express refusal to 
allow the Tribunal to disclose? Conversely, where the defendant may be a senior agent 
of a State who continues to retain links with the regime implicated in atrocity crimes, can 
a State which possesses intelligence material be expected to agree to disclosure where a 
risk exists that the sensitive material maybe fed back to the regime via the defendant's 
legal counsel? 
Ultimately, even where processes such as Rule 70 are instituted, State cooperation 
relating to intelligence disclosure cannot be guaranteed. As Wedgwood noted. The 
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ethical standards attending international judicial office and [such] procedural 
precautions... . may not persuade national governments that they can afford the risks of 
complete disclosure. "41 A U. S. Pentagon delegate to the Rome Conference which 
established the ICC Treaty, emphatically confirmed Wedgwood's observations, stating 
"we don't trust judges to make the proper decisions about U. S. national security interests 
and how important they are. . . these 
judges are not even trained in assessing 
intelligence. '42 
Obtaining cooperation from the intelligence services of States,, entities who are implicated 
in the commission of atrocity crimes may be even more challenging for international 
investigative and prosecutory bodies. In certain instances, domestic intelligence services 
which have established contact networks can provide vital support in locating witnesses,. 
However, such support generally comes with the caveat that the domestic intelligence 
agencies may also be pursuing their own domestic agendas via such cooperation. 
Witnesses may have been `planted' to present a particular version of events, or support in 
investigating one particular case may be offered as a mechanism to divert attention from 
other cases which the domestic intelligence service wishes to cover-up. Furthermore, 
while support may be offered in some instances, the security and intelligence services of 
a State/entity may play an active role in the commission of atrocity crimes. In such cases, 
the State/entity will have little incentive to assist investigators and to disclose documents 
or other evidence which might inculpate them personally, their subordinates or their 
superiors. 43 Conversely, rather than assist, it is more likely that the intelligence services 
of a State/entity implicated in atrocity crimes will actively seek to frustrate and 
undermine international investigations. Chapters four and five highlight how all the 
domestic intelligence services in the region monitored the activities of the ICTY, with the 
Croats and Bosnia Croats also attempting to penetrate the Tribunal's investigative 
41 Sec Ruth Wedgwood, `The International Criminal Tribunal and Subpoenas for State Documents', in 
MICFIAEL N. SCHMITT & LESLIE C. GREEN (EDS. ) THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE: NEXT 
MILLENNIUM. INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOLUME 71 (Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island) 
1998, p. 494. 
42 Interview with Pentagon member of the U. S. delegation to the Rome Conference. 
'si See Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor. 'Prosecuting Massi\ e Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three 
Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings'. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice. Vol. 2., No. 2., June 2004, p. 407. 
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support network by recruiting interpreters as informers. In light of these factors, the 
refusal of a State/entity whose forces have been directly implicated in the commission of 
atrocity crimes, to release documents on the grounds that such disclosure would 
constitute a threat to its national security, becomes all the more controversial. The 
Blaskic case discussed in chapter five, aptly illustrates the potential consequences of a 
State's refusal to disclose information on such grounds. The documentation which was 
not supplied to the Tribunal during the initial trial and subsequently released by the 
Croatian government after President Tudjman's death, revealed the existence of a parallel 
chain of command in relation to the forces operating in and around Ahmici. This critical 
development contributed to General Blaskic's initial conviction of crimes against 
humanity being overturned. The episode reveals how non-disclosure, based on a 
subjective determination by a State that the requested material threatens national security, 
may seriously inhibit an international criminal court's efforts to establish a credible case, 
or may lead to defendants being wrongly convicted on the basis of incomplete evidence. 
Despite the difficulties the Tribunal has faced in gaining intelligence information, the 
thesis demonstrates that intelligence disclosure and wider cooperation by a number of key 
Western States did, in certain instances, improve over time. Chapter five illustrates how 
British and U. S. intelligence agencies played a critical role in tracking and monitoring 
PIFWCs, forming an integral part of the wider apprehension strategy. Furthermore, 
during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the U. K. provided material to assist in the Tribunal's 
compilation of the Milosevic indictment in what the (then) Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
described as "the biggest handover of British intelligence to an outside agency in 
history. "44 Similarly, Britain's M16 or SIS were heavily involved in attempts to locate 
General Ante Gotovina. Nevertheless, the latter two examples suggest that cooperation 
is heavily dependent on a synthesis of interests of the disclosing State(s) and the recipient 
of the information. Thus, in the case of the U. K. s handover of material reportedly to 
assist in the Milosevic indictment, former Prosecutor Goldstone's query as to why the 
information had not been released earlier, suggests that the material was only handed 
" See Ed \ ulliamv and Patrick \Vintour, 'Hawks smell a Tyrant's blood. N-ATO's tieNN Confidence 
Suggests That the Neck of Slobodan Milosevic, the Butcher of Belgrade. May Itself Be on the Block'. The 
Obser, ver, May 10,1999. 
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over after the U. K., in conjunction with the U. S. had determined that M. lilosevic could no 
longer be viewed as part of the solution, but was in fact the major problem in the re, -, ion. 
and consequently should be further de-legitimized. In the case of Britain's SIS tracking 
of General Gotovina, it appears that concerns that his support network may have been 
involved in trafficking weapons to the Real IRA was also a motivating factor in 
commencing the operation. 45 
The principle that intelligence cooperation will be enhanced where common interests 
exist, is further illustrated in the case of the prosecution of senior Ba'ath Party personnel 
in Iraq after U. S. -led invasion in 2003. A former official of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority's (CPA) Crimes against Humanity Unit who had previously worked at the 
ICTY confirmed that a much closer relationship was developed with U. S. intelligence 
agencies. With the trial of Saddam Hussein and his senior associates representing a 
central element of U. S. post-war policy in Iraq, officials involved in the initial 
prosecution strategy were granted access to the `High Value Detainee Conference', a 
round-up of pertinent information gathered by the intelligence community. ``' Ironically. 
the Crimes against Humanity unit would face obstruction from the very organization 
which has often criticized State's for failing to disclose intelligence information. Human 
Rights Watch refuse to pass on original documents in its possession relating to the Anfal 
Campaign, the Iraqi military campaign against the country's Kurdish population. This 
non-disclosure was premised on Human Rights Watch's objection to the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal's decision to include the death penalty as part of its potential sentences. The 
former CPA Crimes against Humanity Unit official highlighted how much of the 
information HRW possessed was provided by Kurdish organizations with the express 
intention that it could, one day, be used for the purpose of prosecution. The official went 
on to express frustration that the international human rights organization had ultimately 
45 Sec Ian Traynor, The Fugitive who stands in the way of Croatia's El Entry', Guardian, March 18. 
2005. 
46 Inter\ iew with former member of the CPA's Crimes against Humanity Unit. Despite this enhanced 
cooperation, the official also highlighted that the unit did face problems in some cases where material 
requested had to be declassified by the same individuals who originally classified it. The three month 
rotation of intelligence personnel from the field in some cases made this a time consuming process. 
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"imposed its own value system" to the detriment of the actual victims of the Anfal 
Campaign. 47 
Intelligence Cooperation and The International Criminal Court 
Similar to Rule 70 of the ICTY's RPE, Article 54 (3) (e) of The ICC's Statute seeks to 
assuage States' concerns relating to the sharing of sensitive material with the Court. It 
stipulates the Prosecutor may "Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings. 
documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality 
and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the 
information consents. "48 An ICC OTP official confirmed that the Court had received 
information from a number of States via this mechanism, which was viewed as 
"providing a level of comfort"49 for States. Whilst comforting for States, the provision 
will also impact upon a defendant's potential to access exculpatory evidence. which may 
impair his/her right to a fair trial. However, like rule 70 of the ICTY's RPE. it is difficult 
to imagine many States submitting information without such protective measures. 
Article 72 of the Court's statute also addresses the issue of the protection of national 
security information, and applies in any case where the disclosure of the information or 
documents of a State would, in the opinion of that State, prejudice its national security 
interests. "50 Thus, in contrast to the initial Trial Chamber judgment in the Bla. skic 
subpoena case, the decision as to whether disclosure of the information would be 
damaging to the State's national security rests on a subjective determination of the State. 
Such a blanket provision potentially opens up "sweeping opportunities for refusing 
cooperation . "51 In the Blaskic subpoena case Appeals 
Chamber judgment, Judge Cassese 
argued that Croatia's claim of an unbounded national security privilege ww ould shield 
"documents that might prove of decisive importance to the conduct of trials" and would 
Inters ieww with former member of the CPAs Crimes against Humanity Unit. 48 Sec Article 54 (3) (e) Rome Statute. 
49 Interview with OTP official, ICC. 
50 See Article 72(1). Rome Statute. 
See Roland Bank, 'Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 
the Production of Evidence', in J. A. FROWEIN AND R. \VOLFRUNI (E[)s. ), M \N PL.: \\('K '1'i . -ARBOOK 
01 
UNITED N: v riots L: vvv', (Kluwer Law International) 2000, p. '_47 
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be tantamount to undermining the very essence of the International Tribunal '. x 
functions. "* 52 
Article 72 effectively represents such an unbounded national security privilege. 
However, would an alternative, more robust provision, which granted the Court the 
power to order the disclosure of material, have been any more effective? Like the ICTY. 
the ICC lacks any real power to enforce such an order. In an event of non-compliance the 
Court may inform the Assembly of State Parties which may in turn refer the matter to the 
U. N. Security Council, which as Chuter acerbically notes are no doubt terrif\ ing 
punishments but which might not be wholly effective [in facilitating disclosure]. 53 It is 
unclear what coercive power, if any, the former body possesses and although the Security 
Council is endowed under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter with considerable power to 
impose sanctions or authorize the use of military force, the ICTY's experience of 
reporting non-compliance to the Council suggests the body will often be disinclined to 
act. 
When a State seeks to invoke Article 72, the Court may find it particularly difficult to 
pursue credible prosecutions relating to command responsibility, where the existence of 
official sources of military documentation (likely to be determined by a State as falling 
under the cover of national security considerations) is often essential to establish the 
necessary chain of command. However, where a State refuses a request for assistance, in 
whole or in part, on the basis of concerns that the production of the requested documents 
or evidence is prejudicial to its national security, the Court may "make such inference in 
the trial of the accused as to the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances' 54 A defendant's legal counsel may well rely on the 
Court's ability to make such an inference. arguing that a State's refusal to disclose the 
requested information may be based on the existence of critically important exculpatory 
evidence, and that any continuation of a trial without access to the withheld material 
52 See Blaskic Subpoena Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 84. 
53 See CHU I ER, \VAR CRIMES, p. 220. 54 Sce At icie 72 (7) (a) (iii), Rome Statute. 
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would be contrary to the presumption of innocence set out in Article 66 of the Statute. " 
As Behrens highlights, under such circumstances a State "could shield wrongdoers 
simply by withholding relevant information, which is certainly not in conformity with the 
purpose of the Statute . -56 In other instances, a State may not be interested in shielding 
wrongdoers, but nevertheless refuse to disclose information due to other concerns. 
Consequently, Schabas suggests that Article 72 "provides the Defence with a very 
intriguing strategic weapon. It will be in its interest to allege the existence of relevant 
facts in the possession of a State. This might for example, take the form of 
communications intercepts in the hands of the intelligence agencies of major world 
powers. A refusal to disclose is entirely predictable in such cases, and for rrcu. cons totalhv 
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. "57 Whatever the motivations are for a 
States refusal to disclose information, `some of the guilty will go free because of the 
effects of Article 72. " Schabas goes on to highlight that it remains to be seen whether 
its terms will also lead to the conviction of the innocent. "5 8 
To date (August 2006) no State has invoked its right under Article 72 of the ICC's Treaty 
to withhold requested information, although the Court has received material under the 
provisions of Article 54 (3) (e). 59 An official within the ICC's OTP noted how, learning 
from the experiences of the ICTY, uncoordinated blanket requests for information are not 
being submitted to States. Furthermore, States' intelligence services were not being 
specifically approached with requests for information. Instead, a limited number of OTP 
officials, with experience in liaising with States via traditional diplomatic channels, are 
55 Article 66 comprises three sub-sections: (1) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
before the Court in accordance with the applicable law; (2) The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt 
of the accused; (3) In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt. 56 See Hans-Jorg Behrens, `Protection of National Security Information in the ICC: A Guide to Article 72 
of the Rome Statute', in HERWIG ROGGEMANN AND PETAR SARCEVIC (EDS. ), NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Kluwer Law International) 2002, p. 125. 
57 See William Schabas, `National Security Interests and the Rights of the Accused'. in 
HERWIG ROGGEMANN AND PETAR SARCEVIC (EDS. ). NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRINI IN AL 
JUSTICE (Kluwer Law International) 2002, pp. 108-109. 
58 Sec William Schabas, `National Security Interests and the Rights of the Accused'. in 
HERWIG ROGGEM; \NN AND PETAR SARCEVIC (EDS. ), NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERN CATION \L CRI\I I\AL 
JUSTICE (Kluwer Law International) 2002, p. 113. 
59 Interview with OTP official, International Criminal Court. 
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engaged in establishing constructive relationships in an attempt to facilitate productive 
information provision. 60 
Obtaining Military Cooperation: 
Investigations 
Chapter one highlights how the Commission had difficulty persuading elements of 
UNPROFOR to provide assistance with its field missions, particularly the attempted mass 
grave exhumation at Ovcara, Croatia. This resistance was predicated on several grounds. 
Firstly, support of human rights investigations was distinctly viewed as not part of the 
force's mandate. Involvement in such issues was perceived as contrary to the cardinal 
principle of neutrality within U. N. Peacekeeping operations. Considerations of force 
protection and fears of a backlash by the local Serbian forces also played a role, leading 
to UNPROFOR stressing that an alleged mass grave site of Serb victims should be 
investigated concurrently in order to maintain perceptions of parity. A reluctance to 
support the Commission's work was also linked to the more prosaic reason of limited 
resources. U. N. forces are often undermanned and under equipped. Diverting resources 
beyond the key mandated tasks to other roles, whatever they may be, will generally be 
met with opposition. Nevertheless, as illustrated by UNPROFOR's February 22,1994 
internal memo; `War Crimes Investigation', some elements of the force, particularly the 
Military Police component, did conduct investigations into alleged atrocity crimes, and 
eventually guidelines were drafted providing that UNPROFOR personnel would, where 
possible, secure and preserve evidence relating to such crimes. 
Chapter four illustrates that like UNPROFOR, IFOR displayed a similar reluctance to 
support the Tribunal's investigations, refusing to allocate forces for area security around 
suspected mass grave sites during the initial deployment in 1996. Nevertheless, over 
time SFOR began to adopt a more proactive stance, with SOF personnel providing close 
protection to Tribunal investigators during searches of a number of installations 
controlled by the former 'warring factions, ' which resulted in critical documents being 
obtained. 
60 Interview with OTP official. International Criminal Court. 
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Since Bosnia, international military forces have adopted varying attitudes towards 
assisting attempts to investigate atrocity crimes. With regard to Kosovo. U. N. Security 
Council Resolution 1244 explicitly called for "full cooperation by all concerned. 
including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. -61 In stark contrast to IFOR's initial reluctance to support the 
Tribunal with regard to investigations in Bosnia, KFOR agreed to provide a secure 
environment for `scene of crime' teams, fourteen of which were rapidly provided by U. N. 
member States in response to the Tribunal's request for assistance. These teams were on 
the ground two days after the NATO forces entered the province. Documentation teams 
quickly followed. 62 Furthermore, ICTY investigative teams were "nestled within the 
command structure in each of the sector headquarters. Military teams secured mass 
graves.... escorted [investigators] back and forth as they did the forensics work at the 
sites.. . and executed a myriad of other support 
functions. "`" KFOR actively compiled a 
detailed database of over 150 crime scenes, together with available witness statements 
and digital photos, forwarding it to the Tribunal. Additionally, in one particular case in 
Pristina, "KFOR permitted ICTY investigators to take a truck of documents from a police 
station, allowing the Tribunal to process the material without additional time-consuming 
"64 recourse to national govermnents. 
In East Timor however, international military forces deployed in 1999 reverted to the 
approach of IFOR, and were reluctant to become involved in supporting atrocity crimes 
investigations or guarding suspected mass grave sites. Similarly, in Iraq, U. S. forces 
refused to secure several mass grave sites, leading to their contamination by the desperate 
61 See S. C. Res. 1244, U. N. SCOR, 54th Sess.. 4011th mtg. U. N. Doc. S RES/1244 (1999) (emphasis 
added) 
62 See John Ralston `Investigating War Crimes. "The Role of Investigators In Crisis Intervention"'. 
Presentation given at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal law. 15`h International 
Conference, Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice, august 30,2001. 
63 Sec Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice', 
Connecticut, Journal of International Law, Spring, 2004. p. ? 41. 
64 Sec Michael Newton, 'Harmony or Hegemony? The American Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. 
Connecticut, lournal of International Law. Spring, 2004, p. 255. 
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actions of Iraqis trying to locate family members «ho had been 'disappeared' under the 
Ba'ath regime. 65 
Arrests 
The thesis demonstrates that the most sensitive issue for international military forces 
relates to arresting PIFWCs. Where international forces are to be deployed into an 
operating environment where atrocity crimes have been committed and PIFWW"Cs are 
residing, should the mission mandate explicitly obligate such forces to actively pursue 
and apprehend PIFWCs? Chapter three illustrates that the U. S. military would have 
refused to take part in the post-conflict peacekeeping mission to Bosnia had any such 
obligation been imposed upon them. Without U. S. participation, the mission would have 
been fatally compromised, with the potential European-troop contributing States making 
their involvement conditional on U. S. involvement. (With the scope of IFOR's mandate 
essentially determined in Washington before Dayton, the European troop-contributing 
States did not have to respond to the issue. Nevertheless, it is likely the majority of them 
would also have been actively opposed to an explicit obligation to carry out arrests). 
Consequently, as Newton highlights, imposing an obligation on international forces 
within the mandate may actually "undermine the pursuit of justice by creating a 
disincentive for the very forces capable of restoring respect for the law [to take part in the 
"66 proposed mission]. 
However, chapter four demonstrates that where an international peacekeeping force's 
mandate is nebulous over the issue of arrests, the force may well rely on such ambiguity 
to justify a `minimalist' attitude towards the issue. With discussions intensifying over the 
possible deployment of a large U. N. peacekeeping force to take over from African Union 
forces in Darfur, Sudan, 67 where widespread atrocity crimes have taken place, 
68 the 
debate over mandate scope is likely to be revisited. In future, where a mandate omits 
65 See Rory McCarthy, 'US accused of failing to protect mass grave', Guardian, Niaý 15.2003. 
66 Sec Michael Newton, "'A View from the Trenches": The Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice'. Ca. ' 
ifc'stern Resern"c' Journal of International Law, Spring 2003,35.2. p. 298. 
67 Sec, 'Annan says more than 18.000 troops would be needed for UN mission in Darfur', L1'Neºrs Centre, 
August 4.2006. 
68 Sec 'Sudan: ICC fi nds evidence of Darfur massacres. prepares prosecution'. IRIN. June 16.2006. 
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imposing an active obligation on international forces, it is nevertheless highly likely that 
if deployed into environments where atrocity crimes have been committed and where the 
ICC has issued indictments, demands will be made on the force to carry out 
apprehensions on the basis of customary law obligations. Chapter four highlights how a 
number of `pro-prosecution' advocates argued that NATO forces were obliged to actively 
seek out and detain PIFWCs in order to satisfy the requirements of the Grave Breaches 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, although the contention has been robustly 
contested, particularly by military lawyers. Whilst obligations vis-ä-vis the Grave 
Breaches provisions would not arise in relation to the conflict taking place in Darfur, 
Sudan, due to its non-international character, demands that arrests be conducted in order 
to satisfy the provisions of the Genocide Convention, may well be advanced. 
Burying the Ghost of Mogadishu? 
The thesis illustrates how NATO's reluctance to carry out arrests \1 as in part linked to an 
association of such missions with the disaster at Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, where 18 
U. S. servicemen were killed during an operation to apprehend members of General 
Aideed's militia. However, chapter five demonstrates that Mogadishu should not be so 
readily invoked as a potential template for future arrest operations. Again the specifics of 
each particular case will need to be assessed on their own merits. Nevertheless, the 
numerous successful apprehension missions conducted in Bosnia (e. g. Galic, Krstic) 
illustrates how success can be achieved without incurring disproportionate casualties. 
Beyond the issue of a State's concern about incurring casualties, the thesis demonstrates 
how the reluctance to carry out arrests also relates to an unwillingness, apparent within a 
number of States military forces (particularly the U. S. ), to engage in Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW). This reluctance is particularly acute with regards to what the 
military construe as quasi-police functions and law and order issues. However, the thesis 
also highlights how international military forces may be the only forces with the capacity 
to conduct such operations. Internationally deployed police units are often not 
sufficiently robust to carry out arrests, and the domestic parties are either unwilling or 
unable to do so. Nevertheless, despite the clear practical reasons which suggest that 
_'>4 
international military forces need to engage in such areas, strong resistance towards 
OOTW remains. As Richard Holbrooke highlighted. for many within Washington 
Nationbuilding is considered "a dirty word"69, as illustrated by Condoleezza Rice's view 
that "Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade 
the American capability to do the things America has to do. "70 Similarly, U. S. reluctance 
to engage in OOTW was further demonstrated by Secretary of State for Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld's, ("an implacable opponent of using US troops in peace operations"71) -'00? 
attempts to close the U. S. Army's Peacekeeping Institute at the U. S. Army War College 
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 72 This trenchant opposition to OOTW however. does not 
reflect the operational future or the new world disorder that produced these challenges. 
Fortunately, there appears to be an emerging recognition by some policymakers within 
the 'International Community', that where international forces are deployed into post- 
conflict environments, it is critically important for them to play an active role in restoring 
law and order, and that this should be done sooner rather than later. 73 
Obtaining State Support for Arrests: A New Emphasis 
Consequently, this thesis posits that in future cases where international forces deploy in a 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement capacity to an environment where atrocity crimes 
have been committed and the ICC is investigating, `pro-prosecution' advocates and the 
ICC should actively engage in this debate as a means to induce cooperation from the 
troop-contributing States. This thesis contends that in situations where there is a 
sufficient international military force to contain any negative reaction to the arrest of 
PIFWCs, and where an overall assessment determines that such arrests will not threaten 
the nascent peace, the ICC should emphasise that a mutual interest exists between the 
69 See Richard Holbrooke comments made during presentation 'Achieving Peace - Lessons from Shuttle 
Diplomacy - Ending Military Conflict', Lessons Learned and Best Practices 
from the Western Balkans, 
Conference Proceedings No. 1, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm, October 8-9,2003, p. 23. 
70 Condoleeza Rice, quote in, William Drozdiak, 'Bush Plan Worries Europeans; Removing US Troops 
from Balkans is Seen as Divisive', The lI äshington Post, October 24,2000. 
71 Sec William G. O'Neill, `A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced. ' Occasional 
Paper, The Brookings Institution - John Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, 
April 2004. p. 44. 
72 Sec, Jim Lobe, `Pentagon to close only U. S. Peacekeeping Institute', Inter Press Service. June 4.2002. 
73 See Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order 
After Conflict, Rand Corporation, 2005; In The Wake Of War: Improving U. S. Post-Conflict Capabilities. 
Report of an Independent Task Force, Sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations, 2005. 
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Court and international forces engaged in peacebuilding. By highlighting the negative 
impact many PIFWCs exert in post-conflict environments (who act as spoilers through 
their involvement in obstructing refugee and IDP return, and their links to oruanized 
crime), it may be contended that the ICC stands a greater chance of obtaining cooperation 
from the troop-contributing States than by merely emphasising a purported nexus 
between prosecutions and deterrence and reconciliation, which remains highly disputed 
and unproven. 
Indeed, the existence of the ICTY did little to prevent the mass execution of over sc% en 
thousand Bosnian Muslim men and boys from the Srebrenica enclave in 1995, or 
Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. As Snyder and Vinjamuri 
highlight, The Tribunal's case against Milosevic noted that he ignored Western 
diplomats' face-to-face warnings that he would be prosecuted if he failed to stop the 
Serbian abuses in Kosovo. 74 Similarly, despite claims that reports of ICC investigators 
operating in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had a potential 
deterrent effect in 2004,75 the numerous atrocities committed since then76 indicate that 
this assessment was overly optimistic. Despite the ICC's public announcements that it is 
actively investigating, the continued commission of atrocity crimes by "Janja« eed' 
militias within the Darfur region of Sudan and within the border region of Eastern Chad, 
further illustrates that the threat of prosecution may have little or no deterrent effect. 77 
Thus, `pro-prosecution' advocates would do well to confront the uncomfortable reality 
that the commission of atrocity crimes may, in certain instances, actually make tactical. 
strategic sense to the perpetrators. Bryan and Salter posit that `'Few would dispute the 
74 See Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri. `Trials and Errors. Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice', International Security. Vol. 28, No. 3 Winter 2003 2004. p. 20. 
75 See generally `In Uncharted waters: Seeking Justice Before the Atrocities Have Stopped. The 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. Citizens for Global 
Solutions, June 2004. 
76 See Human Rights Overview, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Human Rights Watch. available at 
http: //hrw. ot-g/englisli, /docs, '2006/01/18, congol2237. htm 
77 Secc 'Chad: Sudanese Militia Massacre Chadian Civilians. More Than 100 People Killed in Recent 
Attacks in Eastern Chad', Human Rights Watch Press Release, May 26,2006. As recently as mid-Au`_ust 
2006, the U. N. has warned that Sudan appears to be preparing for a major military offensive in Darfur. sece 
Glen Kessler, 'U. N. Official Warns of Major New Sudanese Offensive in Darfur'. Washington Post. 
August 18,2006. 
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irrational nature of the motivations that drive communities to participate in, or at least 
tacitly support, vicious campaigns of ethnic, religious or racial genocide against their 
neighbours-78 However, such "vicious campaigns" may actually be grounded in clear, 
pragmatic reasoning. Take for example, the leader of a militia group, largely comprised 
of child soldiers. A former child soldier himself, the leader maintains his position by a 
culture of fear predicated on the commission of demonstrable atrocities. In such cases. 
carrying out atrocities may well take precedence over considerations that the acts may. 
one day, lead to an indictment being issued by an international criminal court located in 
some distant country which has minimal capacity to obtain the custody of suspects. 
Similarly, Chuter notes, "the best way to ensure control over territory is to persuade 
representatives of other groups to leave it, and the best way to do that is to kill a few of 
them and threaten the rest with similar treatment unless they leave. "79 Chuter continues 
"atrocities are a good way of intimidating and disciplining populations when your forces 
are too weak to expel them.... Though brutal, these tactics are hi no ineans sense'le'ss. " 
80 
Finally, `pro-prosecution' advocates who argue that international criminal prosecutions 
actively contribute to reconciliation within communities have produced little in the way 
of solid empirical evidence to support the contention. Despite Lloyd Axworthy warning, 
that "Without firm action on war crimes, reconciliation is doomed"81, the presumption 
that any action relating to atrocity crimes will necessarily enhance the prospects of 
reconciliation needs to be further explored and critically assessed. In post-war Germany, 
many Germans viewed the Nuremberg trials as an "injustice"82 as highlighted by a 
confidential State Department Memo which noted "The Germans have not accepted the 
underlying principle of the trials and do not believe in the guilt of those who have been 
convicted. " Indeed, it is questionable whether, particularly in the short term, the trials 
facilitated reconciliation between Germany and its former adversaries (Russia and the 
Allies). In the former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal's impact on fostering reconciliation 
78 Sec, Ian Bryan and Michael Salter 'War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence . -agencies: 
The Case for 
Assessing their Collaboration. ' Intelligence and National Securitl, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 2001) p. 
107. 
(emphasis added) 
79 Sec' CHUTER, WAR CRIMES, p. 11. 
80 See CHUTER, WAR CRIMES. p. 12. (emphasis added) 
$1 Sec Lloyd Axworthy quote in WILLIAMS AND SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUS rICE? p. 
222. 
82 Sec PETER H. MAGUIRE, L: \\W* AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY (Columbia Uni. Press) 2000, p. 
229. 
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between the States involved in the conflicts, and within the communities in the respective 
States, has also been limited. As the IWPR Special Report on The Hague Tribunal and 
Balkan Reconciliation stresses, "the violence is over but the Balkans remains very much 
divided, "83 a perspective reiterated by Branko Todorovic, the president of the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in the Republika Srpska; "What we have in Bosnia. 
unfortunately, is a continuing process of division and differentiation, instead of 
"84 reconciliation. 
In light of these considerations, the thesis submits that the ICC would be better advised to 
appeal to the pragmatic considerations of troop-contributing States as a mechanism to 
induce greater cooperation regarding arrests. Thus, an emphasis on the mutual interests 
in detaining PIFWCs may be viewed as the most prudent strategy for the ICC to pursue. 
83 Sec `The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation' Special Report, Tribunal Update, No. 462, Institute 
for War and Peace Reporting, July 21,2006. 
84 See Branko Todorovic quote in The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation' Special Report, 
Tribunal Update. No. 462, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 21.2006 
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